While boiling inside, everything is under control outside...

Alongside a significant compensation from Russia, the demand for the ousted dictator Bashar al-Assad on December 8 is a product of Ankara's wisdom towards Damascus: the day after a meeting held in Damascus by Mikhail Bogdanov, Putin's special envoy for the Middle East, the press secretary Peskov's statement, "We want to send a delegation," shows that Moscow is struggling to open dialogues. Yes, while the fate of the military intelligence station at Hmeymim, along with the Tartus and Latakia bases, hangs in the air, the sharp demands of Damascus' temporary administration were something Dmitri Peskov did not want to comment on, and how these demands will be minimized with concessions remains unknown.

After the demands for "compensation and handing over Assad," the claim that Ahmad ash-Shara would come to Ankara, conditioned on "if it fits President Erdoğan's schedule," clearly reveals Ankara's serious directions in the ongoing processes; that is, it's a very clear expression of the style, "at this moment, I determine everything." The main point of interest here is whether Moscow, claimed to still be closely involved with Ankara, will seek help from Ankara to maintain its bases on the Mediterranean coast and at Hmeymim with Damascus' new administration. The Kremlin knows well that in the current situation, the new administration in Syria will listen to no one but the Turkish head of state, yet I do not expect the Russian head of state to seek help from Turkey. Those who analyze the discussions and occasional disputes between Putin and Erdoğan regarding Syria's Idlib region from September 2018 to August 2023 should know well: the Russian head of state, who has repeatedly demanded his Turkish counterpart clear Idlib of jihadist groups, should now ostensibly ask for mediation from his Turkish counterpart to establish relations with those jihadists who now control Damascus. For this, any state would have to move far beyond the condition of "realpolitik," and doing so would compromise Russia's credibility with both Turkey and Syria's new government, starting at a disadvantage of at least 0-2 in any negotiations.

The power coalition, trying to convert the historic opportunity obtained in Syria into cash within domestic politics, continues its activities on several fronts with the same intensity. One of these is a process that started last October: while the back-and-forths to discuss ideas with the head of the terrorist organization, sentenced to life imprisonment, on Imrali Island continue, it seems unlikely that the demands of Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party who directs this process, will be fully accepted: leaked news claims that the head of the terrorist organization demanded the release of approximately 5,000 terrorists, the return of those in Europe, and the adoption of a general amnesty law. Therefore, even if Devlet Bahçeli alone were to respond positively (which I doubt), it is very difficult to expect that the government's major partner, the state agencies responsible for defense, security, and public order, and the society overall would appreciate this. According to claims, the head of the terrorist organization, imprisoned on Imrali Island in the Marmara Sea for 26 years, intended to make his petition during the Nowruz festival. Whether this will materialize will be known within at most a month. Reiterating the low probability of its realization, let's move on to the moves of President Erdoğan, which are at the top of the agenda 24 hours a day. Yes, you guessed right, it is about the verdicts awaited in court against Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul, along with new court and investigation processes. I attended the press conference he held at the municipality building on January 27 and analyzed İmamoğlu's counter-maneuver against Erdoğan's insinuation "The biggest turnip is in the sack," in the same style, namely the "Biggest turnip" counter-attack. Having directly observed some of the investigations and court processes against journalists, scholars, soldiers, and politicians before, I see that İmamoğlu deeply thought through this counter-attack tactic (the same person was used as an expert in reports prepared against the Istanbul Municipality and İmamoğlu, and in the investigation processes conducted). As a continuation of this, calling his supporters to protest in front of the courthouse indicates that İmamoğlu is as determined as Mr. Erdoğan. However, alongside all this, the main point that encourages İmamoğlu to be confident in these investigations and court processes is the Almighty Social Aids. I have written several times before: during the long reign of respected Erdoğan, Turkish politics underwent a 180-degree paradigm shift, building relationships with voters, party members, and supporters on the condition of "social aid." While social aids played a decisive role in the AK Party coming out on top in elections for years, in his first term as Istanbul's mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu also strengthened his dialogue network with citizens not on Atatürkism but on social aids. Before the municipal elections on March 31, 2024, which I closely observed several times, respected İmamoğlu consistently prioritized the "social aid" factor, gaining in return by leaving his opponent 10 points behind. Now, having made this his main defense argument, Mr. İmamoğlu does not tire of decorating Istanbul's streets with slogans "We increased social aids sixfold." During the press conference for Turkish and foreign media on January 27, he believed as much as his name that increasing social aids sixfold would not only be sufficient to bring people to the streets and squares, but also make them emerge stronger from these processes... Of course, being involved in political games, Ekrem İmamoğlu is also obliged to speak as a politician and interpret everything in his favor.

However...

It is precisely that assured populace and electorate that display the greatest ingratitude in political processes. One of the most instructive examples of this I saw was in March 1999, right there in the same hall of the Istanbul municipality: when respected Tayyip Erdoğan, who had been dismissed from office by the court, held a press conference there, his supporters not only filled the hall but couldn't even fit in the parks. "This song doesn't end here," he inspired hope in his supporters as he left the hall, and the next day Erdoğan toured Istanbul by bus to say goodbye, accompanied by his wife and singer friend Adnan Şenses...

I remember him putting the fish between bread in his native Kasımpaşa's diner just like today...