Artificial Intelligence and the New Concentration of Power: Could Musk and Altman Become the Rockefellers of the 21st Century?

Every technological era produces its own class of magnates. The 19th century belonged to railroad barons and steel kings. The 20th century became the age of oil empires, automobile giants and financial conglomerates. Today, at the beginning of the 21st century, humanity is entering a new phase — the age of artificial intelligence — which may prove to be the largest technological transformation since the Industrial Revolution.

The central question raised by The Economist is strikingly direct: can the leaders of the AI industry become as influential as John Rockefeller or Henry Ford?

At first glance, such a comparison may seem exaggerated. But on closer inspection, it appears increasingly logical. In some respects, the new technological elite may ultimately accumulate even greater power than their historical predecessors.

Today, the global architecture of artificial intelligence is concentrated around an extraordinarily narrow circle of individuals. These include Sam Altman, Elon Musk, Demis Hassabis, Dario Amodei and Mark Zuckerberg. These are the people defining the direction of technologies capable of reshaping labor markets, education systems, healthcare, financial markets and even the structure of state governance itself.

The historical parallel is obvious.

At the end of the 19th century, John Rockefeller, through Standard Oil, controlled up to 90 percent of U.S. oil refining. His influence extended far beyond energy: oil was the foundation of transportation, industry, military power and international trade. In practical terms, control over oil meant control over economic growth.

Henry Ford followed a different model. He did not monopolize the market entirely, but he created a new production system. Assembly-line manufacturing radically reduced the cost of automobiles, transformed labor structures and helped create the American middle class. His innovations shaped not only industry, but urban development, infrastructure, real estate markets and even culture itself.

This is precisely where The Economist sees the resemblance to the current AI revolution.

But there is one fundamental difference.

Ford controlled machines. Rockefeller controlled fuel. The new AI magnates are gaining control over what can be called the intellectual infrastructure of civilization.

This means control over:

information retrieval;

knowledge processing;

automation of cognitive labor;

scientific research;

medical diagnostics;

decision-making in business and government.

For the first time in history, an infrastructure is emerging that can compete with human intelligence across several critical domains.

The article places special emphasis on Elon Musk.

His position is unique not simply because of his wealth, but because of the structural integration of his assets.

Through Tesla, he controls transportation automation, robotics and energy systems. Through SpaceX, he controls satellite communications, logistics and space infrastructure. Through xAI, he is building his own generative AI platform. Through X, he has access to one of the world’s largest real-time data streams.

This combination creates a rare form of vertical integration.

If the future economy is imagined as a single digital ecosystem, Musk is building almost every layer of it: communications, transport, robotics, energy and intelligence.

This is why he is often compared not only to Ford, but also to Rockefeller at the same time.

Yet Sam Altman represents a different model of power.

If Musk is building the industrial architecture of AI, Altman controls the access point to it.

Through OpenAI and ChatGPT, he has created the dominant consumer interface for artificial intelligence. Millions of people use ChatGPT every day for work, education, analysis and content creation. This effectively turns OpenAI into a kind of operating system for intellectual labor.

Economically, this resembles the early Microsoft — but on a much broader scale.

The difference is critical: Microsoft automated computation. OpenAI is automating thought.

That represents a much deeper and more sensitive level of economic disruption.

Demis Hassabis is equally important. Through Google DeepMind, he controls some of the most fundamental scientific work in AI. DeepMind has already demonstrated its ability to transform biotechnology, medicine and scientific computation.

Dario Amodei, through Anthropic, has positioned himself around safe AI development while remaining one of the fastest-growing players in the sector.

Mark Zuckerberg follows his own logic. His strategy of open models through Meta differs from the closed ecosystems of competitors, but his core advantage lies in access to massive user-generated data.

Together, these actors are shaping a new market structure.

The Economist strongly implies that the AI industry increasingly resembles an oligopoly.

The reasons are clear.

First, the barrier to entry is extraordinarily high. Training cutting-edge models requires billions of dollars.

Second, access to computing power is severely limited.

The key GPUs are effectively produced by one company: NVIDIA.

Third, AI consumes enormous amounts of energy, making electricity a strategic factor in the new economy.

Fourth, models require constant access to data and user interaction streams.

The combination of these factors naturally drives concentration around a handful of global players.

Yet AI leaders have not fully reached the scale of historical industrial magnates.

The reason is simple: the economic transformation is still incomplete.

Yes, AI is already boosting productivity in programming, analytics, design and legal services. But it has not yet fundamentally restructured industrial production, transportation, agriculture or global logistics.

Ford transformed the physical economy.

AI, so far, is primarily transforming the digital one.

The real turning point will come when AI converges with robotics.

And this is precisely where Musk once again becomes central.

If autonomous vehicles, factories and logistics systems begin operating under AI control, the economic effect could surpass the Industrial Revolution itself.

But there is also a geopolitical layer.

Nearly all advanced AI development is concentrated in the United States.

This means not just concentration of business power, but concentration of global technological sovereignty.

America has already controlled oil, the dollar and the internet.

Now it is consolidating control over intelligence itself.

For China, Europe and other centers of power, this is becoming a matter of strategic security.

Perhaps this is the most important conclusion of the article.

What we are witnessing is not merely the birth of a new market.

We are witnessing the emergence of a new ruling class.

If oil was the defining resource of the 20th century, intelligence is becoming the defining resource of the 21st.

And those who control its infrastructure today may well become the new Rockefellers of history — or perhaps figures even greater than them.