This time patience and restraint ...

When the press secretary of the president said that they were not opposed to the normalization of relations with Armenia in principle, they were wary of the reaction of Baku. Although a more moderate statement from Azerbaijan removed the hesitation in Ankara to some extent, restraint was maintained. Considering it appropriate to study the views of NGOs on regional issues, the Office of Diplomacy has maintained its traditional tolerance, and NGOs continue to hold meetings to discuss the issue.

From the first day of the 44-day war, Turkey's position was "We are on the side of Azerbaijan both on the battlefield and behind the table", and after the war, this position was evolved without changing the content in the form of "Whatever Azerbaijan says, whatever action it takes, we accept." Therefore, Ankara is hesitant, and consultations with organizations of primary interest in Turkey without waiting for news from Baku are in order to be on the safe side. No matter how close the processes in the two months before and after the 44-day war brought the relationship, especially in the military sphere, it is observed that no decisive steps will be taken without consulting Baku and getting a clear answer. The main reason for this is the possibility of a possible policy change in Baku, regardless of its will.

Yes, at midnight on November 10, the fact that the Russian armed forces, under the label "Peacekeeping Forces", suddenly entered Azerbaijani territory and took control of about 4,000 square kilometers of territory, including the border checkpoint, forces Ankara to "blow on cold water". This should be met normally. Because the presence of a foreign military force in any country, not only in 4,000 or even 400 square kilometers of territory, is always a threat to that country and can lead to a sudden change in policy.

On the other hand, the coldness in relations between the two countries, which began with President Abdullah Gül's one-day visit to Yerevan on September 6, 2008, has intensified since February 2009 with Russian and Armenian disinformation and peaked on October 10 with the signing of the Zurich Protocols, and everyone from an Azerbaijani politician to a diplomat commented on the removal of flags from the Turkish martyrdom in Baku as they thought. Reacting harshly to the signing of the Zurich Protocols, Azerbaijan hosted discussions with the Armenian delegation in November-December 2009 in Istanbul and Ankara with the participation of Russian representatives through Turkey; however, the process ended when the Armenian Constitutional Court annulled the protocols on January 12, 2010.

On October 25, 2011, after SOCAR acquired a 51% stake in Petkim, Turkey's largest oil refinery, Azerbaijan invested $ 5 billion in Turkey and relations calmed down. Therefore, no matter how many olive branches Nikol Pashinyan extends, Ankara will maintain restraint this time; even the "Shusha Declaration" signed on June 15 will not be enough to easily shake Ankara's restraint. Because the most important factors that Ankara fears are the return of the Russian army to control the Azerbaijani-Armenian border (especially the plan to open a new border checkpoint from Azerbaijani lands to Armenia and not controlled by Baku), patronage of separatists, and an increase in comprehensive support for Armenia.

Imagine for a moment that Turkish-Armenian relations have begun to normalize, and on the one hand, Russia has not only put its own power in Nagorno-Karabakh but also supports the Armenian separatists there; on the other hand, it is strengthening Armenia and ignoring Baku's protests. In this case, will Turkey, which has taken certain steps to "normalize" relations with Armenia, stop the process, reverse it, close the border again? Can you say what it will do?

Wouldn't the most logical option for Ankara, which has considered all this in detail, be to take a cautious step after sensitively analyzing the responses from Baku?

While the "Russian army" factor in Syria poses the most serious threat to Turkey's presence there, do you think that the presence of the same country's army in Azerbaijan facilitates Turkey's work?

If so, you are no different from journalists who calculate the day when the Russian army will leave Azerbaijan.

Mayis Alizade