Pashinyan Accelerates the Peace Process and Begins a Political Purge

Against the backdrop of a rapidly shifting political landscape in the South Caucasus, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan appears to be launching two interconnected processes at once: accelerating the peace settlement with Azerbaijan and intensifying an internal campaign against his main political opponents.

On June 14, a working meeting took place in the Armenian town of Dilijan between Azerbaijani presidential aide Hikmet Hajiyev and Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan. The significance of the meeting extends far beyond its official wording.

According to the Armenian side, the parties discussed issues related to the peace agenda between Armenia and Azerbaijan, emphasized the importance of maintaining direct bilateral dialogue, and confirmed that the next meeting would take place in Azerbaijan. Baku released a statement of almost identical substance. Formally, there was nothing sensational in these statements. But in politics, it is often not only the content of negotiations that matters, but also their symbolism.

Hikmet Hajiyev became the first high-ranking Azerbaijani official to visit Armenia after the parliamentary election victory of Pashinyan’s party. The move appears to be a clear signal: both Baku and Yerevan are interested in accelerating the conclusion of a final peace agreement. Behind the diplomatic language, however, more concrete issues were likely on the table.

According to Turan analysts, one of the key topics may have been the timing of a constitutional referendum in Armenia. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly stated that Armenia’s current Constitution, which Baku considers to contain territorial claims against Azerbaijan, remains the last major obstacle to signing a peace treaty.

A second sensitive issue was likely the implementation of the TRIPP transport project — a strategic corridor intended to connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. Pashinyan has repeatedly stressed that Yerevan intends to move forward with this project and will not allow internal or external actors to block it. This is where external diplomacy begins to intersect with the internal struggle for power.

The main opponents of both constitutional changes and transport normalization have been the pro-Russian opposition forces. Their defeat in the recent elections has significantly weakened their position, but it has not eliminated them as a threat to Pashinyan.

The prime minister himself has increasingly adopted a harsher tone. He openly refers to his opponents as a “three-headed mafia” and accuses them not only of corruption but also of undermining state sovereignty.

According to Armenian sources, immediately after the elections several key opposition figures attempted to leave the country: oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan, former Armenian president Robert Kocharyan, and Narek Karapetyan. All of them were detained at the airport.

Narek Karapetyan is considered one of the closest political allies of Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan, who is already under arrest. His “Strong Armenia” party has long been viewed as one of the channels for preserving Russian influence in Armenian politics.

On June 14, Pashinyan delivered an unprecedentedly harsh statement: “The people demand that the three-headed mafia be brought to its knees and destroyed, and this must inevitably happen.”

He also directly threatened former president Serzh Sargsyan, recalling that during the election campaign he had warned the opposition that they would soon be dreaming of escape, but that no such opportunity would be available. The legal outlook for these figures is growing increasingly grim.

Robert Kocharyan continues to face renewed scrutiny over the events of March 1, 2008, when protests against alleged election fraud were violently suppressed, resulting in multiple deaths. In addition, he still faces accusations related to the illegal accumulation of assets estimated at around 200 million dollars.

Gagik Tsarukyan may face charges of large-scale financial fraud, embezzlement, and the illegal appropriation of state property. His cement plant has already been placed under arrest.

Samvel Karapetyan is accused of the незаконной privatization of Electric Networks of Armenia, one of the country’s key strategic energy assets. But beneath these criminal cases lies a deeper political confrontation.

The Armenian authorities are increasingly linking opposition structures to Russian political and business circles, accusing them of preparing destabilization scenarios and attempting to overthrow Pashinyan’s government. According to local observers, these accusations may soon take on an official legal form. If that happens, the consequences will extend far beyond Armenia’s domestic politics.

For Moscow, it would mark yet another signal of its rapidly shrinking influence over Yerevan. For Pashinyan, it would provide an opportunity to dismantle the old pro-Russian architecture of Armenian power once and for all. And for the peace process with Azerbaijan, it could remove the most significant internal obstacle. But the cost of such acceleration may be high.

The faster Pashinyan moves toward peace with Baku, the deeper his confrontation with Moscow becomes. And the deeper that confrontation grows, the greater the likelihood that Armenian-Russian relations are entering their most turbulent phase in the entire post-Soviet era.