A new alliance after the war?

- Let the events develop themselves, and the sides wait for such advances in military clashes that will take the negotiation process out of the impasse,

- or, prepare a new format of negotiations, independent of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship institution (the OSCE Minsk Group includes Turkey, Belarus, Germany, Italy, Finland and Sweden, Azerbaijan and Armenia, co-chairs - Russia, France and the USA).

Which of these options will be chosen? Which countries can enter the new format of the negotiation process on the settlement of the Azerbaijani-Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

In the light of these questions, let us pay attention to the statement of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs. Welcoming relative stability along the Azerbaijani-Armenian border, the Troika urges the parties to prepare for serious substantive negotiations and "refrain from provocative statements and actions, including threats or perceived threats to civilians or critical infrastructure." It is not hard to guess what is meant by "critical infrastructure." Aesop's language of the co-chairs is also clear in terms of ostracism of “recent public statements criticizing the joint efforts of the co-chair countries and seeking to unilaterally establish new “conditions” or changes in the settlement format”. The Troika is obviously aware of the search for "new formats" and, referring to the authority of their countries and international organizations, calls for a "swift and honest resumption of negotiations without any conditions." It is noted that the basis of the mediation efforts are the provisions set out in their statement dated March 9, 2019. Is it necessary to understand that there is a renewed call to return to the Madrid principles, and that it is intended for the ears of only one side of the conflict? This would be a big advance in the policy of the co-chairmen's pharmaceutical prudence!

Meanwhile, in the context of the era of a pandemic, the world has almost completely lost interest in the newly extinguished conflict, shortsightedly relying on outdated methods of containing it. The word "almost" means that this position is not held by two regional players (Russia and Turkey), who are involved in difficult, sometimes startling joint alliances. They are striking because, contrary to the meaning of the term "alliance", the parties are more likely to be at enmity than cooperate. Syria and Libya would have been enough, but now there is an example of an open confrontation between Moscow and Ankara over the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, which we wrote about in the previous article.

On July 28, 20, according to the Kremlin press service, a telephone conversation between V. Putin and R.T.Erdogan took place on the initiative of the Turkish side. Details are not disclosed, however, it turns out that the talk was around the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and its consequences. The readiness to coordinate efforts to stabilize the region, expressed during the conversation, seems important. What can be hidden under the multilayered political procedure of "coordination of efforts"? Almost everything! Up to the division of spheres of authority and influence, as was done in Syria. It is no coincidence that, in the conclusion of the message of the Kremlin press service, it is indifferently noted, "some topical issues of the bilateral agenda were also touched upon."

Is it possible to say in a maximalist way that the parties are preparing to form a new 2 + 2 format to regulate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Russia + Armenia versus Turkey + Azerbaijan? Most likely, this is a trial balloon launched by Moscow and Ankara to probe world political opinion. In the current perspective, a number of problems and issues are being built up, the attitude to which Russia and Turkey can clarify the seriousness of the intentions of the parties.

Taking into account the recent agreement between Washington and Ankara to coordinate jointly their political initiatives on the Libyan problem it is necessary to track all the changes that may occur in the confrontation between the parties in Syria, and especially in Libya.

Second, the initiatives of Moscow and Ankara with respect to Iran, which, together with its temporary allies, is tightly involved in almost all of the above conflict situations, should be the object of close attention. It is obvious that much in a possible alliance on the South Caucasus depends on Tehran's position, which is capable of giving additional political weight to one side or the other.

Third, the time factor should be taken into account, since Washington's current apparent detachment from the processes taking place in the region (or part of it) of the South Caucasus may end immediately after the presidential elections in the United States, and possibly even earlier if Russia and Turkey resort to emergency measures. Naturally, this also applies to the EU, whose eastern policy has so far led to the emergence of new hotbeds of conflict, in which the European Union is almost automatically involved.

Fourthly, it is necessary to find out the current and perspective attitude towards a possible alliance of its “junior partners”: Azerbaijan and Armenia. Indeed, in essence, the possible model of the alliance is about the transition (more precisely, the transfer) of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the global to the regional level. With all the ensuing consequences for its resolution. However, is not it déjà vu?! Did not the region already experience a similar collision in the 20s of the last century?! It was resolved, as I remember, by the procedures from which everyone suffered a little more than half a century later.

That is why the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia R. Safrastyan considers the issue of Yerevan's strategic allies extremely important. According to him, the analysis of the situation and parallels with the period of the First Republic in 1918-1920 lead to the conclusion that Armenia then lost because it could not resolve the issue of geopolitical allies. The first republic then found itself alone.

“This has become an important lesson for our statehood, and now we have a geopolitical, strategic ally - this is Russia. And now we must be able to take maximum advantage of this circumstance."  This statement of the orientalist should be borne in mind.

Maybe the alliance does not intend to implement such far-reaching plans, but pursues completely different goals? Targets that fit well with reports of upcoming large-scale joint tactical and flight-tactical live-fire exercises (Azerbaijan and Turkey). Or, the beginning of bilateral battalion tactical maneuvers of 5,000 service members of the Southern Military District of the Russian Federation simultaneously on the territory of five regions of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia (Dagestan, North Ossetia, Chechnya, military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia) in preparation for the strategic command-staff exercise "Caucasus -2020 ". In both cases, the scale of the territories covered by the exercises and the military equipment involved draws attention.

Kiev managed to declare that Ukraine, realizing the vector of the direction of the Russian exercises, intends to organize its own command-staff exercises "United Efforts 2020", in which it is planned to involve NATO countries.

Let us come back to the topic stated in the article. It is difficult to imagine the conditions under which Armenia would agree to participate in the discussed alliance. Still, now Yerevan insists on the exclusion of Turkey from the membership of the Minsk Group, justifying its position by Ankara's "unilateral" support of only one of the parties to the conflict. “Turkey, with its statements and provocative behavior, causes serious damage to the peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict and poses a threat to the security of Armenia. Turkey cannot be involved in any international processes related to the settlement of the conflict, and, first of all, within the framework of the OSCE,” the Armenian Foreign Ministry said.

According to the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Armenia, Ankara's statements in support of Azerbaijan, among other things, contain open claims against the South Caucasus region, which are justified by reference to Turkey's "historical mission".

It turns out that Armenia's position is categorically negative about any participation of Turkey in the resolution of the conflict. Let us not rush, knowing the extent of Moscow's influence on Yerevan and its role in maintaining the security of Armenia. In this case, one should carefully observe the metamorphosis of the mood of Yerevan, which once almost led to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Ankara.

The processes of total cleansing in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan are no less interesting. Something similar to Stalin's actions against the top of the Red Army on the eve of the war ...

However, something else is interesting now: why are Russian military units stationed in Armenia not participating in the declared format of the Kavkaz-2020 strategic command-staff exercise? Is this a mistake that will be corrected in September? Or,…

Let us also pay attention to the assessments according to which the forthcoming joint exercises in the territory of Azerbaijan are regarded in Armenia as "a propaganda step, which is nothing new in military terms." Is not the “calmness” of Yerevan surprising ?!

Well, let us wait for the second wave of pandemic-era politics.