Chronicle and anatomy of the Azerbaijani "FETO"

Talking about officials hindering reforms in the country, many people think that the talk is about a couple of dozen or a hundred offended people who will unlikely do anything against the will of the president. For me, a person who knows this power from the inside, everything is completely wrong. I don’t think - I just know that the so-called the “old guard”, opposing reforms, is a “state in a state”, this force is not only capable, but it has really repeatedly challenged the president, state interests during the reign of Heydar Aliyev and now, when the country is ruled by Ilham Aliyev. Its strength and influence can be compared with the notorious FETO in neighboring fraternal Turkey. There, too, many at first considered the danger of this organization to be exaggerated, until there was an attempt at a coup d'etat, the blood of hundreds of civilians was spilled. Until now, the purge of Turkish government bodies from the members of this organization continues and there is no end to this process - it has so deeply spread its roots in all state and public institutions. The Azerbaijan FETO, in my opinion, is even more dangerous than its Turkish “colleague”. There FETO penetrated into government bodies from below, over the years and was just getting close to high government posts. Unlike the Turkish counterpart, in Azerbaijan this informal but very close-knit and tightly controlled network actually became the head of the presidential administration, some of its departments, many ministries, especially the law enforcement bloc, had a large “faction” in parliament, run most of the media, and virtually controlled the local executive branch. It would be easier to list the few state bodies that were not controlled by the "old guard" led by the heads of the presidential administration R. Mehdiyev than the organizations that were under his control.

Before characterizing this cancerous tumor in the government, I would like to describe an episode that happened before my eyes so that readers see that the talk is not just about inferences and political science theories, but about real and very tough political reality.

Not so long ago, before the start of cleaning in government bodies, President Ilham Aliyev said in his television speech that the information that officials provide from the regions does not reflect reality, that when traveling to the regions, he sees a completely different picture. I noticed that many questioned the president’s words. Is it possible to deceive the president like that?

Autumn 1998, presidential elections begin in the country, candidates began to travel to the regions. In the president’s office, there is an election meeting and Heydar Aliyev asks, “this morning, opposition candidate E. Mammadov launched a campaign in Ganja, what happened there, what information is coming in?” The chief of staff R. Mehdiyev reports that in Ganja E. Mammadov was disgraced, the people of Ganja did not accept him, the meeting failed, and all people support the president, so there’s no need for him to worry. Several officials close to R. Mehdiyev support what was said. The president is satisfied and moves on to other issues. In the evening, E. Mammadov goes live on AzTV, according to the time allotted to him by the CEC and starts by asking him to show a cassette with his meeting with voters in Ganja, and then he will continue his speech. A recording is shown to the whole country - a full hall of the people, due to lack of seats, a large crowd in front of the building and some of the amplifiers were put on the windows so that those who did not fit in the hall could listen to the candidate on the street. E. Mammadov harshly criticizes the authorities; the people applaud and welcome him.

The next day, the president again gathers the same officials and asks the question: yesterday you said here that the people almost kicked E. Mammadov out of Ganja. However, in the evening I watched this video and this recording. There the situation is not at all, what you say. As another candidate, Nizami Suleymanov, he had to travel to the regions and campaign. R.Mehdiyev again gets up and reports: Yes, Mr. President, N. Suleymanov went to Gokchay, but the head of the executive branch reported to me that practically no one came to meet him.Who will come?, Who is Suleymanov? Everyone supports you. In the evening of the same day, it is N. Suleymanov’s turn to speak on AzTV and he uses the technique of E. Mammadov - he asks first to show a video of his meeting in the region ... And again - there are a lot of people, fiery speeches, criticism of power and applause ..

The next day, the president again gathers the same officials, no longer asks any questions, and says, addressing the head of the apparatus: it means that the heads of the executive branch are deceiving you, and you are deceiving me! After that, the president has decided to start his own trips to the regions of the country in order to personally listen to people and conduct his campaign.

These events are twenty years apart. In 2020, President Ilham Aliyev had to repeat what President Heydar Aliyev said in 1998.And,just like his father 20 years ago, he had to start trips to the regions, meet with people, go around the officials, directly contact the society. Many more analogies can be cited, showing that both President Heydar Aliyev and President Ilham Aliyev had to deal with the same scenario of opposition and of blocking their initiatives and decisions. Ilham Aliyev, before starting the purge of the top of the state apparatus, announced that campaigns of slander and defamation in the media are going on against the new personnel appointed by him from within the government. I could give more than one example when the same people, under Heydar Aliyev did the same, and the late president even had to convene the Security Council and punish a number of perpetrators of these dirty provocations against members of the president’s team and government officials who refused to swear allegiance tothe network of Azerbaijani FETO. There are many dozens, hundreds of such examples, and the center of this “policy” has always been the same person - the head of the presidential administration R. Mehdiyev. However, you need to understand that this is not about pathological love of lies or just slandering people they did not like. In this case, they are instruments of a policy that are quite insidious and aimed at a specific goal.

Azerbaijani FETO always needed a weak president, which is opposed by as many citizens of the country as possible. Then these officials, acting as the “savior of the president” from the people, from the opposition, from non-governmental organizations, can demand most of the “power pie”, more economic preferences. Around are enemies and they are the Praetorian guard of the leader, the only power on which his rule depends, and, due to this “great” contribution, they and their children and grandchildren should bathe in luxury due to the outright robbery of state funds and the robbery of ordinary citizens. They, by definition, do not need a president popular among the people, this is perceived by them as a great danger, because, not being able to build anything in state building, they simply can become unnecessary, redundant people. Therefore, provoking people's discontent and manipulating the bribed leaders of some opposition parties, for many years they exerted direct pressure on the state and the president. It is no coincidence that all major opposition rallies, as commissioned, took place precisely when the Azerbaijani FETO needed it. And it is no coincidence that after the removal of R. Mehdiyev and A.Hasanov from power, all of these very active, eager even for unauthorized rallies, clashes with the police, parties and leaders suddenly calmed down and do not show any rally activity.

Azerbaijani FETO began to take shape in the last years of the reign of Heydar Aliyev among a part of the state apparatus. Taking advantage of the illness and the long period of treatment of the president, it further strengthened noticeably, placing its people at the head and in the structures of almost all state and public institutions. After 2003, the Azerbaijani FETO gradually gained strength, placed its people at the head of many state institutions, law enforcement agencies and the parliament, took control of the public sector and media space, had influential external patrons, and came out with political ambitions. It began to impose on the president and the country something that in political science is called "reigns but does not rule", in other words, actual diarchy.

The objectionable government officials, who were not part of this structure, were subjected to massive information attacks in the media controlled by it, defamation, fabricated incriminating evidence and false denunciations, so that, having achieved their resignation, they would be replaced by people controlled by it. This affected to a greater extent both the law enforcement system, the local executive power, and parliament. Then, they managed to draw some of the opposition parties into the orbit of their network by bribing a number of party leaders. Then, there came a period of total purge of independent media and independent non-governmental organizations. These voids were filled by hundreds of decorative NGOs and the media controlled by the Azerbaijani FETO, which were more used to plunder the budget allocated by the state. At the same time, the Azerbaijani FETO has a clearly expressed foreign policy orientation and external support. The total defeat of all public organizations supporting the integration of Azerbaijan with the West and the public rewarding of Azerbaijani officials in the Kremlin with orders and medals of the Russian Federation is a clear example of this.

Even the development of fraternal relations with Turkey provoked their hatred and malicious reaction. When a strong earthquake occurred in Turkey in the mid-90s, with numerous casualties, an independent campaign began in the Azerbaijani independent media calling for assistance to our brothers. SOCAR vice president I. Aliyev and the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense were the first to respond to this campaign. When it was announced, suddenly the head of the presidential administration, R. Mehdiyev, phoned the MO and sharply rebuked the minister for supporting this initiative and forbade government agencies to participate in this campaign. Turkey is richer than Azerbaijan, why should we help it. Heydar Aliyev had to intervene and publicly reproach R. Mehdiyev - it is not about money, it is about relations between fraternal peoples and states, it is about helping and supporting the brothers in difficult times.

Within the framework of one article, it is impossible to list in full all the enormous damage to the state and national interests of the country, which for more than 20 years has caused this Azerbaijani FETO. To do this, you need a book, and maybe not one. The turning point in this confrontation came only in recent years, after the approval of the first Vice-President M. Aliyeva, as well as a change in the leadership of the presidential administration, the appointment of young people within the leadership of a number of ministries of the socio-economic bloc aimed at implementing serious reforms. However, one should not think that the removal of several major officials in Azerbaijan managed to solve this problem in one fell swoop.

Even under the pandemic crisis, an increase in the number of infected, dead, we see how the process of the emergence of new party centers, the formation of unexpected political blocs and alliances is proceeding in parallel. This is no coincidence: too large-scale reforms have been proposed to society, too serious personnel changes have occurred in the upper echelons of power, and too much damage has been dealt to the political and economic interests of seemingly “untouchable” figures, groups, clans. While they have lost power and privileges, they still have large financial, administrative (due to their numerous protégés remaining in the authorities) resources, have political support from outside circles interested in destabilizing and weakening Azerbaijan, as well as well-established mechanisms for using  a number of “opposition” parties and controlled media, i.e. they have political and media resources. In fact, the course proposed by the president and first vice president for large-scale, systemic reforms has become a fault line within the government, the opposition and society itself. It is based on this criterion (attitude to the proposed reforms) that the reformatting of the internal political field will take place, and we will see in the future the most unexpected and seemed impossible several years ago political alliances and associations. Extremes close, they say. And now, we see with what enthusiasm people who call themselves the most “principled”, “implacable” opposition begin to fraternize with the former “pillars” of the corrupt system of power that have lost their posts.

Since both of these counter processes are still in their initial stages (the old system is not yet completely broken, and the new one is still under construction), one can be sure that a fierce struggle around this process is yet to come. There is a well-known rule of political science - it is much more difficult for a reformer than for a revolutionary. Because the revolutionary is fighting only with power, and the reformer has to fight on two fronts - both with the opposition and part of his state apparatus, which is opposed to reform. Therefore, not all reformers succeed, but only those who decisively renew their team form an effective power tool, without which it is impossible to carry out large-scale reforms, which our country so needs. Underestimation of these dangers and risks can lead to the fact that these reforms can even be interrupted at the start with all the sad consequences for the state, for society and for ordinary citizens.