A forty-four-day war sums up the defeat of the Miatsum idea

The war was stopped on November 10, 2020, when a trilateral Azerbaijani-Armenian-Russian peace statement was signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Russian President Vladimir Putin.

and the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed  a trilateral Azerbaijani-Armenian-Russian peace declaration.

The statement provided for the introduction of Russian peacekeeping forces in Karabakh - on the territory where the Armenians remain, unblocking  transport communications. As a result of this war, seven occupied Azerbaijani regions located around the borders of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO) were liberated. The former borders of the NKAO  reduced by 1/3.

From a moral and psychological point of view, this was a serious blow to the idea of ​​the exclusivity of Armenia and the Armenian nation. Although it would be more correct to note that the lost war was just a summation of the long-term decomposition of the idea of ​​miatsum (reunification), which obviously led Armenia to a dead end.

This idea was openly launched  to the masses in 1987 and since that time an informational, legal war began at the state and public level, in 1991 developed into a sabotage war, and in 1992 into an open war against Azerbaijan. In this period of time, two goals were set: 1) the final and complete cleansing of Armenia from Azerbaijanis, the  impolementatio0n of this policy began  in the 19th century after the annexation of the Caucasus to the Russian Empire, and 2) the accession to Armenia of the NKAO, which was cleared of Azerbaijanis. By May 1992, both goals had been achieved.

The main idea of ​​the reunification policy was to expand the living space of Armenia. In Yerevan, it was believed that without the fertile Karabakh lands, it would be difficult for Armenia to ensure a self-sufficient existence. By 1994, the  goal of the first stage of the conflict - the creation of a mono-state and the seizure of Azerbaijani territories outside the NKAO, completed. Armenia, the  area  of which is 29,743 sq. km, managed to capture 7634 sq. km of territories outside the NKAO, the area of ​​which was 4400 sq. km. Thus, the common living space of the Armenians expanded to 41,777 sq. km. So, the set goal was achieved, and moreover, surpassed.

Subsequently, this success did not give any chance to soften the position of Armenia in the negotiations with Azerbaijan. But that’s not the problem. The idea of ​​expanding living space and resettlement of Armenians to the Armenian Republic from all over the world, paradoxically, failed. The reasons for Armenia's defeat in the 44-day war were associated with the initial reluctance of the Armenian community to exchange a comfortable existence for sacrifice for the sake of raising the homeland. The idea of ​​miatsum was devalued very quickly under the blows of permanent socio-economic crises, property stratification, depressing corruption, loss of love and empathy in the Armenian society, which was the basis for the unity of the nation. The loss of ideological guidelines marked the beginning of the exodus of Armenians from the region. Most of the 400,000 Armenians who left Azerbaijan because of the conflict moved to other countries. The population of Armenia decreased from 3.5 million in 1988 to 1.5 million in 2019, or 57%. At the beginning of 1988, 135 thousand Armenians lived in the former NKAO, and on the eve of the second Karabakh war 50 thousand, that is, the population decreased by 62%. For the most part, the Karabakh Armenians preferred Russia. The proportions of emigration are close.

The main reason for the defeat of Armenia in the 44-day war must be sought in the defeat of ideas and motivation. And sober Armenian politicians and public figures admit this. The question is not only that Azerbaijan was preparing for a war for the liberation of its territories and did a tremendous job, politically, militarily and ideologically. The second Karabakh war, in contrast to the first, showed the unwillingness of the most of the population of Armenia and the Armenians of NK to fight the Azerbaijanis precisely because of the lack of an idea.

A stable trend of demographic decline and economic decline with further confrontation with Azerbaijan, and this: delaying the issue of signing a peace agreement on the recognition of each other's state borders, opening transport communications, continuing the struggle for the independence of NK, will increase the exsanguination of Armenia. The Noravank Armenian Foundation names four factors of emigration: economic, transport, political and psychological. In the article "External migration in Armenia: trends, directions, numbers" Hrant Mikaelyan points out the irreversibility of the population's exodus in the context of all four crisis factors. If we add to this defeat in the war, then we can predict the acceleration of this trend. Post-war statistics show a noticeable increase in emigration, which is natural in conditions not so much of a military defeat, but of the devaluation of the idea of ​​expanding living space. On July 27, 2021, the website eadaily.com published an article “The emigration of Armenian citizens to Russia has increased dramatically,” this is confirmed by other sources, including Armenian political figures. Behind the concept of emigration, which has acquired a mass character, there are serious challenges for the Armenian society, among which the primary causes are the refusal of confrontation with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Although the war in the literal sense of this is over, the behind-the-scenes confrontation continues, where there is a tendency to further weaken Armenia as a state and, on the contrary, strengthen and develop the results of Azerbaijan's victory.

Thorny road to peace

The co-chairing countries of the OSCE Minsk Group on the settlement of the conflict are trying by various means of influence to speed up the process of starting direct negotiations between the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The process never begins due to the conflicting positions of the parties to the conflict. Armenia prioritizes the status of NK, or rather the granting of independence, while Azerbaijan insists on signing a peace agreement, stating that there is no more status issue for the victorious country. In any case, the parties adhere to this position. As for the co-chairs, the United States is most actively inviting Azerbaijan to discuss the status. Ambassador of this country to Armenia Lynn Tracy regularly repeats the need to start negotiations around the status. “We do not consider the issue of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh solved, and we believe that in order to resolve the problems between the two countries there is a need for a comprehensive settlement,” Lynn Tracy said on September 15 this year. In the US, congressmen are putting forward initiatives to punish Azerbaijan for human rights violations. On September 23, congressmen adopted a bill limiting military aid to Azerbaijan. All of this occurs in the context of the requirements for the initiation of status negotiations, which may precede a peace agreement.

Aliyev, as before, remains adamant in his position. In an interview with the Russian magazine National Defense on September 23, Aliyev said that Armenia’s demand for the status of Karabakh is futile. "Unfortunately, the issue of the status of Karabakh is still being raised, which is completely unpromising. I think it is harmful and dangerous for Armenia in its current deplorable state. They should not forget the lessons of the Second Karabakh war," Aliyev said.

Russia is not so much categorical as the United States and is more inclined to the need to start the process of delimitation and demarcation, that is, prioritizes the recognition of borders. The official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, spoke at a briefing on September 16, during which she stated that Russia expects from Azerbaijan and Armenia a response to proposals on the delimitation of the border with its subsequent demarcation throughout.

It seems that due to the collision of these two positions - status and delimitation not only at the level of Yerevan and Baku, but also at the level of mediators,  no one can achieve any results within the framework of the Minsk Group and the Azerbaijani-Armenian-Russian Working Group, created on the basis of the Statement of November 10, 2020.

Parallel consultations, no less important, are going along the Ankara-Yerevan line, to which Russia is devoted. Turkish President Erdogan said he would discuss the course of such consultations with Putin during his visit to Sochi on September 29. Turkey adheres to the line of cooperation with Russia in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict and demonstrates reluctance to carry out some separate actions that could upset the balance in the Russian-Turkish tandem. Hence Erdogan's open reaction to Pashinyan's confidential proposal for peace talks, transmitted through Georgia.

Outcome and perspective

The 44-day war marked the devaluation and defeat of the Armenian idea of ​​reunification, which became the main cause of the problem of stability and development of the South Caucasus in the conditions of independence after the collapse of the USSR. The  positive side, the devaluation of the idea of ​​expanding living space, opens the way for multilateral regional cooperation, which, unfortunately, will begin more than 30 years after the region was bleeding. Actions to resolve the Armenian-Azerbaijani crisis, as we can see, will take place in two dimensions - delimitation and status: 1) Delimitation negotiations on a large peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia and in parallel between Armenia and Turkey will develop under the patronage of Russia. 2) Status negotiations will continue to develop within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, where, as we see, the United States and France will set the tone. Ultimately, we may witness a package solution to the crisis, including issues of delimitation-demarcation and status. In fact, the region will return to the status quo of 1987, but with much greater losses for Armenia and gains for Azerbaijan.