A map in the journey from nationalism to radical Islam

The visit to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus after Diyarbakir was a sharp turn from a loyal approach in the political line to a nationalist-conservative line. We have been writing since January: while trying to dissolve the radical wing of conservative politics in the AKP through Oğuzhan Asiltürk by completely neutralizing it, Asiltürk’s participation in the delegation to Northern Cyprus reveals the intention completely clearly. Thus, it is wanted that Turkey's Cyprus policy be made a very serious political factor in domestic politics as well: the MHP's man on the island (Deputy Prime Minister Arıklı) is calling for a renaming of the state (Turkish State of Northern Cyprus). Political Islam, which has described the deployment of troops in Cyprus as the latest "conquest" since 1974, pretends for its supporters that there are "unity and equality" in Turkey through 87-year-old Asiltürk (who was the Minister of Internal Affairs of the coalition government that decided on the military operation in 1974).

Another interesting aspect of political Islam was the statement made by the AKP leader and the head of state in the Turkish region of Nicosia about a radical Islamist group preparing to seize power in Afghanistan: "Turkey is not in a position contrary to the Taliban's beliefs. I believe we can understand each other better." From these words can be derived meanings that serve approximately the same purpose for both foreign and domestic policy: when interpreted for domestic policy, the Turkish president's words aim to consolidate the conservative class on the widest possible basis, including radical Islamist groups; when interpreted for foreign policy, these words are addressed not only to the Taliban but also to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates: that is, there can be no compelling reason not to reach an agreement with the Taliban as a person claiming to be the leader of Sunni Islam. Part of this message goes to the United States and NATO so that they do not disrupt Turkey's initiative to secure Kabul airport and leave the Taliban issue to Ankara.

While the Turkish President's statement about the Taliban provoked a negative reaction from the pro-secular opposition, a spokesman for the Taliban leadership took the case further and set conditions for Ankara: In an interview with TRT Arabia, Zabihullah Mujahid said that they want to have good relations with Turkey but it is unknown whether Ankara will accept his terms. Drawing attention to the fact that the solution to the Afghan problem depends on the radical implementation of the rules of Islam, Mujahid called on Turkey to follow this path: “We want Turkey to put its past aside and look at the present and the future. Then we can wish for dialogue." In other words, the Taliban’s spokesman says that if Turkey abandons its secular system and looks to the future through the same window as they do, they can talk. Does this proposal push the AKP government into a corner or strengthen its hand? This will be shown by the processes that will take place in the near future (it should not be forgotten that dialogues are continuing in Qatar to establish a radical Islamist regime in Afghanistan). Turkey wants to step forward and organize a peace conference in Istanbul to solve the Afghan problem (I remember very well the "Friends of Syria" conference in April 2012 organized by 100 countries supporting the dismemberment of Syria). Although the Taliban have acknowledged this, they see outside interference in many other issues, including security at Kabul airport, as "interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs." Also, since the beginning. In this case, aren't Turkey's hopes of being in Afghanistan exhausted before raising? If the Taliban wants a religious regime for cooperation, how will Ankara make it real? Assuming a transition to a religious regime, under what conditions will the Taliban give up its position if it inhales "foreign intervention"?

The current picture allows us to predict the current situation as follows: the ruling party will intensify radical Islamist and caliphate rhetoric in the run-up to the next election, and while doing it, it will not give up its efforts to establish relations with the regime in Afghanistan. Nothing will be avoided in order to sharpen the mood of the Islamist class and turn it into a dividend in the ballot box. Because at a time when economic indicators are not encouraging, ideological propaganda is inevitable. What does the nationalist party of Turkey (MHP), which unconditionally supports the government, say about the escalating Islamization? You ask that, don't you? It will not say anything, the major ally has long been convinced of this.

Well, if there is an attempt to give up the secular state, what will the minor ally say?

I guess the nationalist party of Turkey will not oppose it either.

Turkey's biggest problem will happen at this point.

On the one side, the main opposition leader appeals to the world's major powers: "We are coming to power, do not be afraid of Turkey."

On the other side, Adalat Valiyev organizes the provision of health services to Mirmahmud and his companions.

I wonder what was the location of Afghanistan on the map?

Mayis Alizade