Let it blazing away. Changes in the Russian policy on the post-Soviet expanse

Without a whimper, Russia has adapted its foreign policy on the post-Soviet expanse. Great dreams of «Eurasian Union», «zone of preferential interests», «Russian world», regional domination, protection of buffer space against «NATO tanks and missiles», about exceptional role of «security provider, guarantor of sovereignty and freedom of civilization option» of post-Soviet states against external interference, etc. disappeared from Kremlin’s agenda.

Of interest is the fact that Russian politicians are guided by realistic narratives. There is awareness that Russia’s domination on the post-Soviet expanse is not bad; however, materialization of the project is too great, and it might be implemented in reality under the most desperate scenarios where existential interests of the state prevailed. In most cases, especially when there are no common borders with Russia, post-Soviet dominationis luxuriousness, not means of transport toward national development purposes. Moscow «holds what we need and not», says Fedor Lukyanov. In many respects, all these are motivated by rethinking of the results of Russian actions in Ukraine, Georgia and Syria.

Three frames of strategic restraint

The essence of the new Russian approach to post-Soviet affairs lies in three frames being applied in terms of crisis situations in the region: Why? What’s in it for me? How to avoid shit-house? (taken from Barrack Obama’s foreign policy doctrine «Don’t Do Stupid Shit»).

The above is implied as follows:

• Do nothing but absolute minimum arising from contractual obligations ⁠minimize RF expenditures ⁠to settle crisis situations and «render fraternal assistance», keep costs down ⁠«burden of post-Soviet leadership».
• Promote the Russian aid ⁠make specific steps of recipients to subdue own sovereignty to geopolitical purposes of Moscow ⁠Avoid rendering unrelated aid «in return for kisses». If unprepared to adopt Russian conditions, it is essential to agree with low maintenance relationship; get rid of high maintenance girl friends and even agitated allies.
• Reassess Russian allied obligations after their careful audit, correct and specify formats of Russia’s participation therein.
• Shun actions capable of destabilizing internal political situation in Russia, including excessive involvement in domestic crises of neighbors or mechanical expansion of current integration associations.
• Avoid manipulating RF foreign policy with «fraternal Republics» and their «Russian diasporas» in own interests not always aligning with Russian interests.
• Refrain from taking upon new sanctions of the West for the sake of post-Soviet «clients of the Russian Federation.
• Hold back actions closing windows of opportunity for Russia to maneuver or retreat without losing public face and making the situation «stupidshit».
• Keep away from fighting a losing battle, internal destabilization of post-Soviet Republics, develop tolerance to a certain level of regional instability and decline from fighting with «color revolutions».
• Understand its restricted capacities and resources, their insufficiency to have a decisive influence on crises in the region except for situations directly threatening RF’ security.
• Tacitly accept «restricted interests» of other regional actors on the post-Soviet expanse and look for common modus vivendi without fetishizing «Russian domination».
• Acknowledge that Russia’s advancement as a great power in other regions of the globe (Near East, North Africa and Eastern Mediterranean) gives impetus to RF dependence upon other regional powers curtailing its freedom of actions on the pst-Soviet expanse.
• Realize all risks and complexities of direct military confrontation with «rising regional powers» as distinct from imitative «manageable escalation» with the United States, NATO and EU where no military force is possible in principle.
• «Have no issue» with the above even despite the fact that the world mass media is full of headlines reporting on sinking influence of Russia in its own region.

It must be acknowledged that the concept of «strategic restraint of Russia on the post-Soviet expense» is clearly apparent in Vladimir Putin’s last statement at the Valdai club whistled in the dark in the course of fierce debates over acute crises in the near abroad.

It was time coincidence of instability in Belarus and Kirghizia, as well as relapse of full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh proved to be an effective stress-test for the new Russian strategy. The country is still going strong.

Belarus

In Belarus Moscow is demonstrating self-restraint and a freedom of maneuver. It was believed recently that the threat of regime change due to the color revolution in a country subject to duties with the Russian Federation and physically separating Russia from the NATO would cause Moscow’s military intervention to suppress protests or give rise to hybrid wars for the establishment of puppet buffer states by analogy to the DPR/LPR. However, the Ukrainian scenario never occurred again.

It should be added that Moscow closely watched the election campaign in Belarus being quite aware of how it could end. The only question was whether Lukashenko would lose power at once under street pressure or he would «structirize the process» thus enabling Moscow to enter the Belarus Policy expanse.

As a result, «low key response» has been selected»: to signal Lukashenko about determination to interfere «in case of mass disturbances» (not desire in the remotest in the full knowledge that direct intervention implies consolidated protest on anti-Russian basis), block West’s mediation role (by Victoria Nuland’s testaments in Kiev: «… and, you know, fuck the EU!») and recommend protesters «to inquire Lukashenko about constitutional reform».

It has to be kept in mind that no dialogue with Tihanovskaya and her retinue was attainable for Moscow, especially in terms of her public stand in favor of Belarus’ secession from the Common State and the CSTO and in view of the fact that the opposition does not control protesters, so no arrangements with it will be implemented. Note that Moscow regarded Victor Babariko as «Belarusian Yushenko» who pushed forward an idea of «Belarus’ neutrality and refusal from any treaties with the Russian Federation. However, later on members of the Coordination Council of the opposition suddenly «found» themselves at «Kofemania», Lubyanka.

It ought to be noted that Russia managed to avoid dead-end steps pregnant with new western sanctions. Refusal from excessive involvement in Belarus developments made it possible to avoid destabilization in Russia itself. Finally, it was a restrained reaction to the Belarus crisis that allowed Moscow to be comfortable with a Common State draft. Is it so advantageous for Russia and isn’t it too risky for Russian statehood? In other words, all advances of the Common State are attainable within the framework e of the Eurasian Economic Union.

Karabakh

As for Karabakh, Moscow has not come down on either side of conflict participants even despite mass media and TV-fuelled propaganda. Some propagandists put forward reckless plans of deployment of Russian landing force in Karabakh together with ultimatum to Georgia to let Russian troops and military cargo via its territory. Some politicians are making loose talks to announce air-exclusion zone above Karabakh. For this to happen, it’d be necessary to suppress anti-aircraft defense and air forces of Azerbaijan and Georgia.

It’d be appropriate to notice that at present the Russian army is poised to project forces in areas without common land border or short sea-lines. This is explained by the fact that decisions have earlier been made to spend money for flying nuclear reactors, not on tanker-cargo-aircrafts or airborne early warnings and heavy combat drones of all types.

Also, Moscow sends out message that the conflict around Nagorno Karabakh is not directly relevant to Russia, nor affects its national interests. Asked by Oleg Kashin: «Pourquoi mourir pour Stepanakert?», Vladimir Putin satisfied the question as saying: «Onn’en a pas besoin», combat operations are not conducted on the Armenian territory». In spite of the fact that allied commitments by the CSTO in respect of Armenia are not questioned, In reality Moscow is revising the effectiveness of the alliance which is preferential rather for Armenia, not for Russia.

Note that the Russian Council for International Affairs published calls «on Armenia’s membership in the CSTO. The point is that a membership of the country as a party to the conflict is likely to bring discredit to the organization».

It must be acknowledged that a military base in Gyumri seems to be a hostage and tripwire for Russia to get involved in the war on the side of Armenia but not an instrument of force projection in the region. Granting this, installation of a Russian observation post along the offensive of the Azerbaijani army toward Lachin in an attempt to avoid cutting off Karabakh resupply – this is maximum the base can do. If it is confirmed, we can deploy the latest РЭБ «Красуха» to make things hard for Turkish and Israeli remote piloted vehicles in Karabakh.

It should be remembered that relations with Azerbaijan are of independent value for Moscow and not considered through prism of Armenian interests. The value is not accounted for by the fact that Azerbaijan remains faithful  to a canonic version of the Second World War or «Irony of аate or enjoy your steam» feature film televised in Baku on the eve of the New year but by the fact that the two countries have a common border in Dagestan and the Caspian. Tranquility on this border and close cooperation between the two countries (to avoid 1990-earlier 2000 reoccurrence) are no less important than allied obligations with Armenia.

It is no mere coincidence that Baku having sidelined Geneva has become a comfortable area for the most delicate talks between the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States of America, as well as the NATO Supreme Allied Commander. It is not surprising that Putin addressed the Valdai Club session as saying that Azerbaijan and Armenia are equal partners for us, to say nothing of various diasporas inside Russia that demonstrated «a July war in Karabakh» in the streets of Moscow.

It should be realized that Russia is annoyed with attempts of the two parties to manipulate their positions for their own benefits. Azerbaijan is too straight-lined in availing  of the Russian counter-terroristic operations in Chechnya and Dagestan to secure against separatism. Note that absolutization of this stand undermines Russian arguments and instead strengthens arguments of Ukraine over Donbas and Crimea even despite the fact that Baku is not ready to discuss «a special status of Karabakh as a part of Azerbaijan» (which forms the core of the Russian stand on Donbas). Even worse, Aliyev’s demands to change a format of the Karabakh resolution through the involvement of Turkey are unacceptable from image standpoint. The point is that such a state of affairs openly emphasizes limitations of the Russia’s capacity in the process. On the other hand, Baku’s assurances (confirmed by Ankara) that the military operations will not spill over to the Armenian territory inspire Moscow confidence and eliminate escalation risks.

It should be remembered that Armenia’s previous leaders («Karabakh clan») excessively adopted Russian actions in the Crimea in 2014 as a carte blanche for gradual «reunification» through «self-determination of Karabakh people». Despite Sergey Lavrov’s statement that under the UN Charter «the right of nation to self-determination is central while the territorial integrity and sovereignty must be respected», Moscow is ready to apply this legal novation in respect of Crimea only (and also Abkhazia and South Ossetia) but not to Karabakh (and even Donbas).

Note that demands of Yerevan to force Baku hold direct talks on peace resolution with Stepanakert and its statements on impossibility of withdrawing troops from the security zone prior to the definition of final status of Karabakh are in keeping with the Russian stand on implementation of Minsk accords over Donbas (and even preceding them), Moscow’s views on the Karabakh settlement are excessive.

Finally, an irredentist rhetoric of Pashinyan and his team over the past two years, including his statement that «Karabakh is Armenia», territorial claims to Turkey under yet non-operational Sevres Treaty of 1920, statement of the Armenian Defense Minister that a concept «peace in exchange for land» will be replaced by a strategy «a new war for new territories», attempts to declare Madrid and Kazan principles of conflict settlement as «Munich Conspiracy», allegations of the lack of diplomatic resolution of the Karabakh issue – all these dissuade Kremlin from standing with Yerevan. Also, it was Pashinyan’s attempts to manipulate with the Russian political, line, including calls to draw Russian peacemakers in Karabakh, trigger the Collective Safety Treaty Organization» in Karabakh due to the Turkey’s engagement of hirelings from Syria that increasingly alienated the Armenian leader from Kremlin. The issue is not that Putin does not like «the maydan government of Armenia  and that he is not against its falling victim to «color revolution» through defeat in Karabakh but the issue is that Yerevan is eager to restrict independence of the Russian foreign policy.

Turkey

At last, Russia is manifesting restraint in reply to Turkey’s excessive activity in Azerbaijan’s war operation in Nagorno Karabakh. Note that this activity of Turkey (Israel included) has come as no surprise for the Russian intelligence service (the two countries have played a big role in the modernization of the Azerbaijani armed forces over the past 15 years and preparation for modern warfare with the use of remote piloted vehicles),

Moscow is unhappily surprised at Erdogan’s flash-like deployment of militants from Syria to South Caucasus that undermined main principles of the Syrian operation – to crush terrorists in the far reaches. Note that ChVK militants were shifted by Turks to Karabakh, not Jihadists..

It must be conceded that Moscow will never risk tussling with Turkey despite latter’s aspiration to infiltrate on the post-Soviet expanse, claims to take part in the Karabakh resolution even despite calls to apply force and «raise a new Khalkhin-Gol». The question is that Turkey and Russia are presently in symbiotic state where each party is in need of major foreign political purposes. Note that Moscow is thrilled with Erdogan’s opposing the West from value and geopolitical criteria which prescinds the West from opposing Russia and, when all is said and done, might lead to «the death of NATO brain».

What is important to notice is that the conflict between Erdogan and Macron dissuades the French President from turning off Vladimir Putin and, instead, raises importance of collaboration between Europe and Moscow in the Near East and the Mediterranean. Suffice it to go over yesterday’s visit of Lavrov to Greece. It is to be recalled that relations between the two countries were harmed due to the spying scandal; it is for this reason that Erdogan turned against» Greece. While at Valdai, Vladimir Putin gave a glowing account of Erdogan as a politician absolutely independent upon the West: he purchased С-400 and authorized to lay a gas pipeline.

It should be noted that in Syria Moscow is absolutely dependent on Turkey in the matter of combat service support via straits. From military point of view Turkey is in position to raise prices for the Russian operation as it happened in February this year. Of interest is the fact that Turkey is conducting itself on the post-Soviet expanse as Russia did in 2015 in Syria: it is rendering military aid to the legitimate government of the sovereign stsate in its struggle against separatists on its own territory. In so doing, it intrudes itself as a mediator and a political settlement guarantor without worrying too much about any disservice (here hence Erdogan’s calls to Putin «to deal everything as was the case with Syria»).

Granting this, there are two factors to hit  Russian-Turkish relations: expansion of military-technical cooperation between Ankara and Ukraine (production of remotely piloted vehicles, high precision weapons, lobbying Ukraine and Georgia membership in the NATO) and aggressive promotion of Pan-Turkism and political Islam inside Russia.

Allowing for the fact that the expansion of the Turkish presence in South Caucasus is fait accompli, Moscow is presently concerned about Erdogan’s non-crossing of red line as traced out by airstrikes in Idlib.

When adjusted for negative outlook of military situation for Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh armyа (no return of lost positions is possible and winter blockade of Karabakh in the long run), as well as Moscow’s unwillingness to get involved in the conflict, Russia and Turkey are sure to collaborate closely in preventing the humanitarian catastrophe in Karabakh, creating de-escalation zones and humanitarian corridors. So much for «a new Idlib», not «a new Khalkhin-Gol».