The main reason for Turkey's restrained approach to Russia's attack on Ukraine, compared to the United States, the European Union, Great Britain, and even Japan, is the need to be restrained and cautious. The first sign of this was given by the President of Turkey from the very beginning with the words "I can neither dispense with Ukraine nor with Russia", and this policy continues and will continue, despite some harsh statements made later. Given that relations with Ukraine have warmed in recent years, the reason why it is indispensable is not a secret to anyone: Turkey continued to recognize Ukraine's territorial integrity by rejecting Russia's occupation of Crimea in March 2014, and Bayraktar first obtained the consent of Petro Poroshenko in March 2019 to sell PUA. Now the volume of the agreement has grown by about 20 times, training centers have been opened in Ukraine, and Turkey is doing its best to support the development of Ukraine's naval industry, and so on. As for relations with Russia: Turkey (or rather, Mr. Erdoğan and Putin) has raised these relations to such a level in the last 18 years that there is no question of Ankara taking any drastic steps against Moscow. About seven years after the Russian president, who paid an official visit to Ankara in December 2004, opened the doors to developing trade and economic relations in all areas, did the construction of a nuclear power plant, allowed by a government decision without the consent of the Turkish parliament, in the town of Akkuyu in the Mediterranean province of Mersin was taken into account? Could the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, which is being built by Russia, be one of the reasons for Turkey's restraint and caution? If the realization of the trade turnover goal at the maximum level of $ 35 billion, despite being set by the leaders of the two countries at the level of $ 100 billion, has not Mr. Erdoğan or Mr. Putin given up on this goal, are there unquenchable hopes on the horizon that we do not know? The shooting down of a Russian plane that violated the Syrian-Turkish border for 8 seconds on November 24, 2015, caused a 7-month break in trade and tourism cooperation. If relations suddenly warmed up with Erdoğan’s letter to Putin on June 27, 2016, it is really difficult for Turkey to give up on Russia. On August 9, 2016, the two presidents met twice a day in St. Petersburg, and with the deactivation of Russian missiles defending Syrian airspace with S-400 missiles, Turkey was able to launch an operation on the other side of the border. In October, Fikri Işık, Minister of National Defense, said they could buy S-400 missiles from Russia, citing the fact that they were “completely defenseless against airstrikes”. Despite strong protests from the United States, Turkey did not back down. However, it is not known where the air defense complex brought to Turkey in June 2019 was built (pro-government journalist Adnan Müderrisoğlu claimed that it would be maintained in Nakhchivan). In return, the United States has refused to sell the Patriot system to Turkey, which has been an ally of NATO since 1952, as it has withdrawn Turkey from the Patriot program. Although President Erdoğan claimed that he would buy S-400 missiles again and Russia claimed that it would sell them again, no real steps have been taken yet. However, in all cases, the Russian president skillfully used the sale of S-400 missiles and managed to hit several birds with one stone. At the forefront of this is the fact that Russia has managed to create a rift between Turkey and the United States and, in some cases, NATO.
Along with all these factors, we can say that the Idlib issue is the main factor forcing Turkey to be cautious about Russia's attack on Ukraine. After Russia's occupation of part of Syria under the guise of "fighting terrorism" on September 30, 2015, jihadist terrorist groups in the country chose the town of Idlib as their home. Although Russia has repeatedly hinted that jihadist organizations could remain in Idlib under Turkish auspices, no results have been achieved, and a meeting between Putin and Erdoğan in Sochi in September 2018 gave Ankara 20 days to clear the Idlib region of jihadist groups. Serious disagreements between the two countries began when Turkey did not fulfill the commitment it made by “dodging the column”. As a result of Moscow's demands to clear 60,000 jihadist terrorist groups in Idlib, 54 Turkish servicemen were killed on February 27, 2020. The Turkish president's request to meet with the Russian president was not answered for several days, and on the eve of the meeting on March 6, they made the Turkish delegation wait in front of the door for at least 3 minutes. As a result of the agreement, Turkey's gain was a ceasefire; however, this did not mean that Russia's demand for Idlib was lifted. Although President Erdoğan was invited to Sochi again on September 29, 2021, to fulfill the same demand, Turkey did not back down from its position. Russia's military in Syria continues to warn Turkey by periodically bombing jihadist terrorist groups in Idlib. The main reason for Turkey's cautious attitude towards Russia in the war against Ukraine is the nightmare of Idlib. As long as that nightmare exists, Turkey will have to be careful in its relations with its northern neighbor.
In order to explain this necessitation in detail, we had to write this article a little longer.
Mayis Alizade
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