Not a chaotic but confusing scene

Even before the election, it was clear that the failure of the person, who was called "my friend Donald" by President Erdoğan, to be re-elected would have a negative impact on Ankara-Washington relations, at least in the first stage; therefore, as if the pro-media had the power to influence the US electorate, it overworked for Trump to be elected. When the intention was not realized, the lobbying activity was intensified so that the greetings on the phone could begin. However, the demands of the new US administration were very strong, and one of them was made clear through the Ambassador to Ankara without the need to use diplomatic language: “You must completely give up the S-400 S-400 air defense missiles you bought from Russia.”

During the Cold War, such harsh demands were made on the enemy, and in a new world without a system, it seems that there is no problem in speaking with the allies in the same style.

The fact that the demand was voiced not only from Washington but also from Ankara (through the Ambassador) did not create a dilemma for Ankara, and the issue of the S-400, which was declared from the highest veil until yesterday that “it will not be given up”, was given up, and this situation was reflected in political relations at that moment.

The European Union has postponed a new decision on sanctions against Turkey as Washington plans to work with Brussels in the new period. As the popular saying in Turkey, “caught between the devil and the deep blue sea”, this time Moscow immediately launched its own pressure mechanisms, Syria is still at the forefront of them, as it has been for 5 years.

While the Damascus regime has been held accountable for the bombing of the Turkish military and civilian facilities there, as usual, there were also reports that foreign jihadists were leaving the Idlib region, which Ankara strongly insisted on. Undoubtedly, there is a role of Russian pressure here, and Ankara, which has been tied to Moscow for nearly five years, has come under simultaneous pressure from the White House and the Kremlin. This was followed by the fact that Turkish-backed groups were forced to leave Libya, which could be a demand not only from Russia but also from the European Union.

We should not forget that Ankara's recent mild behavior also played a role in not adopting a new decision on sanctions against Turkey, which has had problems with Greece over the Eastern Mediterranean and then with France over Libya since last summer.

Along with the lobbying efforts to start relations with Washington in the new period, what does this softening policy promise for the near future? Will Ankara-Moscow cooperation resume a period of "cooling off" and warm relations with the European Union and the United States, or will Turkey continue its policy of playing chess with both sides, as in the recent past? If there is a telephone conversation between Ankara and Washington at the presidential level before the Climate Action Summit that will be held on April 22-23 via the Internet and the summit on April 22-23 is held under the mood that will or won’t be brought by this opening, how will Moscow react to this?

Washington's reaction to the recent radical steps in the economic and political spheres in Ankara was immediate: an indictment sent to the Constitutional Court (CC) by the Prosecutor General of the Supreme Court to close the Kurdish People's Democratic Party (returned by the CC due to shortcomings), cancellation of the mandate of a human rights activist from the same party (as the mandate of Huseyn Abdullayev, which passed to Fazail Aghamali), fluctuations in the market caused by the removal of the 4.5-month president of the Central Bank and the harsh response that NGOs have finally been able to show over the years, relentless demands for the immediate release of some individuals with specific names, etc.

This was seen as harsher than ever by both Washington and Brussels. What will Ankara do in the near future, and where will it start, so as not to damage its credibility in the domestic community while trying to turn at least part of the process in its favor?

Indeed, Turkey is going through a very difficult period in its history, and the main reason for this complexity is to advance relations with Russia in the field of the arms industry. What does Ankara think: doing a180 degree turn in these relations, sprinkling flour on the yarn as it has been for several years, or standing behind its relations with Moscow to the end?

April may be the starting month to clarify this. And for all parties. Let me not forget that this month also marks the beginning of a new phase of the Halkbank trial in New York. No one should be confused by the fact that the Halkbank process may be the most important issue for Ankara at the moment. Despite the fact that "my friend Donald" has prevented some things in previous trials within his authority, the fact that the Democrats are devoting time to this issue day and night adds to the concern in Ankara.

And Ankara is sending tactical messages to Washington in this regard.