Reality and myths that Armenia is faced with in 2021

Is it possible to insist that the defeat in the war proved to be the collapse of the Armenian model of development adopted and practically implemented in the years of independence? A positive answer is dependent upon the fact that for a long time this model was rather successful to promote an unprecedented consolidation of society as a national dream. The question arises: when this model began running out - after the removal of L. Ter-Petrosyan and the start of R. Kocharyan "from scratch" or the S. Sargsyan's rejection of the plan of gradual liberation of the occupied territories, or the victory of the N. Pashinyan’s velvet revolution? The paradoxical accuracy of the answer lies in the fact that the practiced Armenian model has awakened the half-asleep national self-consciousness of Azerbaijanis, eventually giving rise to an opposing and,yet, reflexive model of the development of the neighboring state. In fact, these two contradictory models do exist today through the use of the major political technology: a symmetric response to each challenge.

The above-mentioned applies to the entire space of confrontation, stretching from the past to the present and going into an uncertain future. "Uncertain", because the new Armenian model of development is beginning to take shape beneath our eyes which might appear to be the "blast from the past" or, otherwise, the breakthrough into a promising, but full of risks, future. Who and how is shaping this future, thereby preparing a new recipe for the correlation of reality and myths? It should be remembered that the arena of Armenia's political struggle in the post-election period shifted from the streets to the parliament. It is here that excessively heated debates on country’s perspectives take place which are immediately evaluated by mass media in the context of their political preferences. According to the law, the government, after being formed, has to submit within 20 days to the National Assembly for approval a program of its long-term activities (2021-2026). Note that this program has become a stumbling block between pro-government and opposition deputies.

"When developing the program, we did not put forward preconditions; on the contrary, we did everything to formulate steps required to form an appropriate conditions for talks evoiding any provisions in the program that could impede the negotiation process," Pashinyan would say unveiling the program consisting of 6 items (security and foreign policy, economy, infrastructure development, human capital development, law and justice, institutional development). It has to be kept in mind that the issues raised above have already caused a confrontation between the two standpoints on the future.

It has to be noted that the main theses of the speech, of course, caused criticism as well. Who is the "best national potential" that should be consolidated, most likely - the ruling elite? Is it possible to "establish the national unity based on the rule of law, mutual respect, elimination of hate and hostility" in a politically polarized country? Is it possible to advocate the opening of peaceful development for Armenia and the region in terms of total defeat? What kind of "active foreign policy" can we talk about in terms when Armenia is losing its independence and subjectivity? Is it not populism, the statement of economic goals until 2026 – "to raise the minimum average annual level of gross domestic product to 7%; and under favorable external economic conditions - to 9%; to bring the salary fund in the non-state sector and other equivalent payments to 25% of GDP; to reduce the unemployment rate to 10%; to equate the average minimum pension to the costs of food and consumer baskets, respectively; to set a minimum wage at 85.000 drams ($170) and eradicate extreme poverty"? Isn't the desire to carry out constitutional reform with the aim of returning Armenia to a presidential (or semi-presidential) form of government an elementary attempt to completely usurp power? It is no coincidence that Pashinyan noted that the issue of reform became acute when the Armenian General Staff opposed the country's leadership, and urgent actions were required. Why are attempts made to accelerate the demarcation and delimitation of borders with Azerbaijan until the "problem of Artsakh" is solved, is it because the problem of this sort, as I. Aliyev claims, no longer exists?

In other words, Pashinyan's opponents are guided by their own arguments and facts covered in their own way, some of which are interesting to listen to. As viewed by the authorities, the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) is not dealt with in the debates over the demarcation and delimitation of borders with Azerbaijan, and there is a clear position: the peace treaty can be signed only after the conflict resolution; there are accusations that the reconciliation on borders might finally resolve the issue of the NK status, since Armenia thereby recognizes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. The appointment of Ararat Mirzoyan as Foreign Minister implies the implementation of the Russian plan: closing the NK issue and curtailing the settlement in the international structures. The point is not about a document designed to save the country from final destruction but a recognition of its irrevocable destruction, since there is no definition of the "Republic of Artsakh" in the program, the subjectivity of which has been abolished to finally disappear at such a pace in the next 5 years.

Asses to this can be that the government is not going to do anything: 9 months have passed since the war, and Yerevan could declare a trilateral agreement and a truce exhausted, thereby making it clear that it is ready to attain the level of the Minsk Group. As a whole, the term "co-chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk Group" is more acceptable for Armenia, and not the "OSCE Minsk Group" of which Turkey is also a member. However, as a result of the anti-national and failed steps of the capitulating regime, Turkey has become one of the most important actors in the conflict resolution.

What is the difference between the "restoration of transport communications" and the "corridor" out forward by Azerbaijan: they seek to acquire the so-called "corridor" which is not mentioned in the agreement, to thus take control of a part of the sovereign territory of Armenia, build railways and highways, removing this territory from the Armenian sovereignty. It is no mere coincidence that the so-called "communication" trilateral group Moscow-Yerevan – Baku has resumed its work at the peak of dynamic transformations in Afghanistan. Note that the beneficiaries of the communications deblocking, and in fact - the project to divide Armenia into "security corridors" - Russia, China and Turkey, as well as Pakistan, are trying to fill in the" American vacuum in Afghanistan " and complete their tasks. Afghanistan, located at a crossroads, is a big "traffic jam". Beijing" in the light of new developments" has already begun consultations with Iraq and Iran on the "One Belt, One Road" project which includes the"Meghri Corridor". For Turkey, the Meghri corridor is important not only from trade standpoint, it is also an opportunity for the rapid movement of military equipment and troops to Azerbaijan, and in the future to the south and east.

That is why there is a dispute about concepts of "corridor" and "road", that is, the task of controlling this communication. Wouldn't it be better for Armenia to become a key transit hub of the region and join the international transport corridor "North-South"? India and Iran are actively supporting Yerevan's involvement in the project. The recent statements of the Indian side, made both in Iran and Armenia, are not coincidental. Both Tehran and New Delhi understand that Armenia is the only (!) country in the South Caucasus with which they follow the same interests and have a lot in common.

As you can see, it is still difficult to predict unequivocally what model of development will be adopted in Armenia and Azerbaijan, especially since we are witnessing almost non-stop violations of the truce. As always in these conditions, the "wars of history" are becoming tougher, "clashes of toponyms" are being revived, the duel of political statements at the highest level is being revived. However, there is a know-how here: the collective guilt and responsibility of Ankara, Baku and Moscow in the troubles of Yerevan. The text below does not require comments.

"The ruler of Baku, Aliev, called on his media in Karvachar to use "Azerbaijani" names of Armenian settlements and start with Vardenis. "This road leads directly to Basarkechar. The Armenians call it Vardenis. But the real name of this district is Basarkechar," Aliyev said.

In Armenia, as a rule, they treat Aliyev's historical excursions with good-natured irony. In a sense, this is natural – for Armenians with their weighty background, such attempts seem curious. But this leads to the other extreme – carelessness about both their territories and heritage. This is the reason for the lack of at least elementary ideas about their own history and the scale of the created civilizations in the Armenian environment.

It should be added that Baku is now in a difficult search for its identity – Turks, Oghuzs, Caucasian Tatars, Albanians and so on. But these searches are carried out at the expense of the appropriation and destruction of Armenian history and civilization. This is the way for them to become a political nation and state, on which Baku is supported by its "comrades in misfortune" – Russia and Turkey, built on an Armenian base and methodically destroying traces of Armenian civilization.

At the same time, the Armenian approaches to this task are more like ritualism: the lack of political thinking, low self-esteem is a fertile ground for the success of Baku's attempts. And there is something for social-political, academic circles, and the media to think about.

Maybe it's just the media that we should start with. For example, with the refusal to use the toponym "Azerbaijan" as the name of the state. This artificial formation was created by Moscow 100 years ago and dubbed "Azerbaijan" with certain political goals, despite Armenia and Iran. And now Russia is trying to "legitimize" its godson as a state in a trilateral format, recognize the results of the terrorist war against Armenia and force Yerevan to sign an appropriate agreement.It is needless to say that the legitimization of" Azerbaijan" is taking place at the expense of the Armenian territories and heritage. Do we agree with this? So, we can start from the very foundation – with the expressions "Azerbaijan" and "President of Azerbaijan". You can take "Azerbaijan" in quotation marks or use the term Western Caspian Sea. Instead of" President of Azerbaijan", use "Baku ruler". Instead of Baku – Bakunakert which was built in the 2nd century and bears the name of King Bakur. In the 19th century, Armenians made a decisive contribution to the development of the oil and urban development industry of Bakunakert, and the first Russian Baku-Batum oil pipeline was laid by the Armenian industrialist Mantashyan.There is no question about the Armenian names Gandzak, Partav, Avegu, Akhchapat, Karvachar, Tartar, Akna and many other settlements – they have been preserved in the Western Caspian region and are used to this day. Moreover, it is not necessary to talk about Nakhichevan.This is not just a language war but a question of one's own rights and claims. Baku and Moscow must answer for the apartheid and genocidal actions against the autochthons of this region – the Armenians, the last manifestations of which in the 20th century were two operations Ring and the autumn terrorist campaign of 2020." - "Aliyev gave a reason. Let's start." - lragir.am 18.08.2021.