Mandate system and Azerbaijan

From mid-1919, the government of Azerbaijan and its Paris representatives were engaged in searching allies and patrons. On the one hand, it was accounted for by desire to come nearer to the free world; on the other, old and new Russia showed formally varied and yet essentially identical approaches to Azerbaijan. After the First World War when both winners and defeated party were tired and ruined, the Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan faced an important issue: whom may we rely on? In his report to the chairman of the Council of Ministers Topchibashov wrote: "We"re enduring and pending. So is peace delegations of Republics newly formed on Russia"s territory. Where can we find support, who can help us? The right of our people to independent existence is beyond doubts. It is talked and written everywhere. Mere assertions are not enough, for peoples, organized and independent, are seeking for not only allies but also patrons and mandatories as well to rely on a stronger power. Our delegation has repeatedly discussed the issue in Constantinople. What shall we rest upon?".

The French patronage over the Caucasian states proved not realistic. French business circles showed interest in the Caucasus, however, Clemenceau"s confidence in the concept of "united and indivisible Russia" turned out to be strong. Of all great powers at the Peace Conference, it was France only to oppose the recognition of newly established post-Russian republics. In mid-1919, France sent its representatives to the Caucasus. It was not surprising that a French representative, Jean Loris-Melikov was an ethnic Armenian and concurrently own nephew of count Loris-Melikov, a member of the Armenian delegation at the conference and a representative of the Armenian Republic to Paris. Note that Jean Loris-Melikov had once studied together with Topchibashov in the same classical school. Before going to the Caucasus, Loris-Melikov had two meetings with Topchibashov, which made it clear that France was feeling its way for establishing the Federative Republic of Caucasian peoples. Topchibashov spoke of Loris-Melikov as follows: "He regards everything from a stance of a Frenchman and at heart he is a follower of "united and indivisible". He holds that he is not nationalist, so he disapproves steps of the Armenian delegation here. In his words, he has no meetings with the Armenian delegation. In general, he never seems to be a man of practical policy. Yet, he is confident in success but disbelieves independent existence of the Caucasian Republics laying an emphasis on restoring great Russia". Following this characteristics of Topchibashov it remains unclear, why Loris-Melikov had to make an exhausting voyage en route Istanbul-Batum-Tiflis-Erevan-Baku-Northern Caucasus if contents of his report to the French government had already been known. French Foreign Minister Jean Marie Pichon notified that, the French government did not legally recognize the Caucasian Republics because of unstable situation in these Republics. At the same time, the French Minister informed that he was respecting the peoples of the Caucasus and that representatives of these peoples were admitted to the Conference and French emissaries were visiting Baku, Batum, and Tiflis. In the end of his message, Pichon pointed out that in terms of destroyed roads and ruined financial system the French government was facing difficulties in signing an agreement with the Caucasian governments. In addition, it was decided to establish mail and telegraph communication with Azerbaijan and Georgia. The government was going to develop trade relations with these countries.

A question of Great Britain and Italy"s mandate on Azerbaijan was to be considered in parallel, for interests of the two countries coincided on the matter. Italians" desire to establish themselves in the Caucasus was connected with Britishers" aspirations to abandon the region. Talks between Britishers and Italians ended on March 24 with signing a preliminary treaty between general staffs. By the stipulations of this secret treaty, British positions in the Transcaucasia were transferred to Italians. Initially, there was no unanimity on the subject. As an expert in the Caucasus, Lord Curzon in his letter to Foreign Minister Balfour of March 25 noted that seizure of the Transcaucasia met no "national interests" of Italy, for Italians were in no position to do with Russians there. Besides, Italians enjoy no authority among the Caucasian peoples, after Britishers withdrawal, they are unlikely to retain control over further developments. However, Curzon"s view was ignored, and on April 9 the British Council of War approved an agreement of March 24. On May 10, the British command informed the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia about Council"s decision to leave the Transcaucasia. A little later, on June 28 the government of Great Britain officially informed the Peace Conference about withdrawal of its troops from the Caucasus and the entire territory of former Russia. The allies agreed to substitute British troops for the Italian ones. A question of granting Italy a mandate in the Transcaucasia was brought up. Having received reassuring comments of their missions from the Caucasus, the government of Orlando gladly agreed with this proposal.

Italians established ties with the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegations in Paris. On June 13, military representative Valerie met on behalf of Colonel Melchiorre Gabba with Topchibashov and stated, "If we send troops to you, it"ll not be for occupation or gendarmerie purposes but for cultural and economic ones, however, the point is that today we face difficulties in performing this hard mission, so I"ve come to learn your view on the subject". Further talks made it clear that Italians would like Azerbaijanis to invite them and voice their accord with their arrival in the country. In all probability, that was necessary for the Italian government to make excuses with the Italian people and government. However, the situation remained uncertain, and two weeks left until England"s decision, that is why Topchibashov gave no promises to Italian Valerie.

On June 15, a meeting was held at the representation of Azerbaijan jointly with Georgians and North Caucasians to have passed a decision on exploring a question of Britishers" withdrawal from the Caucasus and their substitution for Italians. Americans said that this question had not yet been discussed at the Military Council of Versailles. Later June Topchibashov and Tsereteli met with Mallet, one of the leaders of the British delegation who reaffirmed Britishers" withdrawal that needed to be stationed in other countries. As for Italians, Mallet noted, "Arrival of Italians will change nothing, for Italians are expected to do the same that Britishers did". As for the Denikin threat, "he is unlikely to march against Azerbaijan and Georgia. Also, he has instructions from British plenipotentiary Wardrop who in a day or two sets out to the Caucasus". This topic was touched upon in the course of talks between the Azerbaijani delegates and an advisor of the British delegation, Prof. Simpson.

After Great Britain informed June 28 the Peace Conference of its desire to leave the Caucasus, the Azerbaijani, and Georgian and North Caucasus delegations considered it possible to get closer with Italians. The problem was that change of the Cabinet took place in Italy: the government of Orlando that showed interest in the Caucasus and was ready to dispatch troops to the region retired and a new government of Francesco Nitti suspended the process as the first step of the new Cabinet. On June 28, Valerie met with Topchibashov again and reaffirmed his government"s doubt in the Caucasian question. Yet, Italia retained its economic interest in the Caucasus.

On July 7, representatives of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and North Caucasus Republic had a meeting with count Sadino, attaché of the Italian Embassy in Paris. The exchange of views revealed intentions of the Italian government in the Caucasus as follows, 1. Italy pursues economic purposes in the Caucasus only, not political ones; 2. Italy will receive a mandate from the League of Nations to govern the Caucasus, but this right is to be exercised by approbation of region"s population; 3. Italy will stay in the Caucasus for not more than three-five years; 4. In the reviewed period the Caucasian Republics will set up a confederation and then decide on their destiny independently. Note that if the Russian Federative Republic is established over this same time, the Caucasian confederation may join the RFR. In this case, Italy will abandon the Caucasus; 5. Italy will not fight Denikin, nor other else; 6. The Caucasus may have its own army, and Italy may assist on this track.

While these issues were being discussed, a special envoy of the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry under the allied command in Paris Aziz bey Tahirbeyov put up at Roma and had talks with the Italian Embassy representatives. During his talks with Mayoni Aziz bey asked whether Italian troops would be dispatched to Azerbaijan. In reply, Mayoni showed him several papers as saying that Topchibashov made a statement to Italian representatives in Paris about undesirability of dispatching the Italian troops to Azerbaijan. Mayoni asked whether it was Topchibashov"s personal view or the people and the government of Azerbaijan was really opposing the Italian troops" are stationed in Azerbaijan. In fact, the Italian party referred to Ali Mardan bey"s statement at the first discussions when the British troops were still in Azerbaijan, so there was no reason to send the Italian troops to the country. When the Azerbaijani and Georgian representatives touched upon this topic, there was not an official notification about the withdrawal of the British troops from the Caucasus. When the British government officially appealed to the peace conference about its intention to leave the Caucasus, the political situation around the South Caucasian Republics began changing. Therefore, Tairbeyov told Mayoni that he could judge about the Azerbaijani people"s attitude toward Italia by how an Italian mission led by Col. Gabba was received.

In summer 1919, Italy declined from bringing troops into the Caucasus, so the young republics faced great danger from Russia. On August 1, the British Embassy in Rome was informed that the government of Nitti declined from sending troops to the Caucasus, and on August 5, Italy made an official statement. Britishers" statement about withdrawal of troops disadvantaged Azerbaijan and Georgia. An unbiased analysis of social-political and economic situation in Italy is indicative that the Caucasian military expedition would drive the country into stalemate. As distinct from his predecessor Orlando, new Prime Minister Francesco Nitti treated things in a new fashion.

A refusal of Nitti"s government from expedition to the Caucasus strained a question of orientation. During an August 6 general meeting of the Azerbaijani, Georgian and North Caucasus delegations a chair of the meeting, Topchibashov pointed out that despite an aspiration for independence, the new Republics would be in need of external aid. Therefore, it would be appropriate to meet with support. The attendees put forward a number of proposals. First, it was suggested that Azerbaijan and Georgia appealed to the League of Nations, and let it might determine to whom to give the mandate. Then Hajinskii put forward a proposal to ask England adopts the mandate especially as there was no other correct option. In his speech, he tried to substantiate that the Caucasian Republics, including Azerbaijan, could not have any orientation but England. However, despite all efforts of the Azerbaijani government and its Paris representatives, later August the Britishers left the Caucasus. Ali Mardan bey received a report of the Foreign Ministry about the international situation in the Republic that defined concretely that later August the last British detachments left the territory of Azerbaijan.

Withdrawal of the allied troops from the Caucasus turned out unexpected for the Azerbaijani delegation in Versailles. Meetings between Ali Mardan bey and British representatives showed that the withdrawal was final. He wrote, "We became firmly convinced that British troops would remain in Baku forever. However, we were mistaken. Not only were we mistaken but other representatives of the Transcaucasia - Georgian and Armenian delegations were as well. We were all abroad from personal meetings with representatives of the British delegation but the British government has already decided to withdraw the troops. After that we, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, and Armenians decided to appeal to the peace conference and all allies asking them to station the allied troops until the conference resolves destinies of our Republics". That was the appeal of August 28 signed by representatives of all three Republics.

Owing to the withdrawal of British troops from the Caucasus, the British government sent a political mission to region headed by Oliver Wardrop. The Versailles delegation learned about it on July 25 from British delegate Sir Eyre Crowe who wrote in his letter, "I"ve been instructed by Foreign Minister Balfour to inform you that his Excellency intends to send a mission to the Transcaucasia with Mr. Wardrop as its head. He is well aware of the Transcaucasia and worked long here as an officer of the consul system. In the end of the month, he is likely to take the road. Mr. Wardrop will inform the government about the situation in the Transcaucasia; however, this cannot be received as a recognition of the Azerbaijani government by the British government".

Before going to the Caucasus Oliver Wardrop met in Paris with the delegations of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. Topchibashov wrote to Usubbeyov about this meeting: "We had meetings with foreign missions that planed to visit the Caucasus, since they had been notified beforehand. Minister Belfour informed us about Mr. Wardrop"s trip. Mr. Wardrop visited us together with his secretaries, of whom Mr. White, a former consul in Tabriz, speaks well in our language and Russian. He impressed us favorably and asked us to apply efforts for all Caucasian peoples to live in peace and tranquility. He had meetings with Georgians (he speaks Georgian) and Armenians. The same day he left for the Caucasus".