The liberation of Baku

Between August 9 and 17, British military forces entered Baku with three battalions, one trench mortar battery and some tanks. As Hopkirk described the scene in Baku, "on August 17, 1918, the British disembarked in its sleepy port, only the ghosts of this once opulent past remained. In the aftermath of the war and the revolution, Baku must have looked much like Shanghai after the Communist takeover, though the decline of Baku had begun long before the arrival of the Bolsheviks." Harsh working conditions in the oil fields led to a number of strikes that had had an impact on the level of oil production. The industry was developing in a one-sided manner. Ethnic conflicts and the repression measures of the tsarist Russia dealt a heavy blow to the development of the oil industry. Oil industrialists considered it useless to invest in new technology. The war had isolated Baku from the world market and the city depended on its domestic market. All these factors led to the occupation of Baku by revolutionists. It allowed for the short-lived term of the Baku Soviet under the leadership of Stepan Shaumian and was soon thereafter replaced by the Central Caspian Dictatorship.

At a joint meeting between the British commander and the Central Caspian leaders on August 5, the British expressed their own dissatisfaction with the small number of troops in the Central Caspian army and how poorly trained they were. They said that it would be impossible to defend Baku with such a force. It was then that

Menshevik Sadovsky asked the British officer sarcastically "And where is the great army you promised Abram Velunts and Ter-Agaian?" Dunsterville"s representative replied that England had never promised and never would promise that kind of a support to anyone, anywhere. It would be ridiculous to think that the British army

could be moved there from Mesopotamia. Velunts observed that England valued its reputation highly, and that if the British came to Baku they would not leave the city so easily. To calm the Christian population of the city, the word was put out that another British contingent would arrive in Baku in the near future to fortify and equip the Central Caspian army. To raise the morale of the Central Caspian soldiers, a message from Lionel Dunsterville, who was still in Enzeli, was read. He said that on the basis of agreements with the Allied powers and at the request of the people of Baku, the British government was to send reinforcements and supplies to the besieged city. He said that in the struggle against the Turks and the Germans, the British army would ally themselves with the Central Caspian government and Lazar Bicherakhov. In closing, Dunsterville congratulated the "heroic defenders" of the city and said that if everyone were to fight against the enemy, then victory would come soon. On August 8, Captain Reginald Teague-Jones read Dunsterville"s declaration at a joint meeting of the Dictatorship and the British, in an attempt to

inspire his partners. One unit of the small British contingent went to the front, mainly to oversee the technical installation of a communication system, while the rest stayed in the city to conduct military training.

Dunsterville"s assessment of the military forces of the Central Caspian Dictatorship was woeful. He wrote: "Supposedly manning the city"s defenses were 10,000, largely half-hearted, local volunteers. Of these, 3,000 were Russians and 7,000 Armenians. All had rifles, but few had received any proper military training. Most of them felt that they had already risked their lives enough, while some of them were even holding talks with the enemy. As for those Muslims remaining in Baku after the recent massacre, most if not all of them were ready to welcome the Turks and therefore presented a potentially dangerous fifth column, or enemy within." Anticipating the arrival of the Army of Islam, the Central Caspian Dictatorship, and in particular the Armenians, who occupied high posts in the Baku administration, held the populace hostage by various means.

After the arrival of the British, General Lazar Bicherakhov once more appeared on the political stage. He sent a telegram on August 3, in Russian and in Armenian, which was printed as a poster in bold capital letters and spread across the whole city. The telegram stated that the old government had had its hands tied in its struggle

against the enemy. Now, Bicherakhov, together with Central Caspian forces and the British, had organized the army and was ready to take down the enemy. On that very day, August 2, the Army of Islam had liberated Bileceri Station, which complicated the picture, since Bicherakhov had said that he was the victor. Though this first "victory" was a deception, the British pinned their hopes on Bicherakhov. He was very famous among the Christian youth of Baku, such that they had taken to wearing the same hairstyle as he did. The British thought that if Bicherakhov returned to Baku, the city"s youth would be inspired to join the "heroic" army. In the tales spread about him in the city, Bicherakhov was called the "little Napoleon." In a telegram, Bicherakhov expressed that he was ready to take the place of the "defenders" of the city and wrote that "now all of Russia has pinned their hopes on the defenders of Baku." However, the Cossack attacks were short-lived. Despite the rhetoric in his telegram, Bicherakhov knew full well that he did not stand a chance against the Army of Islam, and without warning instructed his regiment to retreat by railway in the direction of Derbent. On August 8, he passed through Khachmaz and on August 12, he occupied Derbent and proceeded toward Petrovsk. Then, on August 15, Bicherakhov announced that he was moving south again in order to clear Derbent and Petrovsk of Bolsheviks, and then onward to provide support to Baku from Russia. He promised that he would return from the South Caucasus with 10,000 soldiers and sacks of grain. Bicherakhov concluded that the arrival of the British in Baku did not pose any threat to Russia. Though the Turks

had surrounded the city, they could not occupy it. Meanwhile, at the front, about a thousand Cossacks, along with forces loyal to the Bolsheviks, made it impossible for the Central Caspian government to hold power.

On August 3, Mursal Pasha, the commander of Ottoman army at the Southern front, sent a letter to the head of the Armenian National Council of Baku, stating: "the Ottoman army is carrying out military operations to liberate Baku. If you surrender without a fight, the rights of all citizens regardless of race and religion will be guaranteed." He added that, should the Armenians wish to leave Baku for Armenia, no obstacle would be encountered. However, he warned, "if you show resistance, since there is no doubt that the city will be occupied, you will bear full responsibility for the bloodshed and damage that will ensue. In the event you are ready to surrender the city, send your representative with your response." The Armenian National Council and Central Caspian representatives, after the reading of the letter, decided not to respond to Mursal Pasha"s ultimatum, in the hope of getting support from the British and General Lazar Bicherkhanov. This silence meant the continuation of military operations.

In early August, the Army of Islam tightened the ring of blockades around Baku. On the 10th day of the month, villages in Absheron revolted against the Central Caspian Dictatorship and Mashtaga village was liberated by a regiment of the Army of Islam. On August 8, the August 3 ultimatum from Mursal Pasha was published in the Dictatorship"s newspaper. It gave hope to the small number of Turks who remained in the city after the bloody March events. The overthrow of Baku Bolsheviks in the summer of 1918 and the entry of the British temporarily alleviated the diplomatic pressure being applied by the Germans, which was previously taken quite seriously. Earlier in July, Mahammad Emin Rasulzade wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahammad Hasan Hajinski, saying, "the Baku issue was settled for us in our favor. Undoubtedly, we should provide the Germans with some economic concessions. We asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs [of Turkey] whether we need to take reciprocal steps in relation to the Germans in this or some other way. He stated that there is no need at the present, and in case it is needed we will be informed. Enver Pasha asked me to inform you [M.H. Hajinski] that they sent fresh regiments

in addition to the existing division and that Nuri Pasha said that the force is sufficient. In cases where urgent mobilization of the local forces is needed, the officer of the headquarters will be visiting there on Friday. According to the agreement concluded between the Germans and the Turks, Nuri Pasha was issued a directive related to the attack on Baku."

However, as German-Russian negotiations intensified, the diplomatic stance of Berlin toward Azerbaijan did not continue for long. In the middle of August, according to information sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Istanbul representative"s office, it became clear that the Germans were once more attempting to prevent the movement of the Turks toward Baku. Rasulzade wrote: "On the 17th day of the month, I visited Enver Pasha and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I personally met with Talaat Pasha a day ago. The issue is that the Germans are not in favor of the movement of the Turkish army toward the Caucasus, and if truth on the matter be told, they want to halt the advance toward Baku. They fear that the Bolsheviks will destroy the bridges and burn the oil fields when they retreat, just as the British did when they left Romania. That is why the Germans prefer to settle the issue peacefully. Even some time ago, they supported the recognition of the independence of Baku with its outlying districts, including Shamakhi and Salian. The Turks protested against this declaration and, finally, according to both Enver and Talaat Pasha, they came to an agreement."

On August 7, the chief representative of the Azerbaijani government in Istanbul, Rasulzade, wrote to Hajinski about the issue of hastening the liberation of Baku, as a defeat of Germany at the Western front might alter the international situation drastically. Rasulzade, who followed the course of the events closely and was witness to their political repercussions, said in his letter: "Baku should be liberated by any means necessary. Otherwise, we will find ourselves in dire straits. The advance of Baku should be on behalf of Azerbaijan and it should be occupied by the Azerbaijani government. Anything else would be a calamity." After studying and analyzing world events, Rasulzade advised the Azerbaijani government: "we should occupy Baku and everybody should accept that fact. Then events will take on a different shape. The Bolsheviks may threaten war, but I think that they will not fight."

On August 31, in another letter to Rasulzade, Khoyski reported that the Ottoman military force was causing offense to the young Azerbaijani administration and interfering with the efforts of the Azerbaijani government, and local officials were complaining about this. "It is important that we set the boundaries and limits in our relations with Turkey in a positive manner. Otherwise, this bilateral or multilateral power-sharing will ruin everything. It is my opinion that governance should be entirely in the hands of the Azerbaijani government

and not subject to the interference our administration is experiencing today. The Turkish military should make known to the government their preferences and intentions and the government will take care of these things for them."

The Army of Islam was also privy to the rumors about the arrival of large contingents of the British army in Baku to begin its final military operations to liberate the city. Like Bicherakhov, General Dunsterville recognized that the government that had invited the British was a puppet regime and that defense of the city was futile.

After spending several days in the city and familiarizing himself with the situation, Dunsterville left for Derbent on August 20, in order to have Bicherakhov recalled. However, as unknown ships were docked at the port, he hesitated to go ashore and he returned to Baku on August 23. As a way out of the situation, he tried to bring together Baku Turks and Armenians, but the gulf between the two nationalities was too deep, and Dunsterville was aware that 80,000 Baku Turks were impatiently awaiting the Turkish army"s arrival. According to a third plan, he wanted to incite rebellion among Erivan"s Armenians against the Turkish army with the help of Baku Armenians. The Turkish command headed by Nuri Pasha, who knew of the plan, issued an order on August 10 dispatching military units to various locations.

From the onset, conflicts raged between the Central Caspian Dictatorship and the British. On one hand, the leaders of the Dictatorship were disappointed at the insubstantial support Britain had apportioned to them; and on the other hand, the British abhorred the ineffectiveness of the local army. Seeing no opportunity, Dunsterville decided to have his men retreat from the city by September 1. Meanwhile the Central Caspian government issued an order to fire at any ship that left port. Major-General Dunsterville thus became a de facto captive of the Dictatorship, before military operations had even started, and, frankly, he was looking forward to the Turkish attack. On August 31, in a letter to the Baku Dictatorship, Dunsterville stated that continuing the defense of the city would mean the sacrifice of time and people"s lives. In his judgment, no power could save Baku from the Turks in this instance. The local population-that is, the Azerbaijanis-saw the government that was protecting them from the Turks as the enemy.

On September 1, Dunsterville received a stern warning from the leaders of Central Caspian Dictatorship. It said that the British army could leave Baku with the local army only after the evacuation of the civilian population from the city. On September 4, Dunsterville received another letter from the leaders of the Dictatorship that was severely criticial of his actions. It said that after the overthrow of the Baku Commune, Moscow offered to provide support for the protection of the city against the Turks, but that they had forgone that offer in the hopes of receiving

British help instead. They acknowledged the folly of their decision as they did not receive the support they expected. They demanded that Dunsterville dispatch an army from Iran or Baghdad that would be capable of defending the city. On September 5, with their cannonfire raining on the center of the city, the Turkish army once more laid down an ultimatum for the surrender of Baku. As accusations between the Dictatorship and the British command were hurled left and right, Dunsterville paid no heed to the Central Caspian ultimatum.

Reviewing the situation that had arisen in the beginning of September, Mahammad Emin Rasulzade observed that the Germans were tired while the interest of the British was increasing day-by-day. That is why the presence of the British in Baku made the situation difficult. He wrote to Hajinski, saying, "If we do not occupy Baku, then everything will come to an end. Farewell to Azerbaijan. Even after occupation, we are facing a number of diplomatic difficulties. In order to meet this challenge, we should mobilize the army beforehand. Turkish public opinion and various political circles are deeply anxious about this issue as well."

After intense military and diplomatic preparation in the summer and autumn of 1918, the advance toward Baku began on September 15. On that day, British military forces hastily departed the city. This action by Dunsterville so angered the leaders of Central Caspian Dictatorship that they fired at the departing ships as they left port. That sudden departure marked the end of the adventures of General Dunsterville in the South Caucasus. For his abandonment of Baku, he was stripped of his rank, dismissed from service, and his army disbanded. The reason for such a harsh penalty was that, in his haste to retreat, the General failed to follow a top secret directive issued by the Ministry of Defense, which was to destroy the oil pipes and set explosions at oil depots of the city. That same evening, a division of the Armenian regiment under the leadership of "military minister" General Yakov

Bagratuni escaped from the front heading for Enzeli. The leaders of the Baku Soviet of People"s Commissars who were arrested by the Central Caspian Dictatorship were released with the help of Anastas Mikoyan and Central Caspian officials, and they too left Baku that night. On September 15, Azerbaijani army units entered Baku. Mahammad Emin Rasulzade wrote about the liberation, saying: "After six months, fortune has smiled upon the population. Baku is once more in the hands of its true inhabitants on such a glorious day as the Gurban Bayrami

(Day of Sacrifice) holiday. The liberation of Baku evokes the same feeling for the population as for the person whose head is between the grip of the scaffold of a guillotine and is set free." Those who had defended Baku under the name of the "people"s forces" ran to the ports and were the first to board. The Armenians fled on account of their culpability for the events that had occurred in March.

After the liberation of the Azerbaijani capital, the Turkish troops under the command of Nuri Pasha, who had been lying in wait in the suburbs, entered Baku on September 18. The Azerbaijani population who were the genuine inhabitants of the city welcomed them openly as saviors. When the Ottoman troops entered the city, they said that they were taking part in the process of liberation of Baku upon the request of the Azerbaijani government.