The Trabzon conference and road to independence

On the eve of the Trabzon conference, the separate factions of the Seim discussed their responsibilities and defined their positions with regard to the peace. The Azerbaijani faction organized a meeting on this issue; the Muslim National Council had prepared an analysis of the events occurring within and around Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijanis were concerned with the concentration of Armenian forces in Baku after their return from the Caucasian borders; the danger to Baku as a result of the movement of British forces in the Middle East in the direction of northern Iran and the southern Caspian Sea; and the activity of Germans in the Caucasus and their intention to seize Baku oil. The Muslim faction considered it necessary to sign a peace agreement with Turkey without delay and stabilize the situation in the South Caucasus.

The delegation members who were supposed to go to Trabzon met on February 28, 1918. The Armenian representatives, invoking the right of nations to define their sovereignty, demanded autonomy for "Turkish Armenia" and expressed the idea that the Turkish government should withdraw its claims to Kars, Batum, and Ardahan. Ibrahim bey Heydarov, representing the Muslim Socialist bloc, considered this to be an intervention into Turkey"s internal affairs and stated that the South Caucasus nations could define their sovereignty only on the condition of doing so within the borders of Transcaucasia. In response to those who were blaming Turkey for breaking the Erzincan agreement, Mahammad Emin Rasulzade argued that the Turks likewise had a right to blame them for breaking the agreement. Two days before, Fatali khan Khoyski had spoken bluntly at the meeting of the Transcaucasian Seim, and there was a serious divergence of opinions between him and Evgeni Gegechkori.

A telegram from Lev Karakhan, the Russian Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs and Secretary for Soviet Russia at the Brest peace negotiations, which was received before the representatives of the Transcaucasian Seim set off for Trabzon, greatly complicated the situation.4 The telegram stated: "We decided to sign the agreement under discussion. The most difficult condition of the February 21 (March 3) agreement is the separation of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum from Russia in the name of sovereignty." One day later, Soviet Russia signed the Brest-Litovsk agreement and, in doing so, officially repudiated the decrees on "Turkish Armenia" signed by Lenin and Stalin two months previously. The agreement stipulated that Russia would do everything to evacuate southern Anatolia and return it to Turkey. Russian troops would be withdrawn from the Ardahan, Kars, and Batum provinces. Russia would not intervene in the formation of new state and judicial relations. With respect to Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, the border line that had existed before the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 would be restored.

Despite the urgings of Turkey and their promises to provide assistance, the government of the South Caucasus had refused to participate in the peace negotiations and announce its independence and so was now in a bad position. After receiving a telegram from Lev Karakhan, the government of the South Caucasus, in telegrams sent to Petrograd, London, Washington, Rome, Tokyo, Istanbul, Berlin, Vienna, and Kiev, immediately expressed objection to the Bolsheviks" actions in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. The telegrams stated that "The government of the South Caucasus considers invalid any agreement on Transcaucasia and its borders signed without its participation."11 But it was too late. Before the start of the Trabzon conference, Vehib Pasha demanded that the commander-in-chief of the Russian army in the Caucasus, General Lebedinsky, clear Ardahan, Kars, and Batum of Russian troops in accord with the Brest-Litovsk agreement.

The government and parliament of the South Caucasus were not declaring independence but, at the same time, did not want to side with the agreement signed by Soviet Russia. This contradiction was one of the most difficult problems that representatives of the South Caucasus faced at the Trabzon conference. The representatives of the South Caucasus arrived in Trabzon on March 8, and waited for the Turkish representatives on board the King Karl, on which they had traveled from Batum, until March 12. The conference officially opened on March 14. The head of Turkish delegation, Rauf Bey (Husayin Rauf Orbay), said at the beginning of the conference that the chairmanship would be given to heads of both delegations in turn. However, the representatives of the South Caucasus rejected this proposal. In his opening speech, Orbay stated that Turkey wanted to sign a long-term peace agreement with the South Caucasus on the basis of friendly relations.

The insistence of the South Caucasus representatives on their claims to Kars and Batum, their refusal to recognize the terms of the Brest agreement, and several other questions under dispute deepened the conflict between the sides. Turkey"s interest in negotiations was weakened by the Seim"s unwillingness to announce its independence. Akaki Chkhenkeli confessed, that, "Considering it objectively, Turkey is interested in the independence of the South Caucasus because the independence of the South Caucasus means the safety of Turkey"s northern borders." The leader of the Ottoman delegation, Rauf Bey, stated that representatives of Turkey were rejecting the declaration of the South Caucasian representatives because it interfered in Turkey"s internal affairs. In his opinion, the ideas expressed in the declaration did not comply with a friendly-neighbor policy. Official recognition of the South Caucasus government by Turkey was possible only if this government rejected its territorial claims on Kars, Batum, and Ardahan provinces on the basis of a special agreement. It would not contradict the obligations of Russia and Turkey, because Russia had accepted the right of its nations to sovereignty. The international agreement signed at Brest-Litovsk gave grounds for the Ottoman Empire to lay down a new order in these three regions; at the same time, the Ottoman government was ready to establish favorable economic relations between these regions and the regions of the Caucasus.

At that moment, Vehib Pasha ordered that the disputed territories of the South Caucasus be cleared. Intense discussions in the Seim on this issue showed that disagreement among the Trancaucasian nations was strong. While the Armenians and Georgians urged that the Turkish claims be rejected and war begun with Turkey, the Muslim faction proposed reaching an agreement with Turkey on the basis of mutual compromise. During the discussions, Mir Yagub Mehdiyev stated on behalf of the Muslim faction that it would not support the continuation of the negotiations if the independence of the South Caucasus was not announced. He noted that, normally, peace negotiations are held not by members of the Seim but by the minister of foreign affairs of a sovereign government. Discussion of territorial problems led to a situation in which the Georgians agreed to make concessions about Kars and Ardahan, on the condition of keeping Batum; the Armenians agreed to make concessions on Batum and Ajaria but did not want to give away Kars. The Azerbaijani faction stated that the government should fulfill its obligations according to the Brest-Litovsk agreement and give away Kars and Ardahan, because the majority of the population of these provinces was Turkish. They also thought that Ajaria should either become an independent
Muslim republic as a part of the South Caucasus or, if this was impossible, should unite with Turkey. They also felt that Batum should stay within the South Caucasus, because the Black Sea port was an important outlet to other countries.

While discussions were being held in Trabzon and Tiflis, the Turkish army began to establish Turkey"s claims under the Brest agreement. Ardahan was captured on March 19, and Armenian troops were disarmed. The local population, which had been terrorized by the Armenian troops, supported Turkey in the military operations. Armenian representatives in the Seim and in the government, who had remained silent while Armenian troops used force against Turkish populations at every opportunity, now tried to blame the Musavat party for betrayal in connection with the attitude of the Muslim population.
The position on the issue of war and peace became clearer at the joint meeting of government members and leaders of the Seim on March 25. Hovhannes Kachaznuni, representing Armenia at the Trabzon negotiations, informed the participants that Turkey considered the declaration of the independence of the South Caucasus a necessity. It needed a state that would play the role of buffer between Turkey and Russia. Those speaking on behalf of the Azerbaijani faction clearly stated that they considered the declaration of independence of the South Caucasus inevitable and thus demanded it. In spite of the fact that Azerbaijani representatives participating in the discussions belonged to different political parties, none agreed to fight against Turkey. They stated that the Azerbaijani people would not fight against the Turks if war began. Khalil Khasmammadov said, If you do not fulfill Turkey"s demands, war is inevitable, and we cannot participate in a war against Turkey. If the Armenian and Georgian people feel they have enough power and strength, then let them take the responsibility on themselves and risk beginning a war with Turkey. No Muslim people will take part in this war.

Worrying news from Baku about bloodshed organized by the combined efforts of Armenian and Bolshevik forces worsened the situation of the Seim and the progress of peace negotiations. The Seim was informed about the events in Baku on April 2. Noe Ramishvili, a member of the Seim, evaluated these as the beginning of a Bolshevik attack on Tiflis and Bolshevik seizure of power in the South Caucasus. Shaken by the March bloodshed, the representatives of the Muslim faction demanded that immediate measures be taken against the Bolsheviks in Baku; otherwise, as they stated, the Muslim faction would boycott the Seim.

Positions on war and peace issues were being debated by factions of the Seim. Although after long negotiations on April 5, the representatives of the South Caucasus supported the idea of compromising over Kars and part of Ardahan, they refused to recognize the lawfulness of the Brest agreement. On April 6, the Turkish side, tired of repetition of the same solutions at the bargaining table, issued an ultimatum to the Transcaucasian representatives demanding that they provide an answer within forty-eight hours to the question of whether or not they accepted the Brest-Litovsk agreement. It was stipulated in the ultimatum that, if the South Caucasus wanted to reach an agreement with Turkey, it must proclaim its independence; only then could the diplomatic negotiations be continued.

On April 7, Akaki Chkhenkeli informed Tiflis about the ultimatum. Making reference to the anarchy in the country and the collapse of the front, he called for acceptance of the Brest agreement, except for the Batum part, and for an immediate proclamation of independence. At the same time, he wrote to Noe Jordania, the chairman of the Georgian National Council, "We are in a crisis situation, the level of the army is lower than critical, the Turks were allowed to get very close to Batum, the railroad near Chakvi will be cut off. If Batum is taken, we will have to think about the future of Georgia."

In Tiflis, events were moving in a somewhat different direction. As soon as the ultimatum about Batum was received, an extraordinary meeting of the Transcaucasian Seim was called. Evgeni Gegechkori, Irakli Tsereteli, Khachatur Karchikian, Yuli Semyonov, and others considered resistance to be very important and demanded in their statements that war be declared on Turkey. A call to war was echoed in the statements of the Armenian and Georgian representatives of the Seim.The antiwar views of the Azerbaijani parties did not succeed in changing the standpoint of the Seim, which on April 13 passed a resolution on war with Turkey. Martial law was proclaimed in the city. A military board with extraordinary powers was created, and an appeal was issued to all the peoples of the South Caucasus to protect their "fatherland" by taking up weapons. Irakli Tsereteli and others stated, in an obvious allusion to Azerbaijanis, that "as long as there is no betrayal from the rear," the Transcaucasian forces would be capable of resisting the Ottomans. Of course, there was no basis for such an assertion. Akaki Chkhenkeli, who was close to the front line and directly observed the situation there, could see very well that the Transcaucasian army was weak and falling apart and was not strong enough to resist an attack by Turkey.
The day after the war decree was accepted, Evgeni Gegechkori, in a secret telegram to Akaki Chkhenkeli, informed him that he must stop negotiations and leave Trabzon immediately. This news frustrated the Azerbaijani representatives in Trabzon. Mahammad Hasan Hajinski considered the decision of the Transcaucasian Seim as a violation of the peace and called it a "a scandal unequaled in the history of international relations" Angered by the situation, he stated that "he had a mandate from his party to go to Istanbul to take the final steps toward the conclusion of peace which is indispensable for us." Chkhenkeli, who was not in favor of war, did not fully terminate the negotiations but informed the Turkish representatives in a proper manner that the delegation must leave for Tiflis that same day in order to get instructions from the South Caucasus government. Chkhenkeli thought that upon his return to Tiflis, he would be able to distance the government from the war venture. He was concerned that war would intensify national conflicts in the South Caucasus. In his view, "war will endanger not only the independence of Transcaucasia, but also its unity." Chkhenkeli, who correctly evaluated the situation, "feared the war as much as he feared fire." Efforts by Chkhenkeli in the Georgian National Council to prevent the war did not bring about any results, as the capture of Batum by the Turks alarmed the Georgians and swayed them to support the war.

The war between the South Caucasus government and Turkey lasted for only eight days. On April 15, news of the capture of Batum was officially announced in Istanbul. After forty years, Turkey had regained Batum, with the assistance of the Ajarian population. The battle over Kars lasted longer. When the Turks had occupied most of the intended territories, and did not want to take any more losses, they put forward a peace proposal on April 22. In a telegram sent to Akaki Chkhenkeli, Vehib Pasha blamed the South Caucasus for the termination of negotiations and informed him that the issue of peace depended on the South Caucasus. The Seim accepted the offer to start peace talks. In fact, the South Caucasus government was relieved by this offer, as it turned out that waging a war was more difficult than declaring it. Serious dissatisfaction had arisen among the members of the Muslim faction because of the war and among the members of the Georgian faction because of the apparent defeat.

On April 20, there was an urgent joint meeting of representatives of all parties including the Azerbaijani faction of the Seim, with the exception of the Hummet party members. The Seim met that same day, April 20-that is, two days before receiving the offer to start talks with Turkey. All the leading parties, except for the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Constitutional Democrats, were in favor of accepting all the Turkish demands and declaring independence. Representatives who had stayed in Trabzon were not passive during this time. Soon after the negotiations were terminated, Enver Pasha had visited Trabzon and Batum and was received by the representatives in Trabzon. Mahammad Hasan Hajinski informed Enver Pasha that ending the hostility in Georgian-Turkish relations depended on resolution of the Batum problem. He made some attempts to retain Batum for the Georgians but without success. Noting that Turkey"s claim on Batum had been recognized by the Russian government, he stated that if the Georgians did not get carried away by Armenian politics and did not have a hostile attitude toward Turkey, Turkey would wish to see Georgia as an independent country and consider it a reliable neighbor. The Azerbaijani representatives wanted to sound out the views of Enver Pasha on such issues as the political structure of the South Caucasus and the future bilateral relations of the fraternal Azerbaijani Turks and Ottoman Turks. Enver Pasha said that Akhalsikh and Akhalkelek, which were Muslim districts, should join Turkey, as they had long wished to do. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia could create a federation or a confederation with Turkey; they would continue having a common Seim and would exist in close union with Turkey. Enver Pasha also noted that, if it proved impossible to create a common Transcaucasian state, an independent Azerbaijan bordering Turkey could enter into a closer union with the Ottoman Empire, as close as the union of Austria and Hungary. He added that Turkey had already decided to take serious steps in the direction of providing aid to Azerbaijan. Hajinski relayed to the Muslim faction the news that Nuri Pasha,brother of Enver Pasha and Military Minister of the Ottoman Empire, would soon arrive in Azerbaijan, by way of Iran, with 300 military instructors, and that they were probably on the way from Tabriz to Araz at the time.

Finally, on April 22, as soon as the offer by Turkey was received, a historic meeting of the Seim was called, chaired by Nikolai Chkheidze. Three important issues were on the agenda of the meeting: (1) the independence of the South Caucasus; (2) the report by Akaki Chkhenkeli about the Trabzon negotiations; and (3) the formation of a government. After a long period of hesitation, late at night on April 22, 1918, the Seim proclaimed the Transcaucasian Independent Democratic Federative Republic by a majority vote. It was decided that a commission would be established that would prepare a constitution for the newly formed republic. The proclamation of independence was an important victory, primarily by the Azerbaijani faction and the Musavat party.

On April 23, the day after the meeting, Akaki Chkhenkeli informed Vehib Pasha that the Transcaucasian republic, which had proclaimed its independence, accepted all of Turkey"s claims and was ready to continue negotiations on the basis of the Brest agreement. He requested that the negotiations be continued in Batum. Chkhenkeli ordered an immediate ceasefire on the Batum and Kars fronts and that the cities should be cleared of troops immediately. On April 28, the newly formed Transcaucasian Independent Democratic Federal Republic was recognized by the Ottoman Empire. After that, there is only one month left before the declaration of independence of Azerbaijan...