The Main Factor Complicating the Acquisition of Funds: The Law

Recent events indicate a marked escalation in anti-Turkey rhetoric from the North. While Ankara's official position remains undeclared, analysts closely monitoring the unfolding situation are advised to interpret these events as part of a broader strategic realignment. Turkey, a cornerstone in the Western alliance's economic, military, and political architecture, has navigated a delicate path with Russia until mid-2023.

In a move that underscored a strategic pivot, Ankara handed over five Azov commanders, who were receiving treatment in Turkey, to President Zelensky. This action signaled Turkey's return to a more traditional power alignment. Ankara, which played a mediating role by hosting delegations from both sides in Istanbul at the beginning of the conflict and facilitating the "grain corridor," is now adjusting to new geopolitical realities.

As the conflict continues, Turkey's inevitable reorientation toward its traditional allies becomes increasingly apparent. The inability of Russian media and strategic analysts, relying on provocative commentary from figures like Margarita Simonyan and Alexander Dugin, to accurately predict Turkey's strategic direction represents a significant oversight. The prolonged anti-Turkey campaign is evidence of these miscalculations and is unlikely to be permanent. Despite sanctions, Russia's vested interests in Turkey, driven by substantial investments, will prevent it from severing ties entirely.

The growing synergy between Baku and Moscow indicates a convergence in Azerbaijani and Russian media narratives regarding Turkey. Observers anticipate that President Vladimir Putin may soon initiate measures to limit propaganda, prompting Azerbaijan to align accordingly.

Domestically, Turkey's economic strategy has come under scrutiny. Over the past two months, the government's reliance on Treasury and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek's "pripiska" figures, along with the convening of the Investment Advisory Committee after an eight-year hiatus with invitations to major Western investors, has not produced a comprehensive solution. This recognition has not escaped the attention of government officials, parliamentarians, and civil society leaders.

Reflecting on historical precedents, in the early 1990s, the International Monetary Fund extended a $1 billion loan to Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, conditioned on reducing state expenses. Despite radical reforms aimed at economic stabilization, such as adjusting the retirement age to alleviate fiscal pressure, subsequent governments, including Erdoğan's, initially achieved stability through privatization. However, unsustainable fiscal policies eventually led to a fiscal impasse.

Currently, Turkey's struggle to secure funding is driven by creditors' reluctance to finance extensive state expenditures. This predicament seems inevitable given the current trajectory.

Further exacerbating Turkey's financial challenges is the deteriorating legal climate, characterized by non-compliance with rulings from the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. Notably, despite Constitutional Court rulings demanding the release of Can Atalay, a Turkish Workers' Party MP who remains imprisoned, the Supreme Court has disregarded these directives. Moreover, Vice-Speaker Bekir Bozdağ's refusal to announce Atalay’s termination of parliamentary status in the Turkish Grand National Assembly underscores systemic legal deficiencies.

In such an environment, potential investors are deterred by the lack of legal protection, especially in a country where political figures can be imprisoned. The critical question remains: which judicial body will protect investors' rights amid such instability?

Amidst these challenges, President Erdoğan has intensified his offensive against the main opposition, while smaller parties that entered the parliament with the support of the secular Republican People's Party on May 14, 2023, are exploring pathways back to the ruling AKP. This realignment is expected to occur swiftly, with factions of former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and former Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan likely returning to their origins.

These events may deepen the ideological gap between secularism and political Islam, and change the internal political balance of power in Turkey.