Egypt: the end of stubbornness or more?

When we look at what Turkey has gained from and what losses have been brought by the policy pursued for 10 years in Syria, Libya, in general, the Eastern Mediterranean region, first of all, the removal of the terrorist organization from the borders of Turkey should be written in a positive tick box.

Despite Russia's insistence and suggestions, Ankara, which refuses to establish relations with the regime in Damascus, is still in dispute with Washington over its support for a terrorist organization in the northeast of that territory, and it seems likely that disagreements over the issue will continue, even if all grievances are resolved.

The agreement signed with the UN-recognized government of Libya in Istanbul on November 26, 2019, was a step in the right direction and played a major role in preventing Turkey from currently being severely oppressed in the Mediterranean. The Libyan policy pursued over the past 1.5 years also plays a role in the current loyalty of the Tripoli-based government to Ankara.

Despite the fact that this policy of the Muslim Brotherhood has brought some success in Libya, it is clear that Ankara's losses are huge when comparing with the complete failure in Egypt.

Turkey has been openly pursuing the Muslim Brotherhood policy since early 2011. Following the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, it supported Mohamed Morsi in June 2012 elections in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood’s coming to power through elections raised the mood of the AKP. As the aid was not interrupted, and the then Prime Minister Erdoğan, who spoke at Al-Azhar University in December of that year, said that "The republican regime came to the region by mistake and I will fight together with my brother Morsi to eliminate this historical injustice."

As the heat of the " Gezi events ", which began in Istanbul in June 2013 and spread to Turkey, began to go down, things broke out in Cairo's Tahir Square. On July 3, Turkish officials, including Erdoğan, protested against the seizure of power by General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi on the grounds that "the elected government cannot be overthrown by a military coup." Relations between Ankara and Cairo fell to the lowest level with the banning of the Muslim Brotherhood. When representatives of one country were in the hall at the meetings of international organizations, representatives of the other country were not there. In other words, as if the practical leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Morsi, left, his struggle was replaced by official Ankara. Anytime soon, it will be the 8^th anniversary of the military coup, and it is, of course, the government's job not to compromise on the Muslim Brotherhood policy during these years.

But when approaching the issue from the point of view of real politics and interests, it is enough to look at the gains in the region by, for example, Washington, Tel Aviv, and even Moscow, which pursue a 180-degree opposite policy. Even more financial issues emerge when the names of the oil-rich countries of Sunni Islam, especially the United Arab Emirates, are mentioned.

"Was it better to pursue an ideological policy against Cairo or to pursue the interests of the state?" Apparently, Ankara began to look for the answer to the question, and the Minister of National Defense and the Minister of Foreign Affairs agreed to announce that "behind-the-scenes talks with Cairo have begun" (intelligence officials reportedly met with Damascus). I am in favor of listening to the words of the Minister of National Defense, General Hulusi Akar: in October 2019, we drew attention to the fact that "the name of General Hulusi Akar came to the fore in determining the regional and international policy." The main reason for this is that NATO General Akar has always had close relations with the other side of the ocean and has always stayed away from political statements; that is, the reality is that the army and, in particular, General Akar, may have a more constructive role in shaping relations.

Will Turkey make a radical change in its Egyptian policy? If so, will this change be seen as a "betrayal of the Muslim Brotherhood" or as a "real political step by a charismatic leader who rules Turkey"? What will the millions of supporters who see the head of state as the "leader of the oppressed Muslims" and His Majesty's "unconditional supporter" media say about this?

Already make sure that they will change 180 degrees.

No, the normalization of Ankara-Cairo relations will not be a "third tectonic break in political Islam." Because after two breaks, political Islam has already been weakened enough, and we should not think that it will need to break again.