Karabakh after a one-day war, and the influence of external players on the region - talk with a political expert Boris Navasardyan
Baku/13.10.23/Turan: In a recent episode of the "Difficult Question" program, Boris Navasardyan, the President of the Yerevan Press Club and a prominent political commentator, provided insights into the evolving geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus region following the anti-terrorist operation conducted by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces in Karabakh.
Navasardyan addressed several key aspects of the current situation, shedding light on the complex dynamics and diplomatic strategies employed by Armenia and its neighbors.
One noteworthy point made by Navasardyan is his perspective on the apparent disconnect between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's decision not to attend the CIS summit in Bishkek and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev's refusal to participate in the European Political Community (ENP) summit in Granada. According to him, this disconnect is not necessarily indicative of a direct relationship but rather underscores Pashinyan's emphasis on European negotiation platforms.
Drawing from historical precedents, Navasardyan cautioned against abrupt shifts between negotiation platforms, citing past instances such as the December 2022 Sochi meeting chaired by Vladimir Putin and the events following intense Western negotiations in Washington, Chisinau, and Brussels in June of the same year. He noted that such transitions have often led to new tensions, as observed in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Navasardyan also expressed concerns about Russia's role as a mediator in the conflict, asserting that it has demonstrated ineffectiveness due to a lack of sufficient leverage over the parties involved and its own vested interests, which sometimes take precedence over the pursuit of peaceful settlements.
On the subject of Armenia's potential reorientation towards the West, Navasardyan highlighted that Yerevan is aware of Moscow's substantial pressure mechanisms. Prime Minister Pashinyan recently stated in an interview that "no change in the foreign policy vector is expected." This suggests Armenia's interest in engaging in negotiations without Russian mediation. Navasardyan argued that Western partners may be better equipped to facilitate effective peace agreements, given their priorities align more closely with peaceful resolutions, and they possess significant leverage over the parties involved. This aligns with Armenia's efforts to establish a new security framework in which Western nations play a more prominent role.
Despite these considerations, Navasardyan emphasized that Armenia's pursuit of dialogue in the "3+3" format (including Turkey, Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia) in the South Caucasus remains unaffected, i.e. it is ready to discuss this initiative.
Regarding the prospects of normalization between Ankara and Yerevan, Navasardyan noted that Turkey's South Caucasus policy is closely aligned with Azerbaijan's stance. Any progress in relations between Turkey and Armenia would likely hinge on signals from Baku, which, as of now, have not materialized.
Navasardyan's analysis provides valuable insights into the intricate web of diplomatic relations and strategies shaping the South Caucasus region, underscoring the challenges and opportunities faced by Armenia and its neighbors in the pursuit of stability and peace.--0--
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