Determination against the South, Indecision against the North...

After the political balance of the March 31 municipal elections shifted in favor of the main opposition party, the process of "dialogue and easing" that began between the ruling party leader and President Erdoğan and the Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Özel has never brought relief to the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, who has fervently supported the government for the past eight years.

The main reason for this unease is the emerging need for a broader coalition with wider support in the country. If the leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and President Erdoğan responds positively to this need, a coalition with the main opposition party will inevitably come to the agenda, eliminating the need for MHP’s support. However, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), having captured significant "levers" of state governance, demonstrates its ability to flex its muscles at AKP and Tayyip Erdoğan from time to time through these levers.

At the forefront of these levers is the placement of nationalist-minded cadres in police organizations. Following this, Turkish nationalists take pleasure in repeating the phrase "The state is in our hands" thanks to the placement of investigators, prosecutors, and judges in prosecutorial and judicial organs with the political support of MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli.

At this point, I cannot help but express my difficulty in understanding Mr. Erdoğan: how can a party that has been in power alone for 22 years fail to develop its police, investigator-prosecutor, and judge cadres? During the initial period of its rule, AKP handed over the police organizations to FETÖ (then a community) and held a referendum on September 12, 2010, to give the prosecutorial and judicial organs to the same organization. Not long after the completion of this process, only 40 months later, a fully authorized prosecutor of FETÖ attempted to carry out an arrest operation against Tayyip Erdoğan and his family members. The next move was a military coup attempt. At the current stage, the nationalists, who are seriously organized within the police, prosecutorial, and judicial organs, did not stop there and reached out to the most sensitive institutions of the military: the commander of the special forces kissing MHP leader Bahçeli's hand indicates that the small partner of the government has gained serious power.

In the event that relations between the major partner of the government and the main opposition party move towards a broadly supported coalition, the reaction of the Nationalist Movement Party, which has gained power within the state’s power structures and prosecutorial-judicial organs, to this situation is already a cause for concern.

Can you imagine the MHP, which submitted a list of 154 people, including 64 journalists and writers, to the prosecution and demanded "measures" against scholars, politicians, NGO leaders, and some independent individuals?

While these processes are causing concern, let us not forget that it will be one month tomorrow since President Erdoğan's statement about reconciling with Syria. However, hopes for the normalization of relations are not sprouting as the responses from Damascus to Mr. Erdoğan's calls are not positive.

Even though we know that behind-the-scenes meetings continue in the area of normalizing relations with Armenia, it is still not possible to achieve concrete results there either. While Baku’s commentators are keeping their place, looking at the news from Ankara and Yerevan, it is clear that Turkey refrains from taking definite and concrete steps due to warnings from Azerbaijan. In November 2021, Turkey appointed its permanent representative for negotiations aimed at normalizing relations with Armenia. Although there was talk of "warnings from Baku" and even "obstructions" at the beginning, it was expected that the process would get on track after President Erdoğan received Prime Minister Pashinyan in Prague on October 6, 2022. However, the fact that concrete steps have not been approached in the 20 months that have passed since then shows that Baku's influence on Ankara remains as strong as it was at the beginning of the process. Although this situation bothers Armenia more than anyone else, it cannot be said that it seriously worries Ankara. This course indicates that without Baku's definite consent, there will be no significant progress in normalizing Turkey-Armenia relations.

In other words, while Turkey, which unconditionally wants to normalize relations with Syria, is not receiving a positive response from Bashar al-Assad in the south, Baku is blocking Nikol Pashinyan's attempts to normalize relations in the north.

Does Ankara feel obligated to change this situation?

Will Ankara always respond with indecision to Damascus's firm demands and Baku's obstructions?