Radical changes in Iran's assessment of Israel's place in the region and a change in the anti-Israel paradigm are possible - Nikita Smagin

Nikita Smagin, a former TASS correspondent in Iran from 2018 to 2022, is widely known as one of the leading experts on Iran in the post-Soviet space. He studied international politics at the University of Manchester and previously worked as an editor of the Internet portal "Iran Today". His analytical articles have been published in The New York Times, Bloomberg, Forbes, Carnegie Foundation and various other international publications.

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Question : Our readers will be interested to know your opinion on how Iran, with its archaic system of government and weak economy, was able to expand its influence in the Middle East, by creating a "crescent belt" covering Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Gaza and part of Yemen. What resources made this happen? How did Iran manage to outplay the Americans in this sensitive region? And can we assume that, at some point, such a development of the situation could be beneficial to Washington?

Answer: In general, I would say that Iran's expansion into the Middle East has been influenced by a whole range of factors. First of all, we are talking about some of the resources that Iran has. Despite the economic difficulties, it is a fairly large country with a certain set of resources to conduct such games. Countries with lesser capabilities, even if they wanted to, would not be able to occupy similar positions.

On the other hand, an important factor was the strategy that the Islamic Republic chose during the Iran-Iraq War. The concept of the asymmetric warfare that Iran has adopted, allowed it to focus on those aspects in which it has become a professional. Asymmetric warfare assumes that Iran must compete in areas where it can compete on an equal footing with its opponents. For example, instead of developing aircraft with which Iran could not compete with the United States or Israel anyway, the country has focused on developing drones and missiles that bring certain results.

It is also worth noting that Iran uses a proxy strategy to support various structures. Finally, the key factor was the short-sighted US policy in the region, which led to the destruction of forces that were naturally opposed to Iran and that balanced the situation. This is primarily the case with the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, as well as the partial invasion of Afghanistan in the early 2000s. The destruction of Iraq created a power vacuum into which Iran has successfully entered and spread its influence. All these factors have contributed to Iran's success in the region.

Question : Israel's special military operation has been going on for about a year now. This is one of the longest and most intensive operations in Tel Aviv, distinguished by its power, scale and goals. The US is fully supportive of Israel and actively helping. It seems that, this time the two forces are determined to end Iranian influence, not only in the region. Iran is creating problems for the Americans both on the Ukrainian front and in the South Caucasus. If you agree with this opinion, will they succeed?

Answer: To some extent, Israel now tends to take a position where its goal is the elimination of key threats on its borders and perhaps in the region as a whole. The destruction of Iran is not yet a matter of course, but Israel is getting closer to achieving it. If not the destruction of Iran, at least the fight against it directly, and not only with its proxy structures. Nevertheless, I believe that such a goal is doomed to failure. It will not be possible to destroy Iran, Hezbollah, or even Hamas. All of them will remain in the region. Short-term results can be achieved by temporarily disabling some of these structures, but even such a determined Israel will not succeed in changing the situation in the region for years to come.

Question : Recently, The Senior Researcher of the Hudson Institute Luke Coffey called on Azerbaijan to be prepared for the worsening situation in the Middle East. This opinion is in line with the statement of the Iranian President that in case of crisis, Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, Sistan, Baluchistan and Khuzestan could create their own governments. Do you think such a development of events is possible?

Answer: The collapse of Iran is unlikely. The idea of creating national governments is more a fantasy. For this to happen, too many events must occur. Iran is a fairly stable nation-state, having existed within its borders for a long time. In theory, it is possible that pockets of instability could arise on the outskirts, as is currently the case in Sistan and Baluchistan, as well as in Kurdistan and Khuzestan, where many ethnic Arabs live. However, I do not see a full-scale disintegration at the moment. I think this scenario is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Question : The Iranian media reported that if Israel destroys Iran's energy infrastructure, Tehran will strike at oil facilities of the Persian Gulf countries and Azerbaijan. How serious are these statements? Does Iran realize that this could lead to a widening of their bloc and cause unrest within the country?

Answer: Strikes on the territory of Azerbaijan are practically excluded, since the country is not involved in the current conflict and does not support either Israel or Iran. Such actions by Iran would be absolutely insane. Elsewhere, Iran may strike at US targets in the Middle East, such as Iraq, Syria or Jordan, as well as in the Persian Gulf region. The main targets could be Iraq and Syria, where blows have already been made.

Question : Russia does not actually have the resources to provide significant military and political assistance to Iran. This will not remain unnoticed in Tehran. On the other hand, the situation is leading to the weakening of Tehran. Could this affect Iran’s military-technical cooperation with Russia and its willingness to supply weapons?

Answer: The current situation, of course, could affect Iran's ability to send weapons to Russia. First of all, because Iran itself now needs these types of weapons - missiles and drones. The possibility of reducing supplies is there. However, it is worth to mention that Russia has now reached a certain self-sufficiency in the production of drones. Iran supplies Russia with only components for the "Shaheds", and not in full. Thus, Russia is much less dependent on Iran now than it was 2 or 3 years ago.

Question : According to Mikhail Krutikhin, after the crushing defeats of Hamas and Hezbollah and the destruction of the leadership of these organizations, Iran may face changes in the domestic political field. There are social media spots where the Iranians are happy to welcome the successful strikes of Israel. How ready do you think Iranian society is for political change?

Answer: I think that radical changes in Iran's assessment of Israel's place in the region and a change in the anti-Israeli paradigm are possible. There are many people in the Iranian ruling elite who understand that the confrontation with Israel has not yet brought any serious dividends to Iran. On the contrary, it diverts considerable forces and resources, often causing failure in the international arena. At least remember about the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal under Donald Trump was largely due to Israel’s position. So, changes are possible, but I doubt that they will happen in the near future. These changes are possible only after the departure of the current spiritual leader, as he is a guarantee of maintaining the old strategy, which does not involve even a minimal revision of the ideological position towards Israel. Therefore, changes can only occur after the transit of power. The additional problem is that, if Israel and Iran now enter into a state of open conflict, even limited exchange of blows, and civilians on Iranian soil are killed as a result, Anti-Israeli sentiment in the country could become stronger. Iranians who are largely indifferent to Israel and have no strong feelings for it may change their position. In this case, the current situation could theoretically exacerbate the conflict and make a move to a more rational and less anti-Israeli policy unlikely even if the power changes.