Relations with Southern and Northern Neighbors: A Complex Interplay

The "Astana Process," initiated in January 2017 by Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to address the Syrian conflict, has held 21 summit meetings to date. The process, involving Turkey, Iran, and Russia, saw a significant change during its latest session held on November 11-12 in Astana, where representatives from the Damascus regime and the opposition were also invited. Ankara played a role in this unexpected move, as it has been attempting to normalize relations with the Damascus regime for nearly a year. Despite previous unsuccessful efforts, hopes have now turned to the "Astana Process."

At this stage, the key question is: "If the Kurdish militant group’s Syrian branch, supported by the United States, seeks dialogue with the Damascus regime and gains autonomy or even declares independence in the country’s northeastern region, will Turkey launch a large-scale military operation in response?" Readers will recall that during Donald Trump’s first term (2018-2019), Turkey, through decisive military actions and political pressure, managed to push PYD/YPG forces 20 kilometers away from the Syria-Turkey border. The latest session in Astana hinted at Turkey's potential for a more determined intervention this time. In response to the question, "How would you react if Turkey launched a large-scale military intervention?" a Syrian opposition representative said, "We will support the operation." This situation indicates that Turkey has maintained its control over the region and continued its relationships with the Arab tribes there.

One of Ankara's motivations for normalizing relations with Damascus is to gain the official government's approval for potential military operations in the northeastern regions and perhaps even collaborate with official military forces. However, this requires the dictator Assad to obtain Moscow’s consent, and it is uncertain whether Washington will suddenly abandon its support for PYD/YPG, which controls 70% of Syria’s oil reserves.

Will Ankara conduct a swift military operation in the region before the presidential handover ceremony in Washington on January 20? There is no doubt that Ankara has thoroughly analyzed the potential reactions to such operations. Another key factor influencing Ankara’s decision will be the course of the Russia-Ukraine war. If the new U.S. president manages to halt military operations, what plans will Turkey put into action? During the BRICS summit held in Kazan on October 22-24, President Erdoğan proposed to his Russian counterpart the restoration of the "Grain Corridor." Will there still be a need for this corridor if the operations end?

Turkey’s defense industry agreement with Ukraine, signed even before the war started and before Zelensky’s presidency, may strengthen Turkey-West cooperation in projects that would be realized if Donald Trump successfully halts the war. In this scenario, relations with Russia could be at risk. However, from Russia’s standpoint, this should not happen. Abandoning projects like the "Akkuyu" nuclear power plant and "TurkStream" would lead to significant losses for Russia, making it, in a way, dependent on Turkey. The latest data indicates that Russia sold the most oil to Turkey in October. Could Turkey, with Western approval, have exported this oil to Europe? Is Turkey now implementing the EU’s principle of purchasing Russian natural resources indirectly, through third countries?

In the event of a ceasefire, there is also the possibility of peace talks being held in Turkey, which both the West and Moscow would likely welcome. After the end of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and with Western consent, Turkey’s military presence in Ukraine and its economic presence in Russia are expected to strengthen.

Given the current dynamics, it seems crucial for Ankara to find common ground with the Damascus regime in line with the country's interests. Ankara’s cautious approach to opening this door continues. The consequences of ending military operations in Ukraine for Russia will also significantly influence Ankara's relations with its southern neighbor. If the cessation of hostilities results in a weakened Russia, Ankara will adjust its policy accordingly. However, if a stronger Russia emerges, efforts to normalize relations with Syria may remain suspended for the time being.