US analyst on Turkish turmoil, Ukrainian uprising and Azerbaijan

Gerald Robbins, Senior Fellow at the US Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), who specializes in analyzing Turkey and the Caucasus, described the recent development in the region in an interview with Turan’s Washington DC correspondent.  

Mr. Robbins served as Program Director for Freedom House in Baku during the mid 1990's, where he managed post-Soviet political and economic programs.   

Q. What is happening in Turkey right now and how could it affect the regional dimension ahead? 

A. A serious split has occurred between two of the most powerful factions within the ruling AKP administration. Administrative matters have devolved into factional rifts, resulting in an environment of political and economic uncertainty. It’s an ongoing situation whose impact reverberates throughout Turkey’s neighboring environment and beyond.

Q. How would you describe the main differences between Gulenists's and Erdogan's overviews of Turkey and the entire region's future? Are they on the same page or do they have different views?

A.It’s important to note that the AK party was never a homogenous entity. While it espouses an Islamist philosophy, there are different outlooks and interpretations. This is noticeably reflected in the viewpoints of the Gulen movement and Prime Minister Erdogan. Generally speaking, the Gulenist’s adhere to a Sufi-oriented philosophy, which perceives Islam’s societal role in less doctrinaire terms. Conversely, Mr. Erdogan espouses a more traditional interpretation. 

There’s a noticeable disparity between Gulenists and Erdogan regarding Turkey’s regional status. The Prime Minister envisions what’s known as a “neo-Ottoman” concept, namely reviving the heyday of that Empire’s grandeur and influence to present-day circumstances.  The Arab world is particularly targeted for this idea, namely turbulent societies that would benefit from Turkish tutelage. This outreach to once Ottoman domains comes at Israel’s expense, which is ironically castigated for practicing neo-colonialism. 

There’s a different regional priority for the Gulenists. Much of the movement’s outreach is aimed towards Central Asia and the Caucasus region. It exhibits a more Pan Turkic outlook. The imperial homage prevalent in Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman rationale is noticeably absent in the Gulenist version. Furthermore Israel is viewed with less antipathy.   

Q. Gulenists have long been very actively involved in Turkish regional diplomacy in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Will the recent developments in Turkey affect Ankara's policy in countries like Azerbaijan?

A.It’s unlikely that Turkey’s Foreign Ministry will be subject to the bureaucratic purges currently occurring at other agencies. The Foreign Ministry’s personnel are predominantly secularist in their orientation and therefore exempt from the government’s allegations of Gulenist infiltration and “parallel states.” 

Q. What are your expectations from next year's election in Turkey?

A.Unclear – much depends on what the outcome is with the upcoming local election in March and August’s Presidential vote. There’s still a lot of political theater to watch between now and 2015.  

Q. How would you describe the role and existence of Islam in the region?In Azerbaijan, many are afraid that the religion is replacing the regular opposition.

A.The common factor behind the regional turmoil is bad governance. Russia’s management of its Northern Caucasus territory has been disastrous. Two decades of post-Soviet rule has resulted in rampant corruption and a growing Islamic militancy. The upcoming Winter Olympics in Sochi will have little impact placating sullen and disaffected communities. Although the current situation isn’t as dire in Azerbaijan, there’s cause for concern. Baku won’t remain immune from the problems north of its border, especially if it doesn’t begin to enact meaningful reforms.   

Q. While looking at the broader region, do you see any effect of the Vilnius summit results as well as Ukrainian uprising for the democratic transition of the Caucasus nations?

A. The Ukraine and Azerbaijan have a common Soviet legacy, but otherwise are different stories. The conditions causing Ukraine’s current situation vary from the challenges facing the Caucasus. There are different political narratives, economic factors along with cultural and historical aspects to consider.

Q. What lessons would you highlight for the people the Middle East and the Caucasus, where people suffer from the oil-reach authoritarian governments, corruptions and have similar problems, which took Ukrainian protesters to the streets?

A. The same criteria applies to the Middle East which I pointed out in a prior interview… Granted they all suffer from corruption and oppression, but their respective circumstances aren’t the same. 

The basic answer to solving Ukraine’s/the Middle East’s/Azerbaijan’s dilemmas is establishing democratic societies and rule of law. How this gets enacted depends on a nation’s level of political and economic development. Ukraine’s “democratic transition” is at a different stage than Azerbaijan’s which varies from the Middle East. The same goes for integrating the South Caucasus nations into Euro-Atlantic structures, particularly when you compare Georgia to Azerbaijan, much less Armenia.

Q. As for the democratic transition, some in the west mention that it is getting difficult for the international community and partners to deal with Azerbaijan. Would you agree with that? 

A. Yes, I agree..

Q. Last week, two top Senators -John McCain and Ben Cardin --introduced a new bill that extends the reach of the 2012 Magnitsky Act, aimed to block human rights abusers from any country, not just Russia, from entering the U.S. and using its financial institutions. What should be the message of the new bill to the rights violators in the countries like Azerbaijan?

A. Extending the Magnitsky Act to other nations besides Russia reinforces America’s commitment to individual freedom and the right to dissent. These are necessary foundations for establishing more open, democratic societies.  It serves notice to Azerbaijan that human rights will become a significant part in determining relations.

Q. On Nagorno-Karabakh, as tension along the front line has escalated dramatically over the last couple of days, at the time when peace process seemed to have gotten back on its feet, some worry that violence might underline the risk of a conflict... Why do you think this is happening now? 

A.  It appears the upticks in cross-border incidents are incitements aimed at derailing the foreign minister talks. This might be a recurring matter for the near future. Note that WWI’s centennial might partially explain the recent escalation, particularly when it comes to the Armenian viewpoint. What occurred to their population then is still an open wound.  Even though Azerbaijan was never part of the Ottoman Empire and its policies during that period, Armenian extremists see otherwise. Conversely, there are certain Azeri perspectives viewing the Nagorno-Karabakh impasse in extremist terms. As long as these emotional topics remain unresolved, they are subject to manipulated narratives and extremist provocations.

Q. Secretary Kerry last year made clear that the US sees a serious commitment to substantial talks as the Administration was prepared to invest more resources in supporting it. What do you think the US could do to facilitate the process and encourage both sides to the long-term peace? 

A.Regarding Secretary Kerry, he’s the latest in a long line of State Department executives declaring their focus to resolving Nagorno-Karabakh.  Simultaneously, he also declared a serious intent towards finding a solution between Israel and the Palestinians.  It therefore appears that the Secretary is overstretched as to where he can place substantive time and effort. Unless the Obama Adminstration perceives Nagorno-Karabakh as a prime example of their “lead from behind” diplomacy, the Secretary’s commitment sounds like rhetoric.      

A.Raufoglu

Washington, DC