The gains of the Karabakh war must be defended

Despite the Minsk Group did not resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for 26 years, Azerbaijan did not waste time, and effectively used it, taking significant measures to strengthen its military potential. Azerbaijan, which has created a modern army in terms of weapons and training, thanks to the correct strategy, won a victory on November 10 and significantly improved its position in terms of military balance. Now is the time not only to preserve, but also to consolidate these achievements.

When, after the liberation of Shusha, nothing prevented the Azerbaijani army from entering Khankendi, Russia intervened in the course of hostilities, and not only to prevent the occupation of Khankendi by Azerbaijan. At the very beginning of the war, Russian President Vladimir Putin, who did not conceal his dissatisfaction with the pro-Western policy of Armenian Prime Minister N. Pashinyan, did not support him. Moreover, not being disposed towards him, he could close his eyes to Pashinyan's defeat. However, Putin did not agree to this: the strategic directives of the Russian sovereigns were losing the upper hand. And Moscow, having decided to take advantage of the opportunity to strengthen its positions in the South Caucasus, considered it expedient to continue the policy of preserving the smoldering conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

And what could have happened if Azerbaijan did not agree to a ceasefire and continued hostilities? In such cases, I recall a lot of far from reality options from the past. Naturally, in order not to lose Khankendi, the Armenian army could fiercely resist, and both sides would suffer heavy losses. You can separately analyze the degree of risk in this continuation of the operation. Be that as it may, Russia took advantage of the opportunity that appeared in this war to restore its military presence in Azerbaijan.

Almost 100 years ago, having achieved the granting of autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan, Stalin basically pursued the goal of providing Moscow with the opportunity to continue to play a dominant role in this region. It is clear that the "father of nations" could not predict exactly what the balance of power in this region would be in 100 years. However, in the context of the long history of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it should be recognized that Stalin at that time took the right step in terms of ensuring Russia's interests. He left for Moscow the opportunity to play its own game and manage the situation in the region, constantly clashing Azerbaijan and Armenia.

In November 2020, Putin likewise effectively seized the opportunity for Russia to play a dominant role in the South Caucasus.

Another important aspect of the issue is the problem of Azerbaijan's ability to defend the advantages gained after victory in the war. One of the latter is the Lachin corridor. Now it is quite natural that anyone who wants to travel from Armenia to the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan should go through passport control or an identity card check. At present, this passport control is carried out by Russian peacekeepers, since after the establishment of the ceasefire regime, Azerbaijan allowed Russia to control the entry into the part of the territory of Karabakh where its peacekeeping contingent is temporarily located. But it would be a huge mistake to approve this situation in the negotiations on a peace agreement, which, albeit somewhat later than the ceasefire, will nevertheless appear on the agenda.

Therefore, before or after the posts where Russian peacekeepers check passports or identity cards, Azerbaijani checkpoints should be set up. For this is the territory of Azerbaijan, and such measures should be controlled by its representatives. However, there are rumors that Russia has established a passport control point uncontrolled by Azerbaijan to enter and exit from Armenia to Karabakh. Such an attitude, in fact, constituting an interference of one country in the sovereign law of another state, is contrary to international law.

This issue concerns not only those performing the exit-entry into the country, but also the import of goods. In international law, there is no conventional clause that would limit this power of states. The state bodies of Azerbaijan should in no way put up with the violation of this right. And since Russia very strictly protects its borders by law, it would be difficult for it to oppose this right of Azerbaijan, which it must respect. Given the close friendly relations between the two countries, official Baku should be able to clarify this issue to Moscow.

The second important issue is the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which has not yet been liberated from the Armenian occupation. Under international law, a ceasefire gives the parties the opportunity to negotiate a final solution to the problem. No country, including Armenia, denies that Karabakh is the territory of Azerbaijan. Therefore, Azerbaijan should in no case remove from the agenda the issue of liberating the territories still under occupation. Otherwise, the opportunities and advantages gained from winning the war may be lost at the negotiating table.

The third question is the problem of the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan in 5 years. The buildings and barracks erected there for them by Russia may be a hint of Moscow's intention to stay longer than agreed. Azerbaijan should, constantly supporting the urgency of this issue, promptly start discussing the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Azerbaijan. Since Azerbaijan has adopted a 5-year term in the agreement, one should not expect that Russia will withdraw this contingent earlier than the time stipulated in it, and Azerbaijan cannot demand this in violation of the agreement. At the same time, Moscow also should not insist on the continuation of "peacekeeping" after 5 years without the consent of Baku. Therefore, it is very important that the official circles of Azerbaijan always keep on the agenda the issue that in 5 years there will be no need to continue the stay of Russian peacekeepers in Azerbaijan.

The fourth issue is the opening of a transport corridor between Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan. Despite the persistence of Russia, which is interested in this project, Armenia continues to delay its implementation. Therefore, Russia decided to reconstruct land and rail communications with Iran. However, work on the opening of the Zangezur corridor, designed to connect Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan by land and railway, is not being carried out at the proper level.

Comparison of the Lachin corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh with the Zangezur corridor is not correct, because the first can be used to move between two countries (Azerbaijan and Armenia), the second - by two parts of one country (Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan). And although there is talk of building a new corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, the construction of the only corridor between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan is being hampered. Azerbaijan should point out this contradiction to Russia. On the other hand, it must be shown that the Turkish-Azerbaijani project of the Zangezur Corridor, designed to promote regional development, will be beneficial to Armenia, that is, for both sides.

The second important issue is the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which has not yet been liberated from the Armenian occupation. Under international law, a ceasefire gives the parties the opportunity to negotiate a final solution to the problem. No country, including Armenia, denies that Karabakh is the territory of Azerbaijan. Therefore, Azerbaijan should in no case remove from the agenda the issue of liberating the territories still under occupation. Otherwise, the opportunities and advantages gained from winning the war may be lost at the negotiating table.

The third question is the problem of the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan in 5 years. The buildings and barracks erected there for them by Russia may be a hint of Moscow's intention to stay longer than agreed. Azerbaijan should, constantly supporting the urgency of this issue, promptly start discussing the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Azerbaijan. Since Azerbaijan has adopted a 5-year term in the agreement, one should not expect that Russia will withdraw this contingent earlier than the time stipulated in it, and Azerbaijan cannot demand this in violation of the agreement. At the same time, Moscow also should not insist on the continuation of "peacekeeping" after 5 years without the consent of Baku. Therefore, it is very important that the official circles of Azerbaijan always keep on the agenda the issue that in 5 years there will be no need to continue the stay of Russian peacekeepers in Azerbaijan.

The fourth issue is the opening of a transport corridor between Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan. Despite the persistence of Russia, which is interested in this project, Armenia continues to delay its implementation. Therefore, Russia decided to reconstruct land and rail communications with Iran. However, work on the opening of the Zangezur corridor, designed to connect Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan by land and railway, is not being carried out at the proper level.

Comparison of the Lachin corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh with the Zangezur corridor is not correct, because the first can be used to move between two countries (Azerbaijan and Armenia), the second - by two parts of one country (Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan) ... And although there is talk of building a new corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, the construction of the only corridor between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan is being hampered. Azerbaijan should point out this contradiction to Russia. On the other hand, it must be shown that the Turkish-Azerbaijani project of the Zangezur Corridor, designed to promote regional development, will be beneficial to Armenia, that is, for both sides.

The fifth question  is about mines. Azerbaijan received a map of some Karabakh fields filled with mines by Armenians during the long years of occupation. However, the deaths from mines in Kelbajar and other areas require an even more serious approach to this issue. Given the shortcomings of such cards, one should think about holding a tender between companies specialized in this area to clean these territories - for Azerbaijan, as a fairly rich country, this will not cause financial difficulties - and solve the problem completely.

There is one more, although not directly related to Nagorno-Karabakh, but relevant to the problem: Professor of Maltepe University Hasan Unal, in one of his articles, outlined an interesting idea that should be pondered despite the fact that it seems unrealistic to him.

As you know, there are now two states in Cyprus - the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus. If they are brought into a single federal state in a form approved by the European Union and most of the international community, then it will have to comply with all decisions taken against Russia as a member of the EU. This is what South Cyprus is currently doing. Turkey and Northern Cyprus insist on solving the problem on the island through the recognition of two independent states. The latter can come true if Russia ceases to seek non-recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by both Azerbaijan and other Turkic-speaking countries. Otherwise, South Cyprus will remain anti-Russian in the Western bloc and, moreover, in the context of NATO membership in the future, pressure on it will increase, even if Turkey uses its veto.

Summing up, let us emphasize once again that the most important thing that Azerbaijan should do as a country that has become even stronger and more self-confident is to use all the advantages and opportunities provided by the ceasefire and achieve as much success as possible.