From unjustified expectations to an unjustified crisis

The actions of President Aliyev's administration against his opponents went against the expectations of the society and the international community, who saw the 100th anniversary of the Republic as a chance to establish constructive relations between the authorities and society. For example, the issue of a "golden amnesty" with regard to political prisoners was seen as a possible step of the goodwill of the authorities in the way of establishing a dialogue. The theme of this amnesty was voiced by the ardent apologists of the regime, such as member of the political council of the New Azerbaijan Party Siyavush Novruzov. But the steps that followed after the inauguration were diametrically opposed, or rather provocatively confrontational. There was no amnesty. Arrests began in the Popular Front and others, the leader of the Popular Front Party Ali Kerimli was accused of money laundering, a blackening campaign was launched with the Armenian overtones of the former head of the National Council of Democratic Forces, playwright Rustam Ibrahimbayov and others.

Context

In this sense, it is important to assess the situation from the standpoint of events and dispositions of internal and external players that covered the period under review. They should include:

-presidential elections,

-institutional and personnel reforms,

-100 anniversary of the Academy of Sciences,

- the signing of the next oil and gas contracts with British Petroleum, Statoil (Equinor), the company Total started drilling at the Absheron field,

- opening of the southern gas corridor TANAP,

-the beginning of the implementation of the project of a free economic zone in the area of ​​the international port of Alat,

the international revolution in Armenia,

- New US sanctions against Iran,

-deployment of the Syrian military campaign to divide the country into zones of responsibility of Russia, the United States, Turkey and Iran.

External factor

Let's start with the fact that the attitude of the West to the regime in this period has changed diametrically. Although we did not observe open support or condemnation of the idea of ​​early presidential elections, the nature and conditions of its holding, however, the tone was too restrained and ensured the legitimacy of the elections, which President Aliyev needed. The pre-election and post-election messages of the leaders of the EU and the US were not recognition of victory, but were appeals for invitations to cooperation in energy, reform, security and fighting corruption. Democracy and human rights fell out of the lexicon in contrast to similar messages of past years (for example, in 2015-2016 the pressure on the regime was noticeable). In principle, these invitations were more reminiscent of the obligations that Aliyev apparently promised to fulfill after his election.

In fact, it is striking that the West is courting Aliyev and expects some action from him. What are the possible expectations? We list:

- further implementation of oil and gas contracts,

- further development of a network of communication projects, including pipelines, railways,

- the implementation of institutional reforms and the complete elimination of the old team, based on clan and oligarchism,

- signing an agreement with the EU on strategic partnership,

- fight against corruption and legalization of the economy,

- creating conditions for the introduction of non-oil Western capital,

-participation in anti-Iranian sanctions.

Internal motivation

All these expectations should be considered as a weighty factor, which allows Aliyev to take a tougher line in relation to society. Consider options for motivating the actions of the administration. Among them may be:

- the leader of the PFPA, Ali Kerimli, and his supporters for pre-election actions. The front-line leader was an active organizer of the pre-election rallies that spoiled the background, in fact, of the technical elections that resulted from their boycott of the opposition. The PFPA activists also actively conduct a virtual fight with the regime in social networks, replaying the trolls recruited by the regime.

-full neutralization of the opposition or its weakening against the backdrop of intra-state struggle, which entered the culmination phase. The president may be afraid of a link between the opposition and the ceding position of the old team. Practically there is a replacement of old cadres in all departments. The only exception is the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Ministry of Defense, the removal of personnel is inevitable and a matter of time.

- pressure on the opposition in the conditions of the revolutionary events in Armenia, which are an inspiring example of the possibility of a change of power as a result of the will of the people,

- the spread of fear in society through demonstrative arrests of activists against the background of growing social discontent among the population. The latter represents a real threat, as was seen in the example of the protest action of internally displaced persons in front of the Cabinet of Ministers on June 5.

The authorities have always used demonstrative force against the opposition in the face of growing social tension, indirectly letting them know that it is ready to suppress any protests and expressions of discontent. An example is the arrests of secular civil activists in the second half of 2014 and religious activists in November 2015 on the eve and during the development of the systemic crisis of 2015-.

Grains and tares

It is difficult in this case to separate the listed factors of external and internal character from each other, they are most likely interrelated. The only question is what is paramount. From the external cuff of factors, the most important are the expectations associated with reforming the political system and establishing constructive relations. From the internal set of tools for motivating the actions of the authorities, the main thing is the presence of a crisis situation and social tension in society, which is not unknown to the authorities, which are monitoring their public moods.

Thus, one can come to the conclusion that two lines - unjustified expectations of the West and delaying the process of overcoming the crisis, can provoke a new situation, when the unprecedented pressure of the West, like the wave 2015-2016, will resume, and will have an impact on public sentiment. It should also be recalled that the authorities' pressure on the society of 2014 did not prevent the system crisis of 2015, which they tried to prevent, and that was one of the reasons for the then resonant arrests.