Iran’s Red Lines

Due to Baku’s pronounced preference, or more specifically, its largely pro-Moscow stance, two countries could once again find themselves at odds, just as in 2009, though not in the same way as during the Cold War. The state visit of the Russian president on August 18-19 further solidified relations between Russia and Azerbaijan, but short- and medium-term goals have not been entirely forgotten, making it not too difficult for observers to understand what is happening.

Abdel Fattah el-Sisi being received by President Erdoğan at Ankara Airport on September 4 marked the first sign of a 180-degree shift in Turkey's policy towards Cairo. Subsequently, a rare event occurred in the state protocol: Erdoğan traveled from the airport to his palace in the capital in the same car with his Egyptian guest.

After the end of the Cold War, Turkey is perhaps experiencing the most stagnant period in its foreign policy. About half of the reasons for this stem from the Islamist policies Ankara has pursued over the past 15 years, while the other half is due to historical mutual disagreements and, particularly, the stance of countries that do not wish to see Turkey's arms industry strengthen.

Until a few months ago, Ankara, which expressed its intention to join all organizations, both old and new, from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to BRICS, at every opportunity, deemed it appropriate to turn back and once again prioritize repairing its fractured relations with Middle Eastern countries.