Putin at the end of the trilateral talks with the President of Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia. Photo: Sergey Bobylev, TASS
The Aliyev-Putin-Pashinyan meeting in Sochi on October 31 consolidated the existing status quo that developed after the end of the Second Karabakh War, the legal basis of which was the statements of the three parties dated November 10, 2020 and January 11 and November 26, 2021. The statements are based on three pillars: the opening of communications, the demarcation and delimitation of the border, and the solution of humanitarian issues.
At Valdai, Putin enriched these conditions with his readiness to recognize the final version of peace that Armenia and Azerbaijan would lay down, also taking into account the opinion of the Karabakh Armenians. In the same place, Putin prioritized the statements of the three, relegating the peace treaty to the background as the ultimate goal of the peace process.
Putin's Valdai remarks that inspired hope: “Whatever option is chosen, if it leads to peace, we are for it. But we are not going to impose anything. We are not going to dictate anything to Armenia. If the Armenian people and the Armenian leadership believe that it is necessary to choose the so-called Washington version of this agreement, which, as far as I understand, provides for the recognition of Azerbaijan's sovereignty over Karabakh, please ... "if the Armenian people and the Armenian leadership believe that Karabakh has some their own peculiarities and these peculiarities must be taken into account in a future peace treaty, this is also possible.”
One got the impression that Russia was squeezing the plan of signing a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia from the European Union, without waiting for the fulfillment of the conditions of the “statements of the three”. However, Putin's Valdai speech regarding the Karabakh conflict did not receive the proper development expected by the Armenians in Sochi.
Pashinyan continued to look depressed, as was broadcast in the past at all peacekeeping meetings in Moscow and Brussels.
His tempting offer from Russia, supported by the Armenian rally in Khankendi, to stay in Karabakh as a peacekeeper for 20 years instead of the five envisaged and did not arouse sentiment among the Russians.
The statement following the Sochi meeting stated that the parties agreed to refrain from the use of force or the threat of its use, to discuss and resolve all problematic issues solely on the basis of mutual recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders in accordance with the UN Charter and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991 d. Thus, the participants of the meeting emphasized their commitment to the Prague Statement of October 6, where Aliyev and Pashinyan negotiated with the mediation of Western moderators of the head of the European Council Charles Michel and French President Emmanuel Macron.
It cannot be said that Pashinyan is cornered without options. In terms of pragmatism, his team is ready to move along the path of "real politics". On October 29, at the congress of the ruling Civil Contract party in Armenia, a new concept for the settlement of the Karabakh problem was approved.
“We are convinced that the way to ensure the security of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh lies in the development of a formula for coexistence with all countries of the region, primarily with Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran and Georgia ... Armenia should not be considered a source of threat to its neighbors, and its neighbors should not be a source of threat for Armenia... “As for the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the party accepts a new concept of its settlement. If earlier the status of Karabakh was considered a priority ensuring their rights and security, now the security and rights of Armenians are considered a priority and the status is withdrawn from the system of these guarantees,” said Deputy Speaker of the Parliament Ruben Rubinyan.
The establishment of peace is named one of the 3 priorities of the "Civil Contract" for the period up to 2026.
So, we see that the Kremlin turned out to be more constructive in Sochi than expected. Moscow accepted the pass given from Prague, and following the tradition of alternating changes of platforms for negotiations, now is the turn of the West. Will it remain committed to the spirit of Prague?
Post-Soviet region
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