«It’d be more accurate to yield up Stepanakert rather than Shusha» – Vova Vartanov

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Question: - Where does the blame lie for Armenia’s failure in 44-day war?

Answer: - Ancient combatants used to say that losers gain while winners rest content with their achievements. In other words, losers begin mending his ways and make up more ground than anticipated. I mean your today’s success. But the same may happen with us in future

We enjoyed the fruits of our last victory. It was an excellent triumph where Nagorno Karabakh with its 150, 000 strong population backed by volunteers from Armenia gained victory over 30-fold metropolis. As a consequence, this made us 30-fold self-assertive more in word than in deed. That predetermined our today’s defeat.

There were persons that called for greater activity, including myself. However, our sporting-patriotic society could field a battalion only, a military unit number

 99 223 and some other detachments. But in fact, a main part of society proved to be insufficiently prepared.

Question: - Armenians have always alleged that their army as well as Karabakh military are the South Caucasus most battle-worthy.

However, in reality the opposite has been the case. Why?

Answer: - The two aren’t mutually exclusive. I mean the most battle-worth army, on the one hand, and the defeat in the war, on the other. It sounds like nonsense but our army was the most efficient in the 1992-94-s; however, its intoxicating success over a hot opponent gave rise to mothballing.

In the meanwhile, the army of Azerbaijan developed at rapid rates, fought against corruption and reformed through creating new military branches and investing heavily into its transformation. As a result, you scored advantage we failed to overcome.

Question: - You are possibly aware of a press-conference of Movses Akopyan, former chief of the general staff of the armed forces of Armenia, who listed reasons of the defeat, including strategic errors in planning, mismanagement, and purchase of unwanted arms and a low morale of the Armenian troops. In particular, he referred to the purchase of СУ-30 without operational missiles, as well as anti-defense «ОСА» antiquated systems naked to remotely piloted vehicles. All these things testify to system shortcomings in the Armenian army rather than the underestimation of the enemy. Do you agree with the above?

Answer: - Permit me doubt. First of all, the Karabakh army had no aviation; the Armenian army had. We witnessed involvement of the Turkish army in the conflict expecting possible attacks of the 3^rd field forces of Turkey against Armenia. We doubt that the Russian military base №102 could have deployed its units in terms of Georgia’s «favorable» attitude having in mind Russian armed forces’ passage through its territory and further to Karabakh. For this reason no Armenia’s military units moved towards Karabakh. By the way, the Armenian Prime Minister was charged with announcing mobilization but not sending a regular army to Karabakh. Instead, volunteer-formed units were sent to the battleground; in particular, our battalion was fully formed out of volunteers.

Question: - In other words, you mean to say that the army of Armenia did not fight in Karabakh?

Answer: - The army of the Armenian Republic did not fight in the region. The Armenian army is an elastic notion. Volunteers fought as a part of the Armenian army.

Question: That’s why air forces of Armenia took no part in combat operations?

Answer: - Yes, we expected attacks from Turkey.

Question:- On this account, you disagree with Akopyan?

Answer: - I disagree with him in many respects. As an officer, general and former chief of the General Staff he was unauthorized to make statements on the matter at hand. These were none other than manipulative statements aimed at affecting the situation. The same is true of our government with its similar manipulative statements.

When it comes to the aviation, it was meant to patrol air space of Armenia only with probable intrusion on the territory of Karabakh. To my thinking, two Су were shot down. That said, the aviation was involved partially.

Question: - From this perspective, why are all charging Pashinyan with treason if no Armenian armed forces had taken part in the war?  In other words, the treason is that he failed to send troops to Karabakh?

Answer: - As for me, I have never proclaimed him a traitor. On the face of it, he seems to do the proper thing: volunteers were assisted in every possible way to avoid occurrences around sending mercenaries to Karabakh. For this reason, volunteer detachments were formed into fighting entities with their own numbers and names falling under the command of military structures. This notwithstanding, threats from Turkey forced us to preserve major military units and mobilization resources in a bid to repel possible attacks from Turkey.

Question: - In other words, Pashinyan has done the right thing?

Answer: - No, no, he was wrong…With my detachment, I was staying at Krasniy Bazar and Tagavard.  We succeeded in stemming the advance of your troops and units of Ottoman Turks, Mujahideens and Syrians. It was a life and death struggle, tens of our soldiers and 23 of your soldiers, together with two wounded. It was the entry of Azerbaijani armed forces in Shusha that chilled our Prime Minister’ bones. He should have waited one half/ two days, and it came on to rain. Under the circumstances it was no longer possible to maintain contacts and supply support from Gadrut and Shusha grouping. It would yield up independently. The best trump card for Pashinyan’s fear mongering (Shusha’s capture) would not work then. If the Prime Minister had more restraint and bravery, he would not have signed the disreputable agreement on November 10.

Question: - Shortly afterwards, chief of the General Staff of Armenia Onik Gasparyan and leader of Karabakh Araik Arytunyan declared that they personally insisted on ceasefire fearing Stepanakert’s fall and imprisonment of 25, 000 servicemen.

Answer: - All correct but they insisted prior to Azerbaijani armed forces’ entry in Shusha. From a military perspective and in view of further survival of Nagorno Karabakh population it’d be appropriate to surrender Stepanakert, not Shusha, leave plains and go into mountains to thus retain Lachin, Kelbadjar, Mardakert and a part of Shusha regions as mountain territories. Should that be the case, Karabakh would be backed by Armenia and have a chance to survive and be independent of Russian peacekeeping forces being deployed in the region for their own benefit, not for philanthropy.

Question: - That is Azerbaijan would have no energy enough to liberate other territories?

Answer: - Yes, in consideration of your forces and those of your allies, it would be impossible.

Question: - Don’t you find that you tend to underestimate the Azerbaijani army?

Answer: - No, that’s not the question. In my interview 2019, I told you that I knew very well that your army was putting up dukes; that your armed forces were perfectly motivated, to say nothing of mobilization resources. Should you fail to achieve success, you’d face major challenges. The point is that it is rather difficult to get people motivated and start fighting for property lost. It is typical for mercenaries you invited. It is rather difficult to jeopardize one’s life. Your army would be unable to attack us in the mountains with climbing experience though. The Armenian population and army in the mountains and the woods could have easily protected themselves from airstrikes.

Question: - You’ve just mentioned our interview of 2019, and I’d like to cite your passage:  «Even if Armenians have armaments of low quality and defective military training, they are bearing arms enough to exercise control over heights and check not only your army but the Ottoman one as well. I’ve already referred to the motivation – your injured pride, for you were beaten even despite numerical superiority. While our motivation is the desire to survive. We have no backing room, while you do».

Answer: - It is correct and consistent with what I have said before. I believed that through drawing the population and army to the mountains our government would be able to mount a defense. Regretfully, our government and political leadership fail to take the view of mine.

Question: In your last interview you mentioned that there were numerous representatives of national minorities in the Azerbaijani army, including Lezghins, Talyshes and Avars who were unwilling to fight or seeking to desert, the reason you stressed was that they were not minded to fight for alien motherland. 

Are you aware of the role our warriors from among Lezghins, Talyshes, Avars, Russians, etc. played in our triumph, including the liberation of Shusha?

Answer: - I’m rubbish at figures, and I’m not in the picture. Allowing for the 1990-s experience, I’m inclined to think that the first collapse of the Azerbaijani army, if any, and the first regular successes of Armenians, should they be, you’d face challenges with national minorities, as well as numerous deserters among these minorities. And the same to you. You must have heard nothing of them.

Question: - Why not? I’m aware of the situation. There were not deserters in the Azerbaijani army, it is common knowledge. In the meanwhile, the said Movses Akopyan stated that there were 1500 Armenian deserters on the fifth day of the war, and the authorities were forced to isolate them in Karabakh to thus avoid the panic. He told about it at the press-conference in Yerevan.

Answer: - I’ve not read this interview. The possibility remains that we’d have more deserters. I do say now, are you sure you’d not have deserters if failed.

Question: - We are talking about the fact that the current situation, and your prediction proved to be incorrect.

Answer: - My forecast proved to be wrong for the sheer reason that the activities plan (mountain withdrawal) was executed in part. Our military-political leadership was dim-sighted and yellow-bellied. From a military perspective, no military actions leading to the collapse of Armenian or Azerbaijani statehood took place, just a surrender act signing. Should combat operations continue, many changes would have taken place. 

Yerevan-Baku

(To be continued)

From the Editorial Office:

How correct is it to publish an interview with a person who has fought and is fighting against your country with arms in hand? Why give him a rostrum and why replicate all this? These and similar questions are often asked by readers.

In short, you need to know the enemy.

In more detail, it is necessary to have an idea of ​​what is happening in the country with which we are at war, what moods there are, what the balance of power is, what should be expected, and what should be borne in mind. This can be done only through communication.

In this case, the interview is written as close as possible to the conversation, because otherwise it is difficult to grasp the logic, the psychology and the mentality of the opposite side.

As for the interlocutor himself, this is not an ordinary soldier, but the commander of a large unit. Therefore, what he said reflects the position of a certain part of the military top echelon of the Armed Forces of Armenia.