Russia will not allow peace in Karabakh

Vafa Guluzade, State Adviser to President Heydar Aliyev on foreign policy, has witnessed all the vicissitudes of the Armenian- Azerbaijani conflict and dedicated in intrigues of the Karabakh problem. Like no one he knows more about one of the highlights of the Karabakh conflict - achieving a truce in May 1994, which was named Bishkek Protocol.

Question: It's been 20 years since the entry into force of the ceasefire agreement. The Protocol was signed on 5 May 1994 at the Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS in Bishkek and called for a cessation of hostilities by May 13. What happened at that time, then why the agreement was signed?

Answer: First, let me say that the signing of the ceasefire agreement was preceded by a very fierce fighting between the Azerbaijani and Armenian sides. The first stage of these fights was the winter campaign. At this stage, the Azerbaijani side caused terrible and unexpected blow to the Armenian army. And the number of coffins, which went to Yerevan, shocked them as about three thousand people were killed, as they said at the time. We were losing a lot less. After the winter campaign in the spring an Armenian counteroffensive began, supported by Russia. In reality, it was a joint Armenian-Russian counteroffensive. I say this because at least Russian soldiers and officers who participated in the battles against us got captured. The counteroffensive was also fierce. This time we had a lot of losses. All hospitals were packed with wounded in Baku, and not to speak of the dead. At the same time, the Armenians continued to incur heavy losses.

Question: Would you say that it was great losses on both sides that moved the parties to conclude an armistice or it was some kind of external solution?

Answer: I believe that this whole process was run by Russia and the Karabakh problem was also created by Russia. By the spring of 1994, Armenia had already occupied seven regions around Karabakh besides Nagorno-Karabakh itself.

Q: And who first sounded the initiative to sign the agreement?

Answer: The first sentence was sounded by Kazimirov, who represented Russia in the OSCE Minsk Group as an ambassador of President Boris Yeltsin. First time Kazimirov sought a ceasefire during the winter campaign of 1994. Heydar Aliyev avoided conversation with Moscow and Kazimirov because we attacked, but then the situation changed. In early spring Heydar Aliyev called to talks, but then Moscow avoided any contact. But in the end, Moscow decided that the objectives were achieved - Nagorno-Karabakh and 7 surrounding districts were occupied, plus the entire line of fire, with the support of Russian troops, was formed in favor of Armenia.

But there was another problem - Azerbaijan was destabilized, many armed groups were operating in the country, which did not obey the center. Despite the fact that Heydar Aliyev came to power in 1993, the situation was completely under these uncontrollable conditions and it needed some non-military situation, to create stability. Both factors brought the sides to take a decision on cessation of hostilities.

Question: Negotiations began in Bishkek on May 4, when there passed the Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS, May 5, the Protocol was already signed. It must be remembered that the day before, May 3, Heydar Aliyev traveled to Brussels and signed the Program Partnership for Peace with NATO. Did it somehow influence the decision on signing the ceasefire agreement?

A: Certainly. Russia created the Karabakh problem and contributed seven Azerbaijani districts’ occupation to prevent the penetration of American and European interests in Azerbaijan. The Russian strategy is perfectly aware that the geo-strategic position of Azerbaijan and its huge oil and gas reserves make the country an area of ​​focus of the West. At that time, Russia could not challenge the West to prevent its penetration into the region. It was too weak and therefore governed by the conflict situation. And the fact that Azerbaijan signed the Partnership for Peace had its value.

By the way, Russia thought it could manipulate Azerbaijan and it will be able to change the situation in its favor. And this was the base. It must be remembered that Heydar Aliyev who came to power in 1993 was a very sick man. His medical history was in Moscow and Russians knew he had a stroke, a heart attack, plus his old age. Moscow probably thought that Heydar Aliyev came for a short time and Moscow was staked, when it agreed to the ceasefire. But then fate bestowed Aliyev more than expected in Moscow. As a person knowledgeable, experienced and strong-willed, he managed to stabilize the situation in Azerbaijan, and soon after the ceasefire, 20 September 1994, he was able to sign oil contracts. This and subsequent activities of Aliyev were a surprise to Russia.

Q: But there is another point. As far as I know, Heydar Aliyev was sure that after the armistice in May 1994, in the near future he will be able to negotiate with Armenia and sign a great political peace agreement, including withdrawal of Armenian troops and giving high autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh within the borders of Azerbaijan. You were with him, what can you say about this?

Answer: Heydar Aliyev was a very deep person. He understood the role of Russia in all this conflict. But despite that, initially, he had hoped that, having made very serious concessions, he could achieve peace with Armenia. We did not articulate what we could provide for Nagorno-Karabakh. After the expulsion of the Azerbaijani population from the seven areas, Heydar Aliyev flew to Moscow, where he met with Yeltsin and Levon Ter-Petrosyan. I was there too. Under Yeltsin, Heydar Aliyev offered Ter-Petrosyan to grant Nagorno-Karabakh a status similar to that of Tatarstan.

It should be noted that it caused discontent in political circles in Azerbaijan. But many people feared Heydar Aliyev and no one openly objected. But I remember being shocked by the then Foreign Minister Hasan Hasanov, who shared his resentment with me. He wondered how they could ever offer such a status. But Heydar Aliyev did.

I am a witness how Levon Ter-Petrosyan was overjoyed. He said: "Heydar Aliyevich, can you surely offer such a status?" Aliyev responded that he offered such a status before witnesses. But after that, I am sure that Russia strongly pressed on Ter-Petrosyan so that he did not agree to any autonomy.

Question: With the conclusion of the oil contract there was a lot of hope, in particular, that it will help Azerbaijan solve the problem of Karabakh. It is a fact that in the years after the signing, due to U.S. and European efforts in the region, they play an increasingly important role. But why is it all the same that for the period of strengthening their role and weakening the role of Russia, no settlement has been reached?

Answer: This is because the world opinion overrated the fact of the Soviet Union collapse. They thought that after the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia as a geopolitical enemy of the U.S. and the West ceased to exist. But later strategists in Washington and the Pentagon realized that no matter how Russia was weakened as a result of sovereignty of 14 states that seceded from the USSR and became independent states, its nuclear power remains the same. And whatever there was talk that Russia will hold the processes of democratization and liberalization, the West understood that Russian nuclear missiles were still aimed at the Western world as an enemy.

If, then, the West had a strong pressure on Russia, a notorious warlord in the face of some Makashov would come to power and would turn Russia into North Korea.

Question: Recently, on May 7, American OSCE MG Warlick announced new principles for achieving peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, presenting them as the product of the co-chairs. How do you think these upgraded Madrid principles will have a positive outcome?

Answer: I do not think it will be positive, because the will of Armenia and its people has no role there. Armenian leaders are appointed by Moscow and execute instructions from Moscow, which punishes arbitrariness. Remember 1996. Levon Ter-Petrosyan proposed a phased peace, the liberation of seven regions and the decision of the NK status in the future, the opening of borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Turkey. We agreed, but we could not implement it because Levon Ter-Petrosyan was ousted.

Then there was another scandal in 1999. Then Heydar Aliyev was able to negotiate with Robert Kocharyan , and through him with strong personalities, Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan and Speaker Karen Demirchyan, who agreed to sign a peace agreement.

Then I told Heydar Aliyev that Russia will not allow concluding peace. He replied:

"Let us argue with you, I 'm going to Istanbul to sign the peace there."

A couple of weeks after my resignation shooting occurred in the Armenian parliament: Armenian leadership, Vazgen Sargsyan and Karen Demirchyan and several deputies were shot dead. That was what I said - Russia did not allow Karabakh peace to be signed.

After the parliamentary shooting Robert Kocharian was summoned to Moscow, and on his return to Yerevan he called Heydar Aliyev, saying that all the agreements were void.

I want to say that today the Armenians do as Moscow says. The West must ensure that the Armenians acted in their own national interests, and not at the behest of Moscow. And how to do it?

I believe that Moscow is now in full control of the President and all the law enforcement agencies in Armenia, ARF party, and the army in Karabakh.

Incidentally, Yevgeny Primakov told Heydar Aliyev that "we created it and it is the strongest in Europe."

Question: Under what conditions can full peace be created?

Answer: I think that while Russia is not neutralized by global sanctions in economic, diplomatic, and other areas, no peace can be spoken about in Karabakh. Moreover, there is a danger that Putin saw his impunity with regard to Ukraine and can go to a provocation against Azerbaijan, as our country is open to attack from three sides. At one time in our press were fears that Russia is increasing its forces in the North Caucasus. There has already been created a fist of 70 thousand bayonets. On the other hand Russian warships already tested a route from Astrakhan to Baku. Russian Navy located in Astrakhan has been modernized.

 Russia can arrange any provocation in Azerbaijan, as there is a fifth column here. Therefore, I called in 1998 to create a NATO base in Azerbaijan, knowing how vulnerable we are.

Q: Can we assume that you do not expect any changes?

Answer: I do not expect any change in the Karabakh issue.

The Russian-Putin occupation of Crimea was due to the modernization of the army and the use of modern technologies of information warfare.

How can the West solve the Karabakh issue, what has changed in its approach to this issue? Nothing.

The West, of course, is capable of economic sanctions to weaken Russia and make Russia renounce its expansionist policies and make concessions to the South Caucasus. But do Western politicians wish that in the deepening of the economic crisis in Russia, stuffed with nuclear warheads? This is a question. -0 –