What to expect from Azerbaijani election?

Azerbaijan will be holding presidential elections on October, but will this change anything? 

"It's early to say: The Aliyev regime has long been trying to convince the international community that it's not behind cracking down on opponents, muzzling independent media, and rigging elections: Now, it's time to prove it," a former top US diplomat who closely follows Azerbaijan, speaking on condition of anonymity, told TURAN's correspondent.

While some in the region believe that changes in leadership and policy choices are decided upon by regional powers, elite actors -- not citizens, most also rely on political parties and elections. 

Washington "does not cheer the continued rule of President Ilham Aliyev, but is not officially supporting any candidate," the source mentioned.

Can we expect any democratic change after the upcoming elections? 

TURAN asked analyst Karl Rahder, who was until recently the South Caucasus correspondent for ISN (in Zurich) and has taught international relations at universities in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the US, about his hopes and expectations from the election.

Q. How does the pre-election situation in Azerbaijan look to you two months ahead of the vote? Do you see any conditions for real campaigning and competition for candidates?

A. It's simply too early to gauge with any confidence what the campaign atmosphere will be like. After all, there is no assurance that Rustam Ibragimbekov will actually be certified by the CEC (Central Election Commission) as an eligible candidate. That is the real issue at this point. Will there be legal impediments regarding his citizenship? With his residency in Russia? Will he be able to meet the other legal hurdles and actually run as a candidate?

Ibragimbekov has said publically that he may face arrest shortly after his arrival in Baku. I doubt that the government would stoop to anything so crude as that. After all, Rustam Ibragimbekov is not Rasul Guliyev, despite what Isa Gambar has said. (In 2005, I actually arrived at the Baku airport after a year's absence on the very afternoon that Guliyev's plane was expected to touch down. Hundreds of men with machine guns roamed the terminal, with armored personnel carriers and thousands more soldiers lining the streets into downtown. What a reaction for the possible return of one man!)

The fact is that this is probably the most important election since 2005, and Ibragimbekov now embodies the expectations and aspirations of the allegedly "united" opposition - a very unenviable role, and it remains to be seen whether he will be a viable campaigner even if the CEC does approve his candidacy. And you can bet that YAP will exploit Ibragimbekov's lack of experience, his association with the "Moscow billionaires' club," as well as his long and happy relationship with the Aliyev family if it looks like a two-man race.

Q. What kind of international reaction would you expect if the government prevents Mr. Ibragimbekov from entering the country or the election marathon?

A. I do not expect that some legal reason will be invented to bar Ibragimbekov from entering the country. And let's be honest: it's hard to imagine much of an international outcry even if his candidacy is disallowed.

The US, Britain, and other western allies of Azerbaijan will issue ritualized statements deploring the lack of a competitive electoral landscape, but life will go on. Isa Gambar will then run as the only "viable" candidate, although Isa is widely perceived as a figure of the past and is no threat to Ilham Aliyev. 

Arustun Orujlu may also siphon off a small percentage of opposition votes if he actually enters the race. The result will be that someone named Aliyev or Aliyeva will be anointed the next president of Azerbaijan.

I think that a very real possibility of civil unrest will emerge in September and October, as well as in the weeks following the election if the above scenario takes place. And that sort of situation introduces a number of uncontrollable variables. But the Aliyev government learned from the color revolutions, and they learned from the Arab Spring. They have demonstrated this repeatedly last year and this year, and the president made a speech recently that sounded very much like he was giving carte blanche to his police forces for engaging in violent tactics during street demonstrations. Thus-Ibragimbekov or no Ibragimbekov-we may see some random, uncoordinated protest actions, but President Aliyev will clamp down just as effectively as he has in the past.

Q. According to media, there are a few different voices from the government side regarding Ilham Aliyev's candidacy for the third term. While some support Mehriban Aliyeva as a candidate (even though there were no official comments from her), on the other hand the president uses pretty sharp language against his opponents, calling them traitors, etc. The government has also granted free housing to over 150 journalists. What is your take on all these developments two months ahead of election?

A. The "free housing for journalists" proposal has been floating around for a year or two, and I was beginning to think that President Aliyev had forgotten! Honestly, the idea of a charming, comfortable ghetto for journalists is so utterly weird and Orwellian that I imagine it will actually win the president praise from some segments of the press.

A far more fascinating topic is Mehriban Aliyeva's "ghost candidacy." Why, exactly, did Alisahib Huseynov put forward Merhiban's name? Was he trying to curry favor with someone or was the nomination a classic trial balloon? And if so, who wanted it sent up?  A Mehriban candidacy (which assumes that Ilham Aliyev would retire from politics) would open up a Pandora's Box of uncertainly and score-settling between various Azerbaijani oligarchies, at least according to one theory. Which of the major power brokers would back her, and who would defect - calculating an opportunity for greater influence by forming an alliance with another candidate?

But just to be clear: I find this scenario to be unlikely and fully expect the president to run for a third term. And let's not forget that Ibragimbekov has pledged that if he wins in October, he will step down after two years, when a constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections would take place, so his administration would govern for a very brief period  - probably too brief to institute the reforms of the court system, the security apparatus and the CEC that would be needed to ensure a free and fair electoral environment.

AlakbarRaufoglu

Washington, DC

07/30/2013