Will the Russian become the language of separatism?

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-The so-called Nagorno-Karabakh regime, is preparing to declare Russian an official language. What do the regime wants to do by taking such a step?

- Undoubtedly, the regime wants to continue the separatist policy against Azerbaijan. During 1988-2020, this separatism was carried out in the form of the expansion of Armenia through the occupation of a part of Azerbaijan with the hidden support of Russia. In the 44-day war, Armenia was defeated by Azerbaijan. However, having appropriated the status of a winner as a result of the war, Russia, which has deployed its army in the region, opens up new opportunities for the separatist regime.  Now the so-called regime plans to carry out separatist activities directly under the protection of Moscow. The plan for the proclamation of the Russian language as the state language also indicates the intention to become a de facto autonomous part of Russia. The so-called regime is striving to become “Abkhazia” and “Ossetia” of Russia on the territory of Azerbaijan.

- Is it possible that at the next stage they will want to introduce Russian money, the Russian flag, Russian customs and dual citizenship for the Armenians living in the territory of "NKR"? Could this be possible?

-Everything that you have listed actually exists, with the exception of dual citizenship. The Russian flag is flying in Khankendi; no doubt, the Russian currency is in active circulation. The Azerbaijani-Armenian border and the contact line of the Azerbaijani Army with the territories under the control of the so-called regime are controlled by the Russian military. Rumors that Russian passports will be handed out to local Armenians do not subside either. However, in the official form, everything that happens is impossible. The loss of Azerbaijan for the sake of the loyalty of the Karabakh Armenians does not meet the geostrategic interests of Russia. However, it will be used against Azerbaijan from time to time as a threat.

For example, 5 years later, when official Baku will insist that the Russian peacekeepers should not extend their stay in Karabakh.

Then we will witness the transformation of these rumors into real political steps. In general, we will have to pay for the consent of Russia to a settlement in Karabakh for many years to come. Official Baku, which agreed, or was forced to do so, created an even more serious threat to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan than ever before.

- Some experts describe this as a repetition of the scenario used in Crimea, and before that in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The outcome of these scenarios promise nothing good. Do you think Russia had a hand in this?

- Unfortunately, this is the right conclusion. Moreover, this is not a reflexive reaction of official Moscow, but the main direction of the foreign policy concept of Putin's Russia. Russia is using the separatist map against small independent countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, as the main tool of Putin's "near abroad" doctrine to maintain and restore its sphere of influence in the geography of the former empire.

With your permission, we will expand on this topic a little more. After the collapse of the USSR, the system of international relations was oriented towards a single western form of the “new world order”. Russia also had to become part of this system. In Russia, however, Yeltsin's liberalism was defeated. Russia in the 1990s and 2000s even seemed to lose its ability to self-determination.  The tendency of transformation from the status of a world superpower into an ordinary country, economic crises that have become chronical, a decline in the living standard of population began to cause disgust for liberalism. This situation ended the struggle between the nascent streams of ideas, integration with the West, Russian chauvinism, Soviet nostalgia and “Eurasianism” with the victory of the latter - Russia became a hostage of Putinism.

Eurasianism is a strategy that has been defended by communists and ardent nationalists, as well as bureaucratic and academic circles, against pro-Westerners since the mid-1990s. The Eurasianism that guides Putin's Russia encompasses much, from Pan-Slavism to Orthodoxy, from the geography of Russian culture and claims to a great brotherhood to the Soviet legacy. One of the main authors of the conceptual review that substantiates the possibility of coexistence of such a number of antagonisms is the Russian political scientist Alexander Dugin. The essence of his idea is that without an empire, Russia has no future as a great state. Russia should not be a regional state or a nation state, but an empire state capable of uniting all these geopolitical, cultural and geographical resources.

The foreign policy pursued by Putin's Russia largely coincides with this concept of Dugin - on the one hand, the policy of "soft power" for the Pan-Slavist community, covering Eastern Europe, and on the other, the policy of pressure on ethnic autonomies, which will create military-economic dependence for geography of Russian culture, covering the post-Soviet space. Looking at Russian hegemony in the geography of "Russian culture" is a policy consistently pursued by Moscow. The Kremlin believes that this point of view has a serious cultural and political history. The cultural and political presence of Russia for 100 years in Eastern Europe (Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine), in the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia), in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan) has left an indelible mark on the societies of the countries region.

A multimillion Russian population living on the territory from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan, from Ukraine to the Balkans, and millions of non-Russians by ethnicity, but Russian-speaking (thinking in Russian), as well as ethnic groups living in this geography, but do not consider the states “their own” formed on behalf of the local titular nations, who feel close to the Russians, play the role of the diaspora resource of this strategy of the geography of Russian culture. That is, the geography of Russian culture does not cover the geography in which the Russians live individually, or the one that separately was previously part of the Russian Empire, but the vast Eurasia, consisting of different continents, in which all these resources participate together, considering themselves to belong to the Russian world, having the same idea of ​​the “common homeland” as a citizen of Russia.

The Karabakh Armenians are the most loyal group in Russian cultural geography. There is no doubt that the regime's move to introduce the "Russian language" is a product of Moscow's "near abroad" doctrine, as well as its intention to use Armenian separatism as an "Abkhaz card" against Azerbaijan.

- One of the interesting moments is that this happened after the Armenian side spread information about the meeting of the head of the so-called regime in Nagorno-Karabakh Araik Harutyunyan with the official representative of Azerbaijan. True, the Azerbaijani side did not react to this information in any way, did not even deny it. Is such a meeting possible? That is, will the Azerbaijani side agree to a meeting with the person put on the international wanted list? If this meeting took place, can such issues be discussed at this meeting?

-If the meeting really took place, and a decision on the "Russian language" was made after the meeting, then the negotiations failed. As for the discussion of this issue at the meeting, it is clear that this step contradicts the state interests of Azerbaijan. That is, the topic of "the Russian language" may sound not like a meeting topic, but as a threat to the Armenian side.

There is no tragedy in the meeting of official Baku with the head of the separatist regime. On the contrary, it may be necessary. State policy is a rather complicated matter. When it is implemented, moments can appear that seem contradictory if viewed through the prism of law or ethics. As you note, the meeting of the country's officials with the head of the regime, who committed war crimes against Azerbaijan, is contradictory. But in solving strategic issues, it is not such contradictions that are important, but the desire to try to solve the problem.

Official Baku was unable to achieve a complete military solution to the conflict in the 44-day war. Was forced to cease hostilities. Moreover, as a result, a Russian army called the peacekeeping army (without an international mandate) was deployed on the territory. This means that it is necessary to protect the interests of the country this time through negotiations, since we consider the whole of Karabakh, including Khankendi, an integral territory of Azerbaijan, and this is our irreconcilable, uncompromising position.

Then we must implement this not silently, but actively working. In this context, both a meeting and a conversation with the head of the separatist regime, arrest and destruction are the methods that state policy should use. If such negotiations take place not at the will of Azerbaijan, but with the blessing of Moscow, then this will serve not to stop, but to strengthen separatism. A complete solution of the Karabakh problem within the framework of Azerbaijan's interests cannot be achieved by walking alongside Moscow.

- What steps should the Azerbaijani side take to prevent such scenarios?

-  This is a complex issue. Until official Baku is completely out of the orbit of Putin's Russia, we will not be able to get the opportunity to resist seriously Moscow's separatist scenarios. The whole world is sure that Ilham Aliyev is an active member of the International Authoritarian Coalition, of which Russia is the locomotive. Without changing this configuration, it will be impossible to protect effectively the strategic interests of Azerbaijan. There is no way to avoid Putin's scenarios by acting with Putin.