Once again about the Treaty of Sevres-1920

On August 10, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and President Armen Sarkisyan

looked back on the Treaty of Sevres of 1920. They glossed it over as «fair to draw the line in the history of suffering and hardships of region’s peoples», N. Pashinyan added that the Sevres-1920 «created favorable conditions for co-existence of Christian and Moslem peoples, peaceful dwelling, preservation and development of civilizational pluralism in the region, particularly, «independence of Armenia». He stressed that the Republic of Armenia acted as a full-fledged party to the document». In turn, А. Sarkisyan defined the Treaty of Sevres as «legitimate international and de facto effective document» (ru.armeniasputnik.am).

Beyond any doubt, it’d be appropriate not to comment official Yerevan’s view on the document if not Armenian allegations on «efficacy of the century-old Treaty of Sevres. It is exactly this detail that updates an insight into some aspects of the world geopolitics in the reviewed period.

In his monograph «Caucasian collisions of Russia. From Peter the First to Joseph Stalin» (Kiev, 2017) the author went into the question at large. Separate fragments from this work are brought forward to a large public within the framework of the article.

As a whole, a key to the political situation at the date of Sevres-1920 signing was the fact that in May 1920 Bolshevist Russia offered its willingness to adopt mediation efforts of Great Britain in the course of peace talks with Poland that stipulated recognition of lines of its temporary eastern border having been approved by Supreme Council of Entente in 1919. To make Petrograd more compliant, London decided to step up pressures; and on May 6 the Polish troops captured Kiev; along with other small territories they occupied Gomel as well.

In terms of mixed military success, on May 25 Russia got down to untold talks with its eternal geopolitical rival England; the latter called Bolsheviks to decline from pulling off military operations in Persia; from supporting Mustafa Kemal (later on Ataturk) and inspiring anti-British campaigns in the eastern zones of England.

However, Russian troops managed to drive Poles from Kiev, so Bolsheviks had already anticipated the Sovietization of Poland. Contributing to this was a Charter of the Second Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) in July 1920, Moscow that provided a struggle for «downfall of international bourgeoisie and establishment of the international Soviet Republic» (1).

In so doing, the Congress revealed a slogan of the world revolution addressed to the countries of the «third world» primarily supervised by Britishers.

At the same time, in June-July 1920 Great Britain sent to Dashnak Armenia «25, 000 rifles and 40, 000 sets of uniform» (2). Soviet revolutionary, representative of People’s Commissariat of Nationalities (RSFSR) Michael Weltman found out that Entente countries «diligently supplied the Dashnak government to launch an offensive against Soviet Russia in the Caucasus» (3).

At this point of history, on August 10, 1920 London initiated signing of the Treaty of Sevres with the Sultan government of the Ottoman Empire by the Entente countries and acceding states, including Armenia. Under the Treaty, Istanbul and a demilitarized zone of the Black Sea straits were placed under international control. Ottomans received a small territory without access to the Mediterranean. Also, the Turkish party recognized Armenia as «a free and independent state». The two countries acknowledged their subordinance to the US President, Woodrow Wilson by border arbitration within the limits of some Ottoman vilayets and acceptance of his conditions over Armenia’s access to the Black Sea (via Batumi).

It was obvious that the Dashnak government effervesced, especially as combat operations were ceased in accordance with a Peace Treaty with Armenia concluded by Bolshevist Russia (just at the right date of the Treaty of Sevres signing). In so doing, Armenian troops might occupy a line Shahtahty–Sultanbek while operation of a railway on Shahtahty-Julfa district fell under the Armenian control (4).

However, in the reviewed period Armenia faced delayed-action mine. It was US unwillingness to recognize England’s geopolitical leadership that drew nearer positions of Washington and the Lenini-led government. It was no mere coincidence that at the date of the Treaty of Sevres signing  there appeared a statement of the US Secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby in support of «uited Russia». The case touched on borders of 1914 but without Poland, Finland and Armenia. As for Armenia, Colby emphasized that «a final definition of borders» of this country cannot be made «without cooperation and consent of Russia». «To remain independent and free», Armenia «needs a good will and friendly patronage» of Moscow (5).

On the other hand, the Kemal-pasha-led Great National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) (set up on May 3, 1920) declined from recognizing the Treaty of Sevres. In the meanwhile, under an Armenian-Russian agreement, troops of the Russian Federation occupied «disputed regions of Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhchivan», except for a section designed «for deployment of Armenian military units». In the meanwhile, under this document (temporary accommodation) the Russian Federation was minded to create «favorable conditions for peaceful resolution of territorial disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan». In so doing Petrograd meant to settle the conflict in its own interests.

Even better, on August 24, a few days after a crushing defeat of the Russian army by Polish troops («Wonder of Visla») and transition of combat operations outside of ethnically Polish territory, the Russian Federation and the Great National Assembly of Turkey signed an agreement under which the Russian government agreed «to deny any international acts relating to Turkey and unrecognized by the national government of Turkey, submitted by non-Kemalists. One of the most important item was parties’ ascertaining of their obligations to ensure «unimpeded railway traffic between the countries to be used for people and commodity transportation (6).

It makes no sense to define the clause. The fact is that in accordance with some sources the agreement provided for rendering assistance to the GNAT from Russia, including armaments, ammunition, materials and money and, if necessary, joint combat operations. Note that monetary support was agreed in the amount of 10 million gold rubles (1, 25 million of Ottoman gold lira). It has to be kept in mind that prior to the agreement undertaking the primary consignment came to «Turkish comrades» through the mediation of Khalil-pasha Kut, an escaped general in Moscow and a participant of Ottoman military operations in the Caucasus during the First World War (7).

Added to the above can be that on August 26, a head of the GNAT government delegation, Bekir Sami informed Russian Foreign Minister Gregory Chicherin about Ankara’s embrace of Russia’s mediation «in drawing a border line along the Armenian border on the basis of justice and legality» as a response to Armenia’s imperial claims on «Turkey’ owned eastern provinces of Anatolia». In other words, the Treaty of Sevres-stipulated arbitration of US President W. Wilson in resolving «territorial issues» became en nom participation. In retaliation to the situation at hand the Turks occupied Shahtahty and Sarykamysh (with the untold consent of the Russian party) thereby establishing a straight line between Baku and Kemalist Ankara.

The September 1920 First Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku voiced Communist support to the Mustafa Kemal-led movement. It happened despite the fact that this movement was not communist in nature; however, «we are ready to assist any revolutionary struggle against the British government». Note that a statement of GNAT representative, Ibrahim Tali called Dashnaks of Armenia as «eastern accomplices of western capitalism». Also, above-mentioned M. Pavlovich Weltman touched upon an issue of the Dashnak government as saying that «Armenia is advancing claims to Karabakh and Zangezur».

Soon after there appeared an indivulged opinion of the Presidium of the Council of Propaganda and Actions of the Peoples of the East. The document stated that London was engaged in buckling on its armors against Soviet Azerbaijan at the earliest possible time through the use of united British-Persian troops and armed forces of Armenia and, perhaps, Georgia» (under the pretext of liberation of Azerbaijan from Bolshevist yoke» and ouster Baku from Soviet Russia) considered it necessary to support the national movement in Turkey». For this to happen, it was essential «to crack down on Armenia in league with nationalistic Turkish troops under the slogan of overthrowing Dashnaks as oppressors of their own people, and with a view to unite with revolutionary Turkey».

It ought to be noted that the opinion quoted above stated the inevitability of the war as saying that in case of delay, «in a fortnight» Armenia would attack Soviet Azerbaijan and «we’ll face the loss of Baku». The document was left to the discretion of the Presidium of Executive Committee of Comintern and the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (B). A copy of the document was meant to be submitted to the Russian Foreign Ministry (8).

Subsequent event showed that the structures mentioned above accepted all proposals of the Council of Propaganda. On September 8, 1920 the first secretary of the Russian Office in Angor (Ankara), N. Ulmal gave «three boxes of gold totaling two hundred kilograms and 635 or 900 grams» to the Turkish party (9).

On September 13, 1920 the Armenian Foreign Ministry informed its representative in Georgia that «at down» the Turkish troops took the offensive «towards Olty and the right flank of Sarykamysh detachment. «The Turkish offensive is underway», of which it is to be urgently reported to all allied representatives in Tiflis and challenge these actions as contrary to the very principles of the Treaty of Sevres (10).

On September 15, 1920 the Armenian troops had concentrated on a border with Azerbaijan (11). Worthy of notice is the fact that as combat operations between Armenia and Turkey started the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia instructed to launch «a broad propaganda against the war» with an emphasis that «Kemalist Turkey» as non-Sultan state «pursues no aggressive purposes in respect of Armenia» and as «an ally of Soviet Russia» is fighting for its liberation against imperialistic powers – England, France and Greece» (12).

On September 24, Armenia declared war against Turkey. Armenian armed units in the eastern front started offensive against Barkyz and Ketek (13). According to Soviet historian V. Gurko-Krayazhin, Dashnaks manipulated arms from Britishers to stage killings and beatings of Moslem population across the Kars region and Erivan province, including Shuragel, Sharur-Daralagez, Sarykamysh. «With their effective rear», Armenians attacked Olty and Kagyzman (14).

Under such conditions, G. Chicherin titled «friendly policy in respect of kemalists» as «hugely important for us», since «they are a progressive and democratic element in Moslemism». A few days after reports that railway «Shahtahty-Julfa was seized by Turks-insurgents G. Chicherin stated that «we shall not occupy it, for we are not forced to develop it for Armenians», especially as the treaty of August 10, 1920  (i. e. the Treaty of Sevres – author’s note) «needs no war  against Turks» (9).

A session of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party of September 29, 1920 debriefed a report «On Eastern affairs» resolved «to render an actual aid with money and arms to kemalists» and approve an agreement with Azerbaijan». Also, the session approved «comrade Chicherin’s offer to channel gold for kemalists» together with subsequent details and quantity (15). At the same time the Russian Federation signed an agreement with Azerbaijan on mutual aid in military, economic and foreign economy areas.

On November 6, 1920 G. Chicherin informed I. Stalin (who was in Baku) that «owing to continuing offensive of Turks Armenia asked for our mediation efforts». After that he informed Mustafa Kemal that Russia had taken charge of this mission following which the government of the country «reckons on suspension of further hostilities (16). On November 19, 1920 the hostilities were suspended. On December 1, 1920 a bureau of Dashnaktsutun Party, a parliamentary fraction and an Armenian government accepted a proposal of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on Sovietization of the country.

It was I. Stalin who expressively summarized the facts above: «Dashnak Armenia has fallen a prey to Entente provocation that first stirred it up against Turkey and then dishonorably fed it to Turks. Beyond any doubt, Armenia had the only way to survive but get allied with Soviet Russia» (17).

On March 16, 1921 the parties signed a Russian-Turkish agreement on friendship and fraternity under which Ankara was discharged from any «monetary or other liabilities based on international acts previously concluded between Turkey and the tsarist government (18). As a consequence, a status of «free and independent» Armenian state as set forth in the Treaty of Sevres- 1920 turned into a vague and woolly wording on the establishment of Armenian «national hearth» within the limits of eastern regions of Turkey following the results of London conference debates in 1921. Even more, a proposal on «administrative autonomy» for Cilicia as falling within the sphere of the French, remained unrealized (19).

In Lloyd George’ words, «independent Armenian state has turned into a dead loss». The British Prime Minister tried to shift the responsibility onto the United States that «dispelled any idea of acceptance of mandate on Armenia» as set forth in Sevres decisions (20). In fact, in the reviewed period Washington had taken a back seat due its dissatisfaction with the results of the British0-French agreement in San Remo (1920) that bumped the United States from sharing Middle East oil.

On the top of that, a famous Lausanne Peace Treaty was signed on July 24, 1923. Under articles of a special protocol attached to the Treaty it was stipulated to evacuate, within a period of six weeks, garrisons of European countries that occupied Istanbul, straight after the ratification of the Treaty by Turkey. As viewed by Soviet historian A. Shtal, what was most important for Ankara proved to be recognition of «sovereign rights of Turkey».

It has to be kept in mind that the Lausanne decisions meant «an absolute triumph of Turkish nationalists»: in place of the Sevres-stipulated division of Turkey, the power of the state was established «over the whole of Anatolia, Constantinople and Eastern Thrace»; Christian minorities lost their autonomies: millions of Greeks were to ousted to Greece; first ever in its historical existence Turkey had become a nation» (21).

To Prof. Victor Israelyan (Pennsylvania university, USA), cancellation of capitulation regime in Turkey, economic and political privileges of foreigners, international financial control over the country testified to the international recognition of «the independent Turkish state that arose due to the kemalist revolution» (22). W. Churchill pointed out that while «allied armies gained a splendid and indisputable victory over Turkey in 1920», four years later «speechifiers turned the victory into the defeat» (23).

As for the «Armenian movement», the Lausanne conference ignored an issue of the establishment of «national hearth» of Armenians in Turkey. According to a director of the Genocide Study Center under Zoryan Institute (USA, Canada) Vaagn Dadryan, the West «has severed all references to Armenia and Armenians» rejecting all attempts of the Armenian party «to discuss the destiny of Armenians» (24). As viewed by a head of the Armenian parliament in the pre-Bolshevik period and direct participant of the Lausanne debates, Avetis Agaronyan, the Treaty signed in Switzerland «generates a trick of senses, since it was concluded to the effect that Armenians had never existed at all, so it is unaware of existence of Armenians and mum on them» (25). In the meanwhile, according to Lloyd George, «in fact, Armenians had no right to abandon themselves to unwarranted expectations» (26).

It’d be otiose to comment reports cited above, especially as they are confirmed by historical sources. Should this information get around in Irevan, there would be no today’s statements by N. Pashinyan and A. Sarkisyan on «legitimacy and efficacy» of the Treaty of Sevres- 1920.  

Teymur Atayev 

1 Comintern Charter

http://agitclub.ru/front/com/congress022.htm

2.Аким Арутюнов. Досье Ленина без ретуши. Документы. Факты. Свидетельства http://www.pseudology.org/ArutunovLenin/15.htm

3.Мих. Павлович. Кемалистское движение в Турции

http://www.ruthenia.ru/sovlit/j/20.html

4.Соглашение о мире между Республикой Армении и РСФСР http://www.genocide.ru/lib/barseghov/responsibility/v2–1/0762–0794.htm

5.Б. Колби. Заявление итальянскому послу Авеццане. Цит. по: Барсегов Ю. Г. Геноцид армян. Ответственность Турции и обязательства мирового сообщества

http://www.genocide.ru/lib/barseghov/resp/443-460.htm#449_450

6.Проект договора между РСФСР и Кемалистской Турцией

http://www.genocide.ru/lib/barseghov/responsibility/v2-1/0795-

0837.htm

7.Анкара — главный штаб новой власти

http://www.people-stories.ru/ankara-headquarters-of-the-new-government.html

8.ЦГАНИ РА. Ф. 113. Оп. 3. Д. 7. Л. 1–2 и об.–3. Цит. по: Заключение Президиума Совета пропаганды и действия народов Востока http://www.hayastan.ru/Vestnik/vestnik.l?var=Arkhiv/2002/1–2/statya19&number=-1–2+2002 Ф.

9.Из телеграмм Чичерина

http://www.genocide.ru/lib/barseghov/responsibility/v2-1/0795-0837.htm

10.Телеграмма о наступлении

http://www.genocide.ru/lib/barseghov/responsibility/v2-1/0795-0837.htm

11.Пискунов С. Армяно-азербайджанские конфликты 1919–1920 гг.

http://www.hronos.km.ru/sobyt/1919arm.html

12.Инструкция коммунистов

http://www.genocide.ru/lib/barseghov/responsibility/v2-1/0795-0837.htm

13.Хронология событий в Турции за 1920-й год

http://www.kultur.gov.tr/RU/BelgeGoster.aspx?1C04EA51480895DAA79D6F5E6C1B43FF04C841C36B5D3393

14.Гурко-Кряжин В. Армянский вопрос. Статья из Большой Советской Энциклопедии. Изд. 1, т. 3, М.,1926, с. 437–440

15.Протокол № 8 (46) заседания пленума ЦК РКП(б) от 29 сентября 1920 г.

http://www.genocide.ru/lib/barseghov/responsibility/v2-1/0795-0837.htm

16.Радиограмма Г. Чичерина Мустафе Кемалю

http://www.genocide.ru/lib/barseghov/responsibility/v2-1/0864-0904.htm

17.Сталин И. В. Положение на Кавказе. Беседа с сотрудником газеты «Правда»

http://petrograd.biz/stalin/4-57.php

18.Договор между Россией и Турцией от 16 марта 1921 г.

http://www.genocide.ru/lib/treaties/19.htm

19.Лондонская конференция 1921 г.

http://www.genocide.ru/enc/london-conference.htm

20.Ллойд Джордж Д. Правда о мирных договорах. В 2-х т.

http://rutracker.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=4805114

21.Шталь А. Малые войны 1920–1930-х годов

http://militera.lib.ru/h/shtal/01.html

22.Исраэлян В. Л. Лозаннский мирный договор 1923 г.

http://www.cultinfo.ru/fulltext/1/001/008/071/142.htm

23.Черчилль У. С. Мировой кризис

http://grachev62.narod.ru/churchill/chapt19.htm

24.Дадрян В. Турецко-армянские отношения в свете исторических и политических последствий геноцида армян

http://books.nt.am/readbook.php?LangID=5&ID=104

25.Цит. по: Нерсесян С. Огонь под пеплом еще не угас

http://www.golos.am/2000/may_2005/26/st06.html

26.Ллойд Джордж Д. Правда о мирных договорах. В 2-х т.

http://rutracker.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=4805114