Political monitoring

October Summary

In October 2024, Azerbaijan experienced significant political developments, highlighted by heightened diplomatic tensions, ongoing human rights scrutiny, and efforts toward peace with Armenia. The month saw a marked rise in criticism from Western entities, particularly in the lead-up to the COP29 climate summit in Baku. The Norwegian Human Rights House Foundation and major organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International released reports condemning Azerbaijan's treatment of activists and journalists. Additionally, the European Parliament passed a resolution urging the release of political prisoners and suggesting conditional EU cooperation based on Azerbaijan's human rights record.

Diplomatic activities centered on the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process, with President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan meeting in Kazan. Both leaders emphasized peace prospects, albeit amid mutual accusations of delaying tactics. Talks also continued within the 3+3 platform, which included Turkey, Iran, and Russia, aiming to facilitate regional cooperation without external interference. Azerbaijan maintained a delicate balance, bolstering ties with Russia as a counter to perceived Western pressure, while still engaging with the West on specific economic and energy issues.

The geopolitical landscape further shifted with notable Azerbaijani-Iranian engagements, as Azerbaijan's Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev met Iranian officials to reinforce bilateral ties. Iran's rhetoric softened, possibly due to international isolation, though analysts remain cautious about Tehran's intentions.

In Baku, heavy rains exposed infrastructural deficiencies, leading to severe flooding in multiple districts. Public criticism mounted against the city's past leadership for prioritizing aesthetics over functionality, underscoring ongoing urban infrastructure issues.

The events of October highlight the difficult situation of Azerbaijan, which has to balance between regional alliances, relations with the West and domestic human rights issues amid intense international attention since COP29.

Chronicle of events

01.10.24: The Norwegian Human Rights House Foundation has released a report titled “Growing Human Rights Crisis in Azerbaijan,” drawing attention to the intensifying repression against government critics in the country ahead of COP29.

01.10.24: In September, staff from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited individuals of Armenian descent,  the Baku office of the ICRC to the Turan agency. The meetings included one-on-one discussions, and conditions were created for the detainees to communicate with their families.

By a decree of the head of state, Rahman Mustafayev has been appointed as Azerbaijan's ambassador to Russia.  By the other decree  of the president Ilham Aliyev, Mustafayev has been relieved of his position as Azerbaijan's ambassador to the Netherlands and as the permanent representative of Azerbaijan to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

01.10.24:  Employees of the Astara customs office prevented the transit of a significant batch of psychotropic drugs from Iran to Russia via Azerbaijan. The drugs were discovered during an X-ray inspection of a vehicle loaded with "computer accessories", according to a statement from the State Customs Committee.

01.10.24: In a hospital in the French city of Mulhouse, Vidadi, a political emigrant, died from numerous stab wounds, who was attacked early in the morning by three unknown people in his house on September 29.

01.10.24: Azerbaijan must comply with the values of the Council of Europe, this is a condition for the return of the delegation to the PACE. This was the main leitmotif of the debate on ‘Deteriorating situation of human rights, rule of law and democracy in Azerbaijan’ held at the PACE session in Strasbourg.

02.10.24: It is regrettable that co-operation between Azerbaijan and the Council of Europe has reached a stalemate, Gabrielius Landsbergis, the current chairman of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and Lithuania's Foreign Minister, said at a session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in Strasbourg. Last July, the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) issued a public statement to address the persistent lack of co-operation by the Azerbaijani authorities.

02.10.24: The children of a London-based scientist under house arrest in Azerbaijan have called on British Prime Minister Keir Starmer to use the upcoming COP29 climate summit in Baku to secure their father’s release.

 02.10.24: The government of Azerbaijan will finance four projects in the Ukrainian city of Irpin, which is being rebuilt after its liberation from occupation,  the city’s head, Oleksandr Markushin,  said on Facebook following a meeting with Hikmet Hajiyev, the assistant to the Azerbaijani president for foreign policy.

 03.10.24: Aleksker Mammadli, the founder of “Toplum TV”, was subjected to mistreatment today at the Khatai District Court. He was brought there regarding the extension of his detention. Upon returning to the pre-trial detention center, he called his brother, Nasimi Mammadli, to report that he had been kept for several hours in a separate room in handcuffs before the hearing.

03.10.24: "The violent death of Vidadi Iskenderli must be effectively and promptly investigated. We call on the French authorities to consider all possible motives for his murder, including criticism of the President and the Government of Azerbaijan, which was the reason for his exile. This heinous crime must be investigated as a matter of urgency, and all suspects in this crime must be brought to justice in a fair trial." This is stated in a statement by Natalia Nozadze, representative of Amnesty International for the South Caucasus.

03.10.24: On October 2-3, Sergey Naryshkin, Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, made an official visit to Baku, where he met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and the leadership of Azerbaijan's Foreign Intelligence Service and State Security Service.

03.10.24: Belarus and Azerbaijan are consolidating their relationship based on mutual benefits rather than geopolitical alliances, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said during a meeting with Azerbaijani Prime Minister Ali Asadov. The talks, held in Minsk, underscored the depth of the partnership between the two former Soviet republics, particularly amid shifting regional dynamics.

03.10.24: The Khatai district court of Baku has granted the petitions of the investigation to extend the terms of pre-trial detention of the accused in the 'Toplum TV' case.Thus, the arrest terms of Akif Gurbanov, director of the Institute of Democratic Initiatives (IDI); member of the same Institute Ruslan Izzatli; activist Ilkin Amrakhov; founder of 'Toplum TV' Alesker Mammadli and employees of this publication: Mushfig Jabbar and Ali Zeynalov have been extended for three months.

03.10.24: A temporary commission on countering external interference and hybrid threats was set up in Milli Majlis. Newly elected MP Ramid Namazov was elected chairman of the commission on 30 September.The commission's functions include preparing reports on cases of external interference and hybrid threats, as well as proposals to counter them.

03.10.24: From the very first day, COP29 has been closely linked to the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the ambassador further noted. "We have high hopes that COP29 will also help bring peace to the South Caucasus. Both countries (Azerbaijan and Armenia) are closer than ever to a peace agreement. Both sides have taken bold steps towards peace, and we urge them to also walk the last mile on this path, which is always the most difficult. Germany remains committed to supporting this process," said German Ambassador to Azerbaijan Ralf Horlemann.

04.10.24: The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) condemns the extension of pre-trial detention for 11 journalists in Azerbaijan and urges the authorities to release them ahead of the COP29 climate conference in November.

04.10.24: 60 pro-Armenian members of the US Congress have asked the American government to impose additional sanctions against Azerbaijan. ‘I read this vile statement this morning, which cannot affect our will. But it shows that the policy of hostility against us does not stop.’ Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said this at a meeting with residents of Jabrail.‘Looking through this statement, I realized that the author and the address are the same. The address is the Secretary of State of the US Department of State, but I don't have the slightest doubt that this address is written in the State Department. That is, they are writing letters to themselves, threatening us, accusing us,’ Azertaj State Agency quoted Aliyev as saying.

05.10.24: Director of online publication 'Abzas Media' Ulvi Hasanli has been subjected to inhuman treatment after he made public the facts of tortures in Baku SIZO-1, where he is being held, said the journalist's wife Rubaba Guliyeva.

05.10.24: Famil Khalilov, a paralyzed activist, disabled person of the first group, held in the sanitary unit of Baku pre-trial detention center-1, has gone on a dry hunger strike since 2 October. He has been on hunger strike for the 53rd day in protest against unjustified criminal prosecution. ‘We saw Famil on 3 October. He couldn't even drink water because of his stomach illness. Therefore, since 2 October he has been on a dry hunger strike. He is in a serious condition, he has a high temperature. Famil is very weak,’ the activist's wife told Turan.

05.10.24: 43 members of the Milli Majlis (Parliament) of Azerbaijan appealed to the country's Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov, requesting a reassessment of relations with the United States and the termination of defense cooperation agreements.  The MPs called for halting all projects implemented by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and its non-governmental organizations in Azerbaijan, as well as ending USAID's operations in the country. The MPs' appeal was prepared in response to a letter from a group of U.S. Congress members addressed to Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

06.10.24:  Azerbaijan called on Armenia to abandon provocative actions and make a choice between completing the normalization process or continuing the path of confrontation after a diplomatic clash at the Francophonie summit in France earlier this week. "The Armenian side must make a choice: whether to follow the path of completing the normalization process or continue confrontation in all directions," the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said in a statement. "Azerbaijan is committed to the process of normalization of relations initiated by it."

06.10.24: Famil Khalilov, a paralysed activist, disabled activist of the first group, who is on hunger strike for the 55th day in the pre-trial detention center, was awarded a certificate of gratitude for ‘exemplary behaviour’ by the head of the detention centre. Head of the center, Elnur Ismayilov personally handed Khalilov the award, coming to his cell. This was reported by the activist's wife Kichikhanum Khalilov after a telephone conversation with her husband.

07.10.24: The commander of the Second Army Corps, Lieutenant General Mais Barkhudarov, has been dismissed by the order of the head of state.This was reported by a number of pro-government media. The Defense Ministry does not comment on these reports.                                                                                        In turn, military sources confirmed to Turan Agency the fact of Barkhudarov's dismissal. The same sources said that the reason for the dismissal of the young general (48 years old) and hero of the Second Karabakh War is his involvement in massive violations of the rights of servicemen in the scandalous ‘Terter case’.

08.10.24: Pashinyan and Putin have agreed that the checkpoint between Armenia and Iran will be guarded only by Armenian border guards from 1 January 2025. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan agreed to this during a meeting on 8 October, his spokeswoman Nazeli Baghdasaryan said.

08.10.24: "The United States values its bilateral relationship with Azerbaijan," a State Department Spokesperson on Tuesday told TURAN's Washington correspondent when asked about official Baku's latest efforts to portray the U.S. and the West as enemies of Azerbaijan. "Our cooperation with Azerbaijan to help make COP29 a success and advance shared climate and energy goals is an example of what we can achieve when we work together," a State Department spokesperson said.

08.10.24: The Azerbaijani city of Lachin will become the cultural capital of the CIS in 2025, after which the baton will pass to the Armenian city of Meghri, and then to the Belarusian city of Molodechno, Russian President Vladimir Putin  said at the CIS summit in Moscow on Tuesday.

08.10.24: During  one-on-one meetings, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke with Ilham Aliyev and Nikol Pashinyan for half an hour each, the press secretary of the President of Russia, Dmitry Peskov told journalists. "Well, the topic of the 'Zangezur Corridor' was also touched upon," Peskov said in response to a question about whether this topic was raised during the meetings.

08.10.24: Coast Guard forces intercepted a large shipment of drugs being delivered to Azerbaijan, the State Border Service reported on October 8. In the area near the village of Niyazabad in the Khachmaz region, border guards discovered over 205 kg of various types of narcotic substances and 13,110 tablets of methadone M-40, according to the report.

08.10.24: At a meeting of the Milli Majlis Committee on International Relations and Inter-Parliamentary Relations, a draft resolution on the election of heads of working groups for relations with parliaments of other countries was discussed. Note that the approved draft does not provide for the creation of a group for relations with the French parliament.

08.10.24: International human rights organizations ‘Human Rights Watch’ and ‘Freedom Now’ have published a joint 74-page report in which they report on repressions in Azerbaijan against critics of the government in the run-up to the COP29 conference and call for the release of political prisoners. Note that the human rights organization ‘Amnesty International’ made a similar call.  Azerbaijan is carrying out a brutal attack on government critics, independent groups and the media, all three organizations said.

08.10.24: Major General Namig Islamzadeh has been appointed Deputy Minister of Defence - Commander of the Air Force of Azerbaijan by the order of the President of Azerbaijan.Note that the post of the Air Force Commander was vacant after the retirement of Lieutenant General Ramiz Tahirov in May this year.

08.10.24: Chief of General Staff of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces Kerim Veliyev received a NATO delegation headed by Director General of NATO International Military Staff Janusz Adamczak.The meeting discussed various aspects of co-operation in the military, military-educational fields, regional security issues, etc.

09.10.24: President Ilham Aliyev met with Kerry McCarthy, the UK Minister for International Energy and Climate. During the meeting, they discussed preparations for the upcoming climate conference COP29. According to the embassy's statement, the minister offered the UK's support for hosting COP29. The parties also discussed the importance of the transition to clean energy.

09.10.24: President Ilham Aliyev met with Amina Mohammed, the UN Deputy Secretary-General, to discuss preparations for COP29. During the meeting, Mohammed stated that the main theme of the upcoming conference would be financial issues.

09.10.24: President Ilham Aliyev received John Podesta, the US Presidential Advisor on International Climate Policy. Podesta reported that he had productive negotiations with Azerbaijani colleagues regarding COP29 and was pleased to exchange views on the matter with the President of Azerbaijan. He emphasized the importance of making decisions on the two-year transparency reports and the new financial goal at the upcoming conference. In turn, Ilham Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan had made significant efforts to organize the conference and achieve consensus among participating countries. He also noted the good cooperation between the Azerbaijani and US delegations regarding COP.

09.10.24: Sevinj Vagifgizi, the editor-in-chief of “Abzas Media”, is experiencing discrimination at Baku's Pretrial Detention Center No. 1, where she has been denied visits with her mother. This occurred after she revealed information about foreign citizens voting in the detention center during the extraordinary parliamentary elections, her mother, Ofelia Maharramova said.

10.10.24: The border service reported that as a result of the ongoing border and operational search measures in the field of ensuring the security of the state border, combating illegal migration, 6 people were detained who tried to violate the state border of Azerbaijan.

10.10.24: Azerbaijan is taking bold steps to overcome the challenges of climate change, President Ilham Aliyev said in his welcome message to participants of the two-day Pre-COP29 conference opening in Baku.

10.10.24: France's Energy Minister, Olga Givernet,  arrived in Baku to participate in the pre-conference discussions for COP29. "Pre-COP29 discussions are essential for preparing for COP29 and advancing on key climate issues. The event in Baku represents a turning point in debates on climate finance, fossil fuels, and adaptation," Olga Givernet wrote on her account on the platform X. She did not have any meetings with Azerbaijani officials.

11.10.24: According to the General Prosecutor's Office of Azerbaijan, the Binaqadi Court in Baku has extended the detention period for the previously arrested leaders of the Karabakh separatists: Arkadiy Gukasyan, Bako Saakyan, Araik Arutyunyan, David Babayan, David Ishkhanyan, Leva Mnatsakanyan, David Manukyan, and Ruben Vardanyan. The corresponding motion was submitted to the court by the Investigative Department of the General Prosecutor's Office of Azerbaijan.

11.10.24:  John Podesta, Senior Advisor to the US President on Climate Policy, has denied claims by official Baku that a letter from a group of congressmen calling for sanctions against the Azerbaijani authorities was written in the State Department. During a briefing in Baku, commenting on the allegations at Turan's request, he said that the strength of American democracy is in the separation of powers.

11.10.24: Azerbaijan's parliament has ratified a series of agreements with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to host the 29th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP29) in Baku. The agreements were signed in Baku on August 17, 2024, and in Bonn on August 23, 2024, between the Azerbaijani government and the Secretariat of the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.

11.10.24: On 10 and 11 October, Commissioner for Climate Action Wopke Hoekstra attended the last ministerial meeting before COP29. With just a month to go until the COP29 in Baku, it was an important occasion to address topics like climate finance, international carbon markets and Article 6, adaptation, mitigation, transparent reporting and the follow-up of the COP28 commitment to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels.

12.10.24: A video conference meeting was held at the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense with the participation of military leadership, commanders of the branches of the armed forces, and leaders of major military units. The minister issued specific instructions on "maintaining the combat readiness of the troops at a high level, increasing vigilance, and being prepared to take preventive measures against all possible provocations by revanchist forces along the conditional border."

14.10.24:  European observers are creating "distrust" between Baku and Brussels, stated President Ilham Aliyev   during the presentation of credentials by the new Belgian ambassador, Julien de Frepon. Aliyev emphasized that the "binocular diplomacy" of the European monitoring mission is unacceptable and contributes to distrust in Azerbaijan's relations with the European Union.

14.10.24:  In the morning near Gushchu Ayrym village of Gazakh region (bordering Armenia) a local resident Ilkin Saryev (born in 2001) exploded on an anti-personnel mine. This is stated in a joint report of the Interior Ministry, the General Prosecutor's Office and ANAMA demining agency. The young man was injured while grazing cattle. He was taken to hospital, his right leg was injured, his condition is stable, the report said.

15.10.24:  According to the press service of the General Prosecutor's Office of Azerbaijan, French citizen Cedric Michel, accused by Luxembourg authorities of economic crimes, and Turkish citizen Oguz Atalay, accused by Romanian authorities of forming an organized crime group and illegal migrant smuggling, were placed on international wanted lists and arrested in Azerbaijan.

15.10.24:  Public activist Nijat Ibrahim, who protested against the Interior Ministry's ban on travelling out of the country, is behind bars. A criminal case has been opened against him under Article 126.1 (intentional damage to health) of the Criminal Code, lawyer Zibeyda Sadygova told Turan. The Nasimi district court arrested him for four months back on 9 September, she said. Ibrahim faces up to 8 years of imprisonment. It was not possible to get a comment from the Interior Ministry.

15.10.24:  Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi during his visit to Iran. According to İRNA, Araghchi stated that Iran opposes external interference in the South Caucasus and supports resolving all issues by the countries in the region, including in the 3+3 format. He also emphasized the need for global action to halt Israel's operations, supported by Western countries, against the "defenseless people of Palestine and Lebanon." According to the same source, Mustafayev described the cooperation between Azerbaijan and Iran in trade, investments, transit, electricity, water resources, and the oil industry as beneficial and constructive. He emphasized that Baku advocates for peace in the region and stated that "Azerbaijan will never allow its territory to be used for attacks against its neighbors." During his visit to Tehran, Mustafayev also met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad, Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzana Sadiq, and Minister of Economy Abdunasit Khimmati.

16.10.24: Over 95% of drugs were smuggled into Azerbaijan from Iran. This is stated in the report of the State Commission of Azerbaijan on Combating Drug Addiction and Illegal Drug Trafficking for 9 months of the last year. 4 tonnes 881 kg. of the total amount of confiscated drugs (82%) were marijuana. Of these, 3 tonnes 888 kg. were enriched marijuana imported from abroad.

16.10.24: The United States said it'd 'never tied' a possible peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia to Baku hosting the UN’s COP29 climate conference next month, TURAN's Washington correspondent reporters. "We wanted to see a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan months ago and have been pushing for a peace agreement, ultimately hoped to get one over the line," State Department's Spokesperson Matthew Miller told a daily briefing when responding to TURAN's questions.

17.10.24:  In a sudden shift in policy, the newly elected president of the Congress of New Caledonia, Veilma Faleo, announced the cancellation of a controversial cooperation agreement with Azerbaijan. The agreement, which had been signed earlier this year under Faleo’s predecessor, Roh Wamitan, was intended to bolster New Caledonia’s struggle for independence from France. However, the move provoked a sharp reaction from the French government, which accused Azerbaijan of meddling in its overseas territories and stoking separatist ambitions.

17.10.24: Azerbaijani scientist, anti-corruption activist and politician Gubad Ibadoglu is among three nominees for the European Parliament's Sakharov ‘Prize for Freedom of Thought’ for 2024.

18.10.24: The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry evening published a statement on the results of the meeting in Istanbul, which reads:"On October 18, 2024, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Ceyhun Bayramov and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan met in Istanbul within the framework of the "3+3" regional consultative platform. The sides continued negotiations on the Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations and agreed to make more efforts to conclude it as soon as possible.”

18.10.24: At a joint meeting of foreign ministers from Türkiye, Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov emphasized the critical role of regional cooperation in countering foreign militarization and geopolitical tensions in the South Caucasus. Bayramov highlighted the impending completion of transport links between Azerbaijan's Eastern Zangezur and Nakhchivan regions via Iran and reaffirmed Baku's dedication to a lasting peace with Armenia, urging constitutional reforms to prevent future conflicts. In response, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan advocated for enhanced connectivity through the Gyumri-Kars railway between Armenia and Türkiye, noting Armenia’s readiness with border infrastructure. Mirzoyan proposed that Baku streamline border and customs protocols, highlighting the potential of regional railways to connect the Persian Gulf with the Black, Caspian, and Mediterranean Seas.

18.10.24:  In Azerbaijan is celebrated as the Independence Restoration Day.

21.10.24: Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov met with Michael Carpenter, the U.S. National Security Council's Director for Europe. The parties discussed bilateral and regional issues, as well as the current situation and prospects for normalizing relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Foreign Ministry's press service.

21.10.24: President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev received Michael Carpenter, Special Assistant to the President of the United States and Director General for Europe of the National Security Council.As reported by the press service of the President, Michael Carpenter presented Aliyev with a letter from US President Joseph Biden.In a letter to Aliyev, Biden expressed support for the progress toward a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, emphasizing the U.S.'s commitment to backing a lasting peace that respects Azerbaijan's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Biden noted that such an agreement could transform the region, enhancing trade, investment, and connectivity across Europe and Central Asia. As COP29 approaches in Baku, he encouraged Aliyev to seize the opportunity to demonstrate his dedication to peace on the global stage, urging compromise to finalize the agreement this year. Biden highlighted his administration's readiness to support the peace process, with Michael Carpenter set to discuss U.S. initiatives with Aliyev.

22.10.24: At the invitation of the Minister of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic, Lieutenant General Baktybek Bekbolotov, Azerbaijani Minister of Defense Zakir Hasanov departed on an official visit to Kyrgyzstan today. According to the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, Hasanov will hold talks with his Kyrgyz counterpart Baktybek Bekbolotov and other officials from the country.

22.10.24: A fire broke out at the Heydar Aliyev Oil Refinery in Baku’s Nizami district, one of Azerbaijan's largest refineries, according to the Ministry of Emergency Situations. The State Fire Protection Service quickly responded to the scene, successfully containing and extinguishing the blaze to prevent further spread. Social media footage indicated the fire occurred in the refinery's production area. Further details have not yet been disclosed.

22.10.24: Heavy rains in Baku led to severe flooding in several districts, including Sabunchi, Bingady, and Narimanov, as poorly designed underground passages and tunnels—decorated with marble but lacking proper drainage—filled with water up to 1.5-2 meters deep. Dozens of cars were stranded, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations had to block tunnel entrances and pump out the water. This incident highlighted criticisms of former mayor Hajibala Abutalibov’s focus on aesthetics over functionality in infrastructure projects. Residents are now questioning the accountability of officials responsible for these infrastructure decisions.

23.10.24: Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev left for Kazan to participate in the BRICS meeting.

23.10.24:  The European Parliament’s Social Democrats and Greens groups have called for the immediate release of Azerbaijani political prisoners, including economist Gubad Ibadoglu, ahead of the COP29 climate summit in Baku. The Social Democrats urged Azerbaijan to address its deteriorating human rights situation, suggesting that EU agreements with Azerbaijan be tied to human rights progress and peace with Armenia. Both groups urged the EU to suspend its gas agreement with Azerbaijan until conditions improve. MEPs Sergey Lagodinsky and Markéta Gregorová condemned Azerbaijan’s repression of civil society, advocating for strong EU support for opposition voices at COP29.

24.10.24:  Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met in Kazan during the 16th BRICS summit on October 24, 2024. According to statements from both leaders' offices, the discussions focused on advancing a peace treaty, border delimitation and demarcation, and other mutual interests. The foreign ministers were directed to continue negotiations on the Agreement on Peace and Interstate Relations to expedite its finalization and conclusion.

24.10.24:  The European Parliament condemned Azerbaijan’s human rights abuses and urged the EU to end its gas dependency on Baku in a resolution adopted Thursday. MEPs highlighted Azerbaijan's intensified repression of activists, journalists, and opposition leaders ahead of COP29, arguing these actions are incompatible with hosting the climate summit. The resolution called for the release of political prisoners, an end to arbitrary detentions, and the withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from Armenian territory, stressing that future EU-Azerbaijan partnerships should be conditional on human rights improvements and commitment to peace with Armenia. The resolution passed with 453 votes in favor, 31 against, and 89 abstentions.

24.10.24:  During a European Parliament debate, Commissioner Nicolas Schmit urged Azerbaijan to use the upcoming COP29 summit as an opportunity to address human rights issues, calling for the release of detained activists and journalists, including Sakharov Prize finalist Gubad Ibadoghlu. Schmit also highlighted the chance for Azerbaijan and Armenia to advance peace efforts. In response, Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry criticized Schmit's statements as "baseless" and "biased," accusing the EU of interfering in Azerbaijan's internal affairs while ignoring human rights issues within its own member states. The Ministry called on the EU to adopt a more balanced stance on regional stability and peace.

25.10.24:  Ambassador Libby met with Dr. Gubad Ibadoglu and expressed concern for his health.The United States calls on Azerbaijan to adhere to its international human rights commitments and obligations, and to lift the restrictions on Dr. Ibadoglu and to release all those unjustly detained, - reads a press-release of the US Embassy to Azerbaijan.

25.10.24:  Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry summoned EU Ambassador Peter Michalko to deliver a protest note against the European Parliament's recent resolution and statements by a European Commissioner. The Ministry criticized what it described as an EU-led "smear campaign" that undermines Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, interferes in its internal affairs, and fosters revanchism in Armenia, which it claims hampers regional peace efforts. Azerbaijan emphasized its commitment to EU relations based on mutual respect and urged the EU to avoid actions that could harm bilateral relations or violate Azerbaijan's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

25.10.24:  Ilham Aliyev signed a decree approving the "Regulation on the Joint Activities of the State Commission for the Demarcation of the State Border between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the Commission on the Demarcation of the State Border and Border Security Issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan."

25.10.24:  The Milli Majlis of Azerbaijan criticized the European Parliament's recent resolution as "biased and one-sided," accusing MEPs of anti-Azerbaijani sentiments and ignoring Azerbaijan's sovereignty. Azerbaijani parliamentarians objected to what they see as European support for Armenia's armed forces, which they claim fuels revanchist tendencies and risks reigniting regional conflict. The Milli Majlis also condemned MEPs' attempts to politicize the COP29 climate conference and their call for the release of former Karabakh separatist leaders, whom Azerbaijan considers war criminals. The European Parliament's resolution had condemned Azerbaijan for human rights abuses, stating these were incompatible with hosting COP29 in Baku.

25.10.24:  Baku’s Khatai district court rejected a complaint from Abzas Media director Ulvi Hasanly regarding inhuman treatment and poor conditions in pre-trial detention at Baku SIZO-1. Hasanly's lawyer, Zibeida Sadigova, detailed issues such as limited water access, cramped cell space, personal searches, monitored phone calls, and restricted visits with his child. Hasanly reported threats following his exposure of torture cases within the detention center, implicating officers in severe abuse of detainees. Despite the absence of Penitentiary Service representatives in court, the complaint was dismissed, and Hasanly’s defense team plans to appeal the decision.

25.10.24:  During the October 24 meeting between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Kazan, the topic of prisoners was discussed, with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan proposing the return of some Armenian servicemen in exchange for Armenian participation in COP29. Aliyev reportedly responded by questioning Pashinyan’s lack of demand for Ruben Vardanyan, to which Pashinyan replied that he knew Azerbaijan would not release him. Aliyev noted that Vardanyan was, instead, being requested by Russia, according to Armenian daily Hraparak. Mirzoyan shared details of this exchange in a closed session with Civil Contract deputies.

26.10.24:  The President of COP29, Azerbaijan's Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources Mukhtar Babayev met with John Podesta, Senior Advisor to the U.S. President on International Climate Policy, information on the COP29 page on the social platform "X." The parties discussed the importance of cooperation and global action to address climate change in the lead-up to the 29th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29), which will take place in Baku from November 11 to 22.

26.10.24:  Muslim Unity Movement activist Akhsan Nuruzade was detained, just 20 days after his release from prison. Nuruzade was reportedly taken by four civilians while meeting his daughter in Baku, and his whereabouts remain unknown. Attempts by his family to contact authorities have gone unanswered. Previously, in 2017, Nuruzade was charged with drug trafficking and sentenced to seven years in prison, a case that human rights organizations view as politically motivated.

27.10.24:  President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev congratulated Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze on the results of the parliamentary elections held in Georgia and the victory of the Georgian Dream - Democratic Georgia party.

28.10.24:  The Baku Serious Crimes Court sentenced Muslim Unity Movement member Hasan Abbaszade to three years in prison, initially charging him with large-scale drug trafficking but later reducing the charge to drug storage for personal use. Abbaszade, who declared his innocence before his arrest, later recanted self-incriminating statements, claiming they were made under pressure. His lawyer, Zibeida Sadigova, cited procedural violations during the investigation, including the lack of a timely search and failure to review surveillance footage. The defense plans to appeal the verdict and may take the case to the European Court of Human Rights if necessary.

28.10.24:  Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met with Pakistan’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Sahir Shamshad Mirza, reaffirming mutual support for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Aliyev highlighted discussions on Azerbaijani investments in Pakistan, potentially totaling $2 billion, during his recent visit to Islamabad. He praised the addition of Pakistan's JF-17C aircraft to Azerbaijan’s Air Force and expressed anticipation for Pakistan's Prime Minister’s participation in COP29 and an upcoming state visit. General Mirza emphasized the deep ties between the nations, with Azerbaijan backing Pakistan on Kashmir and Pakistan supporting Azerbaijan regarding Armenia.

28.10.24:  Baku hosted a round table discussing Azerbaijan-NATO cooperation on energy security and climate change, marking Azerbaijan's 30th anniversary in NATO's "Partnership for Peace" program. Attended by NATO officials, experts, and Azerbaijani academics, the event focused on Azerbaijan's role in Europe's energy security, threats to critical infrastructure, and climate-related challenges.

29.10.24:  Azerbaijani political émigrés held a protest outside the White House, demanding the release of political prisoners in Azerbaijan. The demonstrators called for a boycott of the upcoming COP29 climate conference in Baku and displayed portraits of detainees. While Azerbaijani authorities deny claims of politically motivated persecution, local human rights organizations report 319 political prisoners in the country.

30.10.24:  Elchin Amirbayov, special representative of the Azerbaijani President, met with UK government and parliament members, including National Security Advisor Tim Barrow and Minister Stephen Doughty, during his visit to the UK. Discussions focused on Azerbaijan-UK relations, the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process, and COP29. Amirbayov also addressed the peace process and COP29 in a speech at Chatham House, as reported by Azerbaijani Ambassador Elin Suleymanov.

30.10.24:  The coalition advocating for transparency in Azerbaijan's extractive industry called for the release of Kanal-13 head Orujov, who has been imprisoned for a year on what it claims are fabricated charges linked to his journalism. Citing violations of the EITI's standards on civil society freedom, the coalition condemned his arrest and urged Azerbaijan to improve human rights ahead of COP29, a major climate event. It also called for the release of other political figures, including Gubad Ibadoglu, and the removal of restrictions on independent civil society and foreign donors.

30.10.24:  Toplum TV founder Alaskar Mammadli faces serious health issues while in detention, including kidney stones and enlarged liver, pancreas, and thyroid nodules requiring surgery. His brother, Nasimi Mammadli, reported that the detention center lacks adequate medical facilities, prompting plans to request house arrest for Alaskar. Despite his poor health, Alaskar has not complained about detention conditions but regards the investigation as “legal terror,” noting he has not been interrogated in over six months. Appeals to authorities for his release remain unanswered, and human rights defenders consider him and other Toplum TV staff political prisoners.

30.10.24:  'Radio Liberty' president Stephen Capus has called for the release of journalist and economist Farid Mehralizadeh.

31.10.24:  The Baku Court for Serious Crimes sentenced Afghan citizen Fawzan Musa Khan to 10 years in prison for planning a terrorist act in Azerbaijan. Khan was found guilty of preparing a weapon-based attack targeting a foreign embassy in Baku. According to Azerbaijan’s State Security Service, Khan arrived in Azerbaijan with intent to commit criminal acts, surveilled the embassy, sought firearms and explosives, and attempted to recruit accomplices. The Times of Israel previously reported that Iran may have financed and directed the attack against the Israeli Embassy in Azerbaijan. Neither Khan's family nor officials from Afghanistan or Iran have commented on the case.

31.10.24: The Sumgait court convicted several Azerbaijani Armed Forces officers in the "Terter case" for torturing fellow servicemen. Fuad Agayev received a 13-year sentence, Gurban Jumshudov 10 years, Fuad Akhundov and Ramil Akhmedov each 9 years and 6 months, and Javid Agadadashov 10 years. These officers, including an assistant to former corps commander Hikmet Hasanov, were found guilty of torture, illegal imprisonment, and abuse of office. The Terter case dates back to 2017, when over 450 servicemen were detained and tortured under false accusations of espionage, leading to at least 10 deaths. High-ranking officials involved in the case have not been punished.

31.10.24: Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov and UK Minister Stephen Doughty discussed the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process, bilateral relations, and regional issues in a recent phone call. They expressed satisfaction with cooperation in energy, education, and investments, with particular attention to alternative energy projects involving SOCAR and BP. Bayramov highlighted progress in peace negotiations with Armenia but identified Armenia's constitutional territorial claims as a key obstacle. Preparations for COP29 were also discussed.

31.10.24: Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan addressed Armenia's potential participation in COP29 in Baku, stating it is still unconfirmed. He highlighted ongoing talks with Azerbaijan about the release of prisoners and border delimitation, emphasizing Armenia’s goal of securing its 29,743 square kilometers of sovereign territory, including over 200 square kilometers currently occupied. Mirzoyan dismissed Azerbaijan’s demands for constitutional changes, citing Armenia’s Constitutional Court's alignment with the Alma-Ata Declaration. He also stressed that all unblocked infrastructure should remain under the sovereignty and laws of the countries involved.

Increased attention

03.10.24: On October 2-3, Sergey Naryshkin, Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, made an official visit to Baku, where he met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and the leadership of Azerbaijan's Foreign Intelligence Service and State Security Service.

Russia Signals Interest in Azerbaijan Amid Rising Tensions with the West

In a move that underscores Russia's strategic interest in the South Caucasus, Sergei Naryshkin, Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), visited Baku earlier this week, holding high-level meetings with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and officials from Azerbaijan's intelligence agencies. The visit, held on October 2-3, highlights Moscow’s intention to reinforce its influence in the region amid a backdrop of growing anti-Western rhetoric from both Russian and Azerbaijani leadership.

During the talks, Naryshkin and Aliyev reportedly discussed a broad range of issues concerning bilateral intelligence cooperation, focusing on counterterrorism and measures to combat Western influence. According to a statement released by the SVR, the two sides addressed “hostile aspirations of Western special services aimed at undermining internal political stability” in Russia and Azerbaijan, and underscored the need for enhanced collaboration to counter external threats.

The visit, which went unreported by the Azerbaijani side, reflects the deepening alignment between Moscow and Baku. Naryshkin’s meetings with the heads of Azerbaijan’s Foreign Intelligence Service and State Security Service were described by the SVR as constructive, mutually beneficial, and centered on protecting the national interests of both countries.

This rapprochement comes at a time when President Aliyev has sharply escalated his criticism of the United States and its allies, accusing them of pursuing a policy of “ingratitude” toward Azerbaijan. Speaking to residents in the Jabrayil region on Friday, Aliyev lambasted Washington for the recent calls by American lawmakers to impose sanctions on Azerbaijan. He pointed fingers at the U.S. State Department, suggesting it orchestrated these initiatives to undermine Baku’s position.

“Sixty pro-Armenian members of Congress have called for new sanctions against Azerbaijan. This is a hostile move that will not deter us,” Aliyev declared. “They write letters to themselves, threaten us, accuse us.” He went on to criticize the U.S. for what he described as double standards, recalling that the 907th Amendment, which restricted U.S. aid to Azerbaijan in 1992, was waived only when Baku’s support was needed during the occupation of Afghanistan.

“When they fled from Afghanistan in disgrace, the sanctions were imposed on us again. What kind of friendship is this?” Aliyev remarked, adding that Western powers cannot forgive Azerbaijan for restoring its territorial integrity without their blessing.

Aliyev’s statements were echoed by Alexander Bortnikov, the head of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), who claimed that Western countries are seeking to insert a NATO peacekeeping presence in the South Caucasus under the guise of a United Nations mission. Speaking at a meeting of CIS security officials in Astana, Bortnikov argued that the EU monitoring mission currently stationed on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border is conducting intelligence operations in the interests of specific NATO countries.

“The Americans and Europeans are clearly not interested in establishing stability in Transcaucasia,” Bortnikov asserted. “By inciting Yerevan to delay negotiations with Baku, the West is trying to steer the settlement process and push for the deployment of its own ‘peacekeeping’ contingent in the region.”

Bortnikov’s remarks align with the broader narrative espoused by Russian officials, who have increasingly framed the West as a destabilizing force in the post-Soviet space. According to Bortnikov, NATO’s aim is to draw Armenia away from its reliance on the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and further integrate it into Western security structures.

The European Union first established its monitoring mission in Armenia in February 2023, deploying 100 personnel with a mandate to monitor the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and help prevent a resurgence of hostilities. In December 2023, the mission was expanded to 209 personnel, a move that has been sharply criticized by Moscow.

Bortnikov warned that Western attempts to consolidate their presence in the South Caucasus could spill over into other parts of the former Soviet Union, drawing Belarus, the Baltic states, Poland, and Moldova into a wider web of conflict. He emphasized that the involvement of NATO in the region would not contribute to long-term stability.

The coordinated messages from Naryshkin and Bortnikov illustrate the extent to which Russia is recalibrating its posture in the South Caucasus, as it faces intensifying geopolitical competition. For Moscow, maintaining a strategic foothold in Azerbaijan—an energy-rich nation pivotal to the Caspian region’s stability—is critical. At the same time, Baku appears willing to lean closer to Russia, leveraging its relationship with Moscow as a counterbalance against perceived Western attempts to curtail its sovereignty.

However, Azerbaijan’s drift toward Russia is not without risks. Despite its rhetoric, Baku has maintained a delicate balance between Moscow and the West, welcoming Western investments while sustaining close security ties with Russia. Any significant shift in this equilibrium could complicate Baku’s foreign policy strategy, particularly as it seeks to navigate the turbulent waters of the Caspian basin where the interests of great powers collide.

The Long road to peace

06.10.24:  Azerbaijan called on Armenia to abandon provocative actions and make a choice between completing the normalization process or continuing the path of confrontation after a diplomatic clash at the Francophonie summit in France earlier this week. "The Armenian side must make a choice: whether to follow the path of completing the normalization process or continue confrontation in all directions," the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said in a statement. "Azerbaijan is committed to the process of normalization of relations initiated by it."

31.10.24: Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov and UK Minister Stephen Doughty discussed the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process, bilateral relations, and regional issues in a recent phone call. They expressed satisfaction with cooperation in energy, education, and investments, with particular attention to alternative energy projects involving SOCAR and BP. Bayramov highlighted progress in peace negotiations with Armenia but identified Armenia's constitutional territorial claims as a key obstacle. Preparations for COP29 were also discussed.

31.10.24: Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan addressed Armenia's potential participation in COP29 in Baku, stating it is still unconfirmed. He highlighted ongoing talks with Azerbaijan about the release of prisoners and border delimitation, emphasizing Armenia’s goal of securing its 29,743 square kilometers of sovereign territory, including over 200 square kilometers currently occupied. Mirzoyan dismissed Azerbaijan’s demands for constitutional changes, citing Armenia’s Constitutional Court's alignment with the Alma-Ata Declaration. He also stressed that all unblocked infrastructure should remain under the sovereignty and laws of the countries involved.

"The goal is to pressure Azerbaijan into signing an incomplete peace agreement"

Armenia hopes to sign provisions of a peace agreement with Azerbaijan within the next four weeks. Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan told Reuters that Yerevan wants to sign the 16 provisions already agreed upon with Baku before the UN Climate Conference in Baku, scheduled for November 11-22.

Speaking at the Sustainability Conference in Hamburg, he said:
"If it were up to us, we would sign it right now, today. But we hope that sooner or later we will reach that point."

Last week, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan stated in Warsaw that Azerbaijan lacks the "political will" to sign a peace agreement with Armenia and might be planning additional military operations against Armenia.

"For some reasons and certain calculations, they keep presenting new preconditions, and we see that Baku simply does not want to sign the document... We do not see political will from the Azerbaijani side," he said.

Mirzoyan also expressed serious concerns about Azerbaijan's potential additional military plans regarding Armenian territories:

"I can give an example. Currently, Azerbaijan is using the term 'Western Azerbaijan,' referring to Armenia's territory. We are assured that this is not a territorial claim, but unfortunately, the impression is entirely different."

The head of the Press Office of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aykhan Hajizadeh, dismissed Mirzoyan's statements:

"Mirzoyan made baseless comments against Azerbaijan at the Warsaw Forum."

Hajizadeh added that the Warsaw Forum aimed to incite anti-Azerbaijani sentiment, and the Armenian Foreign Minister engaged in disinformation and manipulation during his speech at the forum.

Political analyst Oktay Gasimov said in an interview with ASTNA that Armenia's statements about its readiness to sign a peace agreement are not genuine and instead are part of a broader strategy to create international pressure on Azerbaijan.

* * *

Question: Mr. Oktay, the President of Armenia, Vahagn Khachaturyan, stated that they are ready to sign a peace agreement with Azerbaijan. Is Armenia really prepared to sign the peace agreement, or is this just a bluff?

Answer: The statements made by Armenian officials about their readiness to sign a peace agreement are not sincere. These statements should be viewed as propaganda and manipulation. The intention is not to achieve peace but to create the perception that Armenia is a constructive party, thereby manipulating international public opinion and keeping pressure on Azerbaijan to change the situation in Armenia’s favor. The ongoing anti-Azerbaijani rhetoric from Armenia and its supporters in recent months indicates that this is a coordinated effort. It is worth noting the sharp increase in criticism from the United States, European institutions, and international organizations against Azerbaijan. The sudden intensification of these critiques, despite no significant changes in the human rights situation since the 1990s, raises questions. In my view, the goal is to pressure Azerbaijan into signing an incomplete peace agreement. The manipulation of the issue of Karabakh Armenians also serves this purpose.

Question: Last week, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan claimed in Warsaw that Azerbaijan lacks the "political will" to sign a peace agreement with Armenia. How credible is this claim?

Answer: Mirzoyan's speech in Warsaw should be considered a blow to the process because it was entirely an accusation against Azerbaijan. This position should be seen as part of the aforementioned pressure campaign. Logically, a party seeking peace should avoid rhetoric that harms the process. However, in the case of Mirzoyan and the ministry he leads, we see the opposite. Recently, in various platforms, Mirzoyan has tried to accuse Azerbaijan of "ethnic cleansing." The Armenian Foreign Ministry's statement on September 19 is also detrimental to the peace process and is an unacceptable behavior. Azerbaijan's stance on the peace agreement is clear: provisions in the Armenian Constitution and other legislative acts that represent territorial claims against Azerbaijan should be abolished. Without resolving these issues, achieving lasting peace is impossible. At present, instead of demonstrating political will towards sustainable peace, Armenia is more engaged in manipulation.

Question: Mirzoyan stated that Baku has repeatedly rejected Yerevan's proposal to sign an "interim peace agreement" and that Azerbaijan continues to introduce new preconditions. Why doesn’t Azerbaijan want to sign an interim peace agreement, and what could be its conditions for signing the document?

Answer: This is simply demagoguery. A peace agreement either exists or it does not. If not all issues in the process are agreed upon, it means that the process is not complete. If real peace is desired, all issues should be agreed upon. Otherwise, suggesting to sign 80% of the agreement now and agree on the rest later is unacceptable. Who guarantees that Armenia will fulfill its promises on the remaining issues in the future? I do not believe it will. For example, the same Pashinyan, who signed the tripartite statement on November 10, now avoids fulfilling his commitments regarding the Zangezur corridor. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the promises made today will be fulfilled in the future.

It should be noted that Azerbaijan has been proposing a peace agreement based on 5 core principles to Armenia for more than 3 years. While Armenia initially accepted this proposal, it later started making amendments to it, which was an attempt to prolong the negotiation process. Particularly, the attempts to include provisions such as the "rights and security of Karabakh Armenians" in the text of the peace agreement aimed to place a separatist nest under international control, which was unacceptable. The deliberate prolongation of the process has resulted in the document undergoing its 10th revision. The fact that Armenia responded to the last revision after 70 days can also be seen as an indication of its intention to prolong the process. Moreover, Armenia seeks to sit at the negotiating table only with the involvement of mediators, which allows for external interference and prolongation of the process. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, proposes a bilateral direct negotiation format, which can be considered the most optimal option. The effectiveness of this format has already been proven. Currently, Azerbaijan's main demand is that Armenia amends its Constitution and that a joint request is made to legally terminate the activities of the OSCE Minsk Group, which Armenia is avoiding.

Question: Mirzoyan mentioned that Azerbaijan is planning new military operations against Armenia. Could this be possible?

Answer: Mirzoyan is trying to accuse Azerbaijan of premeditated actions. In reality, Armenia's current policy is based on provoking Azerbaijan into retaliatory actions by instigating incidents on the borders. The rapid armament of Armenia and the so-called "civilian" mission of the EU, which cooperates with Armenian military personnel, should be seen as indicators of potential future revenge attempts and upcoming tensions. If the obstacles to signing the peace agreement are not removed and Armenia's intensive armament continues, the possibility of military confrontation becomes real.

Question: They claim to be concerned about the term "Western Azerbaijan." Could Azerbaijan have such a plan?

Answer: Issues regarding the rights of Western Azerbaijanis have been on the agenda, in one way or another, since they were subjected to ethnic cleansing in Armenia. However, in recent years, the prominence of the term "Western Azerbaijan" is linked to Armenia's revanchist policy. The Armenian stance on mutual recognition of territorial integrity, one of the core principles of the peace agreement proposed by Azerbaijan, should be deemed unacceptable. Armenia's attempts to hinder the process by manipulating the issue of Karabakh Armenians and creating an uncontrolled gray zone in the region prompted Azerbaijan to take appropriate steps, and rightfully, this issue was brought to the negotiation table.

Question: Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia Vahan Kostanyan stated that there is no clause in the draft Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement concerning the return of Azerbaijanis to Armenia. Does this mean there is no clause regarding the return of Armenians to Azerbaijan either? How should these issues be resolved?

Answer: Although this issue is not included in the document, its discussion is an undeniable fact. After the trilateral meeting in Brussels in July 2023, facilitated by EU President Charles Michel, it was evident that this issue was discussed. The same issue was reiterated during the foreign ministers' meeting in Moscow a week later. I believe that Azerbaijan’s position is that the issue should be approached comprehensively and conducted in parallel. Either both, or neither. Azerbaijan's position on Karabakh Armenians is clear: meetings have been held with their representatives, a reintegration plan has been presented, and it has been declared at the highest level that those who accept Azerbaijani citizenship and abide by its laws will be guaranteed fundamental rights. However, they voluntarily decided to relocate to Armenia instead of accepting this. In contrast, is Armenia willing to allow the return of Azerbaijanis? No. On the contrary, they claim that such a process would threaten Armenia’s security and try to prevent it. Even the Speaker of the Armenian Parliament crossed the line and suggested that we should return to Altai.

Question: What are your proposals for the swift signing of the peace agreement?

Answer: If external mediators do not interfere in the process, peace could be achieved in the region in a short period of time. Therefore, a bilateral negotiation format is necessary. However, it is difficult to say whether this will be realized. Armenia does not want to sit at the table alone with Azerbaijan under any circumstances. It believes that its position would significantly weaken in such a scenario. Therefore, it is trying to involve the US or other Western institutions in the negotiation process. This stance currently leads the process to a deadlock. To exit this deadlock, political will must be demonstrated. Will Armenia show such political will in the near future? While the probability is low, it is still possible.

The Iranian adjustment

15.10.24:  Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi during his visit to Iran. According to İRNA, Araghchi stated that Iran opposes external interference in the South Caucasus and supports resolving all issues by the countries in the region, including in the 3+3 format. He also emphasized the need for global action to halt Israel's operations, supported by Western countries, against the "defenseless people of Palestine and Lebanon." According to the same source, Mustafayev described the cooperation between Azerbaijan and Iran in trade, investments, transit, electricity, water resources, and the oil industry as beneficial and constructive. He emphasized that Baku advocates for peace in the region and stated that "Azerbaijan will never allow its territory to be used for attacks against its neighbors." During his visit to Tehran, Mustafayev also met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad, Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzana Sadiq, and Minister of Economy Abdunasit Khimmati.

"The Iranian authorities have realized that speaking to Azerbaijan in a threatening tone is ineffective"

In a rare moment of diplomatic openness, Iranian President Masoud Pezeşkian has pledged to resolve the lingering tensions surrounding the attack on Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran. During an October 14 meeting with Azerbaijan’s Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev, Pezeşkian underscored the importance of deepening cooperation between the two countries, signaling a shift from the sometimes hostile rhetoric that has marked relations between Tehran and Baku in recent years.

“There is no need to build walls at borders to strengthen and promote security, peace, and communication between countries,” Pezeşkian said, hinting at a more collaborative future. He stressed the brotherly ties between Iran and Azerbaijan, emphasizing that “the expansion of relations between the two countries is very valuable to us.” However, he also noted that the involvement of non-regional powers in the South Caucasus remains a sensitive issue for Tehran, a subtle yet pointed reminder of Iran’s longstanding apprehensions about foreign influence in the region.

But can Tehran’s olive branch be trusted?

Nasimi Mammadli, a political analyst, remains skeptical. “It’s difficult to point to any consistent evidence of Iran’s friendliness toward Azerbaijan,” Mammadli told ASTNA, referencing the tumultuous history between the two nations.

* * *

Question: The Iranian president called Azerbaijan a friend and brother. Given the events between Iran and Azerbaijan since 2020, how sincere can we consider Pezeşkian's remarks, and how likely is it that Iran will remain committed to this policy?

Answer: So far, it has been difficult to present facts that demonstrate a friendly attitude from the Iranian leadership towards Azerbaijan. On the contrary, there are many instances of unfriendly relations. We can only hope that this approach by the Iranian president is not just his personal stance or a matter of protocol, but that it opens a new window in the future relations of the Iranian state. After all, in Iran, the president does not determine the state's main political direction. While Masoud Pezeşkian may be sincere in his position, he does not define state policy.

Furthermore, in the current contradictory and complex geopolitical processes, any such statements are situational.

We should also consider that Iran's international isolation and threats may prompt it to seek new political relations with its neighbors.

Question: Pezeşkian also said that they do not view the involvement of other countries in the region as aligning with the interests of the regional states. What message is he trying to convey here? Could there be a hidden threat in this seemingly soft message?

Answer: One of the key directions of Azerbaijan's current foreign policy is to live in conditions of close cooperation with regional states. This is even the goal of the 3+3 format. I believe this message is not directed at us. Azerbaijan has already shown its commitment to this policy.

Official Baku has clearly stated that it adheres to the principles of good-neighborliness with all its neighbors, including Iran, and has never and will never allow a third state to use its territory against Iran. At the same time, Azerbaijan remains determined to use all international opportunities for its own security. In my view, the Iranian authorities have realized that speaking to Azerbaijan in a threatening tone is ineffective. This policy has caused them more harm than it has to us.

Question: The Iranian president said that no country's sovereignty should be ignored. But in previous statements, Iran claimed that its border with Armenia is a red line. Should this rhetoric be seen as a continuation of that stance, or has it changed?

Answer: No change has been observed in Iran's policy towards Armenia. Often, rhetoric is used to mask real relationships. However, the unfolding processes in the region and the future actions of the Armenian government do not rule out the possibility of tensions.

In the Middle East and other regions, one of the greatest threats to the sovereignty of various countries has come from the Iranian authorities. Iran, which has occasionally threatened Azerbaijan, has frequently supported Armenia.

Question: Masoud Pezeşkian mentioned that they would monitor the case of the armed attack on Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran until the legal processes are fully completed, but he did not clarify what these processes entail. What should we understand from this? Why is Iran now saying it will investigate the matter?

Answer: According to Iran's official reports, the trial related to this terrorist incident has concluded, but the execution of the verdict has been delayed. I am not fully aware of how the requirements of Iran’s criminal law were followed in this process. It seems that the legal procedures according to Iranian laws have not yet been completed.

In any case, the normalization of Azerbaijan-Iran relations largely depends on this factor. I believe that Iran will complete the legal procedures in this case to foster new and trusting relations with our country.

Question: However, looking at the situation from another perspective, the world's attention is now focused on the Iran-Israel relations due to the ongoing developments in the Middle East. Iran also seems somewhat isolated in this regard. Could it be that Iran, finding itself "trapped," is now seeking allies? Or is Iran trying to improve its relations with Azerbaijan to seek assistance?

Answer: Iran’s isolation is the result of its policies. The proxy forces Iran created to strengthen its ideological, political, and military presence in the Middle East have brought the country to the brink of war. Along with its administrative-political situation, Iran’s social and economic conditions are also deteriorating. Any war could be the beginning of the end for the Iranian regime. Naturally, Tehran would want to avoid such a war. Therefore, we might observe some temporary changes in its traditional policy.

Iran seeks alliances with major powers like Russia and China. In this regard, there is no support Azerbaijan can provide. As I mentioned earlier, we do not allow our territories to be used for military purposes against Iran. Standing in the same trench with Iran also does not align with our policy.

Economic and trade relations between Iran and Azerbaijan continuing and expanding is in the interest of both sides.

Question: What should Azerbaijan's stance be on this matter?

Answer: The behavior of official Tehran has repeatedly demonstrated a jealous attitude toward the existence of the Azerbaijani state. It perceives our country’s strength, independent foreign policy, and secular statehood as a threat. Iran has also expressed concern about Azerbaijan becoming a center of attraction for the Turks living in Iran. Therefore, there is still no trust or confidence in Azerbaijani society regarding a change in Iran's fundamental policy towards us.

Azerbaijan should contribute to the Organization of Turkic States becoming a significant new unity in the region. It should further deepen its strategic relations with Turkey. New transportation and energy corridors from Asia to Europe can greatly promote development, peace, and cooperation in this direction. Azerbaijan should expand bilateral relations with leading Western countries and resolve legal issues in the state-citizen relationship for internal stability and security.

Istanbul 3+3-1 format

18.10.24: The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry evening published a statement on the results of the meeting in Istanbul, which reads:"On October 18, 2024, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Ceyhun Bayramov and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan met in Istanbul within the framework of the "3+3" regional consultative platform. The sides continued negotiations on the Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations and agreed to make more efforts to conclude it as soon as possible.”

18.10.24: At a joint meeting of foreign ministers from Türkiye, Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov emphasized the critical role of regional cooperation in countering foreign militarization and geopolitical tensions in the South Caucasus. Bayramov highlighted the impending completion of transport links between Azerbaijan's Eastern Zangezur and Nakhchivan regions via Iran and reaffirmed Baku's dedication to a lasting peace with Armenia, urging constitutional reforms to prevent future conflicts. In response, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan advocated for enhanced connectivity through the Gyumri-Kars railway between Armenia and Türkiye, noting Armenia’s readiness with border infrastructure. Mirzoyan proposed that Baku streamline border and customs protocols, highlighting the potential of regional railways to connect the Persian Gulf with the Black, Caspian, and Mediterranean Seas.

3+3: A Step Forward with Armenia, A Step Back with Georgia

The meeting between the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Jeyhun Bayramov and Ararat Mirzoyan, held in Istanbul on October 18, 2024, marked another step in ongoing diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict between the two countries. This meeting took place for the first time on the regional cooperation platform known as "3+3."

The "3+3" platform, which was proposed to include the South Caucasus countries of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, along with regional neighbors Turkey, Iran, and Russia, was initiated in 2020 by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkey after the end of the Second Karabakh War. Its main goal is to promote regional cooperation and conflict resolution in the South Caucasus without external interference. This structure has roots in earlier initiatives aimed at stabilizing the region, such as the "Platform for Stability and Cooperation in the Caucasus," proposed by Turkey after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, and even earlier, when presidents Heydar Aliyev, Süleyman Demirel, and Eduard Shevardnadze put forward the idea of a Caucasus Peace Pact.

Despite its ambitions, the platform faces significant challenges, both historical and geopolitical. Russia and Turkey, two key players in the platform, have historically viewed the Caucasus as a strategic battleground. Iran, a regional competitor to Turkey, is wary of Ankara’s influence, especially concerning Azerbaijan. Armenia, having lost the long-standing war over Karabakh to Azerbaijan, remains cautious about fully engaging with a platform that includes historical adversaries.

During the Istanbul meeting, Bayramov emphasized the obstacles to achieving sustainable peace, accusing Armenia of maneuvering with a "hidden agenda" by postponing important decisions. He stressed the need to remove constitutional barriers (referring to Azerbaijan’s demand to remove the clause in Armenia’s constitution about joining Karabakh to Armenia), which could reignite hostility, and to ensure that peace does not depend on internal political dynamics. This view aligns with Azerbaijan's broader strategy of accelerating the restoration of its liberated territories and advancing a peace agreement that guarantees long-term stability.

On the other hand, Mirzoyan focused on the economic dimension of peace, particularly on reopening transport links, such as the Gyumri-Kars railway between Armenia and Turkey. According to Mirzoyan, this railway, along with the one between Armenia and Azerbaijan, could become a vital link between the Persian Gulf, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean, unlocking significant economic potential for the entire region.

While both sides recognize the importance of transport and economic cooperation, the underlying political tensions continue to hinder progress. Bayramov’s remarks about Armenia’s delayed peacebuilding efforts suggest that Baku views Yerevan’s hesitation as a significant obstacle. In contrast, Armenia’s focus on economic connectivity highlights its interest in securing tangible benefits from the peace process before making political concessions.

Regional Contradictions: A Stumbling Block

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, along with his Turkish and Iranian counterparts, has repeatedly stressed the need for Armenia and Azerbaijan to use the 3+3 platform to finalize a peace agreement. However, Russia's role in the region is complicated by its own geopolitical interests. Moscow views the Caucasus as part of its traditional sphere of influence and is cautious about Turkey’s growing presence in the region. Despite working relations with Ankara, particularly in the context of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, Russia remains wary of any long-term shift in the regional balance of power.

Turkey, which has actively integrated itself into Azerbaijan and Georgia and is part of the European security system, stands to benefit the most from peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Establishing peace would extend Turkey’s influence throughout the South Caucasus due to its political-economic power and role as a conduit for Western influence in a region that, despite deviations, still gravitates towards European civilization.

Iran, another key player in the 3+3 format, shares similar concerns. Tehran is particularly sensitive to Azerbaijan’s close ties with Turkey and its growing influence in the region, fearing this could threaten its position in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, Iran’s strained relations with the West make it an unlikely supporter of the kind of comprehensive regional cooperation that the 3+3 platform seeks to achieve.

The Western Perspective on the Region

While the 3+3 platform was conceived as a regional solution to South Caucasus problems, external powers such as the U.S. and the European Union have significant interests in the region. The U.S. has expressed support for a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan but distanced itself from any formal link between the peace process and external events like the upcoming COP29 climate conference. This reflects Washington’s focus on broader strategic goals in the region, including countering Russian and Iranian influence.

The EU, on the other hand, is keen on securing energy supplies from the Caspian region and stabilizing the South Caucasus. However, Brussels has been cautious in engaging with the 3+3 platform, largely due to concerns about Russia and Turkey’s dominance in the framework. Instead, the EU has focused on bilateral relations with individual countries, including its partnership with Azerbaijan in the energy sector.

Despite regional and external contradictions, the 3+3 platform has the potential to become an effective mechanism for addressing the complex political, economic, and security dynamics of the region. The platform's success will depend on the ability of its members to reconcile their conflicting interests and work toward a shared vision for the South Caucasus. If Armenia and Azerbaijan can overcome their political differences and focus on mutual economic benefits, the platform could become a model for regional cooperation. However, without significant progress on the political front, the 3+3 format risks becoming another failed attempt to bring peace to the South Caucasus.

Georgian Postscript

Georgia's absence from the recent 3+3 meeting in Istanbul underscores the country’s delicate geopolitical position. Historically, Georgia advocated for the 2+3 format (U.S., EU + three South Caucasus countries) to emphasize its orientation toward Western institutions. However, the ruling "Georgian Dream" party has, in recent years, shifted toward improving relations with Russia, seeking Moscow’s support in resolving its territorial disputes over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

This strategic recalibration suggests that Georgia may eventually join the 3+3 platform, as participation would align with its broader goals of regional cooperation and stability. The 3+3 format offers Georgia the opportunity to engage directly with key regional powers like Turkey, Russia, and Iran, which could enhance its sovereignty and diplomatic role in the South Caucasus, while balancing its relationships with both Russia and the West. However, this potential shift will require careful management of its Western commitments and its increasingly pragmatic approach to Russi.