Turkey will follow different foreign policy under the Erdogan presidency

Interview with Dr Sezai Ozcelik, head of the International Relations Department at Cankiri Karatekin University

-What should we expect from Turkish policy with President Erdogan?

I think your question refers to the Azeri-Turkish relationship and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In my opinion, Turkey will follow different foreign policy under the Erdogan presidency. President Erdogan stated several times that he will not be a traditional president. As a result, we should expect unexpected things from  the President Erdogan. In foreign policy, Erdogan is mostly pragmatic leader. He has changed Turkish foreign policy according to world system and regional changes. For example, the relationship with the Iraqi Kurdistan region. Four or five  years ago Turkey restricted policy with the Iraqi Kurdistan, but over the  past couple of years, Turkey has totally changed relationship with the Iraqi Kurds. Mesut Barzani visited Turkey and attended an opening ceremony in Diyarbakir. This example shows that Turkey can change its policy in step by step approach. Iraqi Kurds has become a regional ally from a regional foe  during five year period. The same can happen  to the  Armenias-Turkish relations.

-Serj Sargsyan congratulated the elected President Erdogan, and expressed a hope that he will make effort to get Turkish-Armenian protocols get ratified. How serious may Sargsyan’s expectations could be, or is it  just a diplomatic gesture?

Sargsyan expectations can be serious because he expects Erdogan will make some concessionary gestures. I think the concessionary gestures will be tit-for-tat approach. That means if Turkey makes a concession, Armenia will reciprocate it. If Armenia makes a concession, Turkey will reciproacate it. The problem is who will start the concessionary steps. The  Turkish-Armenian protocols are the result of something. That something for Turkey is the resolution of NK conflict. For Armenia, the recognition of 1915 incidents and lifting isolation policies of Turkey and Azerbeijan.

-Are you sure that President Erdogan may visit Armenia in April next year to commemorate of 100-s anniversary of 1915’s events? Do you believe this information in Armenian media?

Yes. I believe President Erdogan may visit Armenia next year in the month of April. The anniversary of 1915 incidents will be next year. I compare and contrast the Egyptian president Enver Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, and  the speech at the Knesset (Israeli Parliament). After Enver Sadat’s visit to Israel, the Camp David Agreement were negotiated, and a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt  as signed under the auspices of the United States. When Enver Sadat announced his visit  to Israel, nobody believed it. But he did that unexpected step. I expect similar steps from Erdogan if there is no major international crisis in the region or in the world. Don’t forget that Erdogan, for the  first time in  the Turkish history, apologized the Armenian Turkish citizens about the 1915 incidents. Erdogan also spoke about the Dersim incidents in which Turkey crashed heavy-handedly upsurgency in the Dersim region during the 1936-38s. Although there is no apology from Turkey non-Turkish citizens, it is stil possible that Erdogan will make a speech about 1915 incidents  at the 100th anniversary in 2015. We can expect that Erdogan will be at the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia in 2015.

-Is there a threat that Turkey will refuse from progress in the  Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict as a precondition for Turkish-Armenia rapprochement process?  

Yes. The possibility that Turkey has lifted its precondition for Turkish-Armenian rapprochement process is increasing. Mentioned above, Turkey’s foreign policy is pragmatic and pro-active. If the regional balance of power and Turkey’s national interests change, it is possible that Turkey makes some conciliatory steps  in its relations  with Armenia without any reciprocation. Also, there is a possibility that the Crimea like crisis will be happen in the NK and Caucasus. If that happens, Turkey will act without consulting Azerbaijan about Turkish-Armenian relations in the framework of the NK conflict.

-By the way, Turkey was monitoring closely a recent military clashes in Karabakh, representatives of the Turkish leadership expressed their position on this conflict. How would you comment on opinion that Turkey is amongst a single states which are really interested in progress in NK and really can play a fruitful role in this process?

In my opinion, Turkey is not amongst a single state in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Unfortunately, NK conflict has progressing to become a frozen conflict like Cyprus. Also, the Crimean Crisis in 2014 can be used to analyze the NK conflict and Turkey’s position. The annexation of Crimea suprised many analysts and scholars. After the Sochi Olympics, most people did not expect that Russia would make such a step. In 1995, the Crimean Crisis happened similarly. But at that time, Ukraine and Russia has made reciprocal conciliatory, and the Crisis was resolved. But in 2014, international system and regional balance power has changed. In the Crimean Crisis, Turkey follows very restricted politics. In Turkey, there is a big Crimean Tatar Diaspora. Moroever,  the Turkish–Ukrainean relations are very good. But interestingly, Turkey has not been involved  in any international sanctions against Russia. Yes. The European Union, especially Germany and the United States, have different policies against Russia. But at least, the European Union has been implementing economic sanctions for Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. If we look at Turkey, Turkish Foreign Ministry also condemned that incident, and indicated that Crimean Tatars rights should be protected. For example, Turkey has not negotiate Akkuyu’s nuclear plant that will be constructed by Russia. Or Turkey has not limited its export, especially agricultural, to Russia, nor decreased  imports from Russia, especially gas. Most analysts  Turkey depends on Russia’s gas, but Russia has dependency as well. There is interdependent relations with Russia. In spite of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey, Erdogan’s government has not acted pro-actively against Russia. This can be used for the NK conflict as well. If there is a sudden change on the ground about the NK, Turkey may restrain any confrontations with Russia whom is allying with Armenia. Since Russia has shown its muscles in Crimea, it is possible that Armenia will do the same thing because Armenia thinks that Russia is behind it. Russia sees Caucasus within “Near Abroad” policy. We can expect that the NK may see more military clashes in order to test Russia there.

-Armenia is isolated by Azerbaijan and Turkey from regional infrastructural and energy projects. Do you believe that Armenia may join them if it renounces its traditional policies and what benefits it would bring to Yerevan?

If  the Turkish-Armenian rapproachment process is successful, it means that not only Turkey, but also Armenia renounces its traditional policies. For lasting Turkish-Armenian and Armenian-Azerbaijani peace, there should be a “confidence building measures”. If there is conciliatory steps in both sides of conflict, Turkey attract  involve Armenia in regional infrastructureal and energy projects.

This can improve Yerevan’s economic and social structures. If Yerevan integrates regional economy, it is possible that there will be spill-over effects in political and civil society arena.