What to Expect from Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow?

The call for a humanitarian ceasefire for the exchange of killed and prisoners means a temporary ceasefire. However, there is no doubt that Moscow will once again put before the parties (primarily the Armenians) the question of the implementation of the so-called "Lavrov Plan". This means a well-known step-by-step settlement plan, which has various modifications and interpretations, but its essence does not change: the Armenians liberate five regions (Agdam, Fizuli, Jabrayil, Zangelan, Gubadli), and peacekeepers are brought into the region, refugees are returning to these regions, and negotiations, the essence of which is to agree on the status of Karabakh, start. Are both parties ready for this?

It is difficult to imagine that the Armenian society will agree to the surrender of the districts that are included in the self-proclaimed NKR and are declared an integral part of it. Until now, the Armenians showed hostility to the proposals to return the districts. And if the previous Armenian authorities were ready for this in exchange for the independence of Karabakh, the government of Nikol Pashinyan rejected this option. If we assume that the current war has sobered Pashinyan, will he be able to convince his society to accept such a plan? This is hard to believe.

As for Azerbaijan, Baku, in principle, is happy with this option, but two of the five regions of the Lavrov Plan have already been liberated - Fizuli and Jabrayil. Therefore, if we talk about the return of five districts, then Kalbajar and Lachin should be included here.

On the other hand, the return of areas implies the subsequent deployment of peacekeepers. However, the Azerbaijani Armed Forces are already in the depths of Karabakh, and if the peace plan is implemented, they will have to leave there, that is, retreat. Does Azerbaijan need it?

The most important thing in this situation is not the positions of Baku and Yerevan, but what Moscow has in mind.

What will it do if the negotiations fail, or if one of the parties accepts its proposals and the other does not?

The situation will fully develop after Ankara expresses its attitude to the situation. Unambiguous support for Baku will mean consolidating the achieved successes and coordinating its actions with Moscow. What will the price be? Here's another important question.

If we assume that the Kremlin is tired of it and decided to establish order in the region itself, then we can talk about the weakening of both sides, a decrease in their combat activity and the depletion of military resources. This can reduce the degree of hostilities, but there will be no drastic solution.

According to a number of Moscow experts, Russia has no strategy in the Caucasus and in relation to Karabakh in particular. It is quite possible that in this case we can just talk about a formal attempt to persuade the parties to restore the ceasefire.

It won't be long to wait.     -02B-