Azerbaijan: Important political events of 2021

I. January 11: Trilateral meeting in Moscow of the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia in January 11,  outlining a specific program for the implementation of decisions taken following the 44-day war in 2020.

 II. January 30: Turkish-Russian Joint Monitoring Center opens in  the city  of Aghdam.

III. May-December: repeated aggravation of the military conflict on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.

IV. June 15: The heads of Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a joint Shusha declaration on allied relations between the two states.

V. October: a sharp aggravation of Azerbaijani-Iranian relations  and conducting  of border military exercises.

VI. November 12: decision of the VIII summit of leaders of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States on the establishment of the Organization of Turkic States.

VII. Trilateral meeting in Sochi on November 26 of the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

VIII. December 7: The International Court of Justice in The Hague made interim decisions on counterclaims of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

IX. December 14: meeting in Brussels I. Aliyev and N. Pashinyan.

X. December 30: Milli Majlis passed a law on media restricting freedom of speech

The outgoing year has become for Azerbaijan, on the one hand, the time of consolidation and development of the results of the 44-day war, on the other, an alarming manifestation of the exhaustion of the existing political system, which is becoming the main factor in slowing down the development of the state and society and the weakest link in overcoming external risks and threats. It is in this direction, of course, that information and diplomatic attacks against Azerbaijan will unfold in the coming 2022. Therefore, Baku faces an acute dilemma of choosing a strategy for the upcoming political development: to continue to be in the camp of authoritarian countries that contributed to the colossal military-political success of Azerbaijan, or to try to start forming a new strategy, which can definitely be started with the liberalization of domestic policy, reforming the most ossified elements of the political system.

The political year began with a trilateral meeting in Moscow (11.01) of the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia and the opening (30.01) of a Turkish-Russian joint monitoring center in Agdam. It ended with a meeting in Brussels between Ilham Aliyev and N. Pashinyan (14.12), which can be largely called a breakthrough. The interval between the beginning and the end of the year was remembered for significant events that had a direct impact on the parties to the conflict and the external players involved in it. Thus, a fragile ceasefire situation has set in motion: since mid-May, the conflict on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border has escalated, giving rise to a new political and military reality. In the summer (June 14), there were cases of shelling of Azerbaijani positions near the city of Shusha from the territory of the temporary deployment of Russian peacekeepers and incidents in other regions of Azerbaijan and Armenia with a considerable number of victims. Meanwhile, the heads of Azerbaijan and Turkey signed (June 15) a joint Shusha declaration on allied relations, and the Civil Contract party (June 21) received a majority in the new parliament of Armenia (72 mandates out of 105, Hayastan bloc - 27, I have the honor "- 6), having worsened its previous result by only 8 mandates. Thus, N. Pashinyan's government received political legitimacy.

2021 - will remain in memory as the year of an unprecedented aggravation of Iranian-Azerbaijani relations, which resulted in an open demonstration of military threats. Its apogee was the meeting (06.10) in Moscow of the foreign ministers of Russia and Iran, after which Amir Abdullahian, expressing concern over the situation in the South Caucasus, warned that Tehran would not tolerate a change in the geopolitical situation in the region and frequent military exercises, regarded as a "provocation" ... Quite unexpectedly, K. Lavrov cooled his colleague, noting that Azerbaijan expresses the same concern about Iran's military exercises on the border. Lavrov specifically stressed that the legal status of the Caspian, which prohibits foreign military presence, cannot enter into force until the last Caspian state, Iran, ratifies the convention.

Turkey's position (21.10) finally sobered Tehran by recalling the "obvious Azerbaijani factor" in Iran and a decisive regrouping of the Turkish armed forces.

Finally, the decision of the VIII Summit of the Leaders of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States (12.11) on the establishment of the Organization of Turkic States showed that Ankara now takes on the role of the unifier of the world of Islam, for which Tehran has been preparing for decades. And in this matter, the opening of the Zangezur corridor has acquired a fundamental character.

Iranian Foreign Minister A. Abdullahian intending to visit Baku (25.12) wants to discuss the details of the agreement (Iran, Azerbaijan, Georgia) on a new transport corridor from the Persian Gulf to the ports of Bulgaria, eliminating the problem of delivering Iranian goods and ensuring the transit of goods from India, Pakistan and other countries region to Europe.

Meanwhile, Baku and Moscow did not agree on the mandate of the Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh, as evidenced by the text of a joint trilateral statement following the talks in Sochi (November 26), held in a hurry before the meeting in Brussels.

The first meeting of the consultative regional platform "3 + 3" at the level of deputy foreign ministers took place (10.12) without the participation of Georgia. The "3 + 3" platform, proposed by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkey after the 44-day war, involves the creation of a narrow format in which Russia, Turkey and Iran become the main guarantors of regional security. How it will work after the meeting in Brussels, where the parties not only agreed on the construction of the Yeraskh-Julfa-Ordubad-Meghri-Horadiz railway, which opens access for Armenia by rail to Iran and the Russian Federation, and Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan and Turkey, but also first formed a format of negotiations without the participation of third parties?

In this regard, two more events attracted attention: in Brussels (December 15), another meeting of I. Aliyev and N. Pashinyan took place with the mediation of French President Macron, the details of which have not yet been made public; The International Court of Justice issued interim decisions on the counterclaims of Azerbaijan and Armenia, which both sides present as their own victory, welcome the Court's order and hope for their practical implementation. Let us recall that the decisions of the International Court of Justice are binding and can be formed depending on the political situation in the country to which they concern.

"The Karabakh conflict is a thing of the past, and there is no administrative-territorial unit called Nagorno-Karabakh on the territory of Azerbaijan," Aliyev said at the UN General Assembly session, noting that by the presidential decree of July 7, 2021, the Karabakh and East Zangezur regions were created in the country economic zones.

What did Azerbaijan have to pay for its political position? Refusal to participate in the work of the Crimean Platform (23.08), coordinating international efforts to return Crimea to Ukraine, odious support for Belarus at the EU summit, lack of an invitation to the forum of democracy under the auspices of the United States. The price might seem reasonable if one does not take into account the internal political situation in Azerbaijan and its assessment by international organizations.

On the initiative of the “Rights and Justice” party, headed by ex-Minister of Health Ali Insanov, (unexpectedly registered by the Ministry of Justice on October 22), a number of meetings of leaders of opposition parties were held. Today, there are 58 officially registered parties in Azerbaijan, even the names of which the majority of the population simply does not know. The crisis situation that has developed both in the ruling and in the opposition, parties is no secret to anyone, as is the absence of an effective program to overcome the long-term stagnation in the country's political life.

The absence of a political space for competition has led to an exaggerated model of statehood, in which there is no other power besides the executive branch. Obviously, in these conditions, the main resource of power is concentrated in the hands of a certain part of the power structures, who prefer to operate in a regime of permanent repression. The danger of such a misalignment of governance first of all threatens the state itself, which ceases to receive any alarm signals from society. It is no coincidence that the media are becoming targets of attacks and sanctions: the Milli Mejlis at a plenary session (30.12) adopted the bill "On Media", despite numerous criticisms of this draft law by experts and media representatives.

An even more egregious fact was the so-called "Terter case", when (2017) there was a gross violation of the law in the army, many military men were tortured, and some of them died on false charges of treason. Only recently (18.12), under internal and external pressure, the General Prosecutor's Office of the country issued a statement confirming the well-known facts.

For almost the entire outgoing year, international organizations have criticized the political situation in Azerbaijan. Recently (14.12) the co-rapporteurs of the Council of Europe on Azerbaijan expressed their serious concern about the state of human rights in the country, calling for the release of Saleh Rustamov and an investigation of the brutal beating of Tofig Yagublu. They also noted that the new law on the legal profession shows that human rights defenders are no longer able to carry out their work.

The co-rapporteurs are going to visit Azerbaijan again in January next year. But even without this, the Summit for Democracy (11.12 to which Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey were not invited) proclaimed 2022 the “Year of Action”, when democrats “can and will support the citizens of the world, regardless of the efforts of authoritarian regimes to prevent this”.

Since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, according to the authorities, is over, isn't it time to start a dialogue with civil society ?! 

Ali Abasov