A brief political-legal review of the joint statement on Karabakh

The signing of the yesterday joint statement on Karabakh issue summing up results of one-and-a-half-month war is none other but a triumph (not only diplomatic) of the Russian Federation in the person of its President. It is no secret that for some time past South Caucasus has gradually spiraled out of geopolitical interests of our northern neighbor as follows:

• With its multifaceted foreign policy and irrespective of Russia economically, Azerbaijan has drifted apart.
• As a result of the so-called orange revolution in Armenia a new Parliament and a new government were formed. The latter was headed by N. Pashinyan with his rapprochement to the West, first of all, European Union and the NATO.
• Georgia, understandably, even after Saakashvili’s exit, has not reconciled with the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia due to Russia’s direct aggression under the pretext that Georgians allegedly dropped shells and killed their peacemakers.

It should be noted that as of today the situation has changed fundamentally:

• Azerbaijan gave its consent to the introduction of Russian military contingent agreeing of its own volition to the restriction of its sovereignty in Nagorno Karabakh and around it through creating real conditions for replay of the Georgian scenario. It will be recalled that armed forces of Russia left Azerbaijan 28 years ago, so it’s difficult to imagine their return to our country, especially in terms of liberation of a considerable part of the occupied regions.
• When entreating of Russia’s interference with combat operations on its side and failing this, Armenia made certain in barren efforts to recognize puppet Nagorno Karabakh Republic, lost thousands of its citizens in Azerbaijan, got tens of thousands of refugees, and found itself on the verge of calamity. And Russia again gave a helping hand as was the case in the last centuries. The aid proved to be timely siccour, and Pashinyan would retain a post. In so doing, Pashinyan will never act as pro-western politician but a champion of Putin’s ideas. Neither he, nor his potential successors have alternative but stay with Russia for perpetuity.
• As for Georgia, nailing down its presence in two neighboring states of South Caucasus, Russia gained greater opportunity to influence processes in this country with its leverage by means of previously annexed Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Thus, V. Putin has been successful in achieving results he meant and imperial Russia without any victims and any costs (deliveries of weapons and technologies are not counted) acting in full compliance with international laws.

What has the Turkish state, truly our brother and savior (since 1918) achieved except for excellent advertising of its fifth generation weapons? It turns out that Turkey has just strengthened its regional rival – Russia. From now on Turkey as non-signatory to the joint statement will give up or, at best, share its presence with Russia in Azerbaijan.

Let’s analyze the joint statement from interests of Azerbaijan and Armenia standpoint. It is no secret that the complete ceasefire and termination of combat operations are exceedingly profitable for Armenia which, in Pashinyan and Karabakh leaders’ words, would be doomed to absolute defeat for lack of resources, disunity and total panic.

It has to be kept in mind that deployment of peacemaking forces of the Russian Federation along the contact line in Nagorno Karabakh means that Hodjaly, including an airport, Khankendi, Agdere and many other points will remain under the Armenian control. Even worse, a considerable part of Lachin region that has never belonged to Nagorno Karabakh under a name of Lachin, 5 km wide, will be ruled by separatists. In so doing, the Azerbaijani party, even without any referendum (without formal consent of the rubber-stamping parliament), finds itself deprived of sovereignty in respect of the said territory. Also, this approach stands out in strong relief against the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic.

Besides, there is well known a decisive role of Russian armed forces (including a notorious 366 regimen and Pskov air-born division) in occupation of our lands in the 1990-s. To all appearance, these events did no good. Also, it was Russian interference that deprived Georgia of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A reason of Russian troops’ invasion of the Georgian territory proved to be an alleged murder of Russian peacemakers by Georgians. The same is true of puppet Pridnestrovskaya Republic in Moldova; presence of Russian troops and navy in the Crimea. We cannot forget the January 1990 tragic events. There is hardly any positive result of Russian army’s activities on the post-Soviet expanse.

As for the minimum 5-year deployment of «Russian peacemakers», it is nothing more than the return of Russian bayonet to Azerbaijan. In so doing, our country is deprived of the most successful diplomatic victory since 1991 – withdrawal of Russian troops from our territory. In other words, if Putin resigns in a year and is superseded by Mishustin, the Russian contingent will remain one way or another.

Paragraph 5 says that there will be a peacemaking center to supervise ceasefire regime with a view of raising effectiveness of agreements concluded between the parties to the conflict. Our representatives inform that the center will include representatives of the Turkish Republic; however, neither Russians nor Armenians back up these allegations. Besides, even if there would be Turkish officers it proves nothing when adjusted for the fact that no responsibilities of the center are submitted to hold little meaning.

I‘m in an agony of doubt about Armenia’s real quitting the Kelbadjar region and a part of the Lachin corridor by 15 November and 1 December). Как быть в этом случае? Вряд ли их оттуда силком выгонит российский контингент, а нам туда зайти уже не дадут.

As for a new route across the Lachin corridor, it will take 3 years to agree upon то!!! What if Armenia disagrees with it? In other words, the route will be the same. Can it be qualified as implementation of sovereign rights over its own territory? And what about a control on the state border, customs, etc? What to do with the demilitarization of Nagorno Karabakh?

It is obvious that pursuant to paragraph 7, internally displaced persons (Azerbaijanis, in absolute majority) and refugees (Armenians) return to the territory of Nagorno Karabakh and adjoining regions under the control of Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. However, it is not clear what to do with war criminals that arrive under the guise of refugees. Are Russians going to hamper instituting criminal proceedings against these persons?

The same is true of parties’ execution of paragraph 8 on exchange of war prisoners and detained persons

Paragraph 9 says that all economic and transport relations in the region are unblocked

As for the Border Force of the Russian Federal Security Service, they keep on exercising control on the state border and are unlikely to escort our people across the territory of Armenia from the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic and the reference. Where is the promised Megri corridor? It may be said that upon consultation between the Parties the construction of new transport communication facilities will be ensured to link the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic with western regions of Azerbaijan. By this is meant the Armenia’s consent which, in my view, is unlikely to be given in the foreseeable future.