What has caused V.Putin's visit to Azerbaijan?

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Of course, the interregional forum is a large-scale event. So, in the work of the previous seventh Russian-Azerbaijani interregional forum in Baku (November 2017), officials, representatives of parliaments and executive bodies of the two countries, entrepreneurs from such spheres of economy as industry, tourism, agriculture, construction, trade, consulting, logistics, pharmaceuticals, ICT, finance, etc., representatives of the media. The forum was attended by approximately 600 delegates - more than 250 people from 9 subjects of the Russian Federation and about 300 representatives of Azerbaijan. An agreement on trade, economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation was signed with 17 constituent entities of the Russian Federation, and Intergovernmental commissions were established with four constituent entities of the Russian Federation. In general, the Republic of Azerbaijan maintains trade and economic relations with 78 subjects of the Russian Federation.

However, there is another reason: from September 25 to September 27, the 3rd Azerbaijan International Defense Exhibition ADEX 2018 will be held in Baku. This year the exhibition will bring together more than 200 companies from 32 countries. Azerbaijan, Turkey, Russia, Israel, the Republic of Belarus, Serbia, Ukraine, Pakistan, France and other countries will be represented at the national pavilions at the ADEX 2018. Turkey has booked a pavilion for an area of ​​30% more than in 2016. Among the participants are the leading companies of the defense sector from Italy, Bulgaria, China, the Netherlands, Lithuania and other countries.

They prefer not to talk about this event in connection with Putin's visit. Meanwhile, it seems that this event, together with the possible steps of the two sides that accompany it, is the main reason for the visit.

And here our article acquires the character of certain assumptions, possible scenarios. Thus, it is assumed that the presidents will sign new agreements on the supply of Russian arms to Azerbaijan, and this, taking into account the recent US sanctions against China that bought planes in Russia, may have consequences for Baku. So why does Baku, which still has a colossal arsenal of armaments (on January 19, 2018, a new batch of Russian-made military equipment and ammunition arrived in Baku), expects to continue to supply arms without fear of Washington's reaction? It is clear that it is important for Moscow to demonstrate to its overseas "partners" that sanctions do not cause significant harm, at least in the leading positions (energy carriers and armament) of Russian exports, that not only such a self-sufficient country-giant as China, but other states ignore US sanctions. But what about Baku itself, whose relations with Western countries evolve from bad to worse? And here it is possible to put forward a new assumption that, along with the agreement on the acquisition of Russian weapons, Baku made certain proposals that strengthened Azerbaijan's determination to take risks. There is only one problem that can move Baku to such a step - and this is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, stretched for decades. It is no coincidence that a very informed Rosbalt agency notes: "In 2018, Armenia will face the danger of a war with Azerbaijan without the "back" of Russia."

Of course, it is too naïve to assume that Moscow promised Baku full control over all the occupied territories, not only Russia, but all the countries involved in the affairs of the region will never give up their leverage over Baku, unless they receive an equivalent instrument of influence and maintenance in return inviolability of their interests. But after all, talks about the transfer of several regions occupied by Armenia to Azerbaijan have been going on for a long time, and this plan was and is included in virtually all models for the settlement of the conflict. So why not let Baku make this plan a reality by force of arms, then with a harsh stop by Azerbaijan's excessive claims, as it was in April 2016? Why not repeat the scenario used at the time of "friend" of Serge, against Nikol "suspicious in pro-Western sentiments"? However, Azerbaijan should not be deluded, how many times the most iridescent promises turned into elementary speculations that could not even be appealed.

Of course, bargaining will not be limited to a large-scale, but still local conflict. And here, for the time, one can move from assumptions to cautious forecasts. With the beginning of a new stage of US sanctions against Iran, the South Caucasus region again began to gain geopolitical weight. It is the position of Azerbaijan that determines which bridgehead the South Caucasus will become in case of the transition of the American-Iranian clashes from the "cold" to the "hot" phase. And Russia understands this well, as is the role of Baku in the Syrian conflict, in which the "tripartite union" is constantly threatened with cracking due to Turkey's "special" position. And in this issue, Baku can become a moderator of the Russian-Turkish dialogue. We by no means exaggerate, the policy of all the years of independence demonstrates that Baku has a much greater influence on Ankara than on Moscow. It is enough to recall the events connected with the Armenian-Turkish protocols. In any case, Azerbaijan can not only bring certain wishes of Russia to Turkey, but also within reasonable limits to lobby them.

There is another sore point for Russia in the South Caucasus region, in which another progress is being made - the European Union - which Moscow, with certain reasons, sees as a downside to the progress of the US and NATO.

The policy of promoting the European Union to the borders of the post-Soviet space is so obvious that it cannot but cause a nervous reaction not only from Moscow, but also from Tehran, which once again found itself in the ring of sanctions, which, despite all objections, was nevertheless accepted by the EU countries.

In order to achieve the goals, set by Russia and Iran, it is vitally important to minimize the influence of the US and EU in the South Caucasus region. It is extremely difficult to do this without Azerbaijan. Suffice it to recall that the deterioration of Baku's relations with the West made it possible to strengthen Russia's influence in the region by involving Azerbaijan in new communication projects ("North-South") and Baku's insistent proposals to reconsider its positions with regard to the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Community. The three most important mechanisms of Moscow's influence (apart from the conflict) on Baku's decisions are the numerous Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia, ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan, which, as events have shown, are strongly influenced by Moscow, Russia's leading positions in Azerbaijan's imports. It's also worth pondering over this.

It should be noted that Azerbaijan's promising foreign policy depends to a significant extent on Turkey's positions, which are increasingly involved in strategic relations with Russia and Iran. So, on September 23, Russia and Turkey managed to overcome the latest disagreements around Idlib - a city and a region in the north-west of Syria, where the last opposition forces are concentrated along with the armed formations.

Meanwhile, at the 3rd Azerbaijan International Defense Exhibition ADEX 2018, Turkish defense companies will display their products at 40 booths, among them: modern armored vehicles, naval vessels, air defense control systems, military equipment simulators, ballistic defense systems, automatic land vehicles, underwater remote control vehicles, ROKETSAN missiles, UAVs, airplanes, helicopters, etc.

After the publication of the Belarusian opposition source "Belarusian Prauda" (based in Poland) Yuri Baranevich's material: "Deliveries of Russian weapons to Azerbaijan cause discontent in Baku and indignation in Armenia," which notes the low quality of Russian weapons supplied to Azerbaijan, there was another reason to turn attention to others, including Turkish, arms suppliers. The article notes that Russian export contracts to other countries are either not partially fulfilled, or are broken by the deadline for implementation, and the quality of their implementation raises many questions. Thus, according to Y. Baranevich: "The Azerbaijani side noted that the rockets for the Smerch MRLS do not explode when firing, ammunition to the BTR-82A machine guns does not reach the target at all, and the Mi-35 helicopters permanently fix thermocouple breakages that do not give the opportunity to start the engine. As well as failures in the operation of on-board equipment, the automatic fire and firing systems of the Ataka-M and Sturm-B missiles do not work properly ... according to experts, in the case of Azerbaijan, such problems may have an intentional character that determines the need for the leadership of Russia to balance between obtaining foreign exchange financial profits from export contracts with Baku, which, as a rule, are signed at very inflated prices, and restraining the latter's military potential in the confrontation with Armenia, which paradise is formally an ally of Moscow in the Caucasus, and is in a state of armed confrontation with Azerbaijan. "

The article says that unlike poor Armenia, Azerbaijan is an excellent solvent customer, that's why Russia does not want to leave this market and give it to its Turkish competitors who could easily cover the lion's share of Azerbaijan's requests without problems. The author believes that at

The article says that unlike poor Armenia, Azerbaijan is an excellent solvent customer, that's why Russia does not want to leave this market and give it to its Turkish competitors who could easily cover the lion's share of Azerbaijani requests without any problems. The author believes that at the same time Baku will stop listening to Russia, and therefore in this issue, rather Baku is turning Moscow, than vice versa.

Despite the refutations (referring to Azerbaijani officials) in the Russian press, it is obvious that there are complex problems with the supply of Russian weapons to Azerbaijan. And this is another indication that arms contracts are of a political nature. The forthcoming visit of V. Putin to Azerbaijan can clarify this issue.