For Turkey, the Most Important Security Problem in Syria is PYD/PYZ - Yilmaz Akinci

Yılmaz Akıncı, a program author for Al-Jazeera's Istanbul office and international TV commentator, answered Turan Information Agency's questions regarding the post-Assad regime developments.

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Turan: You have been following developments in Syria since the early 2000s as an international journalist and TV program producer. Why did the relations between Turkey and the Assad family government deteriorate to the level of hostility in April 2011, when they were at their closest point?

Yılmaz Akıncı: Yes, it is true that relations between Turkey and Syria rose to a familial level in the early 2000s but deteriorated in 2011 with the start of the "Arab Spring" and the civil war in Syria. There are several important reasons for this:

-In 2011, uprisings against governments began in some Middle Eastern countries under the influence of the "Arab Spring." This process affected Syria as well, leading to protests against the government. At the beginning of the process, Turkey called on the Assad family to implement reforms, but the regime responded to these protests with harsh interventions instead of listening to Turkey. This further strained relations.

-Although Turkey exerted pressure on the Assad regime to implement reforms, the regime ignored these calls and took drastic measures to suppress the protests. Why couldn't Turkey make the Assad regime accept its demands for reforms? This is primarily due to the complex political, military, and social reasons in the region. The structure created by jihadist groups in Idlib in 2017, which overthrew the Assad regime in Damascus on December 8, is the result of a combination of various internal and external factors.

Turan: While Russia's military intervention in Syria on September 30, 2015, somewhat shifted the balance in favor of the Assad regime, why did the structure created by jihadists in Idlib in 2017 manage to overthrow the Assad family's regime with ease?

Yılmaz Akıncı: Despite the military and political strength of Russia and the Assad regime, it was very difficult to eliminate jihadist groups in a complex region like Idlib. One of the inherent weaknesses of family regimes is the differing interests of international actors and the negative reaction of the local population to the Damascus regime. These factors led to the overthrow of the Assad regime in Idlib. This development, which marked the end of the Assad family’s reign, also became a turning point for Syria’s future.

The groups in Idlib managed to stay afloat thanks to both ideological loyalty and regional support. After 2017, Russian and Assad-aligned military forces carried out several military operations against Idlib. However, due to the region's geographical features (mountainous areas and border zones) and the presence of civilians, the operations remained limited in scope.

After 2017, the Assad regime and Russia directed their military forces towards regions like Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa to take them from ISIS. This allowed jihadist groups in Idlib to strengthen and gain support from the local population. Especially, with direct support from neighboring countries and indirect support from other countries opposed to the Assad regime, the groups in the north of Syria grew stronger.

Turkey’s refusal to carry out operations also became a factor that shifted the situation against Assad's family regime.

Turan: What kind of new state model will emerge after the fall of the Assad family regime in Syria: secular or Sharia-based? Where does the new state plan to get material support?

Yılmaz Akıncı: Since the new administrative center is formed under the leadership of jihadist groups in Idlib, they seem inclined to establish a Sharia regime. Groups like Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham have previously implemented a legal infrastructure based on Sharia and defended a social system in this form. Therefore, it is highly likely that the new administration will aim to create an infrastructure based on Islamic law.

However, due to the need for international recognition and support, they may pragmatically create a structure that involves broader participation, rather than establishing a fully theocratic regime. This could be a form of governance that aligns with the interests of external actors (such as Turkey and Gulf countries). Whether this new administration continues will largely depend on the material support it receives from abroad. This support can come from several sources:

-Those who have closely followed the developments know that Turkey has had long-standing ties with the groups based in central Idlib. While Turkey has not directly supported these groups, it has assisted them in staying economically and logistically viable in northern Syria. The new administration in Damascus may seek material support by strengthening its relations with Turkey.

-Countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar had previously supported forces opposing the "Alawite-Nusayri" regime in Syria. However, because the approach among Gulf countries varies, support for the new administration may be limited. Especially since Syria's oil and agricultural resources, modern infrastructure, and trade markets have not yet been rebuilt, the material support for the new administration may not be substantial.

Turan: Can Iran, which claims to have created a "Resistance Axis," still have any plans in Syrian territory?

Yılmaz Akıncı: Iran views Syria as a support route and military corridor for the Hezbollah armed organization it supports in Lebanon. At the same time, Tehran sees this corridor as one of the key strategic routes for access to the Mediterranean. After the fall of the Assad family, Iran will likely seek to maintain its presence in Syria to ensure the security of this corridor.

Iran is determined to continue its strategy, which it calls the "Resistance Axis," and views it as a regional alliance against Israel. Since Syria is an important part of this alliance, Iran will want to continue cooperation with a government in Syria that is aligned with its interests. In this context, we can say that Tehran would seek to reactivate groups like the Fatemiyoun Brigades, Zaynabiyoun Brigades, and Hezbollah in Syria. For Iran, Syria is a front-line position against its eternal enemy, Israel.

Turan: It is reported that Ankara has invited Baku to join the reconstruction process in Syria. The deposed leader Bashar al-Assad has taken refuge in Moscow, and Baku and Moscow are close allies. Given this situation, could Baku respond positively to the offer made by Ankara?

Yılmaz Akıncı: Azerbaijan, due to its own security issues and the fact that it has not signed a peace agreement with Armenia, tries to maintain a balanced relationship with Russia, considering the threats it claims to face. For this reason, it may be cautious about directly engaging in a region full of issues like Syria. The sensitive balance between Moscow and Baku may prevent Azerbaijan from making broad decisions.

Additionally, Azerbaijan's close relations with Israel will also hinder its active role in Syria. Since Iran will not want the new administration in Syria to become stronger or gain control over the entire country, it will attempt to create problems, which Azerbaijan is likely to take into account.