US analyst: Azerbaijan might regain some territory, lose independence of action, if joins Eurasia Union

As Russian-lead the Eurasian Union just welcomed its fourth member country – Armenia, last week, many in the region and abroad focus on Azerbaijan’s attitudes in its neighborhood.

For many western analysts, Baku’s strategy of plotting a course between Moscow and the EU has left it even more vulnerable to Russian pressure to join the Eurasian Union.

TURAN’s Washington correspondent interviewed Michael Tkacik, Professor of Government, and Director of the School of Honors at the Stephen F. Austin State University, who closely follow Azerbaijan policy, over recent developments in the country and the region.

Q. Discussions about Azerbaijan’s possible future membership to Eurasia Union seem tocontinue to percolate in the Baku expert community.Some commentaries on the topic have focused on the role of the Kremlin’s propaganda in the region in creating a new sense of USSR. If that is the case, what are the best directions for Azerbaijan to follow?

A. There is little doubt that a successful Eurasian Union -- the “Union” -- helps Russia to reassert its historically dominant role across the region. Russia’s economy is the largest and most central in the region. Its military is far and away the most powerful. And its leadership is the most aggressive.

To understand what the best approach for Azerbaijan is, it makes sense to examine Azerbaijan’s goals in light of Russia’s desires. Primarily, does Azerbaijan value greater independence but no solution to Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), or would Azerbaijan sacrifice some freedom of action in order to resolve NK? By “resolve,” I mean reclamation of some, but not all territory. This is what Russia might offer implicitly – some less than perfect resolution to NK in exchange for Azerbaijan joining the Union and eventually following Russia’s dictates on issues Russia considers important.

Of course, if Azerbaijan rejects this opportunity, it might find itself under increasing Russian pressure, and in this case, Russia would play favorite to Armenia. So then, there is no good solution regarding the political impact of joining the Union, only solutions of varying degrees of unpleasantness.

IF Azerbaijan were to join the Eurasian Union, Azerbaijan’s leadership would need assurances that Russia would work toward resolving the situation in NK favorably. As I previously indicated in our interview last year that Russia would prevent resolution of NK – that Russia would set itself up as the only player that could “deliver” NK – and this has come to pass.

On a secondary level, beyond the issue of security, belonging to some sort of customs union would likely be beneficial to Azerbaijan’s economy. There will be increased economic growth because of the Union, though how much growth will be siphoned off through corruption is unclear. In addition to the political cost of less independence for Azerbaijan, there would likely be some economic price to pay. For example, Russia would seek greater input into oil and gas decision making in Azerbaijan, as well as the pipeline networks. It is possible, of course, that joining the Union could harm economic ties with the West. But I do not believe Kazakhstan has seen its economic ties to the West harmed. Western businesses make very rational cost/benefit decisions on investment. The key here is for Azerbaijan to avoid any action that would lead to Western sanctions. Barring that, economic ties with the West should be maintained, while opportunities with the Union should increase.

Q. Although Azeri government hasn’t yet expressed any interest in the Eurasia Union, Russian Defense Minister Shoigu visited Baku last week and signaled fresh defense contracts between the two. The idea of a “collective defense” system for the Caspian Sea and airspace was also brought up, with joint naval exercises solidified for next year. This comes at the time when Azeri government seems to be tightening its relations with the western countries by cracking down on the civil society and the US-linked organizations. Many in the region worry about the country’s security future, as Russia might try to benefit from this situation by attempting to sway Azerbaijan from a Western alliance over its defense projects and Customs Union, which could hurt energy projects directed at Europe and undermine economic freedom and overall prosperity in the South Caucasus. What actually does Moscow offer to Azerbaijan in terms of security and its future?

A. Moscow offers what we would call a negative security assurance. To wit, Moscow will not destabilize Azerbaijan or otherwise harm Azerbaijan’s security interests -- such as NK, -- if Azerbaijan comes to heel and joins the Union. Azerbaijan gives up some level of independence in exchange for this assurance.

But any agreement with Russia is ultimately a Faustian Bargain. Once Russia ensnares Azerbaijan in the Union, Moscow will slowly but surely more deeply tie Azerbaijan to Russia. Azerbaijan will again find itself tied to Russia’s security interests and to it military industrial complex. It may be imperceptible at first, but eventually Baku will realize it has lost significant independence of action. One might argue that, given Azerbaijan’s size, and given the geographic neighborhood, this will happen eventually, no matter what Azerbaijan’s choice. Perhaps -- and only perhaps -- this is the case. But if so, Azerbaijan should think very clearly and explicitly about whom it is getting in bed with. 

Q.  President Obama last month raised his voice on Azerbaijan’s narrowing window for civil society and NGOs, but it seems like Baku officials dismissed Washington’s concerns. Most recently, this week Azeri government condemned US for ‘interfering into its internal affairs.’ How would you describe Washington’s alarm on recent situation in Azerbaijan, and what lesson should the Azgov. take from it with regard to the future of US - Azeri relationship?

A. As your readers well know, this is a continuing message coming out of Washington, and a continuing response coming from Baku. What is interesting about Obama’s speech is the policy changes he discussed. He intends, through executive order, to provide greater and more overt support for civil society groups. But one should also recognize that in America an executive order can be changed by later presidents. Currently, however, we can look forward to stronger support by the US for NGOs.

I think there is little doubt that the people of Azerbaijan would benefit from greater rule of law, less corruption, and enhanced civil society. Those opposed to greater civil society really have only their narrow interests in mind. We see the same dynamic throughout the world, from China's response to protests in China, to Russia's response to a relatively unknown female rock band in Moscow.

Q. While some observers believe that oil rich Azerbaijan charts a third course between Russia and the West, local critics argues that what is going on in the country has deeper roots than that. The government propaganda allows some Azeris to feel united with anyone who believes that the country is developing and nobody on the outside likes it, and view the world not as “gray” and full of problems in which they are “losers” but as one of bright colors in which they are winners… Where do you think the country is heading to with this trend?

A. I cannot comment directly on domestic issues in Azerbaijan. It strikes me that there are some people who do not understand the complexity of some issues. It is always in the interests of some elites to simplify things in order to mobilize political support from those who do not understand the complexity of the world. This is most easily achieved by painting the world in terms of "us versus them." 

In America we too have people who always simplify reality for their own selfish purposes. Reality, however, is complex and almost always shades of grey. Arguing that “the world is against us,” oversimplifies things. It is the role of those with greater understanding and greater access to information is to remove the deception engaged in by self-interested parties.

Q. Although Azerbaijan and Ukraine used to have many common interests in the region, including energy transit, security, but they do not share the same view on the role of strong civil society. Among the questions that the local observers increasingly raise after Russia’s invention to Crimea, are “are border changes among former Soviet republics possible?” As no country in the post-Soviet space is more concerned about such possibility than Azerbaijan, given the Karabakh conflict, what would be your suggestions to the Azeri people and the government given the current dynamism and reality of the region.

A. Clearly border changes are possible. And Russia seems to be the key to achieving those changes – either in a state’s interests or against a state’s interests. This is the Faustian Bargain to which I alluded earlier. Is NK so important that Azerbaijan is willing to sacrifice its independence? Russia can and will prevent peace in NK. The road to reacquiring NK, if it can be done, goes through Moscow. But the price will be steep. The alternative is to stay independent of Russia and hope that Azerbaijan can prevent an undesired settlement of NK. In other words, can Azerbaijan play the spoiler as Russia has so far? Can Azerbaijan make itself essential to any solution, and therefore create bargaining power? This is unclear. One begins to tread dark paths here when one explores how Azerbaijan might make any undesired settlement of the issue too costly for the other parties.

Unfortunately for Azerbaijan, it lacks the allies to challenge Russia and Armenia directly if they were to grant Armenia control over NK. Turkey is one potential ally, but Turkey is occupied with its southern borders. Iran is another potential ally, but of course relations between the two states are complex and even an informal partnership would bring many problems. The US is a third potential ally, but is unlikely to be helpful until Azerbaijan liberalizes. Even with outside help, it is not clear that any of these allies can stop Russia from formalizing Armenia’s seizure of NK, if it chooses to do so. In the end, only Azerbaijan could so increase the costs to make “swallowing NK” unpalatable to Russia and Armenia.

There are two positives from Azerbaijan's point of view. First, Russia cannot afford another round of sanctions. It has its hands full right now in Ukraine. Second, even after the Ukrainian issue dies down, Russia has less overt interest in NK. So it may be possible that this reduced interest, combined with the international community's distaste for such aggression, may temper Russia's behavior. Still, the solution to NK must go through Russia. Even more so after Armenia joins the Union, only Russia can force the sort of compromise necessary to resolve NK.

Alakbar Raufoglu,

Washington, DC