A strange situation

The Russian military-industrial machine broke into the market on the eve of the Sochi meeting without breaking its tradition. To be honest, on the eve of the meeting on August 5, I was expecting new provocations against the Turkish military forces in Syria. Because from the first meeting on September 17, 2018, to the last meeting on September 29, the Russian military-industrial machine gained a certain military advantage in the Syrian lands and went to the table and dictated its terms after gaining those advantages.

The current move came with the complete removal of the Turkish construction company from the Akkuyu nuclear power plant built by Russia on the Mediterranean coast. That is, the construction of the nuclear power plant will be completed by Russia's own company (or a foreign company that it will determine). The construction of the Mersin-Akkuyu nuclear power station was given to Russia by the Prime Minister of that time (2012), Mr. Erdoğan, without discussion in the government and parliament: Vladimir Putin was very pleased with the transfer of the construction of the nuclear power station to the Rosatom company, while the Turkish Prime Minister trusted his personal relationship with the Russian head of state. Starting from the second period of his power, the Russian head of state aspired to have a say in the energy market of Turkey.

In December 2004, while closely following the visit of the Russian head of state to Ankara, the following words caught my attention in his speech at the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey: "We want to be in the energy and military industry markets of Turkey. That's why we named one of our helicopters “Erdoğan”, we are ready to make any concessions for Turkey to buy it. Our Tatneft company bought 51% of Turkey's Tüpraş company through a tender but the court annulled the result of the tender. We understand the difficulties faced by Mr. Erdoğan, so we are not discouraged, we will patiently continue to participate in the tenders.” Although in the following years, the ever-growing personal relations of the leaders of Turkey and Russia led to the growth of goals, it was not possible to approach some goals - for example, although it was often repeated that the trade turnover between the two countries would increase to 100 billion dollars, the final figure was 37 billion dollars. About 60% of Turkey's current deficit is made up of oil and gas imported from Russia. Despite Ankara's two positive responses to Russia's request to pass 4 pipelines through Turkey in order to export its natural gas to the European market, and despite the realization of the first 2 stages of the project, Moscow maintains restraint for the next 2 projects (of which the vitally important one for Russia is the gas pipeline project, which is planned to reach the Mediterranean Sea from the Turkmendağı region of Syria, passing through the territory of Turkey from north to south, but Turkey is not keen on bringing it to the agenda).

What is behind the steps taken by Russia regarding the final stage of Mersin-Akkuyu nuclear power plant construction? Is the provision of a part of the "hot money" (about 20 billion dollars) by Russia, which Turkey desperately needs, a sharp tactical move made to weaken Turkey's position in Syria? While the possibility of Russia giving permission to Turkey to conduct the next operation in Syria is already weak, could the transfer of control over the construction of the Mersin-Akkuyu nuclear power plant to Russia completely remove the possibility of permission for the operation?

Before the "Arab Spring" began, Russia, which expanded the Tarsus port in Syria, also acquired the Latakia port after sending a military contingent to Syria on September 30, 2015. Having a full say in the nuclear power plant on the Turkish coast of the Mediterranean Sea must have a very serious reason and place in Turkey-Russia relations.

What do Turkey and Russia want to do in the environment of geopolitical fractures that happen almost every day in the world?