The inconsistency of political philosophy

We described the visit of AKP Chairman and President, Erdoğan, to the house of Oğuzhan Asiltürk, one of the two most experienced figures in Islamist politics, two months ago as an "attempt to reopen the door to the old electorate."

It was impossible to predict what would be gained in return for this attempt, and it is still impossible to predict today. Nevertheless, the AKP leader continues to make moves for the origins where he got involved in politics at a young age but with which he completely parted company in the late 1990s.

On the eve of the congress, the election of chairmen from some of the provincial organizations, including Istanbul, from the "national thought" (meaning "religious thought") that Mr. Erdoğan also came from shows that, as we predicted two months ago, the ruling party is strongly focused on the Islamist class. The main reason for this was the complete collapse of the center-right policy, which decisively supported him during the formation of the AKP. The AKP's creation of its own "bourgeoisie" (since the bourgeoisie never corresponds to classical parameters, it would be more accurate to say "financial base") during its 18 years of power alone caused some of the capital that had a significant say in the business world after the proclamation of the republic to either withdraw from the capital market or leave the country.

"One of the main options is to turn to the traditional ideological base of Islamist politics, as the AKP has not been able to knock on the door of that wing, of which maneuverability has been greatly reduced, after 19 years. Therefore, on the eve of the next congress, in the regional conferences attended by Mr. Erdoğan via the Internet, people who have not left the Islamist foundation are brought forward.

Another reason for this step is the inability to reach an agreement with the Nationalist Movement Party, which has been unconditionally supporting the AKP for 4.5 years, not only on the "Kurdish issue" but also on the worldview and political origins in general. Not so long, 7-8 years ago, when MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli threatened the ruling party with his "grey wolves" 7-8 years ago and Erdoğan responded in a derogatory way, saying, "I walk with people, not animals", with the exception of two provisional coalition governments in the 1970s and an interim coalition formed on the eve of the 1991 elections, no one imagined that these two parties and two conflicting philosophies in politics could one day be in a ruling alliance.

Those who analyzed this alliance in terms of the internal dynamics of politics were right in their hesitation (my friend Ahmet Nesin, who was forced to live in exile in Paris like his father, joked when the alliance was formed 4.5 years ago, " Devlet Bahçeli will take over the AKP", but the processes justified the joking Nesin).

It was impossible for President Erdoğan, as well as the electorate of the AKP, not to see this unrest among his supporters when there was no mesh with political worldviews.

It is vital for the most experienced figure in Turkish politics and the head of state to raise the party's rating as much as ruling the state, and the goal is to run in the elections, of which date is still unknown, with the same solidarity as Mr. Erdoğan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994. Another factor forcing the AKP to do so is that the cadres of 20 years ago either left the party, aged or became very tired, and most importantly, quietly stepped aside by gaining more than they thought they could get through politics.

In the excitement of the 1990s, a significant number of young people, who first followed Necmettin Erbakan and then Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, withdrew from the struggle, seeing that the injustices they had suffered at the time had not been eliminated, while others, who were more vigilant, thought that their ideas had been realized once they had secured political and financial security.

A few years ago, I read that the chairman of the youth organization of the New Azerbaijan Party, IRELI, decided to move to the United States. A kind of a similar situation. And it is interesting that when Mr. Erdoğan again focuses on consolidation on a strictly Islamist basis, he finds it expedient to do so not on the basis of the AKP, which he created, but on the basis of the Felicity Party, with which he once split in a very resentful way. If that base's election rating is about 200,000 votes, what will it bring to the ruling party, what will it bring to Mr. Erdoğan?

What will the continuation of the alliance with the radical Sunni Islamic party of Turkish nationalism bring to the ruling party of 18 years, and how much will it cost to break the alliance?

Interpreting political maneuvers in a democratic environment broadens one's horizons; I am upset not to see Adalat Valiyev on that horizon...

Mayis Alizade