Failure of the Minsk Group

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- There are unclear issues in the statement signed between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia on the termination of military operations to liberate the occupied territories that remain unclear. For example, regarding governance in non-liberated areas. Who will manage these territories?

- The Trilateral Statement is a political document, and it is clear that the solution of all technical and political issues was not reflected in this document. Of course, at the heart of the problems that you point to in your statement is the fact that the mandate of the Russian peacekeepers is not reflected or indicated. Although the statement indicates the date of the stay of the Russian peacekeepers in the region, it does not specify in more detail what functions they will perform and on what conditions they will complete their mission after that date. There are still many questions about whether the Russian peacekeepers will disarm the Armenian military formations in the region, whether they will participate in the formation of the administration, and if so, in what form, whether they will carry out police functions and many other issues. At the same time, if within 5 years Azerbaijan and Armenia come to a final peace agreement, will this be the basis for the Russian peacekeepers to leave the region? I think we will be able to get answers to these questions in the coming months, and this, naturally, will be the subject of negotiations.

- Citizens of which country should be considered the Armenians living in territories not liberated from occupation.  Which country's passport will they have? Under the flag of which country will they live? What laws will work? What status will they have? These issues have not been reflected in the statement. How will this issue be regulated?

- This issue will be settled through negotiations. As long as the Russian peacekeepers are in the region and in the area of ​​deployment, we can talk about the formation of an intermediate status. Of course, the interim status was discussed during the peace talks, which meant the clarification of the issues you have mentioned. However, if a peace treaty had been concluded, the details would have been discussed and accepted. In the new post-war situation, we see an unnamed "intermediate status" with unclear details. These issues can only be settled through negotiations.

- Russian flags are flying in the unliberated territories.  We do not see there Azerbaijan’s flags. Is this how it should be?

- There is no such norm. In multinational missions, the flag bears the name of the peacekeeping mission, and participating States can use the flags of both the mission and their own states so as not to create confusion in the territories they control. For example, the NATO-led peacekeeping force used flags bearing the inscription KFOR to ensure security in Kosovo. However, for example, in Afghanistan, Turkey and other states, performing a patrol function in the territories controlled by peacekeepers, also used the flags of their countries. In this regard, the Russian peacekeepers have a KFOR-type flag called MS (Peacekeeping Forces in Russian), but they also use the Russian flag. This is actually understandable because there are no multinational peacekeepers here.

- The head of the Russian peacekeepers Rustam Muradov held several meetings with the head of the so-called regime. Holding these meetings also irritates many people. Does this mean that Russia still perceives him as an official?

- It is clear that the Russian peacekeepers hold such meetings in order to determine the mechanism of their work in the territories they control and to regulate the return of Armenians and related issues. There is no other alternative to regulate current issues. However, this issue will be resolved in the future when the remaining outstanding governance issues are clarified.

- One of the controversial issues is the mission of the Turkish army here. The Russian army acts as a peacekeeper. Even if Turkey is presented as peacekeepers, there is no such point in the statement. The statement refers to the peacekeeping observation center. What will be the mission of the Turkish army here? Do they have the same rights as the Russian peacekeepers, or are they present to calm some emotions?

- Turkish peacekeepers will perform the function of monitoring the ceasefire. Of course, the deployment of Turkish soldiers in the region, as is the case with Russian peacekeepers, is not provided. However, the details of cooperation between the Russian and Turkish forces to control the ceasefire are being discussed, after which it will become known about the division of activities. It is important for us that the Turkish peacekeepers receive important privileges in the distribution of activities, and not numerical superiority. This may include issues such as control over the Lachin Corridor, patrolling. Because the presence of Turkish peacekeepers in the Lachin corridor is very important for controlling what is brought from Armenia to the territory where the Russian peacekeepers are located, and what is taken from there. In addition, it is expected that Turkish peacekeepers will also take part in the demining process.

Therefore, I see Turkey's participation (although the details are not entirely clear) not as pacifying the Azerbaijani population, but rather as removing the monopoly of Russian peacekeepers in the mechanism of control over the ceasefire and a joint role in exercising control.

- Through whose mediation should the follow-up issues be resolved? The OSCE Minsk Group or their mission has already been completed and there is a need for alternative structure?

It is impossible to answer unambiguously to the question if the mission of the OSCE Minsk Group completed. Did the Minsk Group fail? The answer to this question is clear, and this is the answer they actually gave themselves. The  website, which lists the mandate of the Minsk Group, notes that “if a peace agreement is reached between the parties, which will allow the convening of the Minsk Conference, and if the OSCE multinational peacekeeping force is deployed in the region as a peacekeeping force, then the Minsk process can be considered successful” ... These events after the war and the deployment of Russian peacekeepers can be considered a failure of the Minsk Group. After that, negotiations within the OSCE can be continued, but without the dominance of the three co-chairs and with the expansion of the format. With the inclusion of permanent members of the OSCE Minsk Group (Germany, Turkey and others) in this expanding format, negotiations can continue in a renewed format.