Azerbaijan - 2021 (The article one)

 On September 27, Azerbaijan launched an offensive along the entire line of contact in the Karabakh conflict zone, and by November 9, in fact, had solved many of the tasks set by decades of confrontation. The signed trilateral agreement marked a completely new situation in the South Caucasus, a radical change in the status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and a way out of the deadlock in the negotiation process. The same agreement revived the dangerous tendencies of the separation of the three republics of the South Caucasus, the strengthening of the role of external players in the region.

The post-war situation faced three plots that give rise to different models of understanding and behavior.  1. A part of society is completely immersed in the past, trying to determine in it committed mistakes or reasons for success. 2. Another part of society is trying to identify the main results of the post-war situation. 3. The rest of the society thinks about the future and tries to construct its possible scenarios. Although, depending on the post-war situation, one of the models prevails, it is necessary to take into account all of them, as well as the diametrically opposite sentiments of opposing "winning" and "losing" societies.

In the case of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the sides almost mirrored the positions they held in 1994 and in 2020 following the results of two wars. From this perspective, it is necessary to analyze why after the war of 1992-1994, attempts to achieve peace reached a dead end, the way out of which inexorably led to the outbreak of a second war.                                           

The long-standing problem of Karabakh obviously did not interest the Western community, therefore no serious attempts to resolve it were undertaken, and it was reflected in the gradual degeneration of the role of the OSCE Minsk Group. The situation changed greatly after the signing of the trilateral agreement. Now all regional and non-regional forces want to participate in the post-war situation, or they are forced to react to it.

The Karabakh conflict, geographically coinciding with the borders of Russia, Turkey and Iran, naturally affects the national interests of these regional powers, which have recently been jointly or independently trying to change the geopolitical reality of the whole region and, at the same time, the world order, which cannot acquire complete features. With very significant discrepancies, various models of platforms for the unification of the six states are being put forward again, in which the obstacles are Russian-Georgian and Armenian-Turkic relations.

Today, the only reason for Russia's interference in the affairs of any post-Soviet country is the conscious desire of such a country to join the West and join NATO. Accordingly, the opportunity to establish a special relationship with any NATO member country is viewed by Moscow as a significant foreign policy success, for the sake of which even some concessions or agreements are possible. An example of recent times from this perspective is Turkey, which has taken an extremely important position not only at the intersection of the interests of the West and Russia, but also in the collision of Russian interests with countries such as Ukraine and Georgia. At the same time, such a regional power as Iran, which with its entire foreign policy prevents any attempts of the West to gain a foothold in the region, can also be considered an ally.

Today the South Caucasus, together with the rest of the world, is wondering what the policy of the new US administration, which will take up business at the end of January 2021. What will be the response of China to this policy of China, which in an alliance with a number of countries, is able to prevent the revival of a unipolar world. After the devastating consequences of the pandemic, analysts believe that China will become the world's largest economy in terms of GDP in 2028, and not in 2033, as previously thought. It is clear how this can change world politics and the nature of the formation of new political, economic and military alliances.

Risks and challenges of a narrow regional nature

N. Pashinyan came to power as a result of the color revolution hostile to Russia and was such an alien politician that the new link between Yerevan and Moscow was carried out at the expense of Armenia's catastrophic losses. However, Moscow-based Armenian political scientists interpret the situation exactly the opposite: "He achieved the only goal for which he came to power in Armenia - he surrendered Nagorno-Karabakh" to enter NATO, political scientist Sergei Kurginyan said. “We can say directly and frankly, Mr. Pashinyan surrenders Nagorno-Karabakh and acts as a traitor to the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh,” his colleague Semyon Bagdasarov echoes.

Nowadays, few people remember that the Ministry of Defense of Armenia launched the “Modernization Program for 2018–2024,” based on the development of technological innovations. It is interesting whether Armenia will continue this program and how it can affect the situation in the region. The military disaster, oddly enough, gave Armenia greater freedom from Russia, while at the same time tying Azerbaijan to the policy pursued by the Kremlin regarding the future of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Now Pashinyan's government needs to earn quickly new legitimacy, but based on new, non-standard and effective solutions in an extremely short period of time, when his stay in power suits Moscow and should suit Ankara and Baku. There are many options. It is possible to use the new economic reality that develops after the unblocking of old and the creation of new communications that return Armenia to the system of regional, and, therefore, global economic cooperation. It is possible, by starting negotiations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, to try to reduce dependence on Russia in such a way that the latter would be deprived of the opportunity to change the power in Armenia at its own discretion. As you know, the opposition forces in Armenia are extremely revanchist, accusing Pashinyan of "betrayal and deliberate surrender of Karabakh." For them, Pashinyan's departure provides an opportunity to initiate negotiations around the ambiguous provisions of the signed statement in order to find solutions beneficial to the Armenian side and to restore negotiations in the format of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs with the aim of finally consolidating and realizing the "right of Artsakh to self-determination".

Pashinyan can rely on the US military protectorate, which not only exists de facto in Georgia, but can also be formalized de jure after the creation of a base of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. It is also possible that the program of Georgia's accession to NATO at the insistence of the United States may be reduced and this South Caucasian country will soon receive the status of a member of the North Atlantic Alliance and provide territory for creating a military base for this organization. Obviously, this will contribute to a radical change in the situation in the South Caucasus, and Armenia realizes that Georgia's immunity to Turkish ambitions may also be in Yerevan if it correlates its sovereignty with Washington, and not with Moscow.

Because of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, the West (especially the United States) was able to gain exclusive influence in Georgia. The events of 2020 can increase this influence in various combinations, and here a lot will depend on Turkey's role in these plans and the position of Baku. One should remember that three South Caucasian states are participants in the EU's Eastern Partnership program. Georgia has already received the status of an “advanced partner”; Armenia has signed an agreement on a comprehensive partnership with the EU, and although Azerbaijan participates in the program at a lower level, however, with the EU a large-scale Energy Charter, which can receive a new impetus for development after reformatting the South Caucasus region, lifting sanctions on Iran, etc.

Anyway, Azerbaijan should in the near future find out what are the true short-term and long-term goals of Russia and the West in Karabakh. Could the diametrically opposite goals of Russia and the Western countries in Karabakh lead to the granting of legal international status to Karabakh as a separate territorial unit? Does V. Putin want and why does V. Putin give status to Karabakh in the near future? What can this mean for future relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan? Who benefits from the opening of borders and trade routes between Armenia and Azerbaijan? How can opening trade routes between Armenia and Azerbaijan stabilize the region and prevent future wars between the countries?

Obviously, in any case, Azerbaijan should hurry up with the return of refugees and displaced persons to their places of former residence. Without this, the full return of Karabakh to Azerbaijan is practically impossible.

In this regard, let us look at the current post-war situation from a somewhat unusual point of view. Having lost the war, Armenia threw off all the problems associated with Karabakh onto Russia, which today at its own expense solves all the economic and social problems of this region, while guaranteeing its security. I wonder if anyone will object if the budget of Karabakh next year is included in the budget of Russia in 2021. Probably not Armenia, which with relief will be able to transfer the freed up large funds for the needs of modernization, including military.

Azerbaijan not only helped Armenia to free itself of the burden of care from Karabakh, but also contributed to the creation of a zone of potential instability in its own country, completely controlled by Russia and partially by Armenia! Whose position is more preferable? Georgia, which completely lost two territories, but actually got out of the control of Russia, or Azerbaijan?

Of course, we should not ignore the new opportunities that the second Karabakh war opened up for the country and society. The point is that their rational use lies in the ability to create a strong state with a consolidated population, to carry out prompt reforms in the spheres of politics, economy and social life capable of strengthening the legitimacy of the authorities and increasing the attractiveness of Azerbaijani citizenship for all ethnic groups.

Meanwhile, the press announced a meeting on January 11, 2021, in Moscow, between Azerbaijani President I.Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister N. Pashinyan, with the participation of Russian President V. Putin. It seems that this meeting may somewhat clarify the vision of the future by the leaders of the three countries.

Ali Abasov

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