At Crossroads: CSTO or NATO?

One can argue that Belarus, a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, is part of the CSTO, but this example is more like an exception to the rule. Today, it has been pretty forgotten that not only Azerbaijan, but also Georgia (!) were CSTO members. In May 1992, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Tashkent. Azerbaijan signed the treaty on September 24, 1993, Georgia - on September 9, 1993, and Belarus - on December 31, 1993. The treaty entered into force on April 20, 1994 and it was calculated for 5 years, allowing for an extension. On April 2, 1999, the Presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed a protocol on the extension of the treaty for the next five-year period, but Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan refused to extend the treaty.

At different times, the supporters and opponents of this or that block advanced numerous arguments "pro" and "contra". For example, in 2008 it was noted that the Azerbaijani armament is of a Soviet type and, having entered the CSTO, it will be possible to make the same purchases at low prices; meanwhile we should expect a change in Russia's policy towards Karabakh, and Armenia and Azerbaijan will not officially be able to fight; Armenia in the event of a military conflict cannot hope for CSTO assistance; and finally, regional security will increase. It should be borne in mind that Armenia, closely connected with Russia, enjoys the benefits of cooperation with NATO and the EU. The emphasis was also placed on the proximity of Azerbaijan and Russia economically and politically. It was stressed that joining the CSTO will not create problems, since Russia wants to have such an ally in the Caucasus in order to stop the expansion of NATO in this region. It was predicted that by joining the CSTO, we will tie the hands of Armenia and start a new stage of negotiations with the best positions. That is why this choice is better than today's military neutrality.

The arguments of the CSTO opponents were that sooner or later Azerbaijan would switch to more modern Western armament and would strive to achieve NATO standards; the pro-Armenian policy of Russia, if Azerbaijan joins the Collective Security Treaty Organization, will at best be neutral, and Baku will be completely deprived of the opportunity to return the occupied lands by military means; The CSTO (read - Russia), if necessary, may demand the creation of military bases on the territory of Azerbaijan. (The Constitution of Azerbaijan states: one cannot place military bases of foreign states on the territory of Azerbaijan). Having entered the CSTO, Azerbaijan will lose the opportunity to pursue a policy of maneuvering between the West and the Russian Federation.

Is it possible to compare NATO with its history and traditions with such a marginal organization as the CSTO, which in fact has no prospects for development?! Azerbaijan joining the CSTO will not only replace the vector of development and the existing balance, but will also face the threats of revising a number of existing and planned transport, communication and energy projects related to the West. Therefore, Azerbaijan, even if it wants, cannot enter the CSTO.

Another threat will be the cooling of relations with the only ally - Turkey.

Russia's position on Karabakh will change only when it realizes that it has completely acquired Azerbaijan, which will replace Armenia as its outpost in the South Caucasus.

And yet, Azerbaijan's entry into NATO, taking into account the experience of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, is suicidal. Azerbaijan needs to create its own union: Turkey - Azerbaijan - Israel.

Azerbaijan, until it has entered any military blocs, is not threatened by anything, so it is foolish to abandon this position.

There were other, often unexpected opinions. Before resolving the Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan should not join either NATO or the CSTO. Becoming a member of a military bloc, Baku automatically recognizes control of its armed forces by the military bloc. It is clear that by providing security guarantees, the leading powers of the military bloc will in return demand that the military and foreign policy of the bloc members be consistent with them.

By and large, Iran and Russia have no direct business to Azerbaijan. They need the road Moscow-Baku-Tehran. The West will be irritated, but it will understand that we cannot talk with Russia or Iran from the position of strength or threats of a blockade. If the West needs it, let it solve this problem. It is necessary to remember the fate of Saakashvili. For Azerbaijan: the more global communications across the country, the more convenient the position of the blackmailer. It is possible to make Nakhchivan a free economic zone for hidden trade between Georgia and Russia, Iran and the West, Turkey and Armenia under the control of Baku.

One should also listen to advice from the neighboring country: "I am from Georgia and I do not have the right to participate in the survey, but let me express my opinion: Azerbaijan lives peacefully because it pursues a neutral policy, and Georgia is eager for the West and for NATO. Azerbaijan helps us (gas, political support), and that's enough.

If you now try to violate neutrality and try to join NATO, you will face provocations and shelling of Azerbaijani villages, unknown planes will bomb your cities, the Lezgins will want to reunite with their historical homeland, and maybe the Talyshes will move (or someone else on their behalf). The Armenian army will launch an offensive and demand that so-called "Bakurakert" be given to it, while Russia will carry out a "peacekeeping" mission.

If you try to join the CSTO, you will see "orange roses" in Baku. So enjoy a peaceful life for a while, and we will join NATO, and then there will be your turn. It will be easier for you to join NATO. We will help you.

Let's continue the arguments of the opponents of the CSTO. If Azerbaijan joins the CSTO, then it is quite possible that, to reward this choice and improve its image in the world, Russia can return to us five regions (without Lachin and Kalbajar, and naturally without Nagorno-Karabakh), and can contribute to the signing of a peaceful, more precisely, interim peace treaty with Armenia. And in return, we will FOREVER lose Karabakh, we will have to sell all of our extra gas to Russia, increase transportation of oil along the northern route, in short, not only politically, but also economically, we will depend on the whims of Russia.

If we choose NATO and the West, it is quite possible that at first we will experience strong pressure from Russia and may face the expulsion of our citizens from Russia. There can be provocations in the regions bordering Armenia, local battles in Karabakh, which, perhaps, will develop into a war. Russia can increase the issuance of Russian passports (this process is already underway) in the north of our country, and at any time, repeat the Georgian scenario. But if our leadership and all our people can resist the pressure of Russia, then, after that, we will return all our lands, become stronger, with a well-trained army, and become a huge lever for the West in bringing Armenia to the Western course in order to finally expel Russia from our region. We will have economic benefits, support, investment and practical assistance in the ongoing reforms.

Objections: The danger of the moment is that we can no longer be a neutral country and cannot conduct a "balanced" policy. And the main obstacle to our authority in choosing the West is that the Western policy requires reforms. This is unacceptable! Therefore, I'm afraid that our "ship" will take a course to the North...

Baku joined the Non-Aligned Movement in 2011 - therefore, talk about membership in the CSTO, to put it mildly, is questionable. Baku very consistently avoids participation in any military-political alliances. So far, there is actually no military alliance between Azerbaijan and its "elder brother," Turkey. Why should Azerbaijan, rich in oil, having a lot of money, developing close military and technical cooperation with Israel, Pakistan and Turkey, join the CSTO?

At the moment of worsening relations with the West, populist statements by officials and MPs are growing: "To resolve the Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan needs to establish relations with Russia. All the same, the West and NATO do not support Azerbaijan on this issue" (MP Gudrat Hasanguliyev 26.11.2009). "Azerbaijan can join the CSTO and place Russian military bases in exchange for the return of Nagorno-Karabakh."

Another MP Aydin Mirzazadeh believes that official Baku can become a member of the CSTO only under such condition: "The CSTO should condemn the aggressive policy of Armenia against Azerbaijan. It should demand that Armenia withdraw all troops from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. After that, Azerbaijan can cooperate with this organization in various directions. I do not think that Azerbaijan should necessarily enter into any bloc and take part in the implementation of its strategies. However, along with this, cooperation with the CSTO in a number of spheres is possible today. However, as long as Armenia is a full member of this organization, and this organization has not assessed Armenia's aggressive policy, direct cooperation with the CSTO in any sphere is out of the question."

A condition has been put forward, once again hinting to Moscow that, having risen on the Azerbaijani side in the Karabakh conflict, Russia will receive much in return.

Assistant to the President Ali Hasanov: "Azerbaijan would have become a member of the CSTO long ago, if there were..."

Meanwhile, the representative of Armenia Yuri Khachaturov has been the new Secretary General of the CSTO since his appointment on April 14, 2017.

On these days, speeches on the fact that Azerbaijan must join the Collective Security Treaty Organization for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have been resounded in the Milli Majlis...