We will not lose at the table what we have won in battle!

The war for the liberation of the occupied territories that began on September 27 came to a logical conclusion with the liberation of four regions and Shusha by our army on November 8. After Shusha, it was a matter of time for our army to stand on the outskirts of Khankendi, liberate the city and destroy the Armenian army. Until now Armenia ignored Azerbaijan's calls for a ceasefire, and now through Russia it expressed its readiness to end the war, as a result an Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia signed an agreement.  This agreement consisting of nine articles, which satisfy us, contains some moments that puzzle us. We consider it useful for the Foreign Ministry or the Presidential Assistant for Foreign Policy to clarify these issues of public concern.

1. It is necessary to clarify what will be the obligations of the parties to the conflict and the functions of the Center for monitoring the ceasefire. The position of the Azerbaijani and Turkish sides on this issue differs from the statements made by Russia. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zakharova said that Turkey would have nothing to do with the peacekeeping operation. In what status will Turkey participate in this process then? Whereas all of Azerbaijan wanted and expected Turkey's participation in the peace process on an equal basis with Russia based on the 2 + 2 format. It is not in our interests that Turkey does not have equal rights with Russia in the peacekeeping mission, since this will expand the possibilities of Russia's "initiative".

2. The Article 6 says that "Armenia must liberate the Lachin region by December 1, while maintaining the Lachin corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, 5 km wide," and these 5 km do not belong to Shusha. It turns out that these 5 km will continue remain under the control of Armenia? This issue should be clarified. What will be the fate of the city of Lachin, located on the road to Khankendi? In the agreement, it is important to clarify the status of the city of Lachin. Since the Lachin corridor is intended for the free movement of Karabakh Armenians to Armenia, the security guarantees provided by Azerbaijan, should be considered sufficient.

What the President of Azerbaijan was constantly voicing. It is necessary to explain the difference in the status of the Lachin corridor mentioned in the agreement and the Mehri corridor, which will connect Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan. In fact, the status of both corridors should be equal, the Mehri corridor should be 5 km wide and under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan, or the Lachin corridor should consist of a road designed only for safe traffic. What the President of Azerbaijan was constantly voicing. It is necessary to explain the difference in the status of the Lachin corridor mentioned in the agreement and the Mehri corridor, which will connect Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan. In fact, the status of both corridors should be equal, the Mehri corridor should be 5 km wide and under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan, or the Lachin corridor should consist of a road designed only for safe traffic.

3. The most critical part of the document is the entry of the Russian army into the conflict zone called a peacekeeping mission. This is the issue that worries the Azerbaijani society most of all. Because what the Russian army committed on January 20 has not yet been forgotten, its negative role in the first Karabakh war of 1988-1994, direct participation in the Khojaly genocide. In addition, the army deployed as a "peacekeeper" in the Georgian Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the Transnistrian region of Moldova did not solve the problem and did not ensure the territorial integrity of these countries, but froze the conflicts and created conditions for separatists to make demands that are more serious.

From the moment Russia left Azerbaijan in May 1993, under the pretext of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it tried to return its army in various ways. Why Azerbaijan, which until now has not agreed to this, has now agreed, it must be explained to the society. It should be borne in mind that the deployment of the Russian military in its current form in Nagorno-Karabakh contradicts the decisions of the 1994 OSCE Budapest summit, in which Russia took part, on the "deployment of peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone" and the subsequent "non-deployment of the armed forces of the co-chairing countries in the conflict zone" ...

The lack of real steps by the OSCE Minsk Group to resolve the conflict in accordance with international law undermined confidence in it in Azerbaijan. Instead, Turkey, whose influence in the region was growing rapidly, was expected to participate in the process. Although Azerbaijan has been raising this issue since the beginning of the war, it seems that Russia, which was planning to increase its influence in the region, did not abandon its position. For this reason, the so-called "peacekeeping" Russian military unit, consisting of 1,960 servicemen, 90 armored personnel carriers, 380 vehicles and special equipment, was waiting near the conflict zone even before the agreement was signed.

Several news outlets, including the Reuter Agency, have reported that tanks are still entering the conflict zone, in addition to combat vehicles in the arsenal of these forces. If the disseminated information is confirmed, it will mean a serious scandal and invasion, not related to the peacekeeping mission.

On the other hand, if the peacekeepers contact not both sides, but only with the Armenian side, then we should know that the next notorious “Volsky Committee”, created in 1988, awaits us. To prevent this, the Azerbaijani side must retain the initiative and monitor the activities of the "peacekeepers" on a par with Turkey. One of the points to which attention should be paid is the relationship of the "peacekeepers" contingent with the terrorist structure in Karabakh. Will Russia cooperate with them as a “legitimate representative” of the Armenian population or not? If the leadership of the “peacekeeping” contingent, like 32 years ago, again comes into contact with the Armenians, not noticing the Azerbaijani side, then we will face serious problems.

Because if the leadership of the "peacekeeping" contingent, as in previous times,  takes part in the holidays organized by the Armenians, behave like mercenaries in exchange for bribes, this is fraught with serious consequences. Therefore, the military command of Azerbaijan should be in constant contact with them and take upon itself the solution of problems, not leaving them to the Armenians. At present, the Russian military who have arrived in Khankendi are again met by the head of the terrorists Arayik Harutyunyan. Is the participation of the Azerbaijani military command in this process ensured? I don't know the answer to the question.

According to the rules of war, the "peacekeeping" contingent stationed in the conflict zone must resolve security issues by preventing incidents between the parties to the conflict, and disarm illegal military formations. It is important that the Armenian army, which will be withdrawn from the conflict zone, will not leave its weapons in Karabakh; and how Russia will react to this. How we will control this process? Let us assume that the occupation army, which will leave Lachin and Kelbajar, has decided to transfer its military equipment and weapons to Armenia (in fact, very few weapons and military equipment are deployed in these regions, compared to Nagorno-Karabakh). What about the fate of the oversaturated military arsenal in Agder, Askeran, Khojavend, Khojaly and Khankendi? Will they stay in Karabakh, or will they be taken to Armenia? In addition, military fortifications, engineering structures, etc. were built on these territories. What will be the fate of these military facilities?

Azerbaijan must insist on the complete disarmament of the occupied territories, and after the completion of this process, it must resolve security issues in these territories by "peacekeeping" forces, socio-economic and other civil issues within the period specified in the agreement. By this, he must demonstrate that the problems of the Armenian population living in Karabakh are better solved. Because after a while, along with military issues, civil-political management will be required to solve the socio-economic and other problems of people living in these areas. These rulers should not be the leaders of the regions occupied by Armenia who participated in war crimes against the Azerbaijani state.

At present, the issue of war criminals in the occupied territories must be seriously raised. There should be a clear position regarding the persons involved in the war crimes against the Azerbaijani people, led by Arayik Harutyunyan. Their lists must be determined, these war criminals must be convicted in accordance with the legislation of Azerbaijan or their deportation from Nagorno-Karabakh must be ensured. It is useful to reiterate that the current euphoria must be left behind as soon as possible, the ambiguities of the signed agreement must be clarified, and the initiative received during the military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh must not be lost and must continue at the negotiating table. We cannot lose at the negotiating table what we won in the war.