The Republic of Azerbaijan - 100

• The difficult Road to Independence
• The Trabzon conference and road to independence
• Declaration independence of Azerbaijan
• Summer 1918: The Defeat of the Bolsheviks and the Crisis in Baku
• The liberation of Baku
• The Mondros Armistice and Azerbaijan
• The opening of the Azerbaijani Parliament
• The Creation of the Peace Delegation of Azerbaijan
• "Russian question" at the Paris Peace Conference and Azerbaijan
• The Meeting of Azerbaijan Delegation with President Wilson
• The First Anniversary of Independence and Danger from the North
• The defense pact between of the Azerbaijan and Georgia
• Azerbaijan Republic confronts the claims of "Great Armenia"
• Mandate system and Azerbaijan
• The United States interest in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan
• The spread of propaganda in Western Europe
• The strengthening of the Bolshevik danger and Azerbaijan
• Recognition of Azerbaijan`s independence
• The Allies military assistance to Azerbaijan

The difficult Road to Independence

The Azerbaijan Republic, which appeared on the stage of world history in 1918, was a secular state, a logical result of the transition from Islamic populism to Turkish nationalism and a historic confirmation of the philosophy of "national awakening," including the desire to be a distinct and unified nation. Not seeing the footprints of their nation among the nations of the world and suffering from this, the leading minds of Azerbaijan seized the first opportunity presented and succeeded in establishing the first Azerbaijan republic on May 28, 1918. This significant event was a great historical achievement for the Azerbaijani nation and their hope for a change in the political map of the world-a world where diplomatic conflicts were being resolved by cannonballs exploding on battlefields and the situation was becoming tenser from day to day.

The Azerbaijan Republic survived for only twenty-three months. This is not a very long period of time, and yet the history created during those months, the steps taken in the sphere of diplomacy, and the political ramifications of important actions and policies introduced during that period changed the path of the nation. The independence announced on May 28, 1918, and the tricolored flag with crescent and star that was raised to the sky as a symbol of this independence were not only the logical result of a national struggle spanning the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but served as an ideological guide for the future of a new country, a strategy encompassing national targets and goals.

The Azerbaijan Republic was formed at a time of intense diplomatic struggles that accompanied the end of World War I and attempts by Russia to restore the borders of its empire. This demanded from the young Azerbaijani republic great diplomatic skill and an ability to recognize turning points in world politics. Azerbaijani diplomacy managed to fulfill its duty during the two years of independence, and that duty was characterized by the combination of a love for freedom and a struggle for autonomy. Those who represented Azerbaijan in the international political arena gained acceptance in 1920 at Versailles, but postwar geopolitics prevented the Azerbaijani people from deriving the full benefit of their achievements. The Azerbaijan Republic ceased to exist in April 1920, not due to political processes or territorial conflicts within the country but due to the complicated conflicts taking place in world politics. In truth, the difficulty of integrating the new Caucasus republics, including Azerbaijan, into the international arena was related to the collapse of Russia, which was a member of the Entente, the winning bloc of countries in World War I. The victors did not anticipate the collapse of Russia, and their ruling circles were not ready to recognize the new republics that emerged from the ruins. Russia"s allies viewed Bolshevism as a temporary condition and did not lose hope that the country would restore its old borders. They therefore acted with extreme caution on all issues concerning this former world power.

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World War I brought Russia unforeseen disaster. Along with the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy in Russia, the revolution of February 1917 was a blow to the Russian empire, spawning national liberation movements in that "prison of nations." The overthrow of the monarchy sped up the political processes taking place in the South Caucasus. One of the first steps of the Provisional Government that was formed after the revolution was the creation of a special institution to govern the South Caucasus. On March 9, the Special Transcaucasian Committee (OZAKOM) was created to govern the region. Its members were drawn from the State Duma, and it was chaired by the Russian Constitutional Democrat Vasily Kharlamov. The Committee consisted of the Social Federalist Kita Abashidze succeeded by Menshevik Akaki Chkhenkeli from Georgia, Azerbaijani Constitutional Democrat Mahammad Yusif Jafarov (who later occupied the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the fourth cabinet of the government of the Azerbijan Republic), and Armenian Constitutional Democrat Mikayel Papajanov.

The Special Committee was directly subordinate to the Provisional Government. As this institution was created for the management of civil issues, it did not have legislative authority. Due to its limitations, the Committee was overwhelmed by events. The growing trend of the Transcaucasian nations toward autonomy and political freedom, inspired by the February revolution, along with the legalization of the activity of numerous national parties and organizations as well as increased interest on the part of the international community, seriously complicated matters for the government of the South Caucasus.

On March 27, representatives of Muslim organizations and societies in various localities met in Baku to form the Muslim National Council with a temporary executive committee chaired by Mahammad Hasan Hajinski, who later became the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic. The Musavat (Equality) party, founded in Baku in 1911 by Mahammad Emin Rasulzade, had the greatest weight in the Council, and it soon emerged as the all-Azerbaijani party. In the election to the Baku Soviet held in October 1917, the Musavat party collected nearly 40 percent of all the votes cast: 9,617 votes of some

25,000. Despite the fact that the elections were held at a time considered to be favorable for them, the Bolsheviks gathered only 3,823 votes, while the Socialist-Revolutionaries received 6,305, Mensheviks 687, and Dashnaks (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) 528. The October elections demonstrated which party was the strongest. This success was due to the fact that the Muslim masses were being attracted to political processes and to the demands of national organizations to grant Muslims full political rights.

The idea of national and territorial independence was discussed for the first time at the Congress of Caucasian Muslims held in Baku on April 15-20, 1917. The Musavat party and the Turkic Federalist party founded in Ganja (then called Elizavetpol) under the leadership of Nasib bey Usubbeyov (Yusifbeyli) and Hasan bey Aghayev after the February revolution emerged as the dominant political organizations. After long debates, the congress passed the following resolution on the national issue: "The federal democratic republic is to be recognized as the best structure for securing the interests of Muslim nations within the Russian state system."

The Baku congress stipulated the protection of national schools by the state, the opening of a university in the mother tongue of Azerbaijani citizens, the enlargement of the Special Transcaucasian Committee to include Muslims, a census of the Muslim population, and the marshaling of the military potential of the Muslim population in view of the imminent danger. An argument between Turks who were in favor of territorial autonomy and Islamists and Socialists who were in favor of national cultural autonomy lasted for 10 days after the conclusion of the congress and continued at the All-Russian Congress of Muslims held in Moscow on May 1, 1917. At the Moscow congress, Socialists justified their objection to territorial autonomy by stating that it would undo the achievements of the revolution and that within a framework of national cultural autonomy, the Russian central government would act as the guarantor of the protection of the rights of Muslims.

On May 3, Mahammad Emin Rasulzade, in his main address to the congress, explained the importance of demanding territorial autonomy and backed his words with strong arguments. To those who stressed the Islamic factor as the crucial one, he noted that many Turkic nations had already realized that "first of all, they are Turks, and then they are Muslims." Rasulzade stated that the question must be put in the following way:

"What is a nation? I am sure that such characteristics as unity of language, historical relations, and traditions create a nation. Sometimes, when Turkic Tatars are asked about their nationality, they say they are Muslims. However, this is an incorrect viewpoint. Christians do not exist in one nation; neither do Muslims. There must be a place for Turks, Persians, and Arabs in the large house of the Muslim faith." Rasulzade, who has been labeled a pan-Turkist in both Soviet and foreign literature, noted in his speech to the congress that the Turkic nations differed greatly from one another. Despite the strong opposition of the proponents of cultural-national autonomy, the idea of territorial autonomy, proposed by Rasulzade, was accepted with 446 votes in favor versus 271 against. After the victory of the idea of territorial autonomy at the Moscow Congress of Russian Muslims, the party of Turkic Federalists and the Musavat party decided to merge due to the similarity of their aims and purposes. After preparations in May-June, at the first congress held in Baku on June 20, the merger was completed, and a joint central committee was created.

Intellectuals of Azerbaijan who did not join any political party nevertheless considered it important to preserve and protect the achievements of the February revolution. During the revolt led by General Lavr Kornilov against the Provisional Government, leaflets were distributed bearing the signature of Ali Mardan bey Topchubashov and expressing the solidarity of the Muslims of the South Caucasus with the Russian revolution. Topchubashov was elected chairman of the Muslim National Council in Baku, and Fatali khan Khoyski, who was also a member, was sent on an official trip to Petrograd to participate in a discussion concerning elections to the Constituent Assembly.

When the revolution of October 1917 occurred, it raised the hopes of the nations that had been subjects of the Russian empire. These hopes for independence were for the most part nourished by the declarations made by the Bolsheviks in the early days of their coming to power. A peace decree and a Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia were to provide a guarantee that the nations of the former empire would be free to secede and create independent republics. However, quite soon it became clear that these documents were merely propaganda.

While the October events were under way in Petrograd, the Musavat party convened its first congress, which lasted for 5 days. The congress defined the tactical and strategic direction of the national territorial autonomy of Azerbaijan in view of the existing conditions. Mahammad Emin Rasulzade was elected as the chairman of the central committee of the party.

On November 11, a meeting of political organizations of the South Caucasus was held in Tiflis (today"s Tbilisi). The leader of the Georgian Mensheviks, Noe Jordania, gave a long speech in which he said that, for the last 100 years, the South Caucasus had lived shoulder-to-shoulder with Russia and considered itself "an integral part of the Russian state." Now a catastrophe had occurred. The connection with Russia was lost, and the South Caucasus was on its own. "We need to get up on our feet, either to save ourselves or be destroyed in the whirlpool of anarchy." Jordania proposed the creation of an independent local government to save the South Caucasus from disaster. It was decided that, until the governance issue was resolved by the Constituent Assembly, a South Caucasian Commissariat would be created to govern the region. On November 15, the structure of the newly formed government was announced.

Since autumn 1917, Muslims of South Caucasus started their preparations for elections to the Constituent Assembly. In Ganja congress was held here to elect candidates from the Muslim Committee and the "Musavat" Party. In debates were formed a bloc of the Muslim National Committee and "Musavat" that included Mahammad Yusif Jafarov, Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov, Mahammad Emin Rasulzade, Nasib bey Usubbeyov, Fatali khan Khoyskii, Hasan bey Aghayev, Khosrovpasha bey Sultanov, Gazi Ahmed Mamedbeyov, Mustafa bey Mahmudov, Mir Hidayat Seyidov, Aslan bey Gardashov, Shafi bey Rustambeyov et al. Aside from that, Ali Mardan bey was nominated from Syr Darya province; Mahammad Emin bey from Fergana region; Nasib bey from Amu Darya province. This shows that progressive Azerbaijanians played a leading role in the political life of Russian Muslims.

Two weeks after the commissariat establishment, elections to the Constituent Assembly were held on 26 through 28 November. Vast majority of Muslims voted for candidates from the Ganja list. During the elections to the Constituent Assembly the "Musavat" headed by Rasulzadhe and the Muslim National Committee led by Topchibashov and Khoyskii received 63% of votes of Caucasian Muslims. This great victory showed that national forces of the Caucasus had turned into a strong political organization. Consequently, the national bloc received 10 seats; a bloc of Muslim socialists - 2 seats; ittihadists - 1 seat. Bolsheviks received just 4,4% of votes, i.e. seat which vividly demonstrated that they lacked social base. The elections went to show that most Muslims from Baku, Ganja, Erevan, and Tiflis provinces were supportive of Azerbaijani political figures in their struggle for territorial autonomy. In December 1917, Ali Mardan bey resigned from his post of chairman of the Muslim Committee of South Caucasus, for he was elected to the Constituent Assembly. In the end of 1917, the Baku Committee acted as an inter-party organ. However, for heart disease Ali Mardan bey failed to take part in the work of the Committee and Seim. As is known, an idea of the Constituent Assembly belied, and on January 6, 1918, the government of Bolsheviks issues a decree on its dissolution. Expectations around the national question sank into oblivion. The disbandment of the Constituent Assembly became a crucial moment in separating national outskirts, including South Caucasus, from Russia. On January 22, 1918, all delegates to the Constituent Assembly from South Caucasus gathered in Tiflis. Two days debates ended with a decision to redouble seats at the Constituent Assembly and set up a regional legislative body - Transcaucasian Seim. On February 23, 1918, the 1st session of the Seim was held.

The first issue discussed in Seim after its creation was the start of peace talks with Turkey. The Trabzon discussions were the first time that Azerbaijani representatives to the Seim entered the diplomatic arena. On February 23, Vehib Pasha accepted the offer of the South Caucasian government to start peace talks. On the same day, a joint meeting of the South Caucasian Commissariat and the Seim was held. At the meeting, a letter from Vehib Pasha was read in which he stated that the Ottoman Empire was ready to start peace negotiations in Tiflis or Batum. Many Seim members were against holding the negotiations in those cities. Fatali Khan Khoyski, in his speech on behalf of Azerbaijani representatives, stated that the start of peace talks by the government would demonstrate its desire to be independent and stressed the importance of beginning without delay. In his opinion, the location of the conference was not important. Istanbul and Trabzon were suggested as suitable locations and, at the last moment, the decision was made to hold the talks in Trabzon...

The Trabzon conference and road to independence

On the eve of the Trabzon conference, the separate factions of the Seim discussed their responsibilities and defined their positions with regard to the peace. The Azerbaijani faction organized a meeting on this issue; the Muslim National Council had prepared an analysis of the events occurring within and around Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijanis were concerned with the concentration of Armenian forces in Baku after their return from the Caucasian borders; the danger to Baku as a result of the movement of British forces in the Middle East in the direction of northern Iran and the southern Caspian Sea; and the activity of Germans in the Caucasus and their intention to seize Baku oil. The Muslim faction considered it necessary to sign a peace agreement with Turkey without delay and stabilize the situation in the South Caucasus.

The delegation members who were supposed to go to Trabzon met on February 28, 1918. The Armenian representatives, invoking the right of nations to define their sovereignty, demanded autonomy for "Turkish Armenia" and expressed the idea that the Turkish government should withdraw its claims to Kars, Batum, and Ardahan. Ibrahim bey Heydarov, representing the Muslim Socialist bloc, considered this to be an intervention into Turkey"s internal affairs and stated that the South Caucasus nations could define their sovereignty only on the condition of doing so within the borders of Transcaucasia. In response to those who were blaming Turkey for breaking the Erzincan agreement, Mahammad Emin Rasulzade argued that the Turks likewise had a right to blame them for breaking the agreement. Two days before, Fatali khan Khoyski had spoken bluntly at the meeting of the Transcaucasian Seim, and there was a serious divergence of opinions between him and Evgeni Gegechkori.

A telegram from Lev Karakhan, the Russian Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs and Secretary for Soviet Russia at the Brest peace negotiations, which was received before the representatives of the Transcaucasian Seim set off for Trabzon, greatly complicated the situation.4 The telegram stated: "We decided to sign the agreement under discussion. The most difficult condition of the February 21 (March 3) agreement is the separation of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum from Russia in the name of sovereignty." One day later, Soviet Russia signed the Brest-Litovsk agreement and, in doing so, officially repudiated the decrees on "Turkish Armenia" signed by Lenin and Stalin two months previously. The agreement stipulated that Russia would do everything to evacuate southern Anatolia and return it to Turkey. Russian troops would be withdrawn from the Ardahan, Kars, and Batum provinces. Russia would not intervene in the formation of new state and judicial relations. With respect to Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, the border line that had existed before the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 would be restored.

Despite the urgings of Turkey and their promises to provide assistance, the government of the South Caucasus had refused to participate in the peace negotiations and announce its independence and so was now in a bad position. After receiving a telegram from Lev Karakhan, the government of the South Caucasus, in telegrams sent to Petrograd, London, Washington, Rome, Tokyo, Istanbul, Berlin, Vienna, and Kiev, immediately expressed objection to the Bolsheviks" actions in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. The telegrams stated that "The government of the South Caucasus considers invalid any agreement on Transcaucasia and its borders signed without its participation."11 But it was too late. Before the start of the Trabzon conference, Vehib Pasha demanded that the commander-in-chief of the Russian army in the Caucasus, General Lebedinsky, clear Ardahan, Kars, and Batum of Russian troops in accord with the Brest-Litovsk agreement.

The government and parliament of the South Caucasus were not declaring independence but, at the same time, did not want to side with the agreement signed by Soviet Russia. This contradiction was one of the most difficult problems that representatives of the South Caucasus faced at the Trabzon conference. The representatives of the South Caucasus arrived in Trabzon on March 8, and waited for the Turkish representatives on board the King Karl, on which they had traveled from Batum, until March 12. The conference officially opened on March 14. The head of Turkish delegation, Rauf Bey (Husayin Rauf Orbay), said at the beginning of the conference that the chairmanship would be given to heads of both delegations in turn. However, the representatives of the South Caucasus rejected this proposal. In his opening speech, Orbay stated that Turkey wanted to sign a long-term peace agreement with the South Caucasus on the basis of friendly relations.

The insistence of the South Caucasus representatives on their claims to Kars and Batum, their refusal to recognize the terms of the Brest agreement, and several other questions under dispute deepened the conflict between the sides. Turkey"s interest in negotiations was weakened by the Seim"s unwillingness to announce its independence. Akaki Chkhenkeli confessed, that, "Considering it objectively, Turkey is interested in the independence of the South Caucasus because the independence of the South Caucasus means the safety of Turkey"s northern borders." The leader of the Ottoman delegation, Rauf Bey, stated that representatives of Turkey were rejecting the declaration of the South Caucasian representatives because it interfered in Turkey"s internal affairs. In his opinion, the ideas expressed in the declaration did not comply with a friendly-neighbor policy. Official recognition of the South Caucasus government by Turkey was possible only if this government rejected its territorial claims on Kars, Batum, and Ardahan provinces on the basis of a special agreement. It would not contradict the obligations of Russia and Turkey, because Russia had accepted the right of its nations to sovereignty. The international agreement signed at Brest-Litovsk gave grounds for the Ottoman Empire to lay down a new order in these three regions; at the same time, the Ottoman government was ready to establish favorable economic relations between these regions and the regions of the Caucasus.

At that moment, Vehib Pasha ordered that the disputed territories of the South Caucasus be cleared. Intense discussions in the Seim on this issue showed that disagreement among the Trancaucasian nations was strong. While the Armenians and Georgians urged that the Turkish claims be rejected and war begun with Turkey, the Muslim faction proposed reaching an agreement with Turkey on the basis of mutual compromise. During the discussions, Mir Yagub Mehdiyev stated on behalf of the Muslim faction that it would not support the continuation of the negotiations if the independence of the South Caucasus was not announced. He noted that, normally, peace negotiations are held not by members of the Seim but by the minister of foreign affairs of a sovereign government. Discussion of territorial problems led to a situation in which the Georgians agreed to make concessions about Kars and Ardahan, on the condition of keeping Batum; the Armenians agreed to make concessions on Batum and Ajaria but did not want to give away Kars. The Azerbaijani faction stated that the government should fulfill its obligations according to the Brest-Litovsk agreement and give away Kars and Ardahan, because the majority of the population of these provinces was Turkish. They also thought that Ajaria should either become an independent Muslim republic as a part of the South Caucasus or, if this was impossible, should unite with Turkey. They also felt that Batum should stay within the South Caucasus, because the Black Sea port was an important outlet to other countries.

While discussions were being held in Trabzon and Tiflis, the Turkish army began to establish Turkey"s claims under the Brest agreement. Ardahan was captured on March 19, and Armenian troops were disarmed. The local population, which had been terrorized by the Armenian troops, supported Turkey in the military operations. Armenian representatives in the Seim and in the government, who had remained silent while Armenian troops used force against Turkish populations at every opportunity, now tried to blame the Musavat party for betrayal in connection with the attitude of the Muslim population.

The position on the issue of war and peace became clearer at the joint meeting of government members and leaders of the Seim on March 25. Hovhannes Kachaznuni, representing Armenia at the Trabzon negotiations, informed the participants that Turkey considered the declaration of the independence of the South Caucasus a necessity. It needed a state that would play the role of buffer between Turkey and Russia. Those speaking on behalf of the Azerbaijani faction clearly stated that they considered the declaration of independence of the South Caucasus inevitable and thus demanded it. In spite of the fact that Azerbaijani representatives participating in the discussions belonged to different political parties, none agreed to fight against Turkey. They stated that the Azerbaijani people would not fight against the Turks if war began. Khalil Khasmammadov said, If you do not fulfill Turkey"s demands, war is inevitable, and we cannot participate in a war against Turkey. If the Armenian and Georgian people feel they have enough power and strength, then let them take the responsibility on themselves and risk beginning a war with Turkey. No Muslim people will take part in this war.

Worrying news from Baku about bloodshed organized by the combined efforts of Armenian and Bolshevik forces worsened the situation of the Seim and the progress of peace negotiations. The Seim was informed about the events in Baku on April 2. Noe Ramishvili, a member of the Seim, evaluated these as the beginning of a Bolshevik attack on Tiflis and Bolshevik seizure of power in the South Caucasus. Shaken by the March bloodshed, the representatives of the Muslim faction demanded that immediate measures be taken against the Bolsheviks in Baku; otherwise, as they stated, the Muslim faction would boycott the Seim.

Positions on war and peace issues were being debated by factions of the Seim. Although after long negotiations on April 5, the representatives of the South Caucasus supported the idea of compromising over Kars and part of Ardahan, they refused to recognize the lawfulness of the Brest agreement. On April 6, the Turkish side, tired of repetition of the same solutions at the bargaining table, issued an ultimatum to the Transcaucasian representatives demanding that they provide an answer within forty-eight hours to the question of whether or not they accepted the Brest-Litovsk agreement. It was stipulated in the ultimatum that, if the South Caucasus wanted to reach an agreement with Turkey, it must proclaim its independence; only then could the diplomatic negotiations be continued.

On April 7, Akaki Chkhenkeli informed Tiflis about the ultimatum. Making reference to the anarchy in the country and the collapse of the front, he called for acceptance of the Brest agreement, except for the Batum part, and for an immediate proclamation of independence. At the same time, he wrote to Noe Jordania, the chairman of the Georgian National Council, "We are in a crisis situation, the level of the army is lower than critical, the Turks were allowed to get very close to Batum, the railroad near Chakvi will be cut off. If Batum is taken, we will have to think about the future of Georgia."

In Tiflis, events were moving in a somewhat different direction. As soon as the ultimatum about Batum was received, an extraordinary meeting of the Transcaucasian Seim was called. Evgeni Gegechkori, Irakli Tsereteli, Khachatur Karchikian, Yuli Semyonov, and others considered resistance to be very important and demanded in their statements that war be declared on Turkey. A call to war was echoed in the statements of the Armenian and Georgian representatives of the Seim.The antiwar views of the Azerbaijani parties did not succeed in changing the standpoint of the Seim, which on April 13 passed a resolution on war with Turkey. Martial law was proclaimed in the city. A military board with extraordinary powers was created, and an appeal was issued to all the peoples of the South Caucasus to protect their "fatherland" by taking up weapons. Irakli Tsereteli and others stated, in an obvious allusion to Azerbaijanis, that "as long as there is no betrayal from the rear," the Transcaucasian forces would be capable of resisting the Ottomans. Of course, there was no basis for such an assertion. Akaki Chkhenkeli, who was close to the front line and directly observed the situation there, could see very well that the Transcaucasian army was weak and falling apart and was not strong enough to resist an attack by Turkey.

The day after the war decree was accepted, Evgeni Gegechkori, in a secret telegram to Akaki Chkhenkeli, informed him that he must stop negotiations and leave Trabzon immediately. This news frustrated the Azerbaijani representatives in Trabzon. Mahammad Hasan Hajinski considered the decision of the Transcaucasian Seim as a violation of the peace and called it a "a scandal unequaled in the history of international relations" Angered by the situation, he stated that "he had a mandate from his party to go to Istanbul to take the final steps toward the conclusion of peace which is indispensable for us." Chkhenkeli, who was not in favor of war, did not fully terminate the negotiations but informed the Turkish representatives in a proper manner that the delegation must leave for Tiflis that same day in order to get instructions from the South Caucasus government. Chkhenkeli thought that upon his return to Tiflis, he would be able to distance the government from the war venture. He was concerned that war would intensify national conflicts in the South Caucasus. In his view, "war will endanger not only the independence of Transcaucasia, but also its unity." Chkhenkeli, who correctly evaluated the situation, "feared the war as much as he feared fire." Efforts by Chkhenkeli in the Georgian National Council to prevent the war did not bring about any results, as the capture of Batum by the Turks alarmed the Georgians and swayed them to support the war.

The war between the South Caucasus government and Turkey lasted for only eight days. On April 15, news of the capture of Batum was officially announced in Istanbul. After forty years, Turkey had regained Batum, with the assistance of the Ajarian population. The battle over Kars lasted longer. When the Turks had occupied most of the intended territories, and did not want to take any more losses, they put forward a peace proposal on April 22. In a telegram sent to Akaki Chkhenkeli, Vehib Pasha blamed the South Caucasus for the termination of negotiations and informed him that the issue of peace depended on the South Caucasus. The Seim accepted the offer to start peace talks. In fact, the South Caucasus government was relieved by this offer, as it turned out that waging a war was more difficult than declaring it. Serious dissatisfaction had arisen among the members of the Muslim faction because of the war and among the members of the Georgian faction because of the apparent defeat.

On April 20, there was an urgent joint meeting of representatives of all parties including the Azerbaijani faction of the Seim, with the exception of the Hummet party members. The Seim met that same day, April 20-that is, two days before receiving the offer to start talks with Turkey. All the leading parties, except for the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Constitutional Democrats, were in favor of accepting all the Turkish demands and declaring independence. Representatives who had stayed in Trabzon were not passive during this time. Soon after the negotiations were terminated, Enver Pasha had visited Trabzon and Batum and was received by the representatives in Trabzon. Mahammad Hasan Hajinski informed Enver Pasha that ending the hostility in Georgian-Turkish relations depended on resolution of the Batum problem. He made some attempts to retain Batum for the Georgians but without success. Noting that Turkey"s claim on Batum had been recognized by the Russian government, he stated that if the Georgians did not get carried away by Armenian politics and did not have a hostile attitude toward Turkey, Turkey would wish to see Georgia as an independent country and consider it a reliable neighbor. The Azerbaijani representatives wanted to sound out the views of Enver Pasha on such issues as the political structure of the South Caucasus and the future bilateral relations of the fraternal Azerbaijani Turks and Ottoman Turks. Enver Pasha said that Akhalsikh and Akhalkelek, which were Muslim districts, should join Turkey, as they had long wished to do. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia could create a federation or a confederation with Turkey; they would continue having a common Seim and would exist in close union with Turkey. Enver Pasha also noted that, if it proved impossible to create a common Transcaucasian state, an independent Azerbaijan bordering Turkey could enter into a closer union with the Ottoman Empire, as close as the union of Austria and Hungary. He added that Turkey had already decided to take serious steps in the direction of providing aid to Azerbaijan. Hajinski relayed to the Muslim faction the news that Nuri Pasha,brother of Enver Pasha and Military Minister of the Ottoman Empire, would soon arrive in Azerbaijan, by way of Iran, with 300 military instructors, and that they were probably on the way from Tabriz to Araz at the time.

Finally, on April 22, as soon as the offer by Turkey was received, a historic meeting of the Seim was called, chaired by Nikolai Chkheidze. Three important issues were on the agenda of the meeting: (1) the independence of the South Caucasus; (2) the report by Akaki Chkhenkeli about the Trabzon negotiations; and (3) the formation of a government. After a long period of hesitation, late at night on April 22, 1918, the Seim proclaimed the Transcaucasian Independent Democratic Federative Republic by a majority vote. It was decided that a commission would be established that would prepare a constitution for the newly formed republic. The proclamation of independence was an important victory, primarily by the Azerbaijani faction and the Musavat party.

On April 23, the day after the meeting, Akaki Chkhenkeli informed Vehib Pasha that the Transcaucasian republic, which had proclaimed its independence, accepted all of Turkey"s claims and was ready to continue negotiations on the basis of the Brest agreement. He requested that the negotiations be continued in Batum. Chkhenkeli ordered an immediate ceasefire on the Batum and Kars fronts and that the cities should be cleared of troops immediately. On April 28, the newly formed Transcaucasian Independent Democratic Federal Republic was recognized by the Ottoman Empire. After that, there is only one month left before the declaration of independence of Azerbaijan...

Declaration independence of Azerbaijan

The last meeting of the South Caucasus Seim was held on May 26, 1918. In a speech, Irakli Tsereteli blamed the Azerbaijani faction for the dissolution of the Transcaucasian federation. He charged that the Azerbaijani faction as well as the Muslim population of the South Caucasus had refused to fight against Turkey, that it had sent its representatives to the Trabzon conference with no intention of negotiating, and that it had sent propagandists into the regions to persuade them to side with Turkey. Shafi bey Rustambeyov, who was responsible for answering Tsereteli, said that the arguments of the Georgian representatives who had decided to secede from the South Caucasus federation were false. In any case, if the Georgians did not want to cooperate, then Azerbaijan would not object to the dissolution of the Seim.

Giorgi Gvazava, a Georgian Nationalist Democrat, found a better way to resolve the disagreements. He said: "Gentlemen, let us stop arguing. Today we choose to dissolve the Seim, so let us do so in a friendly manner. We are meeting as friends, let us separate the same way." Thus, after Georgia"s statement about its secession, the Transcaucasian Seim decided to dissolve itself. The National Council of Georgia announced the independence of the Republic of Georgia on May 26 and formed a government cabinet with Noe Ramishvili as its head. The new government"s first political step in the international arena was the signing of an agreement with Germany that had been prepared beforehand. The Georgian government accepted Germany"s guardianship.

To discuss the crisis because of the dissolution of the Sejm, members of the Azerbaijani faction gathered on May 27 to hold an extraordinary meeting. In considering the complexity of the situation, the meeting decided to assume the responsibility for managing Azerbaijan and, hence, proclaimed itself the Azerbaijani National Interim Council. A vote by secret ballot elected Mahammad Emın Rasulzade a chairman of the Council. His candidature was backed by all Parties, except for "Ittihad". Hasan bey Aghayev and Mir Hidayat Seidov were elected his deputies, and Mustafa bey Mahmudov and Rahim bey Vekilov as secretaries of the National Council. Then delegates elected an executive body of the National Council composed of nine members in charge of various spheres of Republic"s life. Fatali khan Khoyskii was unanimously elected a chairman of the executive body.

The first meeting of the Azerbaijani National Council was held on May 28. Twenty-six people participated in the meeting, and three items were on the agenda: (1) information presented by Hasan Bey Aghayev about the latest events in Ganja; (2) reading of the letter and telegram of Mahammad Emin Rasulzade from Batum; and (3) the position of Azerbaijan related to the announcement of the independence of Georgia and dissolution of the Seim. Member of the National Council Khalil bey Khasmamedov made a report to substantiate the necessity of immediate declaration of the Azerbaijan Republic. He was backed by members of the National Council Nasib bey Usubbeyov, Akber agha Sheikhulislamov, Mir Hidayet Seidov, etc. The National Council (24 votes for, 2 abstained - Soltan Majid Ganizade and Javad Akhundov) passed a decision to immediate declare the state independence of Azerbaijan and proclaim "Act of Azerbaijan"s Independence". The declaration of independence consisted of six Articles:

1) as of today, Azerbaijan, which constitutes southeastern Transcaucasia, and has the right to national governance, is a genuine independent state;

2) the form of governance of the independent Azerbaijani state is established as a people"s republic;

3) the "Azerbaijan Republic" insists on building good relationships with all nations and states;

4) the "Azerbaijan Republic" guarantees citizenship and legal rights for all those who live within its territory, regardless of their nationality, religion, social position, beliefs, or gender;

5) the "Azerbaijan Republic" provides many opportunities for unrestricted development of all nations living within the territory of the republic; and

6) until the Constituent Assembly is formed, a provisional government consisting of the National Council and the Council of Nations, elected on territorial basis, will govern Azerbaijan.

Members of the National Council heard a text of the Act, then entrusted Khoyskii to form the Azerbaijani government. In an hour, meeting participants heard Khoyskii"s report on formation of the government. It stated, Fatali khan Khoyskii - Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers and concurrently Internal Minister; Khosrovpasha bey Sultanov - War Minister; Mahammmad Hasan Hajinskii - Foreign Minister; Nasib bey Usubbeyov - Minister of Finance and People"s Education; Khalil bey Khasmamedov - Minister of Justice; Mahammad Yusif Jafarov - Minister of Trade and Industry; Akber agha Sheikhulislamov - Minister of Agriculture and Labor; Khudadat bey Melikaslanov - Minister of Means of Communication; Post and Telegraph; State Controller - Jamo Hajinskii. The National Council of Azerbaijan carried out a great historical mission for the Azerbaijani nation by doing this. Whereas the majority of Muslim states were founded on a religious basis, the Azerbaijan Republic became the first Turkic state built on a universal basis. The founding of the Azerbaijani national state was a historic event in the destiny of the nation. Mammad Emin Rasulzade wrote, "The National Council of Azerbaijan, by publishing the Declaration dated May 28, 1918, confirmed the existence of the Azerbaijani nation in a political sense. Thus, the word "Azerbaijan" was understood not only in a geographical, linguistic, and ethnographic, but also in political sense."

On May 30, information about the establishment of the Azerbaijani Republic was telegraphed to Foreign Ministers of countries worldwide. A radiogram addressed to Constantinople, Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, Rome, Washington, Sofia, Bucharest, Teheran, Madrid, Haague, Moscow, Stockholm, Kiev, Christiania, and Copenhagen, said, "As the Federative Transcaucasian Republic was disunited due to separation of Georgia, the National Council of Azerbaijan announced May 28 independence of Azerbaijan consisting of Eastern and Southern Transcaucasia. Your Excellency is kindly asked to inform Your Government about it. My government will temporarily by headquartered in Elizavetpol. Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijani Republic Fathali khan Khoyskii".

At the Batum negotiations, begun by the Transcaucasian government and continued by the newly created republics, each put forward their articles of peace. It was necessary to define the borders of the newly created republics after the announcement of their independence. The Armenian republic was in the most complicated situation. Armenian representatives who applied to the Azerbaijani government for help before the signature of an agreement were met favorably. The chairman of the Ministerial Council of Azerbaijan, Fatali khan Khoyski, informed the National Council about negotiations with the Armenian National Council held on May 29. He stated that the Armenians needed a political center for the formation of an Armenian federation, because Alexandropol (Gumri) was still in Turkey"s hands. Only Erivan (Yerevan) could become such a political center; hence, it was prudent to give the city to Armenia. While addressing the meeting about this subject, Khalil bey Khasmammadov, Mahammad Yusif Jafarov, Akbar agha Sheykhulislamov, and Mahammad Maharramov evaluated the concession of Erivan to Armenia as an inevitable misfortune. The National Council agreed to give Erivan to the Armenians. Two days later, members of the National Council of Erivan-Mir Hidayet Seyidov, Baghir Rzayev, and Nariman Narimanov-rejected the concession, but the meeting of the National Council of Azerbaijan held on April 1 did not accept this rejection. Thus, the National Council decided to send a representative group consisting of Mir Hidayet Seyidov, Baghir Rzayev, and Mamad Yusif Jafarov to Erivan in order to resolve problems related to the conceding of Erivan to the Armenians. After this, the meeting discussed the Elizavetpol province issue. Nasib bey Usubbeyov andShafi bey Rustambeyov, who had returned from Ganja, presented information on this subject. At the meeting, it was decided to send Usubbeyov to Batum in order to inform the Azerbaijani representatives about the situation in the entire country. Negotiations between Azerbaijani and Armenian representatives in Batum on the subject of borders were held, and both sides reached an agreement. Azerbaijan would allow the creation of an Armenian state within the borders of "Alexandropol province" on the condition that Armenians abandon their claims to part of Elizavetpol province (Garabagh). In return, Azerbaijani representatives promised to help them secure signature of an agreement with Turkey.

Opinions within Turkish political circles about the creation of an Armenian state in the South Caucasus and about historically Azerbaijani territories being given to Armenians in order to let them create their own state were not unanimous. Prime Minister Talaat Pasha and Minister of War Enver Pasha, who were defining the foreign policy of Turkey at the end of World War I, did not favor the creation of an Armenian state in the South Caucasus. They considered that the creation would result in a weak country that would not be powerful enough to survive. Halil bey Menteshe ( the Minister of Justice) and Mehmet Vehib pasha (the commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Front), representatives of Turkey at the Batum negotiations, considered the concession of historically Azerbaijani territories to Armenians inevitable and, with that end in view, they advised the Azerbaijani representatives to recognize the existence of Armenia at the international level and to make certain compromises. When Halil bey, who was in Batum, informed Enver Pasha about the territorial compromises, he opposed these. In his telegram to Vehib Pasha, sent on May 27, he wrote, "As can be understood from the telegram of Halil bey, the Armenians, as a concession for those lands returned to us, want to obtain a part of the territories belonging to the Muslims of the South Caucasus, and Muslims would agree to this. I think that this is totally wrong. If today, a small Armenia, populated by five or six hundred thousand people and having sufficient territory, were to exist, then in the future this state would come to have a population of millions of people formed on the basis of American Armenians returning here. This will create a Bulgaria in the East, and this country would be a more harmful enemy for us than Russia. Enver Pasha preferred that the territories occupied by the Armenians, and in the first place Erivan province, where the majority of the population was Muslim, should be free of Armenians. He wrote, "If this situation, which is the most suitable for our benefit, does not take place, then it would be unavoidable to let the Armenians remain. In that case, it is necessary that they be allowed there in small numbers only. Only in that case could the well-being of our state and the present and future well-being of the Caucasian Muslims evade danger." In a reply to the telegram of Enver Pasha, Vehib Pasha wrote on May 29, 1918, "We cannot completely do away with the Armenians. In any case, we need to and have to let them exist." On the same day, Enver Pasha sent instructions to Batum, stating that the Ottoman government must have a direct border with the state that has Ganja as its capital. In his opinion, this border must pass north of Garakilse and through Nakhchivan.

It has to be kept in mind that "Treaty of Friendship between Imperial Ottoman Government and the Azerbaijani Republic" was signed on June 4 following the Batumi talks of May 11. On the part of Turkey, the Treaty was signed by Justice Minister Halil bey Menteshe and commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Front Mehmet Vehib pasha, on the part of Azerbaijan by Chairman of the National Council Rasulzade and Foreign Minister Hajinskii. That was the first treaty signed by the Azerbaijani Republic with a foreign state. An Article 4 of the treaty said that the Ottoman government undertook to render military aid to the government of Azerbaijan if required for order and security in the country.

Following the Batum conference, Turkey signed a treaty with Georgia and with Armenia on June 4 by recognizing their independence. Under the treaty with Georgia, Turkey had Kars, Batum and Ardahan, as well as Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalaki. Under the treaty with Turkey, Armenia had to recognize provisions of the Brest-Lithuanian treaty, following which Echmiadzin and Alexandropol passed over to Turkey, the latter had the right to operate a route Alexandropol-Julfa. A border of Armenia passed along Erivan, and the latter disposed of 6 km railway only. According to the Batum agreement, the Armenian republic was a state of the South Caucasus with a territory of 10,000 square kilometers. Hovhannes Kachaznuni, Alexander Khatisian, and Mikayel Papajanian signed the agreement from the Armenian side. According to the Batum agreement, the Georgian and Armenian republics were now obliged to guarantee safety and free development to the Muslim population living in their territories and to create conditions for the provision of education in native languages and for the free and unhindered observance of religious customs and ceremonies.

Following 3-week activity in Tiflis the Azerbaijani government and the National Council moved to Ganja on June 16. By this moment, first Turkish subdivisions headed by Nuri pasha came up to the city. On June 17, a crisis confrontation took place between supporters of Azerbaijan"s joining Turkey, Turkish command, and advocates of independence, however, it became possible to preserve Azerbaijan"s independence, and the same day a government headed by Khoyskii was formed. Portfolios in the new Cabinet were distributed as follows: Fatali khan Khoyskii - Prime Minister and Minister of Justice; Mahammad Hasan Hajinskii - Foreign Minister; Behbud bey Javanshir - Internal Minister; Khudadat bey Melikaslanov - Communication Minister; Abdulali bey Amirjanov - Finance Minister; Khosrovpasha bey Sultanov - Minister of Agriculture; Nasib bey Usubbeyov - Minister of People"s Education; Khudat bey Rafibeyli - Minister of Public Health. As soon as the governmental crisis was over, on June 23 on the whole territory of the Republic. Composed of the Turkish relulars and Azerbaijani volunteers, the Islamic Army aimed to liberate Baku as historical, political, economic, and cultural center from Bolshevik-Armenian aggressors and return the city to its true owners - Muslims.

Summer 1918: The Defeat of the Bolsheviks and the Crisis in Baku

The internal and external situation of Azerbaijan in the summer of 1918 made the liberation of Baku city an urgent matter. Toward the end of World War I, Baku had become an object of struggle between the Ottoman empire, Germany, England, and Soviet Russia. As the Russian White Guard General Anton Denikin phrased it, Baku"s oil plagued the minds and souls of European and Asian political leaders. While the Baku issue and the events occurring within the city should be approached from a domestic political standpoint, Baku was also a pawn in the world war. The military and diplomatic standoffs between Germany, Turkey, Soviet Russia, and England, and the confrontation between the Quadruple Alliance and the Entente states, propelled Baku into the fray. For all these reasons, the liberation of Baku was imperative. The march for Baku had started in the early spring. Both the Ottoman army led by Nuri Pasha and the British army wanted to reach Baku before the Germans reached it by way of Georgia.

The intrigues surrounding Baku have a place not only in the history of the war but also in world history. Peter Hopkirk, an officer in the British Intelligence Service working in the Middle East, wrote: "At the end of the last century Baku had been one of the wealthiest cities on earth. The discovery of vast oil fields in this remote corner of the Tsar"s empire had brought entrepreneurs and adventurers of every nationality rushing to the spot. Experts calculated that Baku had enough oil to heat and illuminate the entire world. So sodden was it with the stuff that

one had only to toss a match into the Caspian off Baku for the sea to catch fire for several minutes ... . For a few short years the town became a Klondike where huge fortunes were made and gambled away overnight. Baku"s new rich, some of them barely literate, built themselves palaces of great opulence on the seafront." At one point, Baku"s oil fields produced more oil than all of the United States.

When Azerbaijan declared its independence in May, the Baku Soviet of Worker"s Deputies and its executive body, the Baku Soviet of People"s Commissars, did not recognize the newly established national government and declared war against it by all available means-political, economic, military and diplomatic. The Bakinskii rabochii newspaper published articles denying the Azerbaijani people"s right to selfdetermination and wrote defamatory articles that spurred ethnic hatred toward the Azerbaijanis. In March 1918, ethnic violence directed against Azerbaijani Muslims in Shamakhi and other outlying districts was orchestrated by the Baku Soviet and Armenian militias. The organization of a so-called Armenian army heightened apprehension among the Muslim parliamentarians of the Transcaucasian Seim and reinforced their willingness to turn to Turkey for protection.

In their march toward Ganja, as well as through their unlawful activities, the Baku Soviet of People"s Commissars put further strain on an already fraught political situation in the South Caucasus. Almost all political and economic issues were settled by the barrel of the gun during the time the Baku Commune was in power. Before the newly established Azerbaijani government moved to Ganja, the Baku Soviet of People"s Commissars incited civil unrest and began preparations to attack Ganja. On June 2, Josef Stalin, while visiting the city of Tsaritsyn

(today: Volgograd), issued a command ordering the commissars headed by Stepan Shaumian to occupy Ganja. On June 5, Arsen Amirian, a former Dashnak who turned Bolshevik as a result of the revolution, evoked the Paris Commune slogan "Long live the civil war!" in his article "On the Lessons of History," published in Bakinskii rabochii. "Unfortunately," he wrote, "the mistakes made by the Paris Commune are once more repeated by our Baku Soviet ... . Instead of attacking the Versailles of the Caucasus and arresting all the leaders of counterrevolution, we give them an opportunity to gather, strengthen, and establish alliances with foreign enemies. This was a disastrous and an unforgivable mistake. But, "let us let bygones be bygones," as it seems that we are at an advantage. We do not need protection, we need to attack by all means, and I say again and again that we should attack. There is no other way out."

A day after this article was published, the Baku Commune"s Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs, Grigorii Korganov, ordered an attack on Ganja. The purpose of the attack was to destroy Ganja, the cradle of Azerbaijani independence. A telegram sent by Vladimir Lenin in mid-May played a role in the Commune"s aggression. Lenin wrote to Stepan Shaumian: "We are pleased with your resolute and decisive policy. Try to blend that policy with careful diplomacy, which is undoubtedly required by the difficult situation, and then we shall win ... . Thus far we are being saved only by contradictions, conflicts, and struggles among the imperialists. To be able to take advantage of these conflicts, we need to understand the art of diplomacy."

On June 12, Shaumian informed Lenin and Stalin by telegraph about the impending attack of Baku military units on Ganja. Simultaneously, massacres against Muslim populations in the regions began. In territories where war broke out, the Muslim population was subject to plundering by the Baku Soviet army, made up of 70 percent Armenians.7 Sometime later Shaumian, who took part in those military operations, acknowledged the atrocities committed against the local Turkic population by the command staff of the Baku Soviet of People"s Commissars - also made up mainly of Armenians. On May 22, the Soviet Russian representative Korganov wrote a report to the Soviet of People"s Commissars. He indicated that the Baku Commune"s army was 18,000 strong and most of the soldiers were Armenians, with only a few Muslims and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. He stated in his report that "the Armenian peasants and the city democrats are willing to support a unitary Russian republic and Soviet power." On June 18, Korganov reported to the Baku Soviet of People"s Commissars that the situation at the front was favoring the side of the Bolsheviks and the "enemy" had taken numerous casualties. He said that, according to information provided by brigadier commander Hamazasp Srvandztyan, the "enemy" had launched an attack in Garamaryam village, where it was met with fierce resistance and retreated in a cowardly fashion. Hamazasp indicated that the casualties only numbered five dead and 49 wounded, while the "enemy" had about 400 casualties. This conclusion is further reinforced by the communiqué that was sent to the military-naval commissar of Soviet Russia, Lev Trotsky, by Boris Sheboldaev, who was at that time deputy-head of the Baku district. He wrote: "The armed forces of the Baku Commune, including officers, consist mostly of Armenians. On June 10, when the brigades and corps headquarters of the Commune army were established, it was evident that the corps commander (ex-colonel) S. Ghazarian, the chief of staff (ex-colonel of the headquarters) Z. Avetisian, and others were Dashnaks at heart. The command staff of the army was worthless and most of the Armenian officers were Dashnaks; this army will be loyal to Soviet rule as long as the "Russian influence" remains, but if the British gain the upper hand, it will be difficult to gauge what the response of the army would be. Considering that 60-70 per cent of the army is Armenian, surprises can be expected."

The overall command of the army was in the hands of colonels Avetisian and Ghazarian, both known anti-Muslim activists. There was also Hamazasp (Srvandztyan), who had fought as a guerrilla leader against the Turks and whom any Muslim was an enemy simply because he was Muslim. Accordingly, Armenian soldiers wantonly robbed, plundered, and committed acts of violence against the Muslim population on their way to Ganja and during attacks on Ganja. Ronald Grigor Suny noted that when the Red Army moved out from Baku toward Eizavetpol, they marched through the villages of Azerbaijani who were seldom friendly and were awaiting their Muslim brothers, the Turks. The Left Socialist-Revolutionary Grigory Petrov, who had been sent to Baku to help the Baku Bolsheviks, wrote of the barbarism he witnessed that was committed against the Muslims at Shamakhi, stating in his telegram to the Soviet Commissars of Baku: "I do not know whether I struggle for the sacred Soviet goal or I am among a gang of thieves." Petrov was in fact senior to Stepan Shaumian and he was sent to Baku as the Extraordinary Military Commissar for Caucasus Affairs, but it was said that he never put on airs and treated Shaumian as his equal.

By the end of June, the march of the Commune forces toward Ganja was halted at Goychay and four days of intensive fighting between June 27 and July 1 decided the fate at the front. The defeat of the Commune forces at Goychay saw many deserters from the Bolshevik army in the face of the ferocious actions of the Muslim army heading in the direction of Baku. Toward the end of July the Army of Islam reached the Baku suburbs and, in order to strengthen its numbers, Azerbaijani men born between 1894 and 1899 were drafted for military service on July 11. The draft significantly increased the number of Azerbaijanis in the Army of Islam; an influx of Russian supplies of weapons and other military supplies at the end of June did not have a great effect on the situation because of the Army of Islam"s greater numbers.

On July 20, the city of Shamakhi, which also was of strategic importance, was liberated on the way to Baku. This delay in the liberation of Baku by the Army of Islam increased the tension in the diplomatic struggle looming around Baku. In early July 1918 a report was prepared by the German Consulate to Constantinople (as Istanbul was still known in international diplomatic usage) which stated, "If we enter into negotiations with the Bolsheviks, then we could easily seize Baku, its oil fields and its reserves. However, if the Bolsheviks are forced to leave the city, they will set fire to the fields, and in this case neither we nor the Turks would be able to make use of the oil."17 This concern was also expressed by German Ambassador Bernstorff during a meeting with Mahammad Emin Rasulzade, in which he stated that if Baku was attacked by the Army of Islam, the Bolsheviks would destroy the city and set fire to the oil fields.18 It was reasonable to expect that the Bolsheviks could retaliate in this way, seeing that their actions from the beginning were based on a political gamble, as well as the fact that a directive to do this in the event of a defeat had been ordered by the Bolshevik central government. On June 23, 1918, Stepan Shaumian wrote to Vladimir Lenin, "If we cannot seize Baku, then we shall do as you instructed." Mahammad Emin Rasulzade, who was in Istanbul, wrote of his anxieties about the diplomatic struggle on the "Baku issue" to Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahammad Hasan Hajinski: "The premise of the Germans is that if Baku is taken militarily, then the Bolsheviks will set fire to the oil fields and all oil reserves. Everyone understands that oil is as necessary as water to the Alliance at war. For that reason, the Germans want a peaceful diplomatic settlement to the Baku issue. We have learned through personal channels that there is a special agreement between the Germans and Bolsheviks about the oil. We would like to bring to your attention that the oil issue is more of a Turkish-German issue than it is an Azerbaijani-German issue. According to the Batum agreement the remaining oil belongs to Turkey. It seems that the Turks want to use the Germans in exchange for oil."

The Baku Soviet of People"s Commissars, after not receiving effective military support from Russia, hoped for the diplomatic support of Moscow and for the assistance of Lazar Bicherakhov, the leader of one of the Cossack military units in Iran, in case the situation worsened. The intervention of Soviet Russia, through the Germans, had delayed the Azerbaijani government"s entry into Baku. Recognizing its inability to prevent the Azerbaijani-Turkish attack, the Soviets wanted to hold on to Baku by diplomatic means, based on agreements made with Germany in 1918. As noted, the situation at the Western front and generally in the course of the war had significantly increased Germany"s interest in Baku. During the negotiations at a conference in June at Istanbul, Germany decided that it wanted Baku"s oil and would use Russia to get it, seeing that nothing had materialized from the joint efforts of Turkey and Azerbaijan. In Tiflis in June, the Germans had offered to dispatch a light military contingent to help Turkish-Azerbaijani military units to capture Baku, but "the Azerbaijani government was against this German proposal."

While German-Russian talks were underway in Berlin and Moscow, the situation in Baku changed from bad to worse. An item on the agenda was how to defend the city or whom should surrendor. In the end, they stopped at a candidature of tsarist colonel Lazar Bicherakhov, whose Cossack regiment was stationed in Iran. Earlier July the Bicherahov"s detachment moved from Enzeli towards Baku. Lazar Bicharakhov"s unit arrived in Alat on July 5 via the Caspian Sea. On July 7 he accepted the appointment as commander of the right flank of the Baku defense unit. Upon realizing that he was losing at the front, however, Bicherakhov did not fight; at the end of July, he withdrew his unit from the frontlines and retreated toward the west.

At the end of July, the situation in Baku worsened. The Baku Soviet"s record of violence against the Muslim population had the effect of isolating Baku from its outlying districts. In a mass meeting of non-Muslim workers held in Baku on July 24, the Socialist-Revolutionary, Menshevik, and Dashnak leaders approved and seconded a decision to invite the British to Baku in order to defend it from the attack of the Army of Islam. On July 25, an emergency meeting of the Baku Soviet was convened and Stepan Shaumian reported on the political and military situation in Baku. He rejected the proposal of inviting British troops and read the contents of a telegram received from the Soviet central government. The Azerbaijani government, meanwhile, made efforts to liberate Baku through peaceful dialogue and negotiations. On July 24, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hajinski wrote to Rasulzade that he had left for the Baku frontline in order to hold negotiations with the Bolsheviks about the surrender of the city. Hajinski continued: "The situation on the Baku frontlines is in our favor. Though it is a fact that our soldiers could not make much progress along the railway lines, they managed to move up to Karrar Station. However, we have been told that the Bolsheviks are in low spirits. The Baku newspapers we bought from Kurdamir and Salian dated July 18 wrote of disagreements between the Bolsheviks and other parties (at the same time among the right-wing Dashnaks, though I do not believe it). Actually, these disagreements have become a matter of nationality. Armenian Bolsheviks behave like barbarians in territories they themselves occupy and it is the Russians that are against those actions. There is talk at the Kurdamir front about 800 Russians who had laid down their arms and abandoned the front as a sign of protest against Armenian barbarism (they gathered Muslims in a mosque and burnt them, murdered women and children, committing indescribably heinous acts). They were arrested in Baku and now are incarcerated on Nargin Island. The Armenians have called for a general mobilization of troops. The Russians protested against it and do not want to fight. The Muslims are also in agreement on this matter. The Shamakhi-Baku route from Shamakhi to Ganja has been occupied by us. Armenian units are frenzied and are headed toward Baku, so fighting is expected on the outskirts of Baku."

On July 30, one of the leaders of the Commune"s army, Colonel Avetisian, informed the Baku Soviet that resistance was futile. On the same day the leaders of the Armenian National Council visited the Soviet of People"s Commissars and demanded the resignation of the Bolsheviks. Outvoted, on July 31, the commissars left Baku for Astrakhan on the ship Ardahan. On August 1, a newly formed government of the Tsentrokaspii was composed of officers of the Caspian fleet - Pechenkin, Tushkov, Bushev, Lemley, Ermakov; socialist revolutionaries Lev Umanskii and Abram Veluns; Mensheviks Qrigorii Aiolla, Mikhail Sadovskii; Dashnaks Alexander Arakelian and Sergei Melik Elchian. Like before, this government had not been related to Azerbaijan, and was a puppet regime composed of aliens. Formally, the power in the Tsentrokaspii was vested in officers and seamen of the Caspian navy but in fact, the real power was in the hands of the Armenian National Council, party "Dashnaktsutun" and other Armenian parties and organizations.

Like the previous government, the Central Caspian government did not include any Azerbaijanis and consisted wholly of foreigners. After its establishment, it addressed the Christian population of Baku, saying, "You are not alone in the struggle against the Turks. The Allied powers will help in the near future." Soon thereafter, the government decided to arrest the members of the Baku Soviet of People"s Commissars as well as Bolsheviks who were trying to escape from Baku. A conference was held following the repatriation and subsequent arrest of the commissars. The committees in the conference charged that the commissars not only abandoned their posts, they also abandoned the front at a time when it put the residents of Baku in the greatest peril. They also said that the commissars took food, military supplies, and weapons that were vital for the city"s defense. The conference charged the commissars with treason and deemed them the people"s enemies.

The maiden step of the Tsentrokaspii government was the invitation to the British in Enzeli to arrive in Baku. On August 4, the first British detachment headed by col. Claude Stokes arrived in Baku. A little later, another group of British, 1000-strong regiment, under the command of gen. However, the advent of Britishers did not improve the situation in the Baku front. From the first days of August, the Turkish-Azerbaijani army succeeded in narrowing the encirclement.

The liberation of Baku

Between August 9 and 17, British military forces entered Baku with three battalions, one trench mortar battery and some tanks. As Hopkirk described the scene in Baku, "on August 17, 1918, the British disembarked in its sleepy port, only the ghosts of this once opulent past remained. In the aftermath of the war and the revolution, Baku must have looked much like Shanghai after the Communist takeover, though the decline of Baku had begun long before the arrival of the Bolsheviks." Harsh working conditions in the oil fields led to a number of strikes that had had an impact on the level of oil production. The industry was developing in a one-sided manner. Ethnic conflicts and the repression measures of the tsarist Russia dealt a heavy blow to the development of the oil industry. Oil industrialists considered it useless to invest in new technology. The war had isolated Baku from the world market and the city depended on its domestic market. All these factors led to the occupation of Baku by revolutionists. It allowed for the short-lived term of the Baku Soviet under the leadership of Stepan Shaumian and was soon thereafter replaced by the Central Caspian Dictatorship.

At a joint meeting between the British commander and the Central Caspian leaders on August 5, the British expressed their own dissatisfaction with the small number of troops in the Central Caspian army and how poorly trained they were. They said that it would be impossible to defend Baku with such a force. It was then that Menshevik Sadovsky asked the British officer sarcastically "And where is the great army you promised Abram Velunts and Ter-Agaian?" Dunsterville"s representative replied that England had never promised and never would promise that kind of a support to anyone, anywhere. It would be ridiculous to think that the British army could be moved there from Mesopotamia. Velunts observed that England valued its reputation highly, and that if the British came to Baku they would not leave the city so easily. To calm the Christian population of the city, the word was put out that another British contingent would arrive in Baku in the near future to fortify and equip the Central Caspian army. To raise the morale of the Central Caspian soldiers, a message from Lionel Dunsterville, who was still in Enzeli, was read. He said that on the basis of agreements with the Allied powers and at the request of the people of Baku, the British government was to send reinforcements and supplies to the besieged city. He said that in the struggle against the Turks and the Germans, the British army would ally themselves with the Central Caspian government and Lazar Bicherakhov. In closing, Dunsterville congratulated the "heroic defenders" of the city and said that if everyone were to fight against the enemy, then victory would come soon. On August 8, Captain Reginald Teague-Jones read Dunsterville"s declaration at a joint meeting of the Dictatorship and the British, in an attempt to inspire his partners. One unit of the small British contingent went to the front, mainly to oversee the technical installation of a communication system, while the rest stayed in the city to conduct military training.

Dunsterville"s assessment of the military forces of the Central Caspian Dictatorship was woeful. He wrote: "Supposedly manning the city"s defenses were 10,000, largely half-hearted, local volunteers. Of these, 3,000 were Russians and 7,000 Armenians. All had rifles, but few had received any proper military training. Most of them felt that they had already risked their lives enough, while some of them were even holding talks with the enemy. As for those Muslims remaining in Baku after the recent massacre, most if not all of them were ready to welcome the Turks and therefore presented a potentially dangerous fifth column, or enemy within." Anticipating the arrival of the Army of Islam, the Central Caspian Dictatorship, and in particular the Armenians, who occupied high posts in the Baku administration, held the populace hostage by various means.

After the arrival of the British, General Lazar Bicherakhov once more appeared on the political stage. He sent a telegram on August 3, in Russian and in Armenian, which was printed as a poster in bold capital letters and spread across the whole city. The telegram stated that the old government had had its hands tied in its struggle against the enemy. Now, Bicherakhov, together with Central Caspian forces and the British, had organized the army and was ready to take down the enemy. On that very day, August 2, the Army of Islam had liberated Bileceri Station, which complicated the picture, since Bicherakhov had said that he was the victor. Though this first "victory" was a deception, the British pinned their hopes on Bicherakhov. He was very famous among the Christian youth of Baku, such that they had taken to wearing the same hairstyle as he did. The British thought that if Bicherakhov returned to Baku, the city"s youth would be inspired to join the "heroic" army. In the tales spread about him in the city, Bicherakhov was called the "little Napoleon." In a telegram, Bicherakhov expressed that he was ready to take the place of the "defenders" of the city and wrote that "now all of Russia has pinned their hopes on the defenders of Baku." However, the Cossack attacks were short-lived. Despite the rhetoric in his telegram, Bicherakhov knew full well that he did not stand a chance against the Army of Islam, and without warning instructed his regiment to retreat by railway in the direction of Derbent. On August 8, he passed through Khachmaz and on August 12, he occupied Derbent and proceeded toward Petrovsk. Then, on August 15, Bicherakhov announced that he was moving south again in order to clear Derbent and Petrovsk of Bolsheviks, and then onward to provide support to Baku from Russia. He promised that he would return from the South Caucasus with 10,000 soldiers and sacks of grain. Bicherakhov concluded that the arrival of the British in Baku did not pose any threat to Russia. Though the Turks had surrounded the city, they could not occupy it. Meanwhile, at the front, about a thousand Cossacks, along with forces loyal to the Bolsheviks, made it impossible for the Central Caspian government to hold power.

On August 3, Mursal Pasha, the commander of Ottoman army at the Southern front, sent a letter to the head of the Armenian National Council of Baku, stating: "the Ottoman army is carrying out military operations to liberate Baku. If you surrender without a fight, the rights of all citizens regardless of race and religion will be guaranteed." He added that, should the Armenians wish to leave Baku for Armenia, no obstacle would be encountered. However, he warned, "if you show resistance, since there is no doubt that the city will be occupied, you will bear full responsibility for the bloodshed and damage that will ensue. In the event you are ready to surrender the city, send your representative with your response." The Armenian National Council and Central Caspian representatives, after the reading of the letter, decided not to respond to Mursal Pasha"s ultimatum, in the hope of getting support from the British and General Lazar Bicherkhanov. This silence meant the continuation of military operations.

In early August, the Army of Islam tightened the ring of blockades around Baku. On the 10th day of the month, villages in Absheron revolted against the Central Caspian Dictatorship and Mashtaga village was liberated by a regiment of the Army of Islam. On August 8, the August 3 ultimatum from Mursal Pasha was published in the Dictatorship"s newspaper. It gave hope to the small number of Turks who remained in the city after the bloody March events. The overthrow of Baku Bolsheviks in the summer of 1918 and the entry of the British temporarily alleviated the diplomatic pressure being applied by the Germans, which was previously taken quite seriously. Earlier in July, Mahammad Emin Rasulzade wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahammad Hasan Hajinski, saying, "the Baku issue was settled for us in our favor. Undoubtedly, we should provide the Germans with some economic concessions. We asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs [of Turkey] whether we need to take reciprocal steps in relation to the Germans in this or some other way. He stated that there is no need at the present, and in case it is needed we will be informed. Enver Pasha asked me to inform you [M.H. Hajinski] that they sent fresh regiments in addition to the existing division and that Nuri Pasha said that the force is sufficient. In cases where urgent mobilization of the local forces is needed, the officer of the headquarters will be visiting there on Friday. According to the agreement concluded between the Germans and the Turks, Nuri Pasha was issued a directive related to the attack on Baku."

However, as German-Russian negotiations intensified, the diplomatic stance of Berlin toward Azerbaijan did not continue for long. In the middle of August, according to information sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Istanbul representative"s office, it became clear that the Germans were once more attempting to prevent the movement of the Turks toward Baku. Rasulzade wrote: "On the 17th day of the month, I visited Enver Pasha and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I personally met with Talaat Pasha a day ago. The issue is that the Germans are not in favor of the movement of the Turkish army toward the Caucasus, and if truth on the matter be told, they want to halt the advance toward Baku. They fear that the Bolsheviks will destroy the bridges and burn the oil fields when they retreat, just as the British did when they left Romania. That is why the Germans prefer to settle the issue peacefully. Even some time ago, they supported the recognition of the independence of Baku with its outlying districts, including Shamakhi and Salian. The Turks protested against this declaration and, finally, according to both Enver and Talaat Pasha, they came to an agreement."

On August 7, the chief representative of the Azerbaijani government in Istanbul, Rasulzade, wrote to Hajinski about the issue of hastening the liberation of Baku, as a defeat of Germany at the Western front might alter the international situation drastically. Rasulzade, who followed the course of the events closely and was witness to their political repercussions, said in his letter: "Baku should be liberated by any means necessary. Otherwise, we will find ourselves in dire straits. The advance of Baku should be on behalf of Azerbaijan and it should be occupied by the Azerbaijani government. Anything else would be a calamity." After studying and analyzing world events, Rasulzade advised the Azerbaijani government: "we should occupy Baku and everybody should accept that fact. Then events will take on a different shape. The Bolsheviks may threaten war, but I think that they will not fight."

On August 31, in another letter to Rasulzade, Khoyski reported that the Ottoman military force was causing offense to the young Azerbaijani administration and interfering with the efforts of the Azerbaijani government, and local officials were complaining about this. "It is important that we set the boundaries and limits in our relations with Turkey in a positive manner. Otherwise, this bilateral or multilateral power-sharing will ruin everything. It is my opinion that governance should be entirely in the hands of the Azerbaijani government and not subject to the interference our administration is experiencing today. The Turkish military should make known to the government their preferences and intentions and the government will take care of these things for them."

The Army of Islam was also privy to the rumors about the arrival of large contingents of the British army in Baku to begin its final military operations to liberate the city. Like Bicherakhov, General Dunsterville recognized that the government that had invited the British was a puppet regime and that defense of the city was futile.

After spending several days in the city and familiarizing himself with the situation, Dunsterville left for Derbent on August 20, in order to have Bicherakhov recalled. However, as unknown ships were docked at the port, he hesitated to go ashore and he returned to Baku on August 23. As a way out of the situation, he tried to bring together Baku Turks and Armenians, but the gulf between the two nationalities was too deep, and Dunsterville was aware that 80,000 Baku Turks were impatiently awaiting the Turkish army"s arrival. According to a third plan, he wanted to incite rebellion among Erivan"s Armenians against the Turkish army with the help of Baku Armenians. The Turkish command headed by Nuri Pasha, who knew of the plan, issued an order on August 10 dispatching military units to various locations.

From the onset, conflicts raged between the Central Caspian Dictatorship and the British. On one hand, the leaders of the Dictatorship were disappointed at the insubstantial support Britain had apportioned to them; and on the other hand, the British abhorred the ineffectiveness of the local army. Seeing no opportunity, Dunsterville decided to have his men retreat from the city by September 1. Meanwhile the Central Caspian government issued an order to fire at any ship that left port. Major-General Dunsterville thus became a de facto captive of the Dictatorship, before military operations had even started, and, frankly, he was looking forward to the Turkish attack. On August 31, in a letter to the Baku Dictatorship, Dunsterville stated that continuing the defense of the city would mean the sacrifice of time and people"s lives. In his judgment, no power could save Baku from the Turks in this instance. The local population-that is, the Azerbaijanis-saw the government that was protecting them from the Turks as the enemy.

On September 1, Dunsterville received a stern warning from the leaders of Central Caspian Dictatorship. It said that the British army could leave Baku with the local army only after the evacuation of the civilian population from the city. On September 4, Dunsterville received another letter from the leaders of the Dictatorship that was severely criticial of his actions. It said that after the overthrow of the Baku Commune, Moscow offered to provide support for the protection of the city against the Turks, but that they had forgone that offer in the hopes of receiving

British help instead. They acknowledged the folly of their decision as they did not receive the support they expected. They demanded that Dunsterville dispatch an army from Iran or Baghdad that would be capable of defending the city. On September 5, with their cannonfire raining on the center of the city, the Turkish army once more laid down an ultimatum for the surrender of Baku. As accusations between the Dictatorship and the British command were hurled left and right, Dunsterville paid no heed to the Central Caspian ultimatum.

Reviewing the situation that had arisen in the beginning of September, Mahammad Emin Rasulzade observed that the Germans were tired while the interest of the British was increasing day-by-day. That is why the presence of the British in Baku made the situation difficult. He wrote to Hajinski, saying, "If we do not occupy Baku, then everything will come to an end. Farewell to Azerbaijan. Even after occupation, we are facing a number of diplomatic difficulties. In order to meet this challenge, we should mobilize the army beforehand. Turkish public opinion and various political circles are deeply anxious about this issue as well."

After intense military and diplomatic preparation in the summer and autumn of 1918, the advance toward Baku began on September 15. On that day, British military forces hastily departed the city. This action by Dunsterville so angered the leaders of Central Caspian Dictatorship that they fired at the departing ships as they left port. That sudden departure marked the end of the adventures of General Dunsterville in the South Caucasus. For his abandonment of Baku, he was stripped of his rank, dismissed from service, and his army disbanded. The reason for such a harsh penalty was that, in his haste to retreat, the General failed to follow a top secret directive issued by the Ministry of Defense, which was to destroy the oil pipes and set explosions at oil depots of the city. That same evening, a division of the Armenian regiment under the leadership of "military minister" General Yakov

Bagratuni escaped from the front heading for Enzeli. The leaders of the Baku Soviet of People"s Commissars who were arrested by the Central Caspian Dictatorship were released with the help of Anastas Mikoyan and Central Caspian officials, and they too left Baku that night. On September 15, Azerbaijani army units entered Baku. Mahammad Emin Rasulzade wrote about the liberation, saying: "After six months, fortune has smiled upon the population. Baku is once more in the hands of its true inhabitants on such a glorious day as the Gurban Bayrami (Day of Sacrifice) holiday. The liberation of Baku evokes the same feeling for the population as for the person whose head is between the grip of the scaffold of a guillotine and is set free." Those who had defended Baku under the name of the "people"s forces" ran to the ports and were the first to board. The Armenians fled on account of their culpability for the events that had occurred in March.

After the liberation of the Azerbaijani capital, the Turkish troops under the command of Nuri Pasha, who had been lying in wait in the suburbs, entered Baku on September 18. The Azerbaijani population who were the genuine inhabitants of the city welcomed them openly as saviors. When the Ottoman troops entered the city, they said that they were taking part in the process of liberation of Baku upon the request of the Azerbaijani government.

The Mondros Armistice and Azerbaijan

As soon as the Azerbaijani government moved to Baku, its first step was to establish order in the city and set up a functioning council of ministers. After settling in Baku, the government newspaper Azerbaijan, which continued its publication in the capital, published the interim addresses of ministries and offices in early October.The office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was first housed in several rooms of the Metropol Hotel, after which it moved to a magnificent residence located on Sahil Street. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers on October 16, 1918, the staffing table was reviewed, and the bureaucratic red tape between people and the government was minimized. The mission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to devise and realize the foreign policy of the government. It was considered one of the most important ministries of the republic, as its core function was to advance the country"s interests abroad through the conduct and management of its foreign relations. As the efforts of the government had been geared toward the goal of liberating Baku, which was accomplished during the summer and autumn of 1918, the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be determined only after the Council of Ministers had moved to Baku. According to the Statute on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ministry"s responsibilities were as follows: to establish relations with foreign governments on political, economic, social, cultural, and legal matters; to promote and protect the interest of Azerbaijani nationals and businesses in foreign countries; to influence, strengthen, and develop industrial and commercial relations of Azerbaijan with other countries; to protect the dignity and property of Azerbaijanis living abroad; to help protect the borders of Azerbaijan through the issuance of visas to foreign nationals and authenticating documents and ensuring that all their legal requirements are met.

On October 6, 1918, the government decided to establish a commission that set out to inform European capitals about Azerbaijan"s independence. In late August, Ali Mardan Bey Topchupashov was appointed Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador to Istanbul by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and was given the task to start forming the structure of the missions in European capitals. Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov, who was preparing to visit Berlin and Vienna, concluded several meetings with Turkish officials in Istanbul throughout the month of October. But, as Turkey was in crisis on the eve of the defeat and there had been three cabinet changes in Turkey within the last 3 months, it was not possible to establish stable relations between Azerbaijan and the Ottoman government.

In the autumn of 1918, the German-Turkish bloc was defeated in World War I. On October 30, Turkey had to agree to the harsh terms of the Mondros (Mudros) armistice. This defeat dealt a tragic blow to the Azerbaijan Republic. On October 27, before the armistice was signed, Ali Mardan Topchubashov had met the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Nabi Bey, postponed his Vienna and Berlin visits, and expressed his desire to go to Lemnos (Sakkiz) Island, where the Entente representatives were holding peace negotiations. But the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs told him that the negotiations would soon end and asked him to wait. The Mondros armistice, which imposed extremely hard terms not only for Turkey, but for the Republic of Azerbaijan, was signed after 3 days. In accordance to the eleventh article of the armistice, Turkish troops should depart Azerbaijan and the Trans-Caucasus. Ottoman dispatches in Azerbaijan were forwarded an ultimatum to leave Baku within a week and Azerbaijan within a month. The commander-in-chief of the Caucasian army, Nuri Pasha, at the last moment expressed his desired to enlist in the Azerbaijani military and tried to stay in Baku, as had been agreed during the negotiations in Istanbul. But all was futile, because the ultimatum of the Allies was firm. According to Article 15 of the Armistice, the Allies would assume control over the Trans-Caucasian Railway, which had been previously controlled by Turkey in accordance with the Batum agreement. The Allies then had the right to take over Batum and to demand that Turkey should not resist the Allies occupying Baku. According to Article 24, the Allies had the right to assume control over six Armenian provinces in Turkey whenever disorder and unrest would take place. This article pitted Armenians against Turkey and in turn was meant to provoke the former. In early November, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian and German governments signed the acknowledgments of defeat, Soviet Russia renounced the Brest treaty, which meant that Armenia and Georgia could again claim Gars, Batum, and Ardahan. The annulment of the Brest agreement also meant the annulment of the August 27 accord. However, since this agreement was signed secretly between Germany and Russia, it was reason for Soviet Russia not to include that portion in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee resolution.

Azerbaijan faced new difficulties after the completion of the First World War. Under the Mondros artmistice, the allies were entitled to occupy Baku. The Azerbaijani government and its diplomatic representatives in the Ottoman Empire did not stand by idly to the Mondros armistice. Note that the armistice was signed by Rauf Orbay bey on the part of Turkey, a former head of the Turkish delegation at the Trabzon talks and currently a Navy Minister in the Cabinet of Izzet pasha. On November 3, conditions of the Mondros armistice were announced officially. Ali Mardan bey wrote about it: "That evening I visited Rauf bey". Ali Mardan bey protested against provisions that stipulated the transfer of Baku and the Azerbaijani railway to the allies without preliminary discussions with representatives of Azerbaijan. Rauf bey said that the allies nagged at the presence of the Turkish troops in Azerbaijan and compelled the Turks to accept these discriminatory provisions". It can"t be helped, they are winners, and we are losers". However, Rauf bey advised to seek recognition of Azerbaijan"s independence by the Entente. He added that in a day or two a delegation of the allies would arrive in Istanbul for consultations On November 4, Topchibashov submitted his written protest to Reshad Hikmet bey, a deputy Foreign Minister of Turkey. The letter pointed out that the Ottoman government recognized Azerbaijan"s independence, however, at the same time, it signed a treaty that violated international regulations and laws and thus made Britishers easier to capture Azerbaijan". I"m far from accepting this as a premeditated intention of the imperial Ottoman government, yet, I consider it my duty to protest against an item in question". Further, the protest noted that it would be desirable to acquaint Azerbaijan with some provisions of the armistice regarding the Caucasus and notably Azerbaijan. In vindication, Hikmetbey declared that the government of Turkey could not cede to the Entente a city it did not own. As for the Mondros armistice, it stipulated that Turkey would impede occupation of Baku by Britishers. Topchibashov realized this phrase as "go and seize Baku". To conclude, the protest stressed the necessity of direct or, via the Turkish government, participation of Azerbaijani representatives of debates arising from interests of the country. "Hereupon, we kindly ask the Ottoman government to convey my point of view to the government and pave the way for political talks."

On November 5, Topchibashov was received by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Nabi bey. The Minister tried to make excuses to Ali Mardan bey as saying that Turkey had no alternative but to sign the Mondros armistice. He opined that a delay in 15 days would end with occupation of Istanbul. Besides, he warned that Britishers were going to occupy not only Baku but also Batum and the entire Transcaucasia. In his letter to the Azerbaijani government dated November 15 Topchibashov appraised the developments as follows: "Under terms and conditions of the armistice Turkey committed to: 1) not impede Entente troops to occupy Baku; 2) grant them control over the Transcaucasian railways; 3) withdraw the Turkish troops on demand of the Entente.

Touching upon the diplomatic note above, the Turkish Foreign Minister gave a written comment to some provisions of the Mondros armistice concerning Azerbaijan. He emphasized that Baku had never belonged to the Ottomans; hence, Turkey could not cede it to the Entente. To avoid the conflict situation, Turkey had to withdraw its troops from the city and "thus act is not an infringement of sovereign rights of the Azerbaijan Republic to Baku". In accordance with the Mondros armistice, Turkey withdrew all its troops from the Transcaucasia, including Azerbaijan. As for the Azerbaijani railways, the Foreign Minister pointed out that Turkey conceded not all railways to the Entente but only right to control some sections. "As for your request to establish relations between the British and your governments, the Ottoman government will do it at the earliest convenience".

Although the Azerbaijani government was disappointed with the Ottoman government because of the Mondros armistice articles concerning Azerbaijan, they bade farewell to the Turkish delegates with deep respect and esteem in a manner similar to how they had greeted Turkish troops despite their defeat in World War I. On Sunday, November 10, the Azerbaijani government organized a banquet in Nuri Pasha"s honor. Four hundred people were invited to the banquet. Well-known intellectuals and political figures, industrialists, leaders of political parties and societies, and leaders of the Azerbaijani army were in attendance. Fatali khan Khoyski, who was the first to speak at the event, said the following: "In the battlefields of Azerbaijan, our Turkish brothers" blood has mingled with ours. We are relatives by our origins and the intermingling of our blood has made this relationship even stronger. The blood shed for the independence of Azerbaijan is the guarantee of friendship, as well an indestructible tie that binds the Ottomans and the Azeri Turks." In another speech, Mahammad Emin Rasulzade, the head of the Musavat party, who had just returned from Istanbul, said that a year ago, intense discussions were held over the question of the self-determination of Muslims. Baku "Socialists," with Stepan Shaumian as their head, considered it an impossibility for Azerbaijani Muslims, and did everything they could to block the self-determination of Muslims, and other Caucasian nationalities encountered the same resistance. They threatened to reduce Azerbaijan to ruins if the Azerbaijani Turks acted on their ideas. "Now, Azerbaijani Turks have been able to claim their right with the help of their blood brothers." Ahmad bey Aghayev noted in his speech at the event:

There were times when it was considered almost a crime if Azerbaijani Turks talked about their brother, the Ottoman Turks, during the tsarist regime. When Bolshevik Russia proclaimed the Declaration of the Rights of Nations, they stated that they would affirm self-determination only on their terms. Nuri Pasha also gave a speech on behalf of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey"s Caucasian headquarters. He said that he had done what had to be done and was ready to do his best for Azerbaijan. In closing, he said, "The interest of our fraternal Azerbaijani Turks is sacred for every Turk ... . If there will be more need for sacrifice for the independence of Azerbaijan, we are ready for it."

On the same day, November 10, Prime Minister Fatali khan Khoyski and Adil khan Ziyadkhanli, who was responsible for foreign affairs, sent a telegram addressed to the most influential political figure at that time, the leader of the postwar reorganization, Woodrow Wilson, the president of the United States of America. The United States had become the most influential state during the last stages of the World War I. In the telegram to President Wilson was a request to help the Azerbaijanis in their quest for the recognition of the independence of Azerbaijan by the world powers. They implored him, "Before addressing the European powers, the Azerbaijani people and government, in the hope to gain assistance and achieve recognition, turn to you, as a defender of small nations, relying on your humanitarian principles."

In his letter to Fatali khan Khoyskii of October 31 Ali Mardan bey insistently advised to start talks with Britishers quartered in Resht and Enzeli. Earlier November 1918 an Azerbaijani delegation composed of Nasib bey Ussubbeyov, Ahmed bey Aghayev and Musa bey Rafiyev went to Enzeli and began negotiating with the British command in Northern Iran. Note that the British troops in this region were headed by Gen.William Thomson. The talks were difficult. At first, the general denied the very notion of a state titled "Azerbaijan". Following long debates, he declared, "According to our information, there is not a Republic established at the will of the whole Azerbaijani people. There is a government formed thanks to the intrigues of the Turkish command. But if you insist, we shall check up everything and pass an appropriate decision". Gen.Thomson assured that the allies "have come to create, not to destroy". In the end of the talks, Thomson announced that by 10 a.m., November 17 Baku must be free from Turkish or Azerbaijani troops and that the city with oilfields would fall under the British control. The rest of the country would remain under the control of the Azerbaijani government and army.

The opening of the Azerbaijani Parliament

In mid-November 1918, there was a crisis for the fate of Azerbaijan's independence. As is seen from Topchibashov"s letters from Istanbul, he considered a convocation of the National Council as top priority target. Dissolved in June, the National Council was re-convened on November 16. The first session made a statement addressed to all the states worldwide and asking to recognize Azerbaijan. According to the decision of the National Council, the chairman appealed to Gen.Thomson. A telegram said: "The Azerbaijani government does not object to entering the allied troops in Baku on November 17 under Your Excellency"s command. The government is confident that this entry of the troops will not violate the independence and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan". On November 17, in pursuance of the Mondros armistice provisions, the Indians-staffed British troops entered Baku. Attending an official reception in honor of Britishers were Interior Minister Behbud bey Javanshir, acting Foreign Minister Adil khan Ziyadkhanly, a group of officials and representatives of various national organizations. Ziyadkhanli, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, greeted Thomson with a speech, saying:

"With the mandate of the Azerbaijani government, I am currently acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and have been authorized to greet you. Thus, on behalf of our government, I welcome you as commander in chief and representative of the Allies on the occasion of your arrival in our capital. It is evident that after the chaos and bloodshed of war, nations will now enter a new phase. Young Azerbaijani Turks and the people at large will now begin living in a peaceful and independent state after escaping the disasters of the world war. Our nation is confident and hopeful that their civilized European and American brothers will exercise their humanity in recognition of brotherhood and mutual prosperity." General Thomson"s response was hopeful. He announced, "I congratulate you on the occasion of the end of the world war. As a commander of the united French, British, and American powers, I notify you that we have come here in accordance with the agreement signed with Turkey, to replace the Ottoman troops that had been defending your territories up until now. We do not intend to interfere in your internal affairs either today or tomorrow. I hope that everything will change for the better in an atmosphere of cooperation."

On November 18, the Azerbaijani government made an official statement over Entente army"s entry into Baku. It noted that the allied forces were going to enter Baku on a temporary basis with a view of concentrating military power in their hands and that these forces did not intend to interfere with domestic affairs of the country and the capital. The statement pointed out that a final decision of the Azerbaijani constituent assembly about political destiny of the country remained unclear, while the current situation made it necessary to ensure order and tranquility in the country. Confidence was expressed that the allied troops would not infringe sovereign rights of the Azerbaijani people. After staying several days in Baku and familiarizing himself with the current developments, Gen.Thomson realized that assurances of Russian Constitutionalists that "Azerbaijan as a state is an invention of some hundreds of political adventurers" were far from reality. He announced that the British command highly respected the Azerbaijani government and the Prime Minister and that Khoyskii was "one of the ablest men in Baku" to rule the country until a new coalition government was formed.

In the darkest days for the Republic, the National Council took drastic steps to ease the crisis. An institution of the parliamentary form of government was needed to establish ties with the European democracy. A day before Britishers" arrival in Baku, November 16, the National Council considered this issue, and on November 19th, an election law was enacted. It should be noted that the election and education laws played an important role in Azerbaijan"s destiny. Actions of this sort testified to abilities of political figures of the country to come out of crises. A decision of the National Council provided for representation of all nationalities and political parties at the Parliament.

The Azerbaijani parliament was to get composed of 120 deputies: along national lines - 80 seats for Azerbaijanians; - 21 seats for Armenians; 10 seats for Russians, 1 seat for Jews, Germans, Georgians and Poles each; trade unions and union of oil industrialists - 3 seats each. In addition, an equal franchise was provided for both sexes and all nationalities residing on country"s territory. The Parliament of Azerbaijan started its work on December 7. Attending the first session were 96 out of 120 deputies. Chairman of the National Council Rasulzade opened the session to focus on election of the speaker as a matter of the speaker as a matter of paramount importance. He opened the first meeting of the Parliament with a short speech, giving a comprehensive analysis of the events that had transpired after February 1917 with the following words: We want Russia"s happiness. We love the Russian people, but we also cherish our independence. There can never be happiness through the imposition of force. For happiness and freedom is in independence. And for this reason, gentlemen, the National Council has raised this three-colored flag, which represents Azerbaijan, and this flag, the symbol of Turkic sovereignty, Islamic culture, and modern European power, will always fly above us. This flag, once raised, will never come down again. Rasulzade also expressed his faith in the formation of a just world order and touched upon some important aspects of international policy. Expressing hope for the democratization of international politics, he said, I believe in the conscience of mankind, the conscientious mankind that will never give up with what has been achieved at the expense of millions of people. The idea of a "League of Nations" is being supported by everybody today. This gives me hope. ... On behalf of the representatives of the powers in Baku, General Thomson has officially announced that Caucasian issues will be resolved at the Peace Conference. The Republic of Azerbaijan will endure, if we do our best to be resolute, to demonstrate strength and determination in the defense and protection of our future and our independence.

Generally, the Musavat party leadership preferred the continuance of the principles of Caucasian federalism in order to provide better external security. Mammad Emin Rasulzade hoped to establish full relations with the League of Nations, to be set up in accordance with the last of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson"s fourteen points. But the existing situation called for the establishment of close regional relationships with other South Caucasian republics and Dagestan. In his closing, Rasulzade said, Today, all the party"s desires, personal inclinations and all those kinds of things seems insignificant in comparison to the Motherland and nation. All that should be given up and only the feelings of concern for the Motherland and nation should be held in the highest regard.

Following heated debates, Ali Mardan bey, an extraordinary and plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan and Foreign Minister since October 6, 1918, was elected a speaker of the Parliament. Hasan bey Aghayev was his first deputy and Rahim bey Vekilov - a secretary of the Parliament. Favoring Topchibashov"s election was the fact that he was a member of no party, prominent political figure, experienced diplomat, intellectual, and democrat by nature. American historian Firuz Kazimzadeh wrote: "Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov, who was elect President of the Parliament, was a well educated lawyer, tolerant in his views, and not a narrow nationalist."

One of the main tasks of the Parliament was the formation of a new government. Therefore, Hasan bey Aghayev, who chaired the activity of the Parliament, called for the head of the government, Fatali khan Khoyski, to take the floor for his intended speech to the Parliament. Khoyski first reported on the internal and external policy of the government, and then presented an in-depth analysis of the most critical moments the government had experienced, evaluating every event objectively. Although the Ottoman Empire had been defeated in the war and an Allied representative was participating in the Parliament, in Khoyski"s impartial assessment of the British-Turkish conflict as well as the Ottoman army"s activities in Azerbaijan, he considered that those activities did not threaten to the independence of Azerbaijan. He mentioned that there is a chapter in an agreement we had signed with Turkey, wherein Turkey is obligated to dispatch soldiers in the event Azerbaijan needs it for its defense. Our government exercised this option and Turkey was merely fulfilling its commitments. With the assistance of our neighbor, things that were impossible to achieve can be accomplished. It was impossible to turn to some other entity and even if we asked for it, it would be to no avail. It was natural for us to ask Turkey as they were our brothers and they are also one with our faith. Khoyski further said, The Turkish Command entered our territories upon our invitation to protect our borders, put an end to internal strife and prevent brute external interventions. On one hand, we wished to protect our sovereignty and, on the other hand, we had to resort to the Turkish army for help. It was for that reason that we had to protect ourselves from external intervention and not offend those who protected our physical existence at the expense of many casualties. As regards the foreign policy of the government of Azerbaijan, Khoyski noted that the state of Azerbaijan"s foreign affairs reminded him of a thin wooden boat floating among rocks in the darkness that could be bashed against the rocks by the waves and be pummeled into pieces any minute. He said that their duty was to navigate this boat through those rocks. With regard to the Allies" entrance into Baku, as well as British policy, Khoyski said, England is a nation with the oldest civil and legal autonomy. There are more Muslims under British rule than under any other state. They fight shoulder-toshoulder with the British. It shows that the British do not violate their rights and do not offend them. Certainly there cannot be any enmity between us. Therefore, the National Council concurred when the three powers wanted to send their soldiers to Azerbaijan in order to maintain and defend the peace. So far, we have not witnessed any case of abuse or any violation of the rights and independence of the nation and to the existence of Azerbaijan. With our consent, the Allies came and it is evident that there is no harm and no violation of rights. They also do not interfere in the internal affairs of our nation.

After Khoyski"s speech, the Parliament moved to form the new government. Once again, Fatali khan Khoyski was elected to be in charge of this task. The composition of the government was announced on December 26. Upon the insistence of the British, the composition of the coalition government included three ministerial seats for the Russians and two for the Armenians, although the Armenians refused to accept the seats. The following people held positions in the new government: Fatali khan Khoyski, head of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Samad bey Mehmandarov, Minister of Military Affairs; Mirza Asadullayev, Minister of Trade and Industry; Protasyev, Minister of Finance; Lizgar, Minister of Food; Khudadat bey Malik-Aslanov, Minister of Transportation; Aslan bey Safikurdski, Minister of Post, Telegraph and Labor; Mahammad Hasan Hajinski, Minister of State Control, Makinski, Minister of Justice; Khosrovpasha bey Sultanov, Minister of Agriculture; Rustam khan Khoyski, Minister of Patronage; and Yevsei Gindes, Minister of People"s Health. Fatali khan Khoyski thus became the third Minister of Foreign Affairs after Mahammad Hasan Hajinski.

On December 28, 2 days after the formation of the new government, the representative of the Allies in Baku, General Thomson, notified them of the British desire to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan. Thomson"s declaration stated that the coalition government formed under Khoyski"s leadership was the only legal entity for all Azerbaijani territories and that the Allied Command will provide total support to this government.

The Creation of the Peace Delegation of Azerbaijan

On December 28, a third cabinet was informed to approve a peace delegation headed by Topchibashov and his deputy Hajinskii. The delegation also included two MPs - Ahmed bey Aghayev and Akber agha Sheikulislamov. Consultants were Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, editor of "Azerbaijan" newspaper Jeyhun bey Hajibeyli, and Mahammad Maharramov. It should be added that members of the peace delegation represented various parties and parliamentary factions. As a head of the government and a Foreign Minister Fathali khan Khoyskii signed a mandate conferring the right to take part in the work of the peace conference and negotiate with various states, sign political, economic, and financial agreements on behalf of Azerbaijan. In the absence of Ali Mardan bey in Baku, the government entrusted Mahammad Hasan Hajinskii with heading the delegation in Istanbul.

It was Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Qoli khan Ansari whileo in transit to Paris informed Topchibashov in Istanbul about the formation of the government and a delegation to attend Paris. During talks with Topchibashov Ansari noted: "You"ve been elected a chairman of the delegation in Paris. Your government resigned. Fathali khan Khoyskii was confirmed as Prime Minister. As far as I know, the Britishers are behaving correctly and decline from interfering with affairs of your government". The government confirmed Ali Mardan bey as a chairman of the peace delegation with a new mandate entitling him to conduct talks with world leaders and acknowledged statesmen, including Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, Francesco Nitti, marshal Ferdinand Foch, field marshal Henry Wilson, George (Lord) Curzon.

Later December 1918 there was formed an Azerbaijani delegation whose members received their diplomatic passports earlier January 1919. On January 6, the government issued certificates to them for attending the peace conference. On January 7, Foreign Minister Fatali khan Khoyskii signed a diplomatic passport in the name of Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov and a mandate entitling him to represent the Azerbaijani Republic at the peace conference in Paris. To make delegation"s way to Paris easier, commander of the allied forces in Baku, gen. William Tompson gave them on January 3 a letter of recommendation to the British Ambassador in France. The letter noted, "they want to have their say on behalf of the Azerbaijani government, of the future Caucasian government". Another document presented to Ali Mardan bey on January 8 and signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Adil khan Ziyadkhanov requested: to protect interests of endangered Muslim population of Erevan province and seek preserving the current status quo on this territory until the destiny of the Caucasus was decided by peace conference. In addition, the chairman and members of the Azerbaijani delegation were entrusted with protecting interests of Muslim in Batum, Kars and Akhaltsykh.

On January 18, the delegations of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Northern Caucasus left Batumi for Istanbul. Around this time, Topchibashov had done much work in Istanbul. On January 6, he met with Lewis Heck, a US diplomatic representative, and asked him to assist in applying Wilson"s 14 principles to Azerbaijan and recognition of country"s independence by the United States. On January 10, he had talks with Holland"s diplomatic representative van der Does de Willebois. In the course of talks, Willebois noted that a memorandum submitted by Topchibashov provided him with interesting information about Azerbaijan and the Caucasus. He said, "I paid attention to the fact that your country is rich, so you may live at your own expense. You have a lot of oil and cotton but a few of railways". In the end of the talks, Willebois admitted that great changes were expected to take place on Europe"s map. This point of view of the Dutch Minister was built on viability of the new states that emergent on ruins of the Russian Empire in terms of ever changing post-war Europe.

On January 5-6, Topchibashov had meetings with Sergei Sazonov at "Pera Palace" hotel. As a representative of the White Guard governments of Alexander Kolchak and Anton Denikin, Sazonov was going to Paris. Well-known Russian diplomat since 1883, Sazonov worked in the USA, Great Britain, and Vatican; from 1909 to 1916, he led the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Empire and had rendered great services to the formation of the Entente. However, he could not digest the loss of Russia and the formation of new states. A month before, on December 7, 1918 Ali Mardan bey had a circumstantial conversation with the former Russian Foreign Minister Paul Milyukov. Having discussed complex processes going on in Russia, Miliukov, whom Ali Mardan bey knew well since the first Russian revolution, sheered away from answering a question of his attitude to non-Russian peoples as saying that the most important question today was how to save Russia from Bolsheviks. He noted, "If Bolsheviks quit the stage, Russia will be rescued". Asked by Ali Mardan bey about Milyukov"s view on the three South Caucasian Republics with their own governments and armies, the latter replied, "I understand that your peoples had to save themselves, and with that end in view created their own Republics. On the other hand, it was the doing of Germans who put their hands to this business". However, Topchibashov parried Milyukov"s attack as saying: "I think that the former peoples of Russia have decided their destiny, including us, Azerbaijanians".

The first talks demonstrated that Milyukov and Sazonov would fight for "single and indivisible Russia". In turn, Ali Mardan bey informed about the establishment of the sovereign Republic as assuring that Azerbaijan would not interfere with domestic affairs of Russia: "We, Azerbaijanians, are not enemies of Russians; we wish you prosperity in your own country, whether on the basis of Bolshevism, Socialism, or monarchism. At the same time, I declare that Azerbaijanians can no longer live together with Russians. Of the same view are all the Caucasians, except, perhaps, for Cossacks of Terskaya and Kubanskaia provinces. Suffice it to pay attention to newly formed units - Don, Kuban, North Caucasian Republic, and Daghestan. In other words, all physical bonds are broken. Of increasingly greater importance is the spiritual link, and especially social and political outlook. In this connection, there is a great difference and striking discrepancy. This was overlooked by the previous regime and that was a fatal flaw of Russia. This made us unhappy and limited our development. In the meanwhile, Allah endowed us with natural abilities and love for labor. If you want us to be in the bosom of Russia, we are sure to be unhappy as well, for our people is far from extreme socialism of Russia that has presently degenerated into the form of Bolshevism. We shall be always retorted in such a country and doomed to wretched life. Azerbaijanians number 5-6 millions, and they enjoy every opportunity to comply with Wilson"s principle. We shall always be seeking to live independent life in accordance with Wilson"s principles. And we shall always be seeking to preserve our independence and co-exist with our nearest neighbors". Having heard Topchibashov"s opinion on Azerbaijan"s aspiration to separate and live independent life, as well as its intention to set up a Caucasian Confederation, Sazonov added, "From your words it follows that Caucasian Tatars, i.e. Muslims have already buried Russia". Ali Mardan bey objected to this as saying that "we, Azerbaijanians, in an effort to follow our own path and live in compliance with our views, and thus facilitate tasks of future Russia, Russian population. Also, Azerbaijanians want to live in peace and tranquility with our neighbors - Georgians and Armenians, and intend to establish a unified federative republic like the Swiss union". Experienced in politics, Sazonov objected to this as saying: "That"s hardly probable: there is too great difference between peoples of the Caucasus, especially Armenians, they will not go along with you. There were too many bloody clashes with Tatars in the Caucasus. The massacre in Baku when Armenians slaughtered Azerbaijanians, and in September when Azerbaijanians did the same to Armenians. As far as I know, Caucasian Muslims are rather disposed to Russians and do not want to separate from Russia". Ali Mardan bey reasonably replied that it was firstly Russia that abandoned us, not Azerbaijan.

In the course of talks, Sazonov promised that new Russia "will be governed properly to ensure favorable conditions for all the nations to live". As for Bolshevism, Sazonov emphasized, "this is not an idea but a mercenary aspiration to profit by alien and then destroy. A handful of madmen and traitors cannot capture Russia". As for the peoples of the collapsed Russian Empire, Sazonov adhered a position of Great Russian chauvinism with its rather long history. Note that the Old Russian diplomat voted for granting independence to the peoples of the Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empires but for preservation of the colonial regime in the Russian Empire.

On January 11, 1919, Sultan Mehmet VI Vahideddin received Topchibashov, extraordinary and plenipotentiary representative and a member of the Azerbaijani government. Addressing Sultan, Ali Mardan bey noted: "Your Majesty. Some time ago, you received a delegation of the small Turkic state - Azerbaijan and declared, "Azerbaijani Turks are my little thing". We, Azerbaijanians, remember your great honor with great pleasure and respect". During the talks, Ali Mardan bey pointed out that Azerbaijanians had a great number of ill-wishers; however, Azerbaijanians had never been afraid of them, because they had always a great friend. "Not friend, but brother" - put him right Sultan. He stressed that all the Turks were brothers to Azerbaijanians, and fellowship was eternal. "We have always looked at you as our sincere brothers. You must not collapse. This is transition time. I believe that the Muslim world, especially, Ottoman and Azerbaijani Turks, will witness improvement of their own conditions. There were cases like that in the past but the people should keep a good heart and believe in radiant tomorrow, so you, Azerbaijanians, must try for the future, and Ottoman Turks will not deny assistance". Note that this meeting proved to be an important event in the life of the newly formed Azerbaijani state and had a positive effect on the growth of its political prestige. Istanbul press informed its readers about this meeting. Thus, newspaper "Zaman" of January 12 Wrote, "... Ali Mardan bey is assigned a chairman of the delegation to attend the Paris peace a conference and protect interests of Azerbaijan". The newspaper detailed about biography and 4-month mission of Topchibashov to Istanbul. It wrote, Topchibashov graduated from the Petersburg University and was reputed to be one of Russia"s most popular lawyers; it added that he worked for about 30 years, advocating political rights of Russian Turks against violence and persecutions of the tsarism. During his stay in Istanbul, Ali Mardan bey, despite unfavorable political conditions, worked hard for the sake of his people.

Of great importance was a conversation of Topchibashov with Iranian Foreign Minister Mushavir-ul Mamalek (Ali Qoli khan Ansari). It should be noted that news about the establishment of the Azerbaijan Republic was received malevolently. Still, Topchibashov was successful in easing tensions. He described these talks as follows: "I was not sure that I would have an opportunity to meet with the Persian delegation, in particular, with Foreign Minister Mushaver-ul Memalek. I sent my representative Mirzayev who was told, "We do not speak Turkish". Further complicating the case was general dissatisfaction with the Persian government, especially, a conversation with a local Persian envoy - all these stopped me to continue due to undesirable misunderstanding... I happened to meet Tabriz resident Seid Hasan who was going to visit the Persian Minister. I asked him to hint at my desire to see the Minister. He promised me to given an answer that same day but failed to. I found this situation abnormal, and sent my secretary Hashym bey to the Foreign Minister. Hashym bey immediately returned as saying that Murshaver-ul Memalek asked me to call on me. I came to see him, and found poet Danesh bey there, the latter came from Persian Azerbaijan. The Minister cordially greeted me as saying: "I met you donkey"s years back - I was your guest in Baku together with former envoy Mirza Hasan khan Mushir ul-Mulk. Thus for I remember a pleasant company of Muslim intellectuals".

On January 11 and 15 Ali Mardan bey had two more meetings with the Iranian Foreign Minister. Ali Qoli khan once again confirmed recognition of the Caucasian Republics by Iran as saying that these Republics could provide certain guarantees against future Russia. The chairman of the Azerbaijani Parliament expressed his gratitude and added that earlier an Iranian representative had stated that the state of Azerbaijan was established under Turkey"s pressures. The latter allegedly tried to separate Iranian Azerbaijan from Iran. Ali Qoli khan associated this misunderstanding with a toponym "Azerbaijan" and concluded: "It"s your mistake: until recently our territory with Tabriz as a center has been titled "Azerbaijan". The problem is how are you going to preserve your independence? Your neighbors are Armenians, Georgians, and all of them are your enemies. Entente members are unlikely to sympathize for you because of Turkey". Ali Qoli khan was doubtful about possible confederation with Georgians, especially with Armenians. They have powerful patrons new, so they are unlikely to agree with the federation, they are concerned today about their former kingdom. Ali Mardan bey said that Armenians wanted much but unlikely to gain anything. In the course of talks, the Minister hinted that Iran also claimed on Azerbaijan due to "its historical rights". Topchibashov rebuffed as saying that Azerbaijan had its own important reasons. In the end, the Iranian Minister had to cede some historical realities. He noted, "I"d like you not to forget hard times we, Moscow peoples, have suffered. All are outraged against us. Look at what is happening with Turkey. This state is unlikely to be restored. If we fail to be at one with each other, we shall be doomed to death, extinction. Russians in the Caucasus, first, then Georgians and Armenians (all of them are Christians, being hostile to each other notwithstanding) are sure to eat us up. Therefore, we must restore trust between us. We have not got it so far".

On January 20, 1919, the Azerbaijani delegation arrived in Istanbul. Here, Hajinskii decline his responsibilities and conveyed documents to Topchibashov, including a decision of the Azerbaijani government about Topchibashov"s assignment as a head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the peace conference.

"Russian question" at the Paris Peace Conference and Azerbaijan

From left to right: Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and the Italians Vittorio Emanuele Orlando and Sidney Sonnino (en.wikipedia.org)

In the autumn of 1918, it was clear that the Allies had won the war and the Central power countries were conceding, one after another. By the end of November, preparations were under way for an international peace conference, to be held in Paris, that would officially announce the victors, decide the postwar situation, and resolve disputes. The main organizers of the Paris Peace Conference were France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, and Japan. All organizational issues were to be resolved within this limited circle, and deciding on questions concerning the participating countries and working principles posed numerous problems. French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau held that all matters should first be presented to the five states before being discussed by other parties to the conference. "If a new war erupts," he said, "Germany won"t invade Cuba or Honduras, but France, and France will have to fight back." U.S. President Woodrow Wilson was against resolving the issues in such a limited fashion. The British did not object to Clemenceau"s proposal, but they insisted on the participation of small nations at the conference.

After long discussions and based upon a document prepared by the French and adopted on January 12, 1919, the countries that were to participate in the conference were divided into four categories. The first category comprised the countries that fought in the war. Those countries were to take part in all activities and in all commissions of the peace conference. The second category consisted of countries that had fought for domestic interests. Those countries would take part in the discussions of the issues exclusively concerning them. The third category comprised countries that had severed relations with the Central powers during the war. The delegates of those countries would also be able to take part only in the meetings concerning problems specific to them. The last category comprised neutral countries and newly independent countries. Those countries could take part in discussions concerning only themselves and only with the invitation of the one of the states of the first category. They could present their wishes and proposals to the meeting either orally or in written form. Nothing was said about the regulations for Germany and its allies.

The main purpose of the conference was to prepare peace treaties to be signed between the Entente states and the Central powers, but it was obvious that "the Russia question" would be a major topic on the conference"s agenda. The states that had been newly created from the territories of the dismantled Russian empire had great expectations for the conference. The Azerbaijan Republic had declared its independence and had pinned its hopes on the conference: its recognition by world powers as an equal member of international organizations would uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the republic.

The Paris peace conference was opened on January 18, 1919 at the Versailles palace. President of France Poincare made a brief speech, and French Prime Ministry Georges Clemenceau was elected a president of the conference. According to tentative agreement, Robert Lansing (USA), David Lloyd George (Great Britain), Vittorio Orlando (Italy), and Saionji Kimmochi (Japan) were elected vice-presidents, of the conference and a "tripartite organization" was established, consisting of Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, and Woodrow Wilson. At first, the so-called "14 points" of Wilson were assumed as a basis of forthcoming debates. Basic load of the conference work laid on the Council of Ten" that included US President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of State Robert Lansing, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Foreign Minister Arthur James Balfour, accordingly, Georges Clemenceau and Stéphen Pichon from France; Vittorio Orlando and Sidney Sonnino from Italy; Nobuaki Makino and Chinda Sutemi from Japan.

Many issues were on the agenda of the conference, but the "Russia question" took center stage. The question whether to invite Russia to the conference was a topic of discussions that began in November 1918. Lloyd George sent a letter to Georges Clemenceau notifying him that he supported Soviet Russia"s participation at the conference, but Balfour, Lord Curzon, and Clemenceau objected to this at the inter-Allied meeting. Lloyd George pointed out that Russia spanned two-thirds of Europe and a large portion of Asia, and like it or not, it would be impossible to resolve the problems of 200 million people without involving Russia. He supported the idea of inviting the White Guard government as well as the newly established states to the conference along with Russia. Clemenceau argued that the peace to be established now had nothing to do with Russia. On January 12, 1919, at the meeting of the Council of Ten, a resolution was passed upon the suggestion of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Stephen Pichon, moving not to officially invite Russia to the conference. Sergei Sazonov, Prince Georgy Lvov, Paul Milyukov, and other representative would be allowed to participate in the conference as consultants and advisers.

The "Russia question" was again discussed at the meeting of the Council of Ten on January 22, 1919. They adopted President Wilson"s appeal to all the warring parties in Russia to end military operations. It called on the White Guard government and the newly established states to meet for discussions on the Princes" Islands in the Sea of Marmara, close to Istanbul, by February 15, 1919. Representatives of France, Britain, the United States, and Italy were to take part in the conference. Ironically, Lloyd George was the author of this project, although for certain reasons it was Woodrow Wilson who introduced it.

Late in January 1919, British officers in Istanbul left for Princes" Islands in order to prepare for the "Russia conference." Unbeknownst to them, the islands had long been neglected, and there was no venue at which to hold the conference. It was evident that no one had bothered to look at the place before suggesting it as the meeting site. During the war, a nearby island had been used by the Turks to abandon dogs with infectious illnesses. At first the dogs ate each other but eventually all died of hunger. The dogs" bones had turned white with time and were reminiscent of snowy hills on the island. Winston Churchill wrote that the events that had taken place had not yet been forgotten on those inhospitable islands.

All of the newly established states from the former Russian empire, excluding Poland and Finland, had received invitations to the conference to be held on the Princes" Islands. It was not easy to identify the main points of the conference at first, and not all of the invitees had agreed to attend. With a response sent via radio to Great Britain, France, Italy, United States, and Japan on February 4, 1919, Soviet Russia announced that it was ready to participate in the conference. The Baltic states agreed to take part in the conference with the condition that their independence would be recognized and that the conference would be limited only to peace talks with Soviet Russia. Not a single South Caucasus republic agreed to participate in the conference although the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Mountain Peoples, Heydar Bammatov, relayed their acceptance of the invitation to a U.S. representative in Bern. Despite the pressure by British and French representatives in Istanbul, Azerbaijan and Georgia gave notice on January 28, 1919, that they would not take part in the conference on Princes" Islands. It was their opinion that the conference should discuss only disputable questions of recognition and not restoration of the unity of the Russian people. According to both countries, there was no need to sit at a table with representatives of Bolshevik Russia or the former Russia to take part in the conference when they were fighting for the recognition of the independence of their own republics. Mahammad Hasan Hajinski wrote to the chairman of the Azerbaijani government, "We consider it impossible" to take part in this conference.

On February 13, delegations of southern Caucasus Republics were informed that two Georgian representatives, Tckheidze and Tsereteli, were admitted to Paris. Istanbul interpreted this differently. On February 14, Topchibashov voiced a protest to the French mission in Istanbul over this glaring discrimination. The French replied that some day the two representatives from the Azerbaijani delegation would be allowed into Paris. On February 18, an enlarged meeting of the Azerbaijani peace delegation under the chairmanship of Topchibashov was held. He informed about obstacles on the road to Paris, and about French representative"s announcement that only two would go to Paris. Some members of the delegation suggested dividing by two: one for Paris, others - stay in Istanbul. Some people opposed the cleavage of the delegation. Hajinskii stated that there was no need in disbanding the delegation to please the occupation authorities of Istanbul. Sheikhulislamov suggested sending a telegram to the British government to ask for help. However, Ali Mardan bey said that the occupation authorities did not receive telegrams of this sort. So, it"d be necessary to choose two authorized persons for going to Paris or wait here indefinitely. On February 19, Ali Mardan bey telegraphed the Azerbaijani government the following: "I"d like to inform the chairman of the government that regretfully I failed to leave for Paris waiting for permission". Next session was held on February 28. It was decided to act jointly with delegations from other countries who had not been allowed to go to Paris.

However, it became clear later that denial of visas had a political background. In his report to the government of Azerbaijan dated March 5 Ali Mardan bey wrote that at first, it seemed to be the easiest way to resolve the problem, and the most difficult technical issue on this track was to embark on a steamer for Marseilles. However, visits to the British and French missions and talks with them, as well as analysis of the situation in the British headquarters and Ali Mardan bey"s personal visits to persons concerned showed that the problem here lay in reasons of political nature. Prof. Swietochowski wrote about it: "unlike their neighbors, they lacked support comparable to the Armenophile movement in the West or Georgian Mensheviks" connections with international socialism".

Further meetings with British representatives gave no essential results. On March 6, the British government said it had no objections against Azerbaijanian delegation"s participation in the Paris peace conference; just visas of the French government were required to get to Versailles. However, France kept silent. Besides Azerbaijanians, there were delegations of Don, Kuban, North Caucasus Union, parts of Ukrainian and Georgian delegations in Istanbul. It was natural that delegations began collaboring one with another, especially over visas to Paris. Topchibashov-chaired commission drew up a memorandum signed by representatives of Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Don, Kuban and North Caucasus Union. Tchkhiladze replacing Tckheidze, referred to an instruction not to take part in political actions, so he did not sign the memorandum.

Earlier March, the memorandum signed by heads of the delegations was handed over to Admiral Webb who promised to negotiate with the French commissar Amed. On March 5, a mixed delegation visited Italian and American commissariats. Mulish stubbornness of the French political circles not to recognize the newly formed independent states obviously resulted from political line of the Russian chauvinistic emigration. With a heavy heart, Ali Mardan bey wrote: "Not only our delegation was not allowed to attend the conference, nor it even was let into Paris, as if we are Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Turks. Notwithstanding, as soon as we are allowed to the conference, we shall have our say".

On March 6, the British commissariat of Istanbul informed Ali Mardan bey that the royal government considered it possible to arrange a travel of the Azerbaijani delegation to Paris and discuss the issue with the French only. Topchibashov told a meeting of Marh 7 that he insisted on the necessity of the Azerbaijani delegation to attend the conference. British representative Holler asked: "Why don"t you get on with Armenians?" In reply, Ali Mardan bey referred to the March events. Holler returned that Armenians claimed the opposite. Topchibashov stressed that the Azerbaijani delegation needed to get to the conference and present there its explanations on the issue. This fact was illustrative of behind-the-scene deals around Paris visas.

As it stood, the Azerbaijani delegation decided on March 15th to appeal to the chairman of the Paris peace conference with a brief letter. From now on, the French representative wrote to Ali Mardan bey that the situation had changed, so it was necessary to appeal to the French government. Azerbaijani delegated linked this change to the pressure of General Franchet d'Espèrey. On March 21, this letter was sent again to Paris under the signature of Topchibashov and secretary of the delegation Mahammad Maharramov. The letter said that the Azerbaijan Republic had proclaimed its sovereignty on May 28, 1918, with a population numbering 4 mil and a territory of 100,000 sq.km. In The letter asked the chairman of the Paris peace conference to render the Azerbaijani delegation in Istanbul assistance in attending the conference. Copies of the appeal were distributed among heads of governments of the United States, England, France, and Italy.

A correspondence of the Azerbaijani government says that in mid-March the French government had not objected to the candidatures of some delegation members - first, Hajinski, then Sheikhulislamov and Hajibeyli. However, a name of Topchibashov was not included in the list. Initially, the Azerbaijani delegation disagreed to go without Topchibashov; all its efforts were unavailing. They had to address to the allies in Istanbul. On March 27, American commissar Lewis Heck declared that the American mission saw no obstacles in obtaining visas for France. The same statement was made on March 29 by Italian commissar Serezoli. He wrote: "Your excellency, High Commissioner of Italy instructed me to inform you that he does not mind Azerbaijani delegation"s going to Paris". In fact, everything depended on the French. If on March 15, the French High Commissioner, Col.Foulon allowed some members of the Azerbaijani delegation to go to Paris, on March 25, Deputy High Commissioner Seon referred to the ban of the French Foreign Ministry to allow the Azerbaijani delegation to Paris and offered no further comments.

Hopeful of upholding rights of Azerbaijan, the delegates did their best to attain political goals of the country. It was decided to appeal to the chairman of the peace conference and heads of governments of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy. On April 8, a text of the telegram had been prepared and circulated among parties concerned. The same day, Ali Mardan bey sent a letter to an extraordinary representative of the French Republic to Paris. The letter practically repeated the contents of the telegram above. Besides, the letter rejected absurd allegations of the French party and references to technical reasons of our delegation"s delay; it stressed international illegality of obstacles raised against the Azerbaijani delegation with its appropriate mandates of the Parliament and government. Besides, a technical office of the French Foreign Ministry reported that this delay was not caused by technical reasons.

On April 12, the French office replied to the letter from April 8 saying that only three delegates above were allowed to go to Paris. Having discussed the situation, the Azerbaijani delegation decided to divide into several groups. Three of them, consisting of Hajinskii, Maharramov, and Hajibeyli, will go to Paris; while Sheikhulislamov and Mehdiyev will go to London; and Topchibashov, the secretariat, personnel, and technical staff will stay in Istanbul. Wherever they were, they had to act as delegation members and not on delegation"s behalf. Upon arrival in Paris, three delegates were to apply efforts for getting visas for the whole delegation.

Having discussed the telegrams of Topchibashov and a report of special courier, the Azerbaijani government passed a decision on appointing Hajinskii as a head of the peace delegation, and on April 17, it sent an appropriate radiogram to Istanbul: "The government suggests that members of the delegation are not staying too long to get to Paris as soon as possible. If you cannot go to the Paris conference, the government offers to assign the chairmanship to Hajinskii. New people will come in a day or two to strengthen the delegation". However, it proved no use to discuss the radiogram. In connection with US President Wilson"s intention to raise the Azerbaijani question in Versailles, our delegation was urgently called to Paris.

On April 14, 1919 the US Secretary of state, Robert Lansing had been handed a brief survey on Baku oil that testified to Americans" interest in the Caucasus. Proceeding from an appeal Topchibashov to President Wilson, Lansing sent a letter to French Foreign Minister Pichon asking him to issue a visa to the Azerbaijani delegation. Finally, following a long correspondence all members of the delegation, except for technical personnel, were provided with visas. Notes in the diplomatic passport of Topchibashov were indicative that an inter-allied control bureau in Istanbul gave him a visa on April 15, and on April 22 the Azerbaijani delegation left Istanbul, while a technical personnel headed by Alekber bey returned home.

On May 2, a ship playing between Istanbul-Salonika-Piraeus-Messina-Naples arrived in Italy. Following a 4-day waiting period, the Azerbaijani delegation left Rome on May 7 and arrived in Paris on May 9. There is a record of Ali Mardan bey"s passport indicating he crossed the French border. Entry of the Azerbaijani delegation into Paris in terms of aggravated Caucasian relations showed the government"s aspiration for integration in the free world assumed reality upon arrival in France, the Azerbaijani delegates were accommodated first at "Terminus-Saint Lazarus", then at "Claridge" hotel and got down to active work since May 12. At first, Ali Mardan bey sent a report to the French Foreign Ministry about the delegation composition and its exact address. Thus, a 3-month struggle of the Azerbaijani delegation in Istanbul gave its results, and the Topchibashov-led delegation was allowed at the Versailles conference. That was an initial result of goal-oriented steps aimed at removing artificial obstacles.

The Meeting of Azerbaijan Delegation with President Wilson

From the first days of their arrival in Paris, the Azerbaijani representatives closely monitored the political climate of the French capital. Because of the harshness of the peace conditions put before the defeated nations, the policy of the Entente was met with opposition in many European capitals. In the spring of 1919, a strong wave of strikes began in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, and other states. A variety of different representatives of Russia gathered in Paris, including the White Guard government as well as other political parties. Almost all of the ambassadors who had previously represented the Russian empire in various countries came to Versailles. While they had a variety of disagreements, they were all unanimous in supporting a "united and indivisible Russia." The report sent by the Azerbaijani delegation to its government read: "Despite fundamental differences in political vision, the Russians all support the idea of a "united and indivisible Russia." This is their slogan. Hiding behind such ideas as a federation of democratic republics and a constitutional convention, they are, unfortunately, deciding the fates of the various constituent parts, and the relations between the parts, of a future Russia that will reclaim its deserved place among the great nations of the globe. Native and adopted children of Russia are gathered here to think about the reestablishment of Russia in these terms, in defiance of all of the "alien peoples" that have forgotten Russia"s past generosity. However, these alien peoples, current representatives of the states that which have proclaimed their independence, do not want to hear about a "united and indivisible Russia." That is why ten days previously [at the end of May], all of the delegations of states that seceded from the former Russia, including the delegation of Azerbaijan, one after another vehemently protested when the Paris press began discussing the possibility of recognizing the Kolchak government"s jurisdiction over the whole territory of the former Russia. The most active supporter of the idea of a "united and indivisible Russia" among the Entente powers is its former ally France. It seems that the other Allied powers do not wish for this kind of Russia, only England behaves as if she has no objections to its existence."

During May, the representatives of Azerbaijan met with the delegations of Poland, Georgia, the Mountain Republic, Armenia, and Iran. As a result of the meetings, it was decided to form a political-economic union of Caucasian republics. The Georgians and the Mountaineers agreed to unite with Azerbaijan in this formation. The Armenians were invited, too, but they argued that they could participate in the Caucasus confederation only after the creation of a united Armenia merging Turkish Armenia and Caucasian Armenia. On May 23, Azerbaijani representatives met in Paris with the British delegate Louis Mallet. During the talks, the parties exchanged opinions concerning the political, military and economic situation in the South Caucasus and discussed a range of important issues concerning the status of Allied troops stationed in Azerbaijan. Since the beginning of 1919, the Azerbaijani government struggled to close down the British gubernatorial post in Baku. The head of the Azerbaijani delegation, Topchubashov, was instructed to accomplish this goal.

On May 2, on the initiative of President Wilson there was held the first hearing of the Caucasus question with the participation of governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy. On May 5, a meeting of the Council of four suggested to forward troops to Armenia. Wilson had no objection. On May 14, a resolution was adopted to provide America with a mandate to rule Armenia and Istanbul. Discussions over mandates to the Straits and the Caucasus intensified US interest in talks with the Caucasian Republics, so the American delegation in Versailles inquired about the views of the newly formed Caucasian states on the issue. With that end in view, President Wilson received the Azerbaijani delegation later in May. Furthermore, the Azerbaijani delegation attached great importance to this meeting. The meeting took place on May 28th, which was the first anniversary of Azerbaijan"s independence. In the first half of this day, Topchibashov was received by the American diplomat Henry Morgenthau, former US Ambassador to Ottoman Empire and acting deputy chairman of the US aid in the Near East in 1919. The parties discussed some important aspects of the forthcoming negotiations between Wilson and the Azerbaijani delegation. In the second half of May 28, the Azerbaijani delegation was received by President Wilson. Topchibashov noted, "The most momentous event was the reception of our delegation by President Wilson, for he, like other heads of the Entente states, does not receive delegations personally".

Addressing President Wilson, head of the Azerbaijani delegation Topchibashov declared that Azerbaijanis were happy to meet and welcome the President of Great America, mover of higher principles of peace coexistence of peoples and right of nations, including smaller peoples, to self-determination. "We have arrived from distant Caucasus, several thousand miles away from here to express you our gratitude for free and independent life of our people. We kindly ask you as representative of mighty America, Mr. President, to learn truth of our country, our people, even ourselves. The point is that often European and American newspapers provide false, perverted, and distorted information about our country. Indeed, we are not known in Europe so far, but we dispose of everything to live freely. We are hopeful that the conference will hear us out, and we will be admitted to the League of Nations. We are confident that like other peoples we shall be assisted based on your great principles ... We declare that we recognize neither Kolchak/Denikin, nor other pretender to power on the territory of the Old Russian Empire. We recognize and shall recognize our Azerbaijani parliament and our own government". In his speech, Topchibashov informed Wilson about the possibility of establishment of the confederation of Caucasian peoples - Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Georgians and mountaineers and submitted him a Memorandum of the delegation of the Caucasian Azerbaijani Republic.

Describing the Caucasian developments, specifically the situation in Azerbaijan, the Memorandum put forward demands of the Azerbaijani delegation to Wilson as one of the leaders of the Versailles Peace Conference. The Memorandum noted that after the Bolshevist revolution in the Central Russia the Azerbaijani National Council, in pursuance of the will of the Azerbaijani people, established on May 28, 1918 an independent Republic. From now on, the supreme power in Azerbaijan was owned by the Parliament composed, together with Azerbaijanis, of Armenians, Russians, Poles, and Jews.

Touching upon a material aid rendered by Azerbaijan to its allies in the world war, the Memorandum pointed out that Azerbaijanis of tsarist Russia being exempt from military service notwithstanding fought, nevertheless, on the side of the Russian Empire led by Gen. Khan Nakhichivanskii, i.е. on the side of the allies. Generals Mehmandarov, Shikhlinskii, Usubov, and other 200 officers became famous for their heroism in the battlefield of the world war. At the same time, Azerbaijan was actively involved in satisfying medical needs of the allies by providing the Entente armies with hospitals and medical institutions. The Memorandum noted that the Azerbaijani people would never welcome the invasion of Bolshevik troops and had already suffered numerous losses in fighting them. The document explained the lack of geographical and ethnographic ties between Azerbaijan and Russia: "In considering the geographical location of our country, one can easily notice that it is separated from Russia by a range of the Caucasian mountains; in much the same way our people has ethnographically nothing in common with Moscow and Slav people of Russia". A post-amble of the Memorandum pointed out that the Azerbaijani people was firmly confident that its national need would be met due to activities and collaboration of its delegates at the conference, as well as contribution of US President Wilson as a guarantor of peace and security worldwide. Demands and requests of the Azerbaijani delegation found their reflection in six items, 1. Recognition of Azerbaijan"s independence; 2. Extension of "Wilson"s principles" on Azerbaijan; 3. Admission of Azerbaijani delegates to the participation in the Peace Conference; 4. Azerbaijan"s admittance to the League of Nations; 5. Rendering of military aid to Azerbaijan by the US military department; 6. Establishment of diplomatic relations between the Azerbaijani Republic and the United States. In the event that demands above were satisfied, Topchibashov even promised to pay off an Azerbaijan"s share of tsarist Russia"s external debt.

In turn, Wilson expressed his satisfaction with meeting the Azerbaijani delegates, as well as with the fact that he obtained much information about the country. However, a question of the recognition of Azerbaijan"s independence remained open, since 1. Americans did not want the world to be split into small pieces; 2. It"d be appropriate for Azerbaijan to join a concept of the Caucasian Confederation; 3. The Confederation might, at League of Nations" disposal, be patronized by a great power; 4. The Azerbaijani question could not be resolved prior to the Russian question. The talks an agreed on dispatched a special American mission to the Caucasus to scrutinize the situation in loco. The mission reached Baku in October 1919 only.

Wilson"s cautious attitude to Azerbaijan was accounted for by some factors. First, all authors are unanimous that Wilson supported Armenian delegation"s position and provided with great quantity of false information from Armenian missionaries. Second, a date of the meeting fell on holiday, however, as a whole, this period was not lucky enough: leaders of the allies were baffled by intensification in spring 1919 of the activities of White Guard generals - Kolchak, Denikin, and Nikolai Yudenich, including Wilson. Third, two days before the meeting with the Azerbaijani delegation, on May 26, a sitting of the Board of Four discussed and approved a question of recognition of Kolchak"s government. An appropriate note was signed by Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando, and Saionji Kimmochi and then sent to Kolchak.

Despite niceties above, talks between Wilson and the Azerbaijani delegates were of great political importance. Leaders of other allied powers were expected to follow him. Topchibashov reported to the Azerbaijani government: "We have made some steps, and we are hopeful that our delegation will be received by the chairman of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau), as well as by Premiers of England, Italy, and Japan. Thus, now I have got a notice that Arthur Balfour (British Foreign Minister) and Vittorio Orlando (Italian Prime Minister)". The reception of Azerbaijani delegates by Wilson was reported by radio on May 31, and the French media at Batum also confirmed the news. At that time, the first anniversary of independence was being solemnly celebrated in Azerbaijan.

The First Anniversary of Independence and Danger from the North

Azerbaijani Army in Baku, 1919

May 28, 1919, the first anniversary of Azerbaijan"s declaration of independence. The Republican press published numerous materials laying a special emphasis on independence"s role in the destiny of the people. Owing to red-letter date, the Parliament held an extraordinary sitting. Azerbaijan"s independence euphoria was accompanied by growing trouble of Denikin"s jeopardy, especially as Petrovsk and Derbent were reportedly captured. Azerbaijan was facing the danger from the north. It was no mere coincidence that during debates of May 26 Rasulzade reminded, "Daghestan is the gate to Azerbaijan". It was the Denikin" threat and intensification of Kolchak that contributed to the concept of "United, indivisible Russia" and inspired various Russian forces to seek diplomatic support and political trust at the Versailles sittings.

At a special session of Parliament, the acting chairman, Hasan bey Aghayev, made a brief congratulatory speech: Dear visitors! One year ago, on May 28, 1918, the Azerbaijani National Council was homeless, like a bird whose nest had been destroyed. Our independence was proclaimed in the Orient Hotel in Tiflis, two days after Georgia declared independence. The Azerbaijani National Council expected that this event would be a source of happiness for the Azerbaijani people. Was that reality, or was it an illusion? If we consider the life of independent Azerbaijan during the last year, we can see the National Council"s hopes and its expectations for the nation as a reality." Concerning the threat posed from the north by the Volunteer Army, Aghayev said that Azerbaijanis were "ready to defend their independence, ready to offer their life, property, and blood, not fearing enemies or threats from any side."

Aghayev"s speech was followed by remarks from the heads of the diferent factions represented in the Parliament. Mahammad Emin Rasulzade described the enthusiasm that had captured the entire city on Independence Day: Today, the independence of Azerbaijan is especially precious because there is an external threat to our independence, a danger from the outside. But we observe the sincere emotions ascending from the soul of the nation, and we know that they are stronger than any fire, any weapon. Down with the vile hands that are grabbing for our independence! The newspaper Azerbaijan published an article by Uzeyir Hajibeyli titled "One Year" that chronicled the turning points in the year-long history of the independence of Azerbaijan. Alluding to the maligning of Azerbaijani Turks to foreigners, Hajibeyli wrote that, once the Allied forces entered Baku, the Europeans were personally impressed and admitted that their negative opinions of Azerbaijanis had been wrong.

The idea of an "indivisible Russia," sustained by the activities of General Anton Denikin and Admiral Alexander Kolchak, had an influence over Allied policy. Russian forces appearing in different colors were attempting to gain diplomatic support and political trust at Versailles. In early June, the press reported that on May 26, the heads of the Entente states and the prime minister of Japan had addressed a note to Admiral Kolchak concerning recognition of the government at Omsk as the Russian government in toto. The Allied position was prompted by Kolchak"s recent military successes. The majority of the heads of state gathered in Paris hoped for a rapid victory of Kolchak, Denikin, and other White Guard generals and the decisive defeat of Soviet forces. The question of relations with Russia was being actively discussed by the Council of the Four. At their session on May 20, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson had suggested sending a new appeal to the Russian groups. A member of the English delegation, Phillip Kerr, was entrusted with preparing the text. On May 23, the Council of the Four discussed the "Russian question" twice. During the morning session, a brief exchange of views was carried out, and Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau of France noted that the government of Japan had expressed a desire to address the Allies regarding recognition of the government at Omsk. It was his opinion that the Allies should not have left the initiative on this question to Japan. During the day session, the text prepared by Kerr was read by Wilson and discussed. On May 26, the text was signed by Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, Wilson, and Saionji and was sent to Kolchak. The accompanying message specified that the Allies and their partners were seeking to introduce clarity into the "Russian question" and that they were far from intending to interfere with the internal affairs of Russia. The Allies linked their dispatch of troops to Russia to the necessity of rescuing the Czechoslovak Legions from both the Germans and the Bolsheviks. What the Allies and their partners wanted was the prompt restoration of peace, law, and order in Russia. They were confident that the Russian people would put their internal affairs in order, settle the disputes that had arisen within the former Russian empire amicably by means of a legitimately elected State Duma (parliament), and establish relations with neighboring states through the mediation of the League of Nations. The Allies also wished to clarify Admiral Kolchak"s position on a number of issues before they could offer their support to the government at Omsk, namely:

1) the Constituent Assembly would be convened after the capture of Moscow;

2) free elections to the municipal duma, zemstvo, and other self-government institutions would be held;

3) Admiral Kolchak would not undertake to restore the special privilege of any class or estate or way of life destroyed by revolution;

4) the independence of Finland and Poland would be recognized; if boundary and other questions could not be settled by agreements, those questions would be resolved through the intermediary of the League of Nations;

5) if mutual relations between Russia and the territories of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Caucasus, and the Trans-Caspian are not settled amicably, then the situation would be resolved according to the advice of the League of Nations, and the Russian government would recognize the current autonomy of those territories de facto;

6) the authority of the peace conference to decide the future destiny of the Romanian part of Bessarabia would be recognized;

7) as soon as a government was created on a democratic basis, Russia would be included in the League of Nations;

8) the declaration of Admiral Kolchak dated November 27, 1918, regarding Russian debts would be confirmed.

For this reason, chairman of the Azerbaijani delegation Тopchibashev made a statement on May 31 that the expected recognition of the Kolchak"s government as successor to the Russian Empire seriously affects interests of the newly formed Republics, including Caucasian Azerbaijan. It stressed that the people of Azerbaijan with its thousands of victims did not recognize any Russian government and that the territory of Caucasian Azerbaijan could not be a part of the Russian state. As for recognition of Kolchak as a ruler of former Empire"s territory, the delegation lodged a note of protest to the chairman of the Peace Conference and Prime Ministers of Consent Powers which said that the Azerbaijani government had been struggling for half a year against Bolsheviks and cleaned its territory from them incurring great human material losses. It stressed that for a century Azerbaijan had been under the yoke of alien Russian regime and that today the Azerbaijani delegation officially declares, "regardless of current power in Russia, Azerbaijan cannot become a part of Russia, for it recognizes the power of its own Parliament and Government only".

On June 4, Admiral Kolchak responded to the Allies and said that he accepted the conditions laid out in the note dated May 26. He said that it would be possible to refer disputes regarding the Baltic, Caucasian, and trans-Caspian regions to discussion by the League of Nations and to ensure the autonomy of "the national groups." After receiving this satisfactory answer from Kolchak, on June 12, the Supreme Council of the Entente states declared that it recognized the government at Omsk within the above-stated conditions and would render it comprehensive assistance. This note was published in the press on June 13. Thus, the new republics that had sent envoys to Paris for the purpose of obtaining recognition of their own independence now faced a very serious turn of events. The note of June 12, signed by the heads of state in the Council of the Four, meant de facto recognition of Kolchak"s government within the former Russia, except for Poland and Finland. The Allied states opened some communications with it, sent representatives, and declared their intention of providing the government at Omsk with military, political, economic, and financial help.

The recognition of Kolchak"s government roused the indignation of most delegations of the new Republics. To make a joint note of protest, the chairman of the peace conference held a few sittings. Representatives of Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, North Caucasus, Belarus, and Ukraine agreed to sign the note. Signed this historical document were chairman of the Azerbaijani delegation Тopchibashev, chairman of the Estonian delegation Poska, chairman of the Georgian delegation Chkheidze, chairman of the Northern Caucasian Chermoyev, chairman of the Latvian delegation Мееrovich, chairman of the Belarus delegation Lushkevich, chairman of the Ukrainian delegation Sidorenko. The note said: "Decisions of state bodies of Russia cannot be applied to independent states of Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Northern Caucasus, Belarus and Ukraine, and mutual relations between these states and Russia may be regulated as between independent and legally qualified states only, whereas the above correspondence (between the Allies and Kolchak) may be interpreted as negation of this right. The Republics above kindly ask the great powers- participants of the peace conference to urgently recognize their political independence". On June 17, the note was signed and on June 18 Latvian Foreign Minister Meerovich submitted it to President Wilson.

Representatives of the Caucasus in Paris had twice - on June 15 and 18 discussed the situation at "Claridge" hotel. Attending the first meeting were Azerbaijanis, Georgians, and North Caucasus; the second meeting - Azerbaijanis and North Caucasus. The both meetings noted that Denikin, like Kolchak, posed a threat to the Caucasian Republics and that it was necessary to restore status quo that existed before the collapse of the North Caucasus Republic. "Note of Seven Republics" and a note of protest of the Caucasian Republics that was submitted to the peace conference on June 23. Unlike the notes of June 5 and 17, this note of the Azerbaijani delegation protested against not only Kolchak but Denikin as well. Article 6 of the note was directed against Denikin"s offensive: "The internal organization of the Caucasian Republics and the return to normal life and work are impeded by military actions and menacing behavior of the Voluntary army. Note that this army has already occupied a substantial part of the republics of Northern Caucasus; it poses threat to the Transcaucasia as a whole". The delegations ask that this Voluntary army which is unsupported by the allies and not encouraged to fight the Caucasian peoples, has been suggested to liberate the occupied territory and have respect for rights of the Caucasian Republics". Finally, the allies were told that all matters arising from the Caucasian Republics are too agreed with their governments or representatives in Paris. Sensing the need in resolving problems on a centralized basis, they sent a request to the secretariat of the Peace Conference to set up a commission for Caucasian matters like the Baltic commission.

In June 28, the delegations of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Georgia, Northern Caucasus, Azerbaijan, and Poland sent another message to the peace conference. They said, "Today"s occupation of the territory of Northern Caucasus by Gen. Denikin"s army and resultant threat to the Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan go to show that the Russian reactionary forces are seeking to re-colonize the newly independent states on the territory of the former Russian Empire. Document signatories laid an emphasis on the fact that financial and military aid of the allies contributed to Denikin"s offensive. Delegates from all independent states are protesting against this form of interference. They insisted that they were prone to unite all freedom-loving peoples, and they received a threat against one people as a threat against all. They declared that from the right to self-determination standpoint to be instituted not by the Russian Assembly but by the Peace Conference, it was essential to preserve the territorial integrity of all Caucasian states and take into consideration the will of peoples as declared by their parliaments".

A report sent to the delegation by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs spelled out the danger to the new republics, including Azerbaijan, from the Denikin forces fighting for a "united and indivisible Russia." Military aggression had escalated into armed conflict with Georgia over the territories of Tuapse, Sochi, and Sukhumi on the Black Sea. In February 1919, negotiations between the Mountain Republic and Denikin were not crowned with success. The latter insisted that the Volunteer Army was fighting Bolshevism, but Bolshevism existed to the north, not in the south. The Republic of North Caucasia had declared independence in the beginning of May 1918, created its parliament in May 1919, and had been recognized by the Allied command in Baku. On November 27, 1918, General William Thomson said that the North Caucasus government would be recognized as the only legitimate government there until the fate of the Caucasus was decided at the international peace conference and that Denikin"s Volunteer Army would not be allowed to enter the territory of the North Caucasus Mountain Republic. Now, however, General Thomson avoided responding directly to the request of the government of the Mountain Republic. The Allies" mission in Teymur-Khan-Shura under the direction of Colonel Rawlinson returned to Baku after Denikin"s attack. Although the two British battalions in Petrovsk were supposed to prevent Denikin"s Volunteer Army from entering Dagestan,in truth they viewed the army"s movement to the south with indifference.

The government of Azerbaijan took a number of urgent measures with respect to the military and political activities of Denikin volunteers within the country. A letter of February 15, 1919, was addressed to General Thomson concerning attempts by representatives of the Volunteer Army and the Armenians to create military units. Prime Minister Fatali Khan Khoyski made an extraordinary announcement to the Parliament of Azerbaijan regarding the Denikin threat. He noted that factions, including Armenians, in support of Denikin were being secretly armed, that such activities humiliated the dignity of the government, and that it was urgently necessary to prevent such activities.

The defense pact between of the Azerbaijan and Georgia

In spring 1919. ships from the Russian navy"s Caspian fleet that had dropped anchor in Baku were disarmed and placed under the control of the government. The government made propaganda outreach to the Molokans living in the territory of Azerbaijan and tried to put an end to recruiting activities for Denikin"s army. On the demand of Khoyski, General Przhevalsky was forced to leave the territory of Azerbaijan. The activities of Lazar Bicherakhov"s Cossack detachment, which was supported by the British, were forbidden in Azerbaijan. Bicherakhov was the main tool of Denikin"s policy in Azerbaijan. As far back as January he had created a Caucasus Caspian government in order to overthrow the legal government. The British were aware of this adventurist plan and wished to solve this problem discreetly, so they invited Bicherakhov to London on a pretext. As soon as he left Baku, the government of Azerbaijan ordered Bicherakhov"s detachments to leave Azerbaijan within 24 hours. When General Erdeli, who was replacing Bicherakhov, protested to General Thomson, he said that the army of Bicherakhov had discredited itself and represented a danger to law and order.

The British, both in discussions with the government of Azerbaijan and in correspondence and statements, had promised that the Volunteer Army would never enter Dagestan. However, the advance of Denikin toward Derbent proved the unreliability of these promises. In May, during negotiations carried out by a diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan, Abdurrahim Bey Hagverdiyev, in Derbent, the Denikin forces agreed not to advance further south. At the end of May, however, alarming news was received about the occupation of Derbent

by part of the Volunteer Army, which caused tremendous anxiety in Azerbaijan. On May 21 Colonel Lazarev at British command notified Prime Minister Nasib bey Usubbeyov that the command of the Army of South Russia did not have any aggressive intentions toward Azerbaijan and recognized the independence of Azerbaijan. However, it was also noted that after Russia was liberated from Bolsheviks, the question of the new republics on the territories of the former empire would be considered at the Constituent Assembly or the supreme governmental body to which the anti-Bolshevik forces would transfer authority. Usubbeyov informed the Azerbaijani Parliament about this letter at the session held on June 5, and the text of the letter and its translation into Azerbaijani was read to members of the Parliament. The prime minister also read a telegram from Erdeli, the commander of the Volunteer Army, which was sent to Colonel Lazarev from Yekaterinburg on June 18. It said, "If the government of Azerbaijan does not attack us, I will ensure that our forces will not cross the Zagatala Caucasus mountains and the Gizilburun line." Usubbeyov told the members of Parliament that he had discussed the telegram with the British command and notified them that he intended to make all necessary preparations for the purpose of defense. The government of Azerbaijan"s attitude to the Volunteer Army was unequivocal. Prime Minister Usubbeyov had already told the Parliament as far back as June 26 that Denikin could "cross the borders of Azerbaijan only over our dead bodies." On June 5, during the parliamentary debate, Mammad Emin Rasulzade proposed granting the government emergency powers. Under these powers, a general mobilization should be declared, stringent laws applied, and funds allocated from the treasury for preparatory measures against the enemy, with an accounting to be submitted later. Accordingly, on June 5, the Parliament of Azerbaijan set up the State Committee for Defense. The members were Nasib bey Usubbeyov, who was leading the new government; Khudadat bey Melik-Aslanov, Minister of Roads; Aslan bey Safikurdski, Minister of Justice; Samad bey Mehmandarov, Minister of War; and Mammad Yusif Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs. On June 11, the State Committee for Defense declared a state of martial law over the entire territory of Azerbaijan.

At the beginning of June, Usubbeyov, in a telegram sent to Denikin and British General George Norton Cory, who was protecting him, demanded that they force Denikin"s volunteers to leave Dagestan in 5 days. At the same time, the government of Georgia expressed its protest to the British command regarding actions of the Volunteer Army. Even when the British command intervened, however, the Volunteer Army refused to leave Derbent. Instead, they drew a new line of demarcation along Samur river and the northern border of Zagatala.

When the government of Azerbaijan protested again, the British replied that "the southern demarcation line drawn by Denikin does not correspond to the directive of the British government." They promised to inform London about it. To calm the situation, Denikin wrote a letter stating that he recognized the independence of Azerbaijan until such time as the central supreme government of Russia was restored. But the government of Azerbaijan no longer believed such promises. As Firuz Kazemzadeh noted, the Azerbaijanis well understood that Denikin"s ultimate goal was to reclaim Azerbaijan and other parts of the former Russian empire.

Voluntary national defense detachments were urgently raised and deployed, along with regular army units, in the north of Azerbaijan and along Samur River. The attitude of the government of Azerbaijan, which had long been accused of "cooperation" with Denikin and the White Guard army, was explained in a letter that Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Adil Khan Ziyadkhanli sent to Jafar bey Rustambeyov, the authorized diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan to the government of Kuban:

The opinion of our government is this: irrespective of who it is, Bolshevik or Menshevik, Denikin"s volunteers, etc., anyone who encroaches on the independence of Azerbaijan is our enemy. ... Our attitude toward the Volunteer Army is this: it has been decided once and for all that Volunteer Army units should not be allowed to enter the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and that Volunteer Army units located in Dagestan should be removed and the army of Azerbaijan should occupy Dagestan up to the demarcation line.

The demarcation line indicated in this letter was the one defined in January 1919 in negotiations between British command and Denikin"s forces. British General Briggs, at Denikin"s quarters, organized a meeting between

Denikin and Rustambeyov in an attempt to establish relations between the government of Azerbaijan and the Volunteer Army. Although Denikin agreed, the government of Azerbaijan refused this offer. The firm stand of the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia against Denikin"s movement southward produced an effect. General Briggs received a telegram from London saying that the British government was not pleased about Denikin"s appointment of General Liakhov to the position of governor-general of the Mountain region and that Denikin"s army was there only "for the purpose of struggle against Bolshevism." If Denikin persisted in ways that were unacceptable to Great Britain, then His Majesty"s government would refuse to aid him further and would discontinue the current assistance.

The transfer by the British of part of the Caspian navy to the Volunteer Army on the eve of the British departure from Azerbaijan provoked further protests from the government of Azerbaijan. In a note of protest submitted to British command on August 3, the government of Azerbaijan characterized this action as a danger to the sovereignty of the republic and a sign of disrespect. Although General Thomson again connected such actions to Denikin"s struggle against the Bolsheviks, the heads of the government nevertheless viewed this diplomatic folly as a blow directed against the security of Azerbaijan.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a report on the situation to the republic"s delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, noting that the threat from Denikin had strengthened cooperation between Azerbaijan and Georgia. At the Caucasus conference in April 1919, this issue and many others were discussed. The Armenian participants at the conference avoided direct comment regarding Denikin, but the danger from the north troubled Azerbaijan and Georgian in equal measure and they declared their solidarity on this question. In the Workers" Soviet of Tiflis, Gegechkori stated that they, together with the proletariat of Baku, would win a decisive victory over the aggressor and that they would not lay down arms until they had crushed the tsarist general. The ambivalent position of the

Armenian republic, by contrast, is attributable, on the one hand, to its location behind the front line, as opposed to Azerbaijan and Georgia, and, on the other hand, to the fact that the Armenians had their own plans in connection with Denikin, as documented in a book by I. Shakhdin published in Tiflis in 1931. The book referred to a secret agreement between the Volunteer Army and the Republic of Armenia according to which Armenia was to assist Denikin"s forces in attacking Azerbaijan and Georgia. This would create favorable conditions for solving by force the territorial claims of Armenia against Azerbaijan and Georgia. The coincidence of Denikin"s and Armenia"s aims was confirmed later by Anastas Mikoyan, who wrote, "Only the government of Armenia surrendered to Denikin and declared its "neutrality." At that time their sympathy was on the side of Denikin, who was gaining strength day by day."

The effective cooperation of the representatives of Azerbaijan in Paris with representatives of Georgia and the Mountain Republic during the spring and summer of 1919 played a significant role in creating Caucasian solidarity on various international issues. It strengthened their resistance to the Denikin threat. The Allies" recognition of the Kolchak government had the same effect of strengthening the solidarity of the new states created on the territory of the former Russian empire in confronting the threat of a "united and indivisible Russia." The representatives of Azerbaijan at the Paris Peace Conference did not take a step backward from their struggle for recognition of the republic"s independence and protection of its territorial integrity. They attempted by every means to repulse the claims of "Great Armenia," which were being defended by the heads of European states and were clearly directed against the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Denikin"s disregard of the second demarcation line defined by the British on June 11 and his advance south of Petrovsk further strengthened the cooperation between Azerbaijan and Georgia, and the two republics decided to sign a military agreement for their mutual defense. For this purpose, they also appealed to the government of Armenia, which, for reasons that later became clear, declined to join the military defense pact that Azerbaijan and Georgia signed on June 16. According to the agreement, which was fo a 3-year period, in the case of aggression by any state against the independence and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan or Georgia, the parties to the agreement were to provide military assistance to each other. The agreement stipulated as follows:

1. the parties to the agreement bear responsibility to deploy all armed forces in case of any aggression or danger to the territorial integrity and independence of one or both parties stipulated in the agreement;

2. if any of the neighboring states attack one or both parties stipulated in the agreement in order to solve border conflicts by force during military operations started according to the previous article, then this state is defined as a combatant;

3. the agreement has a strongly defensive nature; if one of the parties on its own initiative declares war or starts military operations without prior consent, then the other party to the agreement is not obliged to participate in these operations;

4. parties in the agreement are obliged to solve all border conflicts occurring between them by means of agreements and arbitration; in this case, an accepted decision is considered as a final and obligatory decision for both parties;

5. the agreement is for a duration of three years; one year prior to termination of this period, the parties have a right to express their preference for its prolongation or its termination;

6. the parties to the agreement bear responsibility jointly to carry out diplomatic negotiations directed to the protection of the sovereign rights and independence of these states;

7. the parties to the agreement are obliged not to conclude a separatist treaty;

8. the parties to the agreement bear responsibility not to conclude a military agreement with other states without prior notification of their ally;

9. in the event that a federation will be created wherein both parties will join before termination of the period stipulated in the article 5, and this federation ensures the integrity of borders of all states and both parties to the agreement enter, then this agreement loses its effect; and

10. after the official announcement of this agreement, Armenia has two weeks in which it may join the agreement.

In their notification about the agreement submitted to Paris Peace Conference, the representatives of Azerbaijan and Georgia underscored that it was "solely for the purpose of defense."

Pursuant to the agreement of June 16, the parties signed a military technical agreement, and the defense ministries of Azerbaijan and Georgia established a joint military council. The chairman of the military council was I. Z. Odishelidze, and its members were General Aliagha Shikhlinski, General Mahammad bey Sulkevich (Sulkiewicz), and General Ivane Kutateladze. The military council was to review the scope of military operations and the capacity of the enemy, work out a defense plan, monitor the preparedness of both republics" armies, and develop a strategic position.

At first, the attitude of the British command toward the Azerbaijan-Georgia defense pact was negative, but that later changed when a representative of the Azerbaijan Republic, Aziz bey Tahirbeyov, on mission to Istanbul, met with General George Milne, the commander-in-chief of British forces in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and told him about Denikin"s movements. Milne told Tahirbeyov that Denikin was moving southward without his consent and that he had not been aware of this action. Tahirbeyov sent a radiogram to Usubbeyov to report that Milne had not agreed to Denikin"s actions.

Azerbaijan Republic confronts the claims of "Great Armenia"

Another serious issue of concern to the Azerbaijani delegation in Paris was their relations with the Armenian representatives. The Armenians thought of themselves as "the small ally of the big allies."They hoped that the Paris Peace Conference would solve all their problems and they dreamed of creating a "Great Armenia" reaching from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. Armenia was demanding not only six provinces of Anatolia but also Cilicia and even part of Iranian Azerbaijan, although Iran had not participated in the war. Their groundless claims were supported by Paris, London, and especially Washington. According to one newspaper story, British General Beach, newly arrived in Alexandropol from Tabriz, had supposedly congratulated the Armenians on their independence and announced at a banquet given in his honor that the rightful borders of independent Armenia would stretch from sea to sea. This would be a surprise to the neighbors, Azerbaijan and Georgia, whose independence would not be recognized by the Entente, for they were to be incorporated within a united Russia. When this story appeared in the newspaper Sakartvelo and was republished in the newspaper Georgia, a representative of the British command came to the editorial office to deny that the general had said such things and to demand the publication of a retraction. It was subsequently determined that the Armenians had distorted General Beach"s remarks, and the newspaper Georgia had to publish a disclaimer on July 3.

Proposals for creation of a "Great Armenia" stretching from sea to sea were the main subject of Armenian propaganda throughout the South Caucasus, Europe, and the United States after the war. To pursue these claims, the Armenians sent to Paris not one but two delegations. The first, representing the Armenian diaspora, was headed by Boghos Nubarian (Nubar Pasha), who was well known in Western political circles and especially in France. The second, representing the Republic of Armenia, was headed by the chairman of the Armenian National Council, Avetis Aharonian, who had recently led the Armenian delegation at the Istanbul conference. Nevertheless, Armenia, like the other Caucasian states, was not included on the list of officially invited conference delegations.

On January 30, 1919, the Times of London published a letter that Boghos Nubarian had sent to the editor but which was clearly directed to the leaders of the Entente:

Sir, the name of Armenia is not on the list of the nations admitted to the Peace Conference. Our sorrow and our disappointment are deep beyond expression. Armenians naturally expected their demand for admission to the

Conference to be conceded, after all they had done for the common cause. [The letter continued] The unspeakable suffering and the dreadful losses that have befallen the Armenians by reason of their faithfulness to the Allies are now fully known. But I must emphasize the fact unhappily known to few, that ever since the beginning of the war the Armenians fought by the side of the Allies on all fronts.

Boghos Nubarian went on to practically attribute the Entente"s victory in the Middle East entirely to the Armenians. All this was to make the case that Armenia should have been invited to the peace conference as an equal member of the Entente and should be recognized as independent. President Wilson promised to support admission of the Armenian representatives to the conference. As British diplomat Harold Nicolson noted in his diary, the United States was preparing to seek a mandate over Armenia. On January 30, Lloyd George told the Council of Ten that Britain could not maintain its army in Turkey and the South Caucasus "forever" and that the United States should take over Armenia. President Wilson proposed that the Armenians should be invited to present their program for the future Armenia at a meeting of the Council of Ten on February 26.

Among the Armenians, there was a significant difference of opinions concerning territorial claims. The representative of the diaspora, who had close relations with the Catholics, intended to take Cilicia as well. One of the best known of the diaspora representatives, Jean Loris-Melikov, afterward wrote that Sergei Sazonov had inveigled the Armenians to make claims against Cilicia. It is quite possible that Sazonov was thinking that Russia would soon be restored and would occupy Armenia together with Cilicia.76 Nevertheless, the representative of the Republic of Armenia, Khatisian, advised against any mention of Cilicia. It is interesting that a resolution for an independent Armenia submitted by Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to the Senate included the identical demands for a "Great Armenia" that were submitted by Armenians to the peace conference. At the Council of Ten, Boghos Nubarian had submitted the following territorial claims as agreed between the two Armenian delegations at the peace conference. The demands included some territories where Armenians had never lived:

First: The seven vilayets of Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Harpoot, Sivas, Erzurum, and Trabzon excluding there from the regions situated to the south of Tigris and to the west of the Ordu-Sivas line;

Second: The four Cilician sanjak, i.e.: Marash, Khozan (Sis), Djebel-Berket, and Adana including Alexandretta;

Third: All the territory of the Armenian Republic of the Caucasus, comprising the province of Erivan, the southern part of the former Government of Tiflis, the southwest part of the former Government Elizavetpol, the province of Kars, except the region north of Ardahan.

In addition, the Armenians put forward indemnity claims equal to 19,130,982,000 French francs. As Firuz Kazemzadeh noted, "Fantastic as these figures were, the Armenians hoped to receive the money." The Armenians" territorial claims exceeded anything that had been demanded even by the victorious members of the Entente. Lloyd George stated that the Armenians wished for too much. They demand territories from the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea based on the tsarist Armenia that had once existed but, unfortunately, Armenians made up only a small percentage of the population there.

The Dashnaks realized that the Allies were postponing resolution of the Armenian question, and so they decided to use the delay for their benefit. On May 28, 1919, celebrating the first anniversary of independence, they issued a statement on annexation of seven provinces of Turkey to Armenia and the creation of the unitary state of Armenia. This was at a time when Turkey, as a defeated state and could not react properly, and the movement of Mustafa Kemal Pasha was still in its infancy. The May 28 statement suggested that Armenia was being restored entirely, that the Armenian nation was being given complete freedom in a united and independent Armenia, and that all the conditions for its progress were being created. The Armenian nation was depicted as sole owner of a united country, and the parliament of Armenia as a legislative body that expressed the will of all the Armenian people. News of the statement was sent from Erivan to the Armenian representatives in Paris, who thereafter began to work in concert. Zurab Avalov, the representative of the Georgian delegation in Paris, wrote that the Republic of Armenia had moved beyond purely Caucasian policy to enter the Turkish question in the statement on annexation. The same was said by the head of the delegation of the Republic of Armenia at the Paris Peace Conference, Avetis Aharonian, in conversations with Chkheidze and Topchubashov: "You have only limited Caucasian interests, whereas our concerns are to protect the whole Armenian nation, a united Armenia."

In summer 1919, Andranik, who was responsible for atrocities against Muslims in Turkey as well as in Azerbaijan and had been expelled from the territory of Azerbaijan at the insistence of the British command, arrived in France. On June 15, it was received by French President Raymond Poincaré through the mediation of Boghos Nubarian. At the time, the Armenian press in Europe and the United States was attempting to introduce Andranik into society and elite political circles as the "Armenian Garibaldi." At the presidential reception, Andranik expressed his dissatisfaction with the position of the Allies regarding the Garabagh question, reiterating that "Armenians rely on the Allies." He told Poincaré that Armenians had fought with the Entente against Turkey and Germany, for the "sacred cause" of the Allies, with 180,000 Armenian volunteers in the Russian army (However, according to Russian sources, the total number of Armenian volunteer unit in the Russian Caucasian army is no more than 5-6 thousand) and 15,000 in Europe. "We did this to contribute to the great struggle of France and its allies for the establishment of justice." In a telegram, he called on the United States to intervene in the resolution of the "Armenian question": "We are a very ancient nation. Armenians suffered more losses for liberation than any of the other belligerents ... . We hope that our losses given for the Allies will not be in vain."

The representatives of Azerbaijan suffered from the effects of this classic demagogy and manipulation of public opinion. Topchubashov wrote to Baku that "The activities of Armenian intellectuals in the heart of Europe for more than half a century, the enormous financial resources at their disposal, their skills of movement on all fronts and in attracting people to their side, along with their American compatriots, have stirred up wide sympathy for Armenians, especially lately. These great advantages obscure the negative aspects of the Armenians."

Whenever representatives of the Entente powers, under the influence of Armenian propaganda, met with the representatives of Azerbaijan and Georgia, they would advise them to live with the Armenians in conditions of peace. Avetis Aharonian sent the chairman of the peace conference a special letter and a new memorandum on behalf of the two Armenian delegations. The memorandum had also been published in the French Journal de Debats. The letter stated that Russia, by signing the Brest treaty and transferring Gars and Andahan to Turkey, had strained relations and put Armenia in a difficult situation. In order to resolve these issues, Armenia should be allowed to participate in the conference on an equal basis with the newly created states of Poland and Czechoslovakia. The memorandum was primarily directed against Turkey and Azerbaijan, as the Allies were being asked to force Turks and Azerbaijanis to quit all Armenian territories. The great victory in the East had not lasted long, according to the text. Due to efforts to by the proponents of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism, it said, enemy elements were raising their heads and resuming their activities. It asserted demagogically that Turks and Azerbaijanis could not forgive the Armenian people for sympathizing with the Allies, and so they would savagely attack Armenians to punish them. The intention behind this memorandum was to provoke the Allies. By publishing it in a French magazine, the Armenians were spreading throughout Europe the word that Turks and Tatars rejoiced that the armistice agreement did not change anything in the life of the Armenian people and that "Turkish Armenia" still belonged to its previous owner. This was said by the same organization which a few months earlier had shouted that Armenia would not accept anything except "unconditional liberation".

Armenian representatives in Paris imputed crimes committed in Garabagh by Armenians to Azerbaijanis and thereby attempted to discredit the Azerbaijan Republic and its representatives in Versailles before the representatives of the Allies. In 1919-1920, the British journalist Robert Scotland Liddell wrote from the conflict zone in the Caucasus, Armenia always searches for conflict and when achieved, it names its own agitation an "instrument of pressure" but actually turns it into a proper instrument of punishment. The rule of Dashnaks is the misfortune of Armenia. This terrorist revolutionary organisation has deliberately been inciting Armenians to attack Azerbaijanis for many years. Causing significant damage to Muslims they speak to the whole world about "long-suffering Armenians" and try to get its sympathy. Dead Armenians are very valuable to the Dashnaks. If it is possible to use them properly, then they could bring many benefits to their agitation activities. The government of Armenia used the diversion committed in Garabagh in the summer of 1919 to disgrace Khosrov Bey Sultanov, the Governor General of Garabagh. Their representatives in Paris widely used agitation campaigns proving that Armenians who ostensibly were not protected by the Allies were killed and ousted by Azerbaijanis. Briefly touching this matter, it should be noted that on June 4 and 5, events that occurred in Garabagh had been committed according to a direct plan of the National Council of Armenia. The British command, after finding out about activities of this Council directed to breaching the stability between Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in Garabagh, had promised in April to expel its members from borders of Garabagh. In the beginning of June, it became clear that the National Council of Armenia had secretly brought arms into the Armenian part of Shusha. They were to block the Azerbaijani population from walking up to the summer pastures in the Zangezur mountains. In this instance, Khosrov Bey Sultanov, to ensure security on the roads where people were traveling from place to place, sent soldiers of the Azerbaijani army to the dangerous places and at the same time arrested the members of the National Council of Armenia and gave an order to exile them from Garabagh. In response, on June 4, armed Armenians opened fire on Azerbaijani soldiers, and three soldiers were killed. After such actions, Sultanov began to act in order to establish law and order in Shusha and neighboring villages and as the first step achieved banishment of the members of the National Council of Armenia from the borders of Azerbaijan. Representatives of the British command escorted by Azerbaijani officers banished the members of the National Council of Armenia from Shusha.106 During skirmishes there were the casualties on both sides. On June 6, peace was achieved in Shusha. In connection with these happenings, Armenians of Shusha wrote a letter of apology to Sultanov and stated, Dear Khosrov Bey, allow us to apologize to you and in your person to Muslim people of Shusha in connection with the committed act. We are very disturbed by the violence committed against your soldiers by hooligans who named themselves as Armenians, and this rightly caused disturbance to your army and officers.

While local Armenians viewed the June event in such a manner, the government of Armenia and Armenian representatives in Versailles had a completely diferent opinion. The government of Armenia in its note sent to the government of Azerbaijan demanded that Sultanov and the Azerbaijani army withdraw from Garabagh. However, this demand was refused in the response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan delivered to the government of Erivan via Mammad Khan Tekinski, the diplomatic representative in Armenia. The telegram sent on June 18 said: "Inform the government of Armenia that according to the resolution of the government of Azerbaijan dated January 15, 1919, Sultanov was assigned as Governor General of Shusha, Javanshir and Jabrayil provinces being the integral part of Azerbaijan. On April 3, the Allied command officially recognized this person. Therefore all protests of the government of the Republic of Armenia regarding the activities of Sultanov or the location Azerbaijani army in Garabagh are considered as an attempt to interfere with the internal affairs of Azerbaijan and are not subject to discussion. With respect to a disturbance in the region of Shusha, due to the considered decisions taken by the governor general, law and order is restored and life resumes its normal course.

In order to prove the groundlessness of the agitation campaign started by the government of Armenia against Sultanov in connection with the events in Shusha, a parliamentary committee was set up to investigate his activities, and it became clear that Sultanov was not a guilty party in the event. Armenians committed this diversion to discredit Sultanov before the British command.109 In general, the government of Azerbaijan held that in order to study the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, an international investigation committee should be set up. This question had also been raised by representatives of Azerbaijan in Paris. To this end, the government of Azerbaijan applied to the government of Armenia. Though Armenians at first gave their consent to the setting up of the international investigation committee, they later disclaimed this idea on various pretexts.110 Nevertheless, due to the decisive position and purposeful policy of the government of Azerbaijan in summer of 1919, the sovereign rights of the republic were restored in Garabagh. A report sent to the representatives in Paris stated, "The Garabagh question had been solved once and for all ... . At the Armenian congress the representatives of Garabagh Armenians concluded an agreement on recognizing the power of the government of Azerbaijan with Governor General Khosrov Bey Sultanov." In general, Sulatnov performed great services toward the restoration of sovereign rights of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Upper Garabagh, in Zangezur, and in other places included in the plans of Armenians. It was no mere chance that Armenians had been carrying out strong agitation against him not only in the South Caucasus but in Europe and the United States. At that same time, the Molokan revolt in Mughan and Lenkaran organized against the national government was also quelled. The foreign minister of Azerbaijan sent a telegram to Topchubashov about both events. In the telegram presented to the chairman of the conference by Topchubashov, it was indicated that the city of Lenkaran and the province of Lenkaran is cleared of Bolsheviks and the power of the government of Azerbaijan has been restored. The representatives of the Armenian population of Garabagh have accepted a resolution on submission of this population to the government of Azerbaijan.

Mandate system and Azerbaijan

Alimardan Alakbar oglu Topchubashov was a prominent Azerbaijani politician, foreign minister and speaker of the Parliament of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic

From mid-1919, the government of Azerbaijan and its Paris representatives were engaged in searching allies and patrons. On the one hand, it was accounted for by desire to come nearer to the free world; on the other, old and new Russia showed formally varied and yet essentially identical approaches to Azerbaijan. After the First World War when both winners and defeated party were tired and ruined, the Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan faced an important issue: whom may we rely on? In his report to the chairman of the Council of Ministers Topchibashov wrote: "We"re enduring and pending. So is peace delegations of Republics newly formed on Russia"s territory. Where can we find support, who can help us? The right of our people to independent existence is beyond doubts. It is talked and written everywhere. Mere assertions are not enough, for peoples, organized and independent, are seeking for not only allies but also patrons and mandatories as well to rely on a stronger power. Our delegation has repeatedly discussed the issue in Constantinople. What shall we rest upon?".

The French patronage over the Caucasian states proved not realistic. French business circles showed interest in the Caucasus, however, Clemenceau"s confidence in the concept of "united and indivisible Russia" turned out to be strong. Of all great powers at the Peace Conference, it was France only to oppose the recognition of newly established post-Russian republics. In mid-1919, France sent its representatives to the Caucasus. It was not surprising that a French representative, Jean Loris-Melikov was an ethnic Armenian and concurrently own nephew of count Loris-Melikov, a member of the Armenian delegation at the conference and a representative of the Armenian Republic to Paris. Note that Jean Loris-Melikov had once studied together with Topchibashov in the same classical school. Before going to the Caucasus, Loris-Melikov had two meetings with Topchibashov, which made it clear that France was feeling its way for establishing the Federative Republic of Caucasian peoples. Topchibashov spoke of Loris-Melikov as follows: "He regards everything from a stance of a Frenchman and at heart he is a follower of "united and indivisible". He holds that he is not nationalist, so he disapproves steps of the Armenian delegation here. In his words, he has no meetings with the Armenian delegation. In general, he never seems to be a man of practical policy. Yet, he is confident in success but disbelieves independent existence of the Caucasian Republics laying an emphasis on restoring great Russia". Following this characteristics of Topchibashov it remains unclear, why Loris-Melikov had to make an exhausting voyage en route Istanbul-Batum-Tiflis-Erevan-Baku-Northern Caucasus if contents of his report to the French government had already been known. French Foreign Minister Jean Marie Pichon notified that, the French government did not legally recognize the Caucasian Republics because of unstable situation in these Republics. At the same time, the French Minister informed that he was respecting the peoples of the Caucasus and that representatives of these peoples were admitted to the Conference and French emissaries were visiting Baku, Batum, and Tiflis. In the end of his message, Pichon pointed out that in terms of destroyed roads and ruined financial system the French government was facing difficulties in signing an agreement with the Caucasian governments. In addition, it was decided to establish mail and telegraph communication with Azerbaijan and Georgia. The government was going to develop trade relations with these countries.

A question of Great Britain and Italy"s mandate on Azerbaijan was to be considered in parallel, for interests of the two countries coincided on the matter. Italians" desire to establish themselves in the Caucasus was connected with Britishers" aspirations to abandon the region. Talks between Britishers and Italians ended on March 24 with signing a preliminary treaty between general staffs. By the stipulations of this secret treaty, British positions in the Transcaucasia were transferred to Italians. Initially, there was no unanimity on the subject. As an expert in the Caucasus, Lord Curzon in his letter to Foreign Minister Balfour of March 25 noted that seizure of the Transcaucasia met no "national interests" of Italy, for Italians were in no position to do with Russians there. Besides, Italians enjoy no authority among the Caucasian peoples, after Britishers withdrawal, they are unlikely to retain control over further developments. However, Curzon"s view was ignored, and on April 9 the British Council of War approved an agreement of March 24. On May 10, the British command informed the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia about Council"s decision to leave the Transcaucasia. A little later, on June 28 the government of Great Britain officially informed the Peace Conference about withdrawal of its troops from the Caucasus and the entire territory of former Russia. The allies agreed to substitute British troops for the Italian ones. A question of granting Italy a mandate in the Transcaucasia was brought up. Having received reassuring comments of their missions from the Caucasus, the government of Orlando gladly agreed with this proposal.

Italians established ties with the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegations in Paris. On June 13, military representative Valerie met on behalf of Colonel Melchiorre Gabba with Topchibashov and stated, "If we send troops to you, it"ll not be for occupation or gendarmerie purposes but for cultural and economic ones, however, the point is that today we face difficulties in performing this hard mission, so I"ve come to learn your view on the subject". Further talks made it clear that Italians would like Azerbaijanis to invite them and voice their accord with their arrival in the country. In all probability, that was necessary for the Italian government to make excuses with the Italian people and government. However, the situation remained uncertain, and two weeks left until England"s decision, that is why Topchibashov gave no promises to Italian Valerie.

On June 15, a meeting was held at the representation of Azerbaijan jointly with Georgians and North Caucasians to have passed a decision on exploring a question of Britishers" withdrawal from the Caucasus and their substitution for Italians. Americans said that this question had not yet been discussed at the Military Council of Versailles. Later June Topchibashov and Tsereteli met with Mallet, one of the leaders of the British delegation who reaffirmed Britishers" withdrawal that needed to be stationed in other countries. As for Italians, Mallet noted, "Arrival of Italians will change nothing, for Italians are expected to do the same that Britishers did". As for the Denikin threat, "he is unlikely to march against Azerbaijan and Georgia. Also, he has instructions from British plenipotentiary Wardrop who in a day or two sets out to the Caucasus". This topic was touched upon in the course of talks between the Azerbaijani delegates and an advisor of the British delegation, Prof. Simpson.

After Great Britain informed June 28 the Peace Conference of its desire to leave the Caucasus, the Azerbaijani, and Georgian and North Caucasus delegations considered it possible to get closer with Italians. The problem was that change of the Cabinet took place in Italy: the government of Orlando that showed interest in the Caucasus and was ready to dispatch troops to the region retired and a new government of Francesco Nitti suspended the process as the first step of the new Cabinet. On June 28, Valerie met with Topchibashov again and reaffirmed his government"s doubt in the Caucasian question. Yet, Italia retained its economic interest in the Caucasus.

On July 7, representatives of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and North Caucasus Republic had a meeting with count Sadino, attaché of the Italian Embassy in Paris. The exchange of views revealed intentions of the Italian government in the Caucasus as follows, 1. Italy pursues economic purposes in the Caucasus only, not political ones; 2. Italy will receive a mandate from the League of Nations to govern the Caucasus, but this right is to be exercised by approbation of region"s population; 3. Italy will stay in the Caucasus for not more than three-five years; 4. In the reviewed period the Caucasian Republics will set up a confederation and then decide on their destiny independently. Note that if the Russian Federative Republic is established over this same time, the Caucasian confederation may join the RFR. In this case, Italy will abandon the Caucasus; 5. Italy will not fight Denikin, nor other else; 6. The Caucasus may have its own army, and Italy may assist on this track.

While these issues were being discussed, a special envoy of the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry under the allied command in Paris Aziz bey Tahirbeyov put up at Roma and had talks with the Italian Embassy representatives. During his talks with Mayoni Aziz bey asked whether Italian troops would be dispatched to Azerbaijan. In reply, Mayoni showed him several papers as saying that Topchibashov made a statement to Italian representatives in Paris about undesirability of dispatching the Italian troops to Azerbaijan. Mayoni asked whether it was Topchibashov"s personal view or the people and the government of Azerbaijan was really opposing the Italian troops" are stationed in Azerbaijan. In fact, the Italian party referred to Ali Mardan bey"s statement at the first discussions when the British troops were still in Azerbaijan, so there was no reason to send the Italian troops to the country. When the Azerbaijani and Georgian representatives touched upon this topic, there was not an official notification about the withdrawal of the British troops from the Caucasus. When the British government officially appealed to the peace conference about its intention to leave the Caucasus, the political situation around the South Caucasian Republics began changing. Therefore, Tairbeyov told Mayoni that he could judge about the Azerbaijani people"s attitude toward Italia by how an Italian mission led by Col. Gabba was received.

In summer 1919, Italy declined from bringing troops into the Caucasus, so the young republics faced great danger from Russia. On August 1, the British Embassy in Rome was informed that the government of Nitti declined from sending troops to the Caucasus, and on August 5, Italy made an official statement. Britishers" statement about withdrawal of troops disadvantaged Azerbaijan and Georgia. An unbiased analysis of social-political and economic situation in Italy is indicative that the Caucasian military expedition would drive the country into stalemate. As distinct from his predecessor Orlando, new Prime Minister Francesco Nitti treated things in a new fashion.

A refusal of Nitti"s government from expedition to the Caucasus strained a question of orientation. During an August 6 general meeting of the Azerbaijani, Georgian and North Caucasus delegations a chair of the meeting, Topchibashov pointed out that despite an aspiration for independence, the new Republics would be in need of external aid. Therefore, it would be appropriate to meet with support. The attendees put forward a number of proposals. First, it was suggested that Azerbaijan and Georgia appealed to the League of Nations, and let it might determine to whom to give the mandate. Then Hajinskii put forward a proposal to ask England adopts the mandate especially as there was no other correct option. In his speech, he tried to substantiate that the Caucasian Republics, including Azerbaijan, could not have any orientation but England. However, despite all efforts of the Azerbaijani government and its Paris representatives, later August the Britishers left the Caucasus. Ali Mardan bey received a report of the Foreign Ministry about the international situation in the Republic that defined concretely that later August the last British detachments left the territory of Azerbaijan.

Withdrawal of the allied troops from the Caucasus turned out unexpected for the Azerbaijani delegation in Versailles. Meetings between Ali Mardan bey and British representatives showed that the withdrawal was final. He wrote, "We became firmly convinced that British troops would remain in Baku forever. However, we were mistaken. Not only were we mistaken but other representatives of the Transcaucasia - Georgian and Armenian delegations were as well. We were all abroad from personal meetings with representatives of the British delegation but the British government has already decided to withdraw the troops. After that we, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, and Armenians decided to appeal to the peace conference and all allies asking them to station the allied troops until the conference resolves destinies of our Republics". That was the appeal of August 28 signed by representatives of all three Republics.

Owing to the withdrawal of British troops from the Caucasus, the British government sent a political mission to region headed by Oliver Wardrop. The Versailles delegation learned about it on July 25 from British delegate Sir Eyre Crowe who wrote in his letter, "I"ve been instructed by Foreign Minister Balfour to inform you that his Excellency intends to send a mission to the Transcaucasia with Mr. Wardrop as its head. He is well aware of the Transcaucasia and worked long here as an officer of the consul system. In the end of the month, he is likely to take the road. Mr. Wardrop will inform the government about the situation in the Transcaucasia; however, this cannot be received as a recognition of the Azerbaijani government by the British government".

Before going to the Caucasus Oliver Wardrop met in Paris with the delegations of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. Topchibashov wrote to Usubbeyov about this meeting: "We had meetings with foreign missions that planed to visit the Caucasus, since they had been notified beforehand. Minister Belfour informed us about Mr. Wardrop"s trip. Mr. Wardrop visited us together with his secretaries, of whom Mr. White, a former consul in Tabriz, speaks well in our language and Russian. He impressed us favorably and asked us to apply efforts for all Caucasian peoples to live in peace and tranquility. He had meetings with Georgians (he speaks Georgian) and Armenians. The same day he left for the Caucasus".

The United States interest in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan

Thomas Woodrow Wilson - President of the United States from 1913 to 1921

After World War I, the United States emerged as the most powerful state on the world stage. During the aftermath, the United States became the financial and economic center of the world. Its entry into the conflict in 1917 and its subsequent participation in the victory of the Entente increased the political influence of the United States and strengthened its role in deciding the destiny of the world. The United States achieved this status as a superpower in the new postwar world system, and its president, Woodrow Wilson, became famous as the architect of the peace and a friend of small nations.

The United States came to the Paris Peace Conference with Wilson"s Fourteen Points, which he had declared in January 1918. The compilation of these peace principles embodied the coming of the United States to superpower status. The world Wilson envisaged would be based on principle, not power; on law, not interest -for both victor and vanquished. Although the collapse of the Russian empire and recognition of the new states established in its territory were not mentioned in Wilson"s principles, after the start of the peace conference, the Caucasus region began to attract U.S. interest. That is why the United States, and not only European countries, became a candidate for the Caucasus mandate.

Since autumn 1919, Ali.Mardan bey started establishing ties with the United States with its enhanced role in the world politics. He wrote to Baku, "We are maintaining some relations with American Jews who advise us to send a delegation to America in an effort to allay impressions caused by an Armenian ballyhoo against Azerbaijanis due to alleged mass killings of Armenians in September". As distinct from Great Britain, France, and Italy, the United States expressed the willingness to accept a mandate for controlling the Black Sea straits, Istanbul, and the Caucasian region. It became apparent from talks of Ali Mardan bey with President Wilson, US representatives at the Peace Conference, Under-Secretary Frank Polk and Henry Morgenthau who had long worked in the Near East that the Azerbaijani Republic gave its consent to be patronized by the United States provided latter"s non-interference with internal affairs of the Republic, compliance with "fourteen points" of Wilson without having anything of it. Similar talks were held between Americans and Georgians. On June 11, the Georgian delegation led by Chkheidze had a meeting with Wilson"s advisor, colonel Edward House. The talks ended with Georgia"s consent to the American mandate. Later June the Americans mooted the issue at the Council of Ten. On July 5, the Council of Ten approved Colonel William Haskell as a High Commissioner of Armenia. The decision said that Haskell was assigned as a High Commissioner on behalf of the United States, England, France, and Italy. At the same time, he was responsible for all kinds of aid to Armenia. All representatives of the governments of the United States, England, France, and Italy in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, and Istanbul were to start collaborating with Haskell immediately. The same meeting passed a decision that Gen. James Harbord go to Erevan and draw up report on repatriation, general military and economic questions. The same day Lansing telegraphed to Washington about this decision.

In summer 1919, Haskell arrived in the Caucasus. His residence was located in Erivan. At the first meeting with the Armenian government, he declared about his mission to defend Armenia and Armenians regardless of the place of their residence (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey). This is why his post was titled "High Commissioner of the Allies". As a first step, Haskell, under a cover of general-governorship, tried to get Nakhchivan and Sharur-Daralayaz out of Azerbaijan"s control and give it to Armenia. However, in accordance with a decision of the Azerbaijani government, Topchibashov sent August 19 a note of protest to the chairman of the peace conference. It said that the Azerbaijani delegation was looking forward to the recognition of his country"s independence while attempts were made to interfere with peace conference" powers and forcibly redraw borders of Caucasian Azerbaijan, and its residents were becoming refugees in their homeland. Information was afloat that region of Kars, Erevan guberniya, uyezds of Nakhchivan, Sharur-Daralayaz and a part of Erevan uyezd were annexed to the Armenian Republic. The note reminded that the government of Azerbaijan had never out up with transfer of Nakhchivan, Sharur-Daralayaz, Surmali and a part of Erevan uyezd to Armenia. When adjusted for the recent bloody events in the region, a note requested the allied command to address two important issues: 1. Withdraw all military units from Kars province, except for the allied troops; administer the province at population"s will until a decision of the peace conference is adopted; 2. Authorize the Azerbaijani Republic with managing Nakhchivan, Sharur-Daralayaz, Surmaly uyezds and a part of Erevan uyezd. Azerbaijani representatives submitted this note of protest to the peace conference, as well all representatives of the allies in Paris.

In November 1919, Haskell arrived in Paris to make a report on the situation in Transcaucasia. He met with Topchibashov. In his interview, Haskell did not bring up a question of general-governorship in Nakhchivan realizing that this idea was having no prospects. From now on, they adhered to the view that the whole Transcaucasia should be regarded as a mandated territory of a world power. Topchibashov informed Baku about his meeting with Haskell: "He was much pleased with his reception in Baku; he liked very much our ordinary people: it is a peaceful people and not enemy of the Armenian people. The latter would live in peace and tranquility if not politicians...". Responding to questions, the colonel expressed his confidence that the Transcaucasian peoples could have co-existed peacefully. They are closely related economically; however, a world power must help them at first, improve their financial conditions, following which every people concerned could later live independently and be released from the mandatory, in the first turn, "your Azerbaijan", Haskell noted indicating Azerbaijan on the map".

Prior to going to the Caucasus, Col. Haskell had been instructed with helping Armenians. However, three months he spent in the Caucasus changed his stand on the issue. He witnessed and realized much, he understood that Armenians were far from an image of "long-suffering" people of which trumpeted the western press. During his talks with Topchibashov and Maharramov, Haskell pointed out that "until recently Americans spoke of Armenians as solely suffering. Dispatching of our missions to Turkey and the Caucasus, equally with stay of many Americans in the region, proved to be very useful. Now we are sure that "not all Armenians are good and not all Turks are bad". There are good and bad among Americans as well. "These countries might be united under a generic mandate (shows to Turkey and the Caucasus on the map), however, America is not going to act as such a mandatory". Col. Haskell was not mistaken. Debates of November 1919 in Versailles firmly objected to the inclusion of Azerbaijan and Georgia in the mandate of Col. Haskell. Americans did not insist much on the Caucasian mandate because the question was of America"s another mission in Asia Minor and the Caucasus - a mission of Harbord who submitted a report on the situation in the region to President Wilson. In particular, Harbord opposed the American mandate on the Caucasus.

The developments were as follows. In considering that in 1919 the US interest in the Caucasus increased and political circles began debating over a mandate on the Caucasus, President Wilson made a decision to send a special mission there with the purpose of exploring political, military, geographical, economic and administrative questions in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Asia Minor. Research into a protocol of a general meeting of Azerbaijani, Georgian and North Caucasus Republic delegates of June 12, 1919 makes it possible to assert that earlier June Americans was going to send such a mission.

In mid-August, a head of the US delegation to Versailles Frank Polk sent a special letter to the delegations of the Caucasian Republics about the Harbord mission. It said that brigadier general James Harbord and 12 attendant officers were going to visit the Caucasus. The letter asked to inform respective governments about Harbord"s arrival and assist him in fulfilling his mission. To conclude, the letter emphasized that the Azerbaijani government should not take this mission as recognition of the Azerbaijani Republic.

Then the Azerbaijani delegates met with Col. James Rhea, an authorized agent of Harbord mission for Azerbaijan, and provided him with necessary materials. Topchibashov wrote to Baku, "I"ve seen Col. Rhea several times... He is a head of the mission in Azerbaijan. I gave him necessary materials and informed him about latest developments. It turned out that the confederation and particularly the United States would voice their view on entire Caucasus and us after termination of mission"s three months activity. I and Hajinskii met with Col. Loge, a head of all American missions, and the latter promised to help as saying that he would do his best to include, at least, one our representative to the mission. You"d better take advantage of it".

In September-October 1919, the Harbord mission visited Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. During talks in Baku earlier October, Harbord stressed the necessity of cessation of conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia. He was pleased with discipline and training in Azerbaijan, particularly, that of Azerbaijani soldiers. In his view, all these testified to Azerbaijan"s preparedness for independent life. The general expressed hope that the peace conference would take into account all expectations and aspirations of the Azerbaijani people. He laid an emphasis on peaceful foreign policy of Azerbaijan. Before leaving Batum for his home Harbord sent a letter of appreciation to Premier Nasib bey Usubbeyov for collaboration with his mission. He noted, "I and officers of my mission have fond memories of your people and country, and we are hopeful that squabbles of your neighbors won"t hamper your country"s progress".

On October 16, James Harbord arrived in Paris and submitted his report first to Undersecretary Polk and then the US State Department and Senate. Topchibashov tried to meet with him but failed. He reported to Baku, "A week ago Gen. Harbord, a head of US mission in the Caucasus, left Paris for America. He stayed here for two days only. I sent him a courier twice asking to fix a time for the meeting. His aide replied that the general would be glad to see him and telephone him about a date of the meeting. Regretfully, I failed to see him again. Touching upon Harbord"s arrival, some newspapers ("Le temps") noted that he reports back to President Wilson only and that he opposes US mandate over Armenia and being very busy he receives nobody".

The report prepared by General Harbord on the results of his mission leads one to conclude that he was in favor of uniting the South Caucasus and Istanbul under a common mandate but was against the United States taking on this mandate. The Harbord mission brought to an end the interest of the United States in the Caucasus; it also mentioned the unsupportive attitude of Armenia, which became known in political circles of the United States. A thorough analysis of information and documents shows that though the United States had strong military, political, economic, and strategic interests in the Caucasus, it was not able to defend the Caucasian republics from the growing northern danger in an effective way. Conversely, after World War I, the European allies were not only reluctant to allow United States involvement in the Caucasus but were even more jealous of its inroads into the Near East. The United States had to await the end of World War II in order to strengthen its influence in this region.

The spread of propaganda in Western Europe

With the imminent defeat of the Russian White Guard in the autumn of 1919, Azerbaijan became a source of great interest not only in U.S. political circles but also in Britain, France, and Italy. A Franco-Caucasus Committee headed by Anatole de Monzie held a conference on October 4 that was exclusively for the Caucasus states, including Azerbaijan and Georgia, with the participation of French business groups. The French press did not shy from reporting about the Caucasus. Jeyhun Hajibeyli and Mahammad Maharramov from the Azerbaijani delegation were interviewed during the conference. In the middle of October, the representative of the French Ministry of Trade and Industry visited Baku accompanied by the French military attaché. During negotiations with Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahammad Yusif Jafarov, they expressed the French government"s interest in the economic and political situation of Azerbaijan as well as their desire to establish friendly relations with Azerbaijan. The head of the French diplomatic mission stated that the French community and government were misinformed about the current situation in Azerbaijan. They pledged that they would inform the French government about their observations during their visit to Azerbaijan. Next to come to Azerbaijan was an Italian mission headed by I. Enrico. Soon after, an agreement was signed between the Azerbaijani delegation and the Cosmos Company, one of the largest companies in Britain. The company was tasked to provide for the transport and sale of Azerbaijani raw materials from the ports of the Black Sea to Europe. The telegraph and telephone company of France dispatched a considerable amount of equipment to Azerbaijan and sent its engineers in order to introduce world-class post and telegraph services and to install a radio station in Ganja that would link up with a radio station located at the Eiffel Tower in Paris. In accordance with an agreement with the Azerbaijani delegation in Paris on November of 1919, Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov transmitted a telegram to the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan from the radio station at the Eiffel Tower to the Ganja radio station. The telegram read, "I congratulate you for the first Azerbaijani radio station, which will play an important role in the economic and cultural development of our dear land." A moment after the signing of an agreement with France regarding post and telegraph related matters, Topchubashov filed an application for membership with the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union in Bern, Switzerland.

In the autumn of 1919, the delegations from both Azerbaijan and Georgia addressed and submitted appeals on September 17 to the chairman of the peace conference as well as the members of the Supreme Council in the hopes of speeding up matters regarding the Caucasus. A similar appeal was also filed with the representatives of the Entente that participated in the conference on September 20 regarding the creation of a special commission to tackle issues relating to the Caucasus. The request called for an in-depth analysis of the events that occurred in Azerbaijan and Georgia and the Caucasus in general. It stated that the problems of the South Caucasus should each be settled independently, without delay, and not be incorporated into the Russia question. It also pointed out that since the Caucasus possessed vast raw material resources essential to both European and U.S. markets, the development of post and telegraph services to support commercial activity was urgently needed. The appeal likewise offered to settle all of those issues through the "formation of a special commission on Caucasus issues at the peace conference."

In the autumn of 1919, the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegations discussed issues pertaining to both their countries and the Caucasus, after which they decided to submit a letter addressed to the Supreme Council. After the drafting of the joint letter by the Azerbaijani delegation, it was additionally signed by the representatives of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Kuban, South Caucasus, and Georgia. Belarus and Armenia rejected the letter. Armenian representative Dr. Hamazasp Ohanjanian stated, "If the matter at hand is the recognition of independence, then the Armenian representative will not sign it because according to the Treaty of Versailles, Armenia

has already been recognized." He added, "If there comes a need to choose between the Turks or Denikin, they will prefer the latter." The representatives of the eight republics signed the letter and submitted it to the chairman of the peace conference, Georges Clemenceau, on October 8. This jointly signed letter was the second to be submitted by the newly established republics after the initial jointly signed letter of protest was submitted in June. The letter emphasized that the newly established republics were in serious need of material and moral-but primarily military-support. For that reason, it was important and imperative that recognition be accorded to them as emerging international entities. The political aims of diferent factions in the Russian opposition were taken up for review, and they came to the conclusion that the Bolsheviks wanted to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat within the old Russian empire, and the intransigent forces among the Russian White Guard generals wanted to establish a military dictatorship within that same territory and to restore the glory of the former Russia, which for some was considered a prison of peoples. For the newly established republics, the ways of achieving their causes may have been different, but the aim and premise of these states were in consensus. The letter clearly stated that the forces fighting in Russia were willing to lay down their arms at the first sign that the newly established democratic republics would have a good chance at being recognized. The new republics realized that only the support of the Entente states could save them from the aggression of the Bolsheviks and the forces loyal to old Russia. Yet, in spite of their repeated requests, the Entente had not provided them with any support. On the contrary, this muchcoveted support was provided to Kolchak and Denikin, who did not relent in their assault against the newly established republics although supposedly they were fighting against Bolshevism. Notwithstanding their efforts, the last phase of the war showed that it was impossible to restore Russia within its old boundaries wthout ignoring the spirit of freedom of the people. The letter stated, "in the interest of peace, humanity, and progress, the international settlement of our states" issues should not be delayed and they should not be settled in conjunction with Russian issues. The need for international recognition is essential. We have been isolated from the international financial community and have been prevented from availing ourselves of credit from financial institutions as well as being participants in the regulation of the economic and financial situations."

The letter was brought to the attention of the peace conference as well as the Supreme Council, which was chaired by French foreign minister Stéphen Pichon and whose members were the foreign ministers of the Entente states. A copy of the letter was published in the French newspaper Le Temps on October 12. It is noteworthy that through such publications, French media attitudes began to change in favor of the new republics that previously bore the brunt of negative publicity generated by the press. Soon after the letter was published, on October 29, matters concerning the South Caucasus region were finally heard at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the basis of an appeal filed by the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegations. The director of the French committee, Paul Bourdarie, wrote in a letter sent to the chairman of the Azerbaijani delegation, "the request of the Azerbaijani and Georgian Republics on the de facto and de jure recognition of the existence of your governments was endorsed at the meeting of the French committee." Taking into consideration the growing economic interest of France in these republics, the committee has asked the Clemenceau government to urgently send diplomatic representation to Azerbaijan and Georgia."

The autumn of 1919 brought changes in the international circumstances in favor of the newly established republics. The Azerbaijani representatives were engaged not only in the political and economic aspects of Azerbaijan but at the same time in widespread dissemination activities as well. In spite of great financial difficulty, the Azerbaijani representatives at Versailles were able to achieve much work with minimal resources. Their selfless work included the publication of a series of books dedicated to Azerbaijan"s history, population, economy, natural resources, and politics. The books were written, compiled, and published in both English and Azerbaijani and for the first time attained significant media exposure in Europe. This marked a milestone for Azerbaijan on the eve of the recognition of Azerbaijani independence. The Azerbaijani representatives in Versailles lauded the establishment of an Azerbaijani resource center in Switzerland. It was a good proposal considering that the League of Nations would probably be based in Geneva. The Azerbaijani representatives established ties with L"Europe Orientale, a periodical that was published in English and French. L"Europe Orientale agreed to publish articles about Azerbaijan with an initial run of 20,000 copies. Topchubashov wrote to the chairman of the Azerbaijani Council of Ministers about affiliation with L"Europe Orientale, This agency will be very useful for us in the future; in particular, they will help us establish our center before the League of Nations in Geneva. The matter is not only about our affiliation with this news agency, but our plans to establish this kind of resource center in Geneva and that this center will eventually protect all the newly established republics in the former Russian territory. It is necessary to provide assistance to this endeavor and establish it in Geneva post haste.

Topchubashov, in a letter to Baku on November 10, 1919, wrote, "For the first time, the press writes more about Azerbaijan than ever before. At least now we have gained sympathy among some members of the press." After experiencing difficulties in the spring and autumn of 1919, journals such as L"Europe Orientale, L"image, and Les Peuples Libres and newspapers such as Le Temps, Revue du Monde Musulman, La Revue Contemporaine, Humanité, Le Dépeche Colonial, Les Dernières Nouvelles, La Croix, and others published in different languages in Europe featured attention-grabbing articles about Azerbaijan. In order to promote Azerbaijan, Topchubashov agreed with the editor of L"image to devote one special issue to Azerbaijan, and they both agreed that it would come out in November. Topchubashov wrote, "I chose November for Azerbaijan, but looking though the photos, it became clear that the edition would look faded. The lack of photos of our army makes it difficult for us. We don"t have [General] Mehmandarov"s photo, or others. Other issues are teeming with war photos showing troubled times, but it is also way to show the military prowess and defensive capabilities of a country."

Taking this into account, Topchubashov decided to move the publication"s release from the month of November to January of the next year (1920) and wrote to Baku asking them urgently to send photographs of the Kura valley, Azerbaijani cotton fields, Besh-Barmag Mountain, Caspian coast, oil wells, Baku landscapes and cityscapes, and a map of Absheron. It was decided that the photo-collage would appear on the front and back cover of the journal. He likewise asked for photos having historical, political, economic, and cultural significance: of educational institutions in Baku and Ganja, ancient monuments in Azerbaijani villages, well-known Azerbaijani public, cultural, and military figures such as Samad Bey Mehmandarov, Ali Agha Shikhlinski, and Ibrahim Bey Usubov, the Azerbaijani military parade on the first anniversary of the liberation of Baku, as well as sessions of the parliament.

After the photographs had been gathered, L"image in its January 1920 issue published articles about Azerbaijani history, culture, government, and economy. The issue published most of the photographs sent from Baku. Soon thereafter, journals such as the Journal de Genève published in Geneva and Les Peuples Libres published in Lausanne featured articles about Azerbaijan by French author G. Brocher. The same articles were also translated and published in English. From Azerbaijan"s standpoint, the article published in the Journal de Genève titled "Le Droit d"Auto-Disposition et la Republique de l"Azerbaidjan du Caucase" was very significant.

The article began with U.S. President Wilson"s Fourteen Points, a nation"s right to self-determination, and Wilson"s emphasis of its importance. Every nation is physically, intellectually, morally, and religiously distinctive; each nation has the right to determine its fate; nations should possess the economic, natural, and financial resources to sustain themselves. Nations should be able to defend themselves from military aggression and colonization. Brocher noted the biased nature of some articles, asserting that most of the recognized independent states of Scandinavia, Western Europe, and Latin America shared the same origin, religious beliefs, and language. Their independence was universally recognized. Brocher noted that some nations, despite meeting the five conditions set by Wilson, experienced delays in the recognition of their independence. He went on to say, We see that Azerbaijan possesses all the requirements that are necessary for self-determination. I say this as an observer and a Frenchman who has visited and studied the entire Caucasus. I give voice to the protection of this nation whose right to self-determination until now has been denied and I deeply believe that their demands are fair. Brocher explained to the readers in Europe who were misinformed about Azerbaijan that due attention should be given to Azerbaijan as a country with the potential to contribute its natural resources, geography, and intellect to humanity. He wrote, "It is the central point of trade as it lies between Europe, Iran, and Central Asia. Religiously, although the Russian church oppressed the religious freedom of the Muslims, Azerbaijanis have shown tolerance of other religious faiths. "Brocher likewise addressed the public about their misguided sympathy toward Armenians owing to malicious disinformation published in several issues of journals in English and French. He added, "As a Protestant, I can say that foreign traders who are familiar with the Azerbaijanis" sense of morality place more confidence in them than in Armenians."

In another article, Brocher defended the possibility of Azerbaijan"s independence. He wrote in praise of the Azerbaijani army, with its 50,000 welltrained soldiers and demonstrated heroism in the Russian-German war, and which, under the leadership of its able commanders, was ready to defend its motherland from aggression. Brocher wrote that the Azerbaijani"s desire for freedom and independence should not be taken for granted. He related that no other people bore intense persecution and humiliation as the Azerbaijanis had. He mentioned how the publication of books and newspapers in their mother tongue was banned until 1906 and how numerous rights were curtailed because of the war in 1914. He also compared Azerbaijan with former Russian colonies such as Poland and Finland, whose independence had been recognized by the peace conference. Brocher wrote that Poland was promised independence by the German Kaiser and even fought against the Allied powers, while Azerbaijani volunteers who fought shoulder to shoulder with the Allies were not given due recognition. According to him, Poland had never suffered from Russian oppression as had Azerbaijan. Moreover, unlike the Azerbaijani language, Polish was part of the Slavic language group and was similar to Russian. In his article, Brocher came into a conclusion that "every people wishing for their independence has the right to be independent. Azerbaijan has already proven that it wants to be independent and is able to defend its independence, therefore an independent Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan should be given recognition by the peace conference."

On October 23, 1919, in an interview with the newspaper Corriere della Sera, an Italian businessman named Corsi who had visited Azerbaijan and Georgia talked about the struggle of the Republic of Azerbaijan for independence. He said that the independence of both republics should be recognized by the peace conference quickly-that both republics were deserving of recognition. Corsi was the first European to touch upon the sensitive matter of Turkey. He stated that "Azerbaijan"s alliance with Turkey should not be a hindrance to its recognition.

Although these people have the same language and ethnic origin, they should be approached as an individual nation." Corsi recalled politicians in Europe as saying that if it proved impossible to repel General Denikin"s attacks, those republics might enter into an alliance with the Bolsheviks against a common enemy. Europe should be able to gauge the horrible consequences that would ensue if Bolshevism were to triumph in the Caucasus. If Bolshevism were to prevail, the way to Turkey and Iran would be opened.

Apart from the propaganda work in the European media, Azerbaijani representatives in Versailles published an Information Newsletter about Azerbaijan in September for the participants of the Paris Peace Conference and the French, British, and American public as well other countries. These information newsletters consisted of eight pages of official documents, diplomatic writings and memos, a summary of the media materials in Western countries about the Republic, and chronicles of Azerbaijani political and economic life. The editor of this periodical was well-known French Orientalist and friend of the Azerbaijani people Lucien Bouvier. Four issues of the newsletter were published in 1919, and the remaining seven issues were published until April 1920.

The strengthening of the Bolshevik danger and Azerbaijan

The fate of the new republics established upon the ruins of the former Russian empire was first addressed by British Prime Minister David Lloyd George in his speech before Parliament on November 17, 1919. This speech reflected events taking place in Russia, particularly Kolchak"s defeat and Denikin"s retreat beginning in October 1919. Heavily funded, armed, and diplomatically protected by Britain and other Allies, Denikin"s volunteers surrendered Orel on October 20, Voronezh shortly after that, and Novokhopersk on November 12, 1919. By the end of 1919, it became clear that the White Guard"s aim to save Russia from Communist occupation was unattainable. Yudenich"s attempt to seize Petrograd failed, Kolchak was driven far into Siberia, and Denikin was retreating to the south and surrendering more and more cities. However, for Azerbaijan and Georgia, who had existed under the threat of being attacked by Denikin, the defeat of his armywas now posing a new more terrible threat. Tadeusz Swietochowski correctly notes that the republics of the South Caucasus did not rejoice at Denikin"s defeat, as he and his men were giving way to a much stronger enemy in the form of the exultant Bolsheviks.These complications did not mean that all of Azerbaijan and Georgia were waging a secret battle against Soviet Russia in an alliance with Denikin. Bolshevik leader Lenin"s inclusion of Azerbaijan and Georgia on a list of "fourteen different states" that launched a joint "attack" with Denikin against Soviet Russia had no basis.

The concern of Western countries, in particular Great Britain after Denikin"s defeat and, beginning in late 1919, Britain"s growing interest in the South Caucasus all stemmed from their fear of Bolshevism spreading to the Near and Middle East. Swietochowski was right in his assertion that if the Bolsheviks were allowed to cross the Caucasus mountains, there would be a realistic possibility of the revolution spreading to Persia, Turkey, and the rest of the Middle East. Prime Minister Lloyd George"s mention of both Azerbaijan and Georgia in his November 17 speech before the House of Commons was linked to that particular concern. In his speech, Lloyd George analyzed the situation in Russia and noted that the aims of the disparate people of Russia were still unclear. As for the Russians, he continued, they were a difficult nation. There was never a time when outside attempts to bring them to their senses had been successful. According to him, the Bolshevik machine was dragged forward by terror and pillage. Lloyd George saw the strength of Bolsheviks in the peasantry. He drew an analogy with the eighteenth-century French revolution where the Jacobins were able to unite the people under the slogan "The Revolution is in Danger," which meant that the lands granted to the peasants by the revolution were in danger. There was no doubt that, in the minds of Russian peasants, this was how the revolution was perceived. Lloyd George believed that anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia were numerous. Among those forces, he mentioned the Baltic countries, Finland, and Poland; Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia in the Caucasus; and Kolchak, Petlyura. And Denikin in Russia proper. At the same time, the British prime minister posed an interesting question: Why could they not unite? The canny politician offered a good answer: Because their fundamental interests differed from one another. According to him, the main goals of Kolchak and Denikin were, first, to overthrow the Bolsheviks and restore the old regime and, second, to preserve Russia"s territorial integrity. While the anti-Bolshevik movements agreed on the former, they were enemies with regard to the latter. He said, Estonians do not want an indivisible Russia, for Lithuanians it is poisonous; I am not certain about Ukrainians ... . If we look at the other states, Denikin says Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Russian Armenia are part of Russia. Uniting them with Russia is the cornerstone of his policy, whereas the new republics will not hear of this. They are fighting for independence ... . In uniting against Bolshevism, they are making it a condition for us to secure their independence, as well as to provide them with money and ammunition.

Lloyd George told the House of Commons that the main problem was in the varying interests of Russia"s anti-Bolshevik movements. On one hand, the White Guardists were fighting for the old, powerful, united and indivisible Russia, while on the other, anti-Bolshevik movements were defending their national independence. In his speech, Lloyd George implicitly advocated aiding the nation-states struggling for independence, specifically Azerbaijan and Georgia. British political circles and Lloyd George in particular had a change of opinion for the better about Azerbaijan, thanks to articles by Robert Scotland Liddell published in The Morning Post in September and in Tariq on November 11. In his first article, Liddell informed his British readers that their impressions of Azerbaijan were far from the truth. He considered Azerbaijan the first republic in the South Caucasus to be able to exist independently. With regard to the Armenians creating a stir over Garabagh in Great Britain and other countries,

Liddell believed that due to its geographic location, the Garabagh should belong to Azerbaijan. As for the Armenian-Azeri ethnic conflict in the South Caucasus, the British reporter wrote, Neither in Russia nor in the Caucasus is it possible to encounter a man who would have a good opinion of Armenians. Russians, Tatars [Azeris], and Georgians abhor them and do not to wish to have anything to do with them. Whether this is true or not, I cannot say, but it is obvious that Armenians have brought their neighbours" hate upon themselves. With this, their propaganda in the West is so powerful that Europe and the whole world are on their side. With respect to Azeris, Liddell wrote that in certain characteristics "Tatars are superior to Armenians." He believed if it were not for the Armenians" subversive activities, it would be possible for the two peoples to live side by side in peace.

Lloyd George"s November 17 speech to Parliament and his references to the "Russian question" two times in November as well as a letter sent to Topchubashov in mid-November by the chairman of the League of Nations Division for Colonial and Foreign affairs, Paul Bourdarie, caused a sensation in the European media. Specifically, the White émigré media in Paris received the news with hostility. In his letter to the chairman of the Azerbaijani Council of Ministers, Topchubashov wrote, British Prime Minister Lloyd George"s speech before the House of Commons on November 17 is now a fact. The head of the British government mentioned Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia twice as countries that are not willing to reunite with Russia. This speech caused great uproar and all-round interest. If November 17 were not a day off for publishers [i.e., a day when newspapers were not printed], some literature regarding that speech would be compiled by now ... . Russian elements, especially their left wing, are unhappy.

On November 29, a member of that same left wing, E. Staliski, commented extensively on Lloyd George"s speech in the weekly French-language newspaper for Russian émigrés, Pour la Russie. Staliski believed Britain"s attitude toward Russia was twofold. On the one hand, it defended the Russian generals that were fighting Bolshevism for the sake of a "united and indivisible Russia" while, on the other hand, it encouraged the newly formed states to fight for their independence. In the words of Lord Beaconsfield (i.e., former British prime minister Benjamin Disraeli), "a great and powerful Russia is a threat to Britain." With that quote, Lloyd George indirectly expressed his own opinion so that it would not cause anxiety among Paris-based Russian political circles. Staliski bitterly noted that Lloyd George did not wish to recall that international relations had drastically changed since the times of Beaconsfield. On the contrary, all of his arguments were meant to prove the impossibility of reuniting Russia with its seceded parts. Lloyd George"s recent speech leads us to believe that he leans toward calling for Russia"s disintegration. British politicians believed that in order to save Europe and Asia from the Bolshevik threat, it was necessary to localize Bolshevik Russia and to surround it by newly formed states subordinate to Britain. Thus, the Bolshevik threat would be significantly weakened. Pour la Russie wrote, "Localizing Bolshevism is an infantile dream. Surrounding it by small, weak, ill-organized states as a sanitary cordon would not be able to last long." This article demonstrated that Russian émigrés did not wish to let go of their old attitudes toward the peoples of Russia. According to them, a strong Russia could guarantee free development of the people in its "Eastern provinces." They even claimed that "Russian democracy would never think of uniting these people with Russia against their will." Rather, Staliski said, "these people would not survive without Russia."

"Russian democrats" who often appealed to the interests of the Russians of the former empire displayed a dismissive attitude toward the nations who had proclaimed their independence. This in turn caused a protest from representatives of the new states in Paris. As the Western countries" interest in the new republics began to grow, Russian politicians proposed to hold a gathering similar to the conference that had been planned to be held on Princes" Islands in January 1919. The latter was meant to bring together existing Russian political powers and representatives of the new republics. Despite the harsh realities of the beginning of 1919, the representatives of the new republics refused to participate in the Princes" Islands gathering. They once again rejected a proposal by the Russian émigrés to hold such a conference in late 1919. By the end of that year, the implementation of that plan was already impossible. The European media now openly defended the newly established states, in particular, the republics of the Caucasus. Topchubashov explained the positive change in the media and political opinion of Azerbaijan and Georgia thus: The defeat of Yudenich and Kolchak, Denikin"s hopeless state, the Allies" refusal to supply them with money, provisions, and weapons, Germany"s plans for warmer relations with Russia, the Baltic states" attempts to make peace with the Bolsheviks, the negative attitude of the majority of U.S. senators toward the peace conference and specifically, the Versailles Peace Treaty-in general, all these are inspiring and reassuring of positive developments for small nations. Given the situation, Lloyd George"s speech was not in vain.

There is no doubt that the favorable change in media and public opinion is related to the aforementioned events.

After a meeting with American Deputy Secretary of State Frank Polk in Paris at the end of November, Lloyd George"s attitude to the states formed from the former territories of Russia became clearer. During talks with Americans, Lloyd George openly stated that there was no need to help Kolchak and Denikin, that their defeat was fast approaching, and that the weapons and ammunition sent to them were falling into the Red Army"s hands. Lloyd George went on to inform Polk that a unified Bolshevik Russia would pose a considerable threat to Europe.

Therefore, he proposed that "Georgia, Azerbaijan, Bessarabia, the Ukraine, the Baltic provinces and Finland, and possibly even Siberia, should be independent."

On November 29, Polk informed Secretary of State Robert Lansing of this conversation. To clarify Great Britain"s attitude toward Azerbaijan and Georgia, in early December, the British Foreign Office through its High Commissioner for the South Caucasus, Oliver Wardrop, notified chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Nasib Usubbeyov that the British government would protect Azerbaijan"s independence and on the whole was sympathetic to the new republic.

At a meeting organized in London in December for the prime ministers of the Entente countries, issues around the South Caucasus were not discussed separately but within the context of the Russian question. The heads of the major states expressed their regret at the defeat of the Russian generals. They hesitated to accept Britain"s position but themselves had no clear plan for further action. They considered reconciling Denikin with Azerbaijan and Georgia and organizing a joint defence strategy for them. By doing this, they wanted to solidify defense strategies for anti-Bolshevik forces. To this end, they decided to delegate a British member of Parliament named Halford MacKinder to the Caucasus.21 However, MacKinder"s mission failed, as there were too many disagreements among the sides to be reconciled. Azerbaijan and Georgia vehemently refused to form a bloc with Denikin. Denikin, in turn, considered it unacceptable for these states to participate in the negotiations as independent countries.

Recognition of Azerbaijan`s independence

Oliver Wardrop

In early January of 1920, Britain"s High Commissioner for the South Caucasus, Oliver Wardrop, telegraphed the Allies and Britain almost every day. He informed them that Denikin"s army was retreating to the south chased by Bolshevik forces. Wardrop recommended immediate recognition of the South Caucasus republics as well as the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus in order to strengthen their position. He wrote that if Britain did not take active measures, the Caucasus republics would have to reach an agreement with the Bolsheviks.

On January 2, 1920, the RSFSR People"s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Georgy V. Chicherin, sent a note to the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia in which he called for entering into a military alliance against the Volunteer Army. However, this offer was not based on good intentions. The propagandistic aim behind it was to weaken the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia. The victory over the Volunteer Army and the overall success of the Soviet forces in the Russian civil war gradually strengthened Russia"s position. Military triumph, in turn, increased diplomatic pressure on neighboring states and created favorable conditions for Bolshevik propaganda. In Azerbaijan"s case, this pressure manifested itself in an exchange of diplomatic notes lasting from January to April 1920. Waging war on Denikin at the behest of Soviet Russia at the time of Armenia"s aggression against Azerbaijan could have led to terrible consequences, but Chicherin was demanding that the Azerbaijani government promptly enter the war. He wrote,

Due to the heroic efforts of Russian workers and peasants, the Red Army defeated Yudenich and Kolchak and is striking crushing blows to Denikin"s White Guard gangs that are chaotically retreating towards Rostov-on-Don. In

order to speed up the destruction of the White Guard armies in the Russian South and to strike a final blow to the counter-revolutionary monarchy, the RSFSR government is offering to start negotiations with Azerbaijan

for a military agreement. The Soviet government would like to stress that the southern counter-revolution is not considered to be the enemy of the Soviet republic alone but all the smaller peoples of the former Russian

empire as well. Denikin is the enemy not just of Russian, but of Georgian and Azerbaijani workers and peasants alike. We hope that the workers and peasants of Georgia and Azerbaijan recognize their enemy. We also hope that

they are looking forward to removing the White Guard shield between Soviet Russia and the Caucasus and to restoring ties between people who once lived within the same borders. At this point, it is necessary to hasten the thrust and to join the military strike of Russian workers and peasants coming from the north. We believe that is it not too late. We are addressing our call for a battle against Denikin to the Azerbaijani government and people. The real understanding of Azerbaijan"s interests and the socio-political benefits of its working class would compel Azerbaijan to accept our offer.

Upon receiving Chicherin"s note on January 6, Nasib Usubbeyov called an emergency meeting of the Azerbaijan State Defence Committee. At the gathering, he mentioned a proposal made by then-foreign minister of Azerbaijan, Fatali Khan Khoyski, at a meeting organized by Usubbeyov in December 1919. The proposal was to sign a military pact with Soviet Russia and Georgia. On January 6, Khoyski discussed Chicherin"s note and the Azerbaijani foreign ministry"s reply to Soviet Russia with a British representative in Baku, Colonel Claude Stokes. That evening, Stokes headed to the British High Commission in Tiflis. On January 7, in his telegram to the Azerbaijani representative in Tiflis, Fariz Bey Vakilov, the Azerbaijani foreign minister inquired about Georgia"s and the British High Commission"s take on Russia"s note. The telegram said,

Yesterday I received a telegram from Soviet Russia offering to start negotiations to sign a military pact against Denikin as did the Georgian government. Please meet with Gegechkori as soon as possible and find out the Georgian government"s opinion and further actions on the matter. Our government believes that with regard to this issue, the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia must act in a close alliance with each other. We currently consider it apt to agree to start negotiations in order to establish mutual relations between the Caucasus republics and Soviet Russia. Meet with Wardrop immediately and find out Britain"s attitude. Be sure to inquire how and in which ways Britain can assist us in the nearest future.

During Vakilov"s meeting with the Georgian foreign minister, Khoyski"s plan was approved. Negotiations aimed at establishing mutual relations with Soviet Russia were seen as possible. Concerning a war against Denikin, it was noted that it was unacceptable for Azerbaijan and Georgia to be drawn to the Russian civil war. During a meeting with Oliver Wardrop, the British High Commissioner talked about the Entente"s intention to recognize Azerbaijan"s and Georgia"s independence shortly and to assist these republics in their defense policy. At the same time, Wardrop submitted a detailed report to the British Foreign Office on the situation in the Caucasus after the note from Soviet Russia. On January 12, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Soviet Russia that the Georgian government was ready to start talks in order to establish peaceful relations. However, it would not intervene in the civil war, which was a Russian internal affair. Two days later, Azerbaijani foreign minister Khoyski said in his response to Chicherin that despite Denikin"s posing a long-term threat to Azerbaijan and the existence of a defense pact between Azerbaijan and Georgia against him, they considered the situation to be Russia"s internal affair; meanwhile, Azerbaijan was ready to start talks in order to establish peaceful relations with Soviet Russia. In his January 14 radiogram, Khoyski said,

In response to your January 2 radio telegram that I received on January 6, I am informing you as follows: In the course of historical events, the people of Azerbaijan have gained freedom and independence at the cost of enormous losses and difficulties. It founded a state based on democratic principles. Established on the basis of people"s self-determination, the Azerbaijan republic insists that every nation has the right to define its fate and existence. Following its self-determination, Azerbaijan has never allowed foreign interference in its affairs and adheres to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other nations. Proceeding from this inviolable principle, the government of Azerbaijan considers it unacceptable to interfere in the ways the people of Russia define their fate. As a neutral state, the Azerbaijan republic is determined to protect its freedom and independence from foreign aggression. For this reason the government of Azerbaijan has been battling the tsarist General Denikin who has encroached on the independence of Azerbaijani people. In order for the battle to be successful, Azerbaijan has established a defense alliance with the government of Georgia. This political programme is prioritized bythe government of Azerbaijan, and it stipulates peaceful relations between Azerbaijan and other nations. From this point of view, Azerbaijan respects the principles of independence of both states and expresses its readiness toestablish peaceful relations between the people of Russia and Azerbaijan.

It was obvious that the Azerbaijani side considered it necessary for Soviet Russia to formally recognize Azerbaijan"s independence. Only this step could guarantee protection of Azerbaijan"s national freedom. High Commissioner Oliver Wardrop was also notified of the content of the note sent to Chicherin. Azerbaijan"s point of view did not satisfy Soviet Russia. At the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Politburo congress on January 17-18, Khoyski"s response and the overall attitude to the government of Azerbaijan were discussed. After Chicherin"s report, at Lenin"s request, the congress made a decision in the spirit of intervention in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan. The decision stated, The People"s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs is advised to implement restraining and distrustful policies against the government of Azerbaijan, as it refused our offer to carry out joint operations against Denikin and serves the British forces that are fighting us in the Caspian Sea. While respecting the right of working masses of each nation to define its fate, the People"s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs must protest such behavior on the part of the Azerbaijani government.

In light of the Bolshevik threat, the situation in the Caucasus compelled the Entente to consider carefully and take concrete measures. Western political circles acknowledged that the Soviet army"s advance into the South Caucasus would help spread Bolshevik ideology to Iran and Turkey, causing upheaval in the entire Near and Middle East. Therefore, most European politicians believed that in order to oppose Bolshevik attacks, it was necessary to strengthen Azerbaijan and Georgia and to provide them with a means of defense. However, due to the newly formed principles of international relations, aiding unrecognized states could cause the aiding party serious liability issues. Conversely, in the harsh reality of the first days of 1920, the principle of "a united and indivisible Russia," which was an obstacle to the recognition of these republics, lost its purpose and had not justified the hopes of its advocates.

Given such a rapid development of events, the recognition of Azerbaijan"s and Georgia"s independence became an urgent matter. For this purpose, Great Britain suggested that the Paris Peace Conference Allied Powers Congress be called on January 10. British, French, and Italian heads of state, foreign ministers, American and Japanese delegates, and ambassadors to France participated in the congress. Issues around the South Caucasus were thoroughly discussed at the congress held at the Quai D"Orsay. The British prime minister addressed the situation. He expressed his concern with regard to the Bolsheviks moving along the Caspian shore. If they defeated Denikin and seized control over the Caspian Sea, it would be possible for the Turks to unite with them (here he meant the national movement headed by Mustafa Kemal that had emerged in Turkey). At that juncture, the Caucasus states would find themselves in a hopeless situation. Therefore, Lloyd George proposed feasible ways to supply these states with weapons and ammunition. Following his suggestion, the Allied powers requested that military experts propose ways of providing assistance to the South Caucasus republics. French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau agreed with Lloyd George"s suggestion and noted that the British delegates who had experience in Caucasian matters prepare a memorandum concerning aid to the republics. The congress called for an examination of possibilities for providing military aid to the Caucasus in the battle against Bolshevism. The experts were then to report to them along with the British delegates to the Allied powers.

In the afternoon, the Allied powers" congress continued without the presence of Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Nitti, being now conducted by the foreign ministers. On British foreign minister Lord Curzon"s initiative, they discussed the political side of the South Caucasus agenda. In his statement, Curzon informed his colleagues that Lloyd George planned to bring up the question of recognizing the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia before the Allied powers congress. He added that the Armenian question was to be resolved as part of the Turkish question. After a long discussion, the foreign ministers came to the conclusion that Azerbaijan and Georgia were facing a triple threat. First, Bolshevik Russian troops were moving into the south. Second, Denikin"s retreating army could make an incursion into these republics. Third, the Kemalists could invade these republics upon an agreement with Russia. Due to the critical nature of the situation, the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia had appealed to the Entente for help. After informing the audience about those requests, Curzon proposed to immediately recognize Azerbaijan and Georgia de facto. Mir Yagub Mehdiyev later wrote, describing the situation of the time, "The atmosphere of the conference at Versailles enabled the recognition of autonomous countries. A push toward it was all that was needed, and that push was made at the peace conference by British foreign minister Lord Curzon." According to Curzon, Britain had established closer ties with the South Caucasus republics as its troops were the first to enter the region after the Mondros armistice was signed. One day later, on January 11, 1920, the Allied powers at Curzon"s recommendation made a decision in substance that the Allied states recognize the Governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan as "de facto" governments. Thus, Azerbaijan"s independence was de facto recognized by the Paris Peace Conference on January 11, 1920. The representatives of the United States and Japan had agreed to consult such an important issue with their respective governments before making any statements. Shortly afterward, on February 7, Japan also concurred with the Allied powers" decision. The United States, however, officially refused to do so. This decision of the United States stemmed from various reasons. First, the American government was concerned with the growing British influence in the South Caucasus. Second, at the final stage of the peace conference, serious disagreements emerged between the United States and its European allies. On January 13, the American ambassador to France, Hugh Campbell Wallace, informed authorities in Washington that Great Britain and France had de facto recognized the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia and were considering providing the latter with military aid. At the same time, the Allied powers" decision was given to the French ambassador to the United States to inform the American government. The document stated that the Allies have recognized the independence of the neighbors of Russia, to list of which has just been added Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and that in the eventuality that the Bolsheviks would refuse to make peace with with these states and would attempt to infringe on the independence of the said communities by force, the Allies would accord these states the fullest support in their power. The Allied Governments are very desirous of knowing wether the Government of the United States is disposed to concur in this policy.

The Azerbaijani government was notified of the recognition of Azerbaijan"s independence by the Allied powers through Britain"s diplomatic representative in the Caucasus, Oliver Wardrop. In his January 12 telegram sent to Baku from Tiflis, he wrote, I have the honour to inform you that Lord Curzon authorises me to inform you, the Azerbaijan government, that he yesterday in Paris took the initiative in recommending immediate de facto recognition of the republics of Azerbaijan and Georgia. The Supreme Council of the Allies accepted this unanimously.

The Allies military assistance to Azerbaijan

On January 12, the Allies" Joint Military Committee submitted its recommendations to the Allied power delegates in Versailles. The document was signed by Marshal Ferdinand Foch, General Charles Sackville-West, and Ugo Cavallero. It stated that, if Bolshevism cannot be stemmed, it will be able to spread to dangerous regions such as the Caucasus. Therefore it is important to review once again the possibilities of creating obstacles to prevent its spread to these regions. Taking into consideration the lack of stability in the local governments and the unfitness of their military units, these obstacles should first be created by European armies. This task can be undertaken by two well-equipped divisions. In time, as local military forces will have undergone training and can then be harnessed to these operations, the number of the European troops in the Caucasus could be reduced. "Beyond financial and material provision, this organization of the defensive barrier of the Caucasus would require time (a minimum of three months should be allowed). It would be advisable, therefore, to under take it without delay." The experts believed that until a defense barrier could be set up, the plan to provide the Caucasus with military supplies should be fulfilled under certain conditions and that the Allied fleet in the Caspian Sea should control the situation.

According to experts, if the Allied states agreed with the foregoing suggestions, it would be possible to explore ways of assisting the Caucasus states. On the same day, British delegates prepared a similar document. They believed the Bolsheviks had failed to fulfill their dream of destroying Europe. Therefore, they had started talks with Muslims and began moving eastward. Denikin"s inevitable defeat would form a dangerous corridor in the South Caucasus, which the Allies were trying to save from both ends. It was now necessary to prevent the two forces (Bolshevik Russia and Kemalist Turkey) from uniting. The British believed an attack on Georgia would lead to negative consequences for the Allies. If Georgians could enjoy assistance from the Allies, they could secure their borders. The document suggested that political, military, financial, and logistical aid to Georgia and Azerbaijan was important.

After the Versailles decision of the Allied powers, on January 15, the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegates were invited to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ali Mardan Topchubashov and Mahammad Maharramov and the Georgian representatives Irakli Tsereteli and Zurab Avalov were greeted by the secretary general of the ministry, Jules Cambon, British delegate Philip Kerr, and Italian delegate Marquis della Torretta. Cambon presented the official decision of the Paris Peace Conference participants to recognize Azerbaijan"s de facto independence, to Topchubashov. He congratulated the delegates, saying that as recognized states, Azerbaijan and Georgia would be able to address important matters to the peace conference from now on. Mehdiyev wrote in this regard, Monsieur Cambon stated that Azerbaijan and Georgia had been recognized as independent states in accordance with international legal norms. These two states had now been empowered to engage in direct relations with the Allied powers, addressing their needs and demanding their legal rights and equal membership at congresses. In addition, Cambon informed them that recognition of these countries" governments should simultaneously be accompanied with the recognition of their secession from Russia. It could be concluded that from that point on, Azerbaijan and Georgia would be considered sovereign states.

Afterward, when Cambon asked the delegates "to address any concerns," Topchubashov on behalf of Azerbaijan presented basic facts about the state system of his country, expressed his gratitude for its recognition, and noted that Azerbaijan was expecting aid and the de jure recognition of its independence from the major states. After the information about the Allied powers" decision spread, the Azerbaijani representatives began receiving congratulatory telegrams from many diplomatic missions, societies, and unions. Congratulatory telegrams were received from representatives of Georgia, Estonia, Iran, India, and other states; the Ukrainian bureau in Lausanne; the Franco-Caucasus Committee; from Mr. Pittard, the chairman of the Geneva-based league of states that had seceded from the Russian empire; and others.

On January 15, in the afternoon, the military experts in Versailles discussed the issue of military assistance to Azerbaijan and Georgia. To participate in the discussion of this matter, Britain"s War Secretary Winston Churchill, chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal Henry Wilson, First Lord Walter Long, First Sea Lord David Beatty, and others arrived in Paris. The military expert congress and the invitation of high-ranking British military staff to Paris began to spark rumors. French radio reported that 10,000 British troops were on their way to Baku. According to the report, Lloyd George had allegedly asked Clemenceau to increase French military presence in Germany so that the German-based British troops could be relocated to Baku. However, all these were merely rumors. By the time of the April events, no British troops or even British military advisors had been sent either to Baku or Tiflis.

The congress of military experts continued on until January 16 with Clemenceau acting as chairman. He asked Cambon, who had met with the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegates the previous day, to report on the current situation in the South Caucasus. Cambon informed the participants about the republics" urgent financial, military, and other needs and their fitness for self-defense. He noted that the representatives of both republics had asked for political, military, and financial assistance. Initially, they feared Denikin, but the Volunteer Army had now weakened. From his previous talks with the representatives, Philip Kerr had determined that Georgia was ready to mobilize 50,000 men and Azerbaijan was ready to mobilize 100,000 men. This information, in turn, was presented to Clemenceau. However, neither Cambon"s nor Kerr"s report satisfied Clemenceau; he doubted the numbers. In Lloyd George"s view, however, the republics had well-trained combat-ready units, mainly consisting of Tatars (i.e., Azeri Turks). Cambon added that both armies had been established on the basis of the old tsarist army and the national guard. Each republic possessed enough soldiers to defend the front line; only weapons and ammunition were in short supply. The republics addressed this particular issue to the Allies. Cambon also noted that the Azerbaijani and Georgian representatives wanted the independence of the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus to be de facto recognized as well. In particular, the Azerbaijanis believed that if the Bolsheviks pursued Denikin, the Volunteer Army might retreat to Derbent, which would place Baku under the threat of occupation. The occupation of Baku, in turn, would place the entire Caspian basin in danger. Lloyd George thought recognition of the Daghestan would be a clever move, one that Muslims would regard positively. He also noted that, although the Allies possessed enough weapons and provisions, the problem was to deliver them to the region. Clemenceau said that most of the weapons sent to Denikin had fallen into the hands of Bolsheviks. After long discussions, it was finally decided that Field Marshal Henry Wilson would continue discussions the next day in the presence of the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegates.

On January 17, a joint meeting was held at the Claridge Hotel where Azerbaijani representatives were staying. The meeting was chaired by Field Marshal Wilson and involved Admiral Beatty, a representative of the British Foreign Office named Robert Vansittart, and the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegates. The main goal of the meeting was to clarify what specific material aid could be rendered to Azerbaijan and Georgia in case of a Bolshevik incursion. The issue of sending Allied troops to the Caucasus was not discussed; the participants touched only upon the issue of military and logistical assistance. When Admiral Beatty asked whether Azerbaijan could defend its portion of the Caspian shore single-handedly, Topchubashov replied in the negative.

On January 19, 1920, at the Paris Peace Conference, the Allied powers discussed the issues surrounding the South Caucasus in detail. The meeting was attended by heads of state. By that time, the Azerbaijani delegation was represented at the Paris Peace Conference in a body. The gathering was attended by prominent figures including Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Nitti, Cambon, Mazzi, Curzon, Churchill, Foch, Beatty, Wilson, and others. Marshal Foch presented the report by the military expert group. The longest debate arose around the issue of transporting aid. Foch, who headed the group, considered it essential to send several military divisions to the South Caucasus.

Field Marshal Wilson supported Foch by adding that if Britain did not show initiative in controlling the Caspian Sea, it would be impossible to save the South Caucasus. Defense Secretary Churchill agreed with Wilson and stated that if Britain failed to control the Caspian, all the weapons shipped to the Transcaucasia would be lost to the Bolsheviks. Lloyd George vehemently protested the military experts" proposal on the grounds that they had not taken politics into consideration. He asked Marshal Foch, if the South Caucasus cannot be saved without sending troops there, and if the aid sent there will be lost, then it would be logical to deny any assistance. "We have already been asked to send materials to those tribesmen. I want to know if that is militarily expedient." Foch was right in believing that the Caucasus could be saved from Bolshevik aggression by admitting troops. The military experts saw the solution in sending troops to the region, while Lloyd George and his following insisted on providing the republics only with weapons and ammunition, and he wanted to clarify whether the republics could make rational use of this assistance or would lose it to the Bolsheviks as had Denikin. The chairman of the conference, Georges Clemenceau, addressed the following questions to the military experts: what forces directly threatened these countries and, regarding Lloyd George"s comment, would the assistance provided by the Allies be used efficiently? Lord Curzon informed him that he had talked with representatives of the Caucasus republics who were currently in the waiting room. They were extremely concerned about a Bolshevik attack. They were certain that if weapons and ammunition were delivered on time, the threat could be alleviated. Otherwise, the fall of their governments would be inevitable. Lord Curzon said a decision could not be made without consulting them. Clemenceau agreed with this idea and decided that the Azerbaijani and Georgian representatives should be heard. After delegates from the Caucasus joined the gathering, Clemenceau said to them, Gentlemen, the conference has been discussing the urgency of sending to Georgia, Daghestan and Azerbaijan, food, arms and ammunition. We are told that you can give us information about an intended Bolshevik attack upon your people and of the means at your disposal for defence. We wish to know if at this juncture you would be in a position to exploit the help that we might be able to send you. We are quite disposed to do something effective, but we want to know the present states of your countries and whether such aid would be effectively used against Bolsheviks, or whether it is more likely to happen, as it did with Denikin, that the Bolsheviks would be strong enough simply to capture from you the materiel sent and thus to make matters worse. As appointed representative, Irakli Tsereteli spoke on behalf of both delegations. He noted that Georgia and Azerbaijan were in serious need of the Allies" help. Tsereteli said, We are equally likely to be attacked by the Bolsheviks, but we do not know whether we shall be or not. Were we helped by the Entente, the Bolshevik might hesitate to attack us. In any case, we need the material assistance of the Great Powers if we are to defend ourselves. To Clemenceau"s question "I am to understand that you are asking us to send troops also?" Tsereteli replied that this would be the best kind of aid, Bolsheviks would attack the Caucasus sooner or later. He noted, The state of mind of our people is such that, should the Bolsheviks attack, and if at the same time we received the material support of the Entente, we hope to defeat every attack. But such material aid is necessary immediately...When Denikin was in our land, our despairing peoples fought his troops by every means in their power, and a current of sympathy with the Bolsheviks appeared. To-day, our people see their independence recognized and we are convinced that all the forces of the Highlanders will be used to resist a Bolshevik invasion and to defend our independence. It is under those circumstances that we build so much hope upon receiving help from the Supreme Council. We do not wish war: we are even ready to come to an agreement if that were possible with the Bolsheviks, but only upon the condition that they also recognize our independence. Georges Clemenceau asked Tsereteli: "You would really sign an agreement with the Bolsheviks?" Tsereteli replied: Yes, on condition that they pledged themselves not to invade our country and that they did not try to introduce propaganda among our people. But I must repeat, if we were strong, and the Entente were to help us, Bolsheviks would be obliged to recognize our independence and give up their attempts. To Lloyd George"s question, "How many men can Azerbaijan put into the field?" Mahammad Maharramov, an advisor to the Azerbaijani delegates, informed him that, if weapons and ammunition were shipped, Azerbaijan would be able to mobilize 100,000 men. To Lloyd George"s question, "Have you the troops at the moment?" Maharramov replied: "We have a little army, in the command of a native Azerbaijani general, about a 50,000 strong, perhaps more, disciplined; but there are only from 10,000 to 12,000 of these men with arms." When Lloyd George asked Tsereteli the same question, Tsereteli said his country possessed 15,000 well-trained troops divided into sixteen battalions. If they were provided with equipment, they could mobilize 50,000 people in 2 weeks. Lord Curzon from the floor addressed a question to the Azerbaijani representatives: "Reports that I have received say that a certain number of officers in Azerbaijan are Turkish officers. Does the presence of these Turkish officers in the army leave us the guarantees necessary in a fight against the Bolsheviks?" Maharramov said, to fight the Russian occupation of Azerbaijan, the population had asked Turkey for help. At the time, the Turkish army had liberated the Caucasus. A certain number of its officers were in fact former residents of Azerbaijan and Dagestan. After the Turks left the Caucasus, there had been no more than fifty Turkish officers remaining in Azerbaijan. They were originally from the region, and the Azerbaijanis were certain they would fight the Bolsheviks for freedom along with the entire nation. Topchubashov, who also spoke at the conference, noted that Azerbaijan had no foul intentions with regard to the Bolsheviks or Denikin. It did not intend to intervene in Russia"s internal affairs. However, in order to defend itself from the two threats, it was ready to use all means possible, most important, through efficient use of the aid provided by the Allies. According to Topchubashov, the British fleet at Enzeli could provide enormous help by protecting Baku. He also urged the Allies to recognize the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus, which could serve as a buffer zone between the army advancing from the north and the South Caucasus republics. After Topchubashov"s speech, Lloyd George inquired about the reasons for Denikin"s potential attack on Dagestan. Tsereteli said that Denikin viewed Dagestan and the South Caucasus alike as provinces of Russia. Nitti wanted to know whether the recognition of the Caucasus states could create an atmosphere of resistance against the Bolsheviks. Tsereteli gave an affirmative answer and added that if the recognition became de jure, the strength of the resistance would significantly increase. Maharramov joined the discussion by stating that Azerbaijan was against the dividing of Denikin"s fleet. In light of Denikin"s failure, there had been a positive shift toward Bolshevism observed among the sailors. They were likely to side with the Bolsheviks, creating a threat to Baku and the entire South Caucasus. Lloyd George wondered whether Baku could be defended upon the arrival of weapons from Europe and how many soldiers could be mobilized for that purpose. Maharramov said that Baku already possessed a strong garrison. When Clemenceau wanted to clarify the size of the garrison, Maharramov mentioned the number 7,000. The remainder of the discussion continued without the participation of the Caucasus representatives. At this stage of the conference, Churchill asked Foch if the Caucasus defense was to be viewed as an independent matter or as part of the general matter of anti-Bolshevik defense. Marshal Foch said he viewed it as the latter. When Churchill asked whether Denikin or the Bolsheviks constituted a worse threat to the Caucasus, Ferdinand Foch stressed that the Bolsheviks were more threatening.

He added that first and foremost, the Bolshevik advance into the south should be prevented and the newly established states should be strengthened. He suggested the creation of a union of East European and South Caucasus states aimed at resisting Bolshevism. After Marshal Foch"s remark, the discussions continued without the participation of the military experts.

This meeting was the final one not just of the Paris Peace Conference but of the political career of France"s Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau. When Clemenceau died in 1929, Topchubashov as the head of the Azerbaijani delegation at the peace conference expressed his deep condolences to the French government. He emphasized Clemenceau"s important role and services in the recognition of Azerbaijan"s independence. In his statement, he wrote, "The death of one of France"s greatest political leaders Georges Clemenceau deeply saddened us. We Azerbaijanis will always remember that the independence of Azerbaijan was recognized under Clemenceau"s chairmanship."