Has Tripoli become the second Idlib?

Why did President Erdogan give messages on Iraq instead of Syria and Libya at the opening of the “TurkStream” on January 8? Did the request (perhaps a demand) come from Vladimir Putin, or was Iraq even more important at that time in the chain of stunning processes in the region?

Both were possible. Putin arrived in Ankara from Damascus, in addition to the general situation of the country, Vladimir Putin received special briefing from Bashar al-Assad about the situation in Idlib, which is the major subject of disagreement between Ankara and Moscow, and, as expected, the main theme of the one-on-one meetings (this is the second case since the meeting in St. Petersburg on August 9, 2016: Erdogan and Putin met twice a day on the same issue) in Istanbul was Idlib and Libya.

The more serious tensions that emerged between Tehran and Washington in Iraq after the assassination of Qasim Suleiman, of course, worried both Erdogan and Putin.

What happened to the problem of cleansing Idlib from radical forces? No different information was leaked to the media in this regard, but in the case of Libya, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said, “We are ready to do our best to have a ceasefire there and we expect Russia to do the same” and the ceasefire came into force at midnight on January 12.

That is, an agreement was reached not to fire between Fayez al-Sarraj’s forces, which President Erdoğan describes as “legal” and is actually recognized by the UN and which controls 8% of the country’s lands, including the capital Tripoli and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces, which controls 76% of the country’s lands.

Recall that although superior side in every aspect, which was supported by Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, rejected the ceasefire hours ago, Haftar, who was graduated from the USSR Frunze Military Academy in 1967, has agreed to the ceasefire “out of respect for Moscow”, fulfilling the need for military diplomacy. In other words, these maneuvers actually strengthened Russia’s position too.

Under the circumstances, while the ratio of forces was so abnormal against Tripoli, why Ankara has insisted on a ceasefire: Does it not know that only one serious violation of the ceasefire will also bring the end of the government in Tripoli? From a political standpoint, Haftar’s position is similar to Khomeini’s situation in Iran in early 1979: When Reza Shah Pahlavi, who lost his support in the community and especially in the army and trapped in Tehran, wanted to send his last prime minister Shahpur Bakhtiar to peace talks with Khomeini, Ayatollah, who tied his waist from the West first and then from inside with the support of the West, had rejected the offer without hesitation.

In fact, there is no need to be a soothsayer to see that Haftar’s acceptance of the ceasefire is a formal one. So, what Ankara, which defends Tripoli (with the massive support of Qatar), is trying to achieve? President Erdogan, along with his country’s historic right to Libya, is no longer hiding their intention to go there for oil. Although it is known that both are romantic dreams in the current situation, Let’s also pray for its realization by keeping up with the fashion in Turkey. From the current pragmatic point of view of Ankara, as in Idlib, we see that the "religious brotherhood" in Tripoli is at the forefront of military-strategic interests.

In other words, Ankara says idiomatically: Even if it was in a tight corner in Idlib, so far, with the approval of Vladimir Putin, we have managed to continue the Islamist government there, why not do the same in Tripoli? There can also be a ceasefire, Haftar controls 76%, and Fayez al- Sarraj controls 8%, and as well as in Idlib, we can find solace in the fact that there is a power of “Muslim Brotherhood”, which we support, at the second point. In this way, we can also infuriate neighboring Egypt, which is the place where the “Muslim Brotherhood” was the most powerful and toppled by a military coup. The second concrete example of the foreign-military policy pursued by Turkey in the region and protecting Idlib since the “Astana Process”, which has begun in January 2017, is Tripoli.

Well, why does Turkey need these “islands”, which are now being created in both countries with the request of Ankara and the permission of Russia? How long will it be possible to keep them on their feet? In return, for example, what kind of benefits will Russia be given later? Will Turkey regret due to the loss of somethings in the case of the removal of these “islands”? Or will the support given to radical religious groups at some point in history be the biggest consolation of today’s government?