Iran-Azerbaijan: 28 years later

On October 6, the adviser on international affairs of the Spiritual Leader of Iran and ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Akbar Velayati declared the inadmissibility of the occupation of the territory of one country by another. “Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent regions of the Azerbaijan Republic are occupied. The UN has adopted four resolutions on this issue. All of them demand from Armenia to leave the occupied lands, to return to international borders,” he said.

It is not known whether this statement was made after a telephone conversation between the presidents of Iran and Azerbaijan, which also dates October 6. According to official information, President Aliyev informed his colleague Hassan Rouhani that part of the Azerbaijani-Iranian border had been taken under control and Azerbaijani border troops would be deployed here. Can this be regarded that Aliyev promised not to deploy the army and any forces of third countries on the border, and not to create inconveniences for Iran. If so, then in this case, Velayati's statement fits into the doctrine of Iran's interests, which does not allow the use of Azerbaijani territory by Tehran's opponents. Later, the head of the Iranian presidential administration, Mahmoud Vaezi, said, "Iran is ready to play a more active role in resolving the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and welcomes Baku's proposal for a more active role for Iran, Russia and Turkey in resolving the conflict."

Aliyev's actual assurance contains the idea of ​​creating a security system in the South Caucasus with the participation and combination of interests of regional powers that have historically competed in the region for a sphere of influence. This can be viewed as a system of stability based on balancing the interests of regional powers.

After the collapse of the USSR, when the Karabakh conflict had already flared up with might and main, Iran repeatedly tried to act as a mediator for a peaceful settlement of the problem. However, all these attempts at Iranian penetration were unsuccessful. The same Vilayati, who had experience in resolving the Iranian-Iraqi conflict, arrived in Baku on February 25, 1992 as the Iranian Foreign Minister with the aim of mediating between Azerbaijanis and Armenians. However, his mission, agreed with both sides, was thwarted when, on the night of February 26, Armenian troops, supported by the 366 Russian regiment, attacked the Azerbaijani city of Khojaly, staging a massacre of civilians.

Throughout the entire Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, Iran held a diplomatic position. Iran recognized the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, at the same time cooperated with both sides.  Under the conditions of the trilateral blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, it remained the main transport corridor for this country. Now, when Iran took the side of Azerbaijan, Armenia found itself in a complete land blockade and unfriendly encirclement with all its border neighbors: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Iran.

True, the official representative of the Iranian Foreign Ministry Sayeed Khatibzade said on September 29 that the transshipment of goods, with the exception of the military, from Iran to Armenia continues. However, it is no secret that against the background of the growing solidarity with Azerbaijan of the Azerbaijanis of Iran, who constitute an ethnic parity with the Persians (30 million each), and who occupy a serious position in the management of the Iranian state machine, the gates for Armenia may be completely closed. The latest facts of blocking transport from Iran to Armenia by Iranian Azerbaijanis give grounds for such conclusions.

Karen Shakhnazarov, an Armenian-Russian filmmaker, an active participant in political talk shows on Russian TV, noted that the change in Iran's vector in the Karabakh issue creates a dangerous situation for Armenia. He literally noted that today it is not the fate of Karabakh that is at stake, but Armenia, and the Armenians in this country need to realize this and reconsider their relations with neighbors, since in the future, if the current policy continues, Armenia may cease to exist.

It is unlikely that Iran can be admitted to the peace process as a mediator. For all its glorious relations with Armenia, the latter was never interested in changing the format of the OSCE Minsk Group, however, like Azerbaijan until recently.

True, Moscow is conducting a dialogue with Iran, and quite constructively, on the disputed status of the Caspian Sea with the participation of other coastal countries - Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan. Although the dialogue directly concerns the water basin that surrounds these five countries, it has shown the ability and willingness to negotiate amicably. It should be taken into account that Russia has important interests in the Iranian direction, including the North-South transport corridor, as well as trade and promising projects in Iran in the sphere of energy, chemistry, nuclear project, etc.

Two aspects link the region and the interests of Iran and Russia. First, the South Caucasus until the beginning of the 19th century, although nominally, was part of the Persian Empire and was seized by Russia after two wars. Before the fall of the Soviet Iron Curtain, Iranian influence in the region was meager. Then it began to intensify because of the resulting gap and the methodical return of Iran, like Turkey, to the South Caucasus, and today we can talk about the growing Iranian-Turkish influence and the weakening presence of Russia. This can also serve as an impetus for a revision of the Kremlin's view of the Karabakh conflict in the legitimate interests of Azerbaijan, which, as in the 19th century, remains a central battleground for the influence of regional powers in the South Caucasus.

The second aspect is the growing national consciousness and self-identity of the southern Azerbaijanis of Iran, their craving for unity with the northern Azerbaijanis (Azerbaijan Republic), who have their own national (ethnic) statehood. Iranian Azerbaijanis, who call themselves Turks, are integrated into the Iranian state and consider themselves carriers of both Persian and Turkic (Azerbaijani) culture, as well as creators and keepers of Shiite Iran over the past 500 years (from the 15th century to the beginning of the 20th century, all the rulers Iran were Azerbaijanis). However, it should be noted that after the collapse of the USSR, the opening of state borders, the simplified movement of Iran-Azerbaijan-Turkey, the formation of a single language information space through satellite broadcasting from the late 80s with Turkey and early 2000s with Azerbaijan, significantly influenced the self-awareness and their self-identification. We are witnessing the formation of a single information-political-economic Turkic space in the region, covering three countries with a Turkic population of more than 100 million people, who actually speak the same language.

For centuries, Iran has been worried about the violation of the integrity of the state due to the presence of large center forming. But competing Turkic and Persian ethnic groups and less significant in number and influence Arab, Kurdish communities, the unity of which has so far been managed to ensure under the unifying religious ideology of Shiism, where nationality and ethnicity retreated to second plan. Today, when secular views on the future development of the country are gaining momentum in Iran (and this is the desire for democracy, national and cultural equality), for him allied relations with the border Turkic countries - Turkey and Azerbaijan, become an important factor in ensuring the stability and integrity of the state.

This process is closely monitored by Russia, and its balanced relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan that have been building over the past 10 years are dictated by the growing influence and regional integration of these two Turkic states.

If to look at the new situation through the prism of Shankhnazarov's reconsidered view, the problem for the region today is not the self-determination of Karabakh, but the political self-determination of Armenia. The historical Armenian policy of tension with all its neighbors becomes an obstacle not only for the neighboring countries, but also for such an imperial player as Russia. Russia does not want to lose its positions in the region of Western Asia, including the South Caucasus, in favor of an amorphous and conflict outpost represented by Armenia, which was created in the 19th century, has lost its geopolitical significance today.