The official version of the attempt on the head of the executive power of Ganja, Elmar Veliyev, has been formed - it was committed by Islamic Shiite radicals. It was formulated 3 days after a public and official discourse about the reasons and motivations that prompted the native of Ganja, Yunis Safarov, to try to assassinate Veliyev on July 3.
In the first hours after the incident, when Safarov wounded the guard and paralyzed Veliyev by hitting the handle of the pistol in his head, the public and official opinion was already dispersed in the interpretation of the event.
Social networks were happy with the event, insulted to Veliyev, and raised Safarov on the pedestal of the national avenger. Foreign diplomatic missions this track the non-ordinary case for Azerbaijan were shocked by the high emotional-aggressive reactions of society, with the understanding the signals about the illegal actions of the head of Ganja. It should be noted that such a reaction is peculiar not only for the Ganja community, but for the entire socially active population of Azerbaijan.
The authorities operatively, in the mouth of the presidential assistant Ali Hasanov, put forward a criminal version of what happened. It was counter to the public assessment and lasted only a couple of days and was re-qualified, apparently under the pressure of public opinion, which is convinced that Veliyev was punished for his long-term arbitrariness and unethical behavior as the Chief Executive of the city of Ganja. This public understanding of the process, which has not changed yet, in the understanding of the authorities, is projected onto the whole regime, as the facts of violation of the rights of citizens, arrogant and pejorative attitude towards them by officials is observed in various regions and corners of Azerbaijan. This was repeatedly noted publicly by the president, urging officials to respect the rights and feelings of citizens. Probably, many such officials have seen themselves in the place of Veliyev.
In the following days, the interpretations of the fact of the attempt were even more divided. The society keeps to its opinion, but the authorities still try to impose the trace of Islamic terrorism. Initially, this act was presented as a terrorist act of a single Shiite-radical. There was unconfirmed information that Safarov got religious education in the smithy forge of Shiite cadres in Iran's Guma, and then participated in the LIH in Syria. This version was not accepted by the community monitoring the process, as it was not confirmed by convincing evidence. In operative order, the version of the lone terrorist transformed into a conspiracy by a group of radical Shiites, who intended to bring discord and seize power in the country. But this was not enough. On July 10, no more than a couple of hundred people went to the central Ganja square in order to start riots and violate the existing public idyll. Two senior police officers who tried to negotiate with the assembled people, were killed with a knife. Two persons were suspected of killing officers: one of them, Rashad Beyukishiyev, with a criminal record, formerly convicted for robbery and murder. It is difficult to call them Shiite radicals, as well as many of the participants in the event on the central square in Ganja. This is confirmed by the fact that officers who went to the square without adequate power support, which is mandatory for such actions, knew the contingent who tried they tried to calm down. The police, by virtue of their official duties, fights and controls criminals. And apparently the officers were sure that the criminal contingent would not cross the line. But two of the crowd crossed it. One of them was soon found and arrested, the second, Beyukishiyev, was killed when an attempted armed resistance to the police. The murdered (the main alleged killer) could shed light on what happened on July 10 and the threads leading to the square, but the ends were torn off, and it gives some opportunity for further advance and develop the version of the Shiite conspiracy in the Shiite country. It sounds strange, does not it?
Also, strangely enough, Shiite Iran is silent about the accusations in the Azerbaijani media about involvement in the Ganja events, and does not refute the official version that Safarov was trained in Guma, although the fact of training was not confirmed.
We cannot affirm, but we can hypothetically say that the topic of Iranian involvement could be in the spotlight during the meeting of President Ilham Aliyev with Iran's health minister Hasan Gazizadeh Hashemi in Baku on July 13. From the meeting of the two persons it is evident that the parties did not communicate long, and perhaps Aliyev received assurances about Iran's non-involvement in the assassination and its consequences, as his entourage is trying to present it.
While it is difficult to say whether the Shiite trail will receive the same amplitude of development as the Nardaran case, which culminated in the arrest of hundreds of residents of the Baku village of Nardaran in 2015, and the introduction of an unspecified state of emergency on its territory. But one thing is clear, neither the Azerbaijani public opinion, nor the foreign expert assessment perceive the official Shiite interpretation of the events of July 3 and 10. Then the question arises: What are the goals of the supporters of the version of the Shiite conspiracy against Elmar Veliyev, whom they represent as a benefactor of the residents of Ganja and the president's support in the fight against radicalism in the western region of Azerbaijan, with its public and expert rejection?
Leave a review