The Situation Around Iran Continues to Escalate

Following President Trump’s statement that the military operation against Iran could last four to five weeks, it became clear that Washington is unlikely to achieve its desired results in the near term.

In turn, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that the most powerful strikes against Iran are still ahead, without disclosing details of the American military command’s plans.

On Monday evening, Israel continued its series of missile strikes on Tehran. The headquarters of Iran’s state television was destroyed, and the building of the Expediency Discernment Council was damaged. In Beirut, the headquarters of Hezbollah, around 50 weapons depots, and the building of the Al-Noor TV channel were destroyed.

So far, coalition strikes have not resulted in the complete destruction of missile bases and launch systems. Iranian missiles and drones continue to target U.S. military facilities in Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar, as well as the U.S. embassy in Riyadh. A British military base in Larnaca (Cyprus) was also attacked by drones.

Persian Gulf countries report that their air defense missile stocks are being depleted while intercepting Iranian attacks. Moreover, a lack of coordination among allies has become evident: Kuwait’s air defenses shot down three American F-15 fighter jets.

Tasks Facing the U.S. Military

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) reported the destruction of Iranian warships in the Gulf of Oman by a task force led by the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln.

However, the situation in the Strait of Hormuz remains extremely tense. A representative of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated that the strait has been closed and that Tehran will fire on any vessels attempting to pass through it. At the same time, Fox News, citing military sources, claims that the strait remains open and that no mines have been laid.

Approximately a quarter of global oil trade and a significant share of Qatar’s liquefied natural gas exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Any threat to navigation automatically increases the risk premium in oil prices, raises insurance costs for tankers and heightens volatility on energy markets.

Even a partial restriction of shipping would trigger a price spike, creating additional inflationary pressure in Europe and Asia. For Persian Gulf states, this represents not only military risks but also threats to energy infrastructure, export terminals and ports.

In the short term, the United States could benefit from higher oil prices as a major producer. However, global instability would weigh on financial markets and increase pressure on the federal budget due to rising military expenditures.

For China, the world’s largest oil importer, a blockade of Hormuz would pose a strategic challenge. This could push Beijing toward a more active diplomatic—or even naval—role in the region.

Military experts believe Iran will inevitably attempt to use the strait as a lever of pressure. Control of the coastline, anti-ship missiles, drones, fast attack boats and the capability to lay naval mines make the waterway highly vulnerable. Its narrow width (33–39 kilometers) turns any vessel into a potential target.

Under such conditions, the United States would have to conduct a separate military operation involving mine clearance and the destruction of coastal missile systems under air cover. Such an operation cannot be short-term, especially given the presence of six Iranian naval bases in the region—Bandar Abbas (the main base), Bushehr, Khorramshahr, Chabahar, Bandar-e Lengeh and Jask.

Iran possesses more than 20 small and medium-class submarines, three destroyers, seven corvettes, more than ten amphibious ships and dozens of small combat boats. Without neutralizing this fleet, control over the Strait of Hormuz is impossible. This would require a separate large-scale operation.

According to Western analysts, the defeat of Iranian forces in the Hormuz area could become a turning point not only militarily but politically as well.

The Situation Inside Iran

Tehran shows no signs of readiness for compromise. The IRGC and the political leadership declare their intention to continue resisting.

Ali Larijani—considered a potential successor to Ayatollah Khamenei—has effectively become a central figure, sidelining the government led by President Pezeshkian with the backing of the IRGC command.

External military pressure traditionally consolidates Iranian society around the authorities, even if serious dissatisfaction with the economic situation persists domestically. High inflation, unemployment, currency restrictions and sanctions have generated social tension for years.

However, in the context of direct conflict, protest activity usually declines. National solidarity begins to outweigh social grievances, strengthening the position of security institutions and the IRGC.

At the same time, questions remain regarding the behavior of national minorities—Kurds, Baloch, Arabs of Khuzestan and Iranian Azerbaijanis. In the event of a prolonged war, economic exhaustion could provoke localized instability, particularly in border regions.

If the military campaign results in serious infrastructure damage and economic collapse, the social factor could become decisive in transforming the political system.

As a non-cleric, Larijani formally cannot assume the position of Supreme Leader. Nevertheless, following the death of the ayatollah, Iran’s future as a clerical regime no longer appears guaranteed. A transition toward a tougher and less predictable governance model is possible.

Global Reaction and Possible Consequences

The actions of the United Kingdom, France and Germany indicate readiness to support increased pressure on Tehran. Attacks on Persian Gulf states and energy infrastructure reinforce the perception of the conflict as a confrontation between Iran and the broader West.

Further escalation could lead to a large-scale war in the Middle East, a reshaping of the regional balance of power and the risk of Iran’s disintegration.

A scenario involving the formation of an Islamic coalition against Western states cannot be ruled out. This would automatically expand the geography of the conflict—from Iraq and Syria to Afghanistan, Pakistan and several African countries.

In such a case, risks would also rise for Azerbaijan—both in terms of border security and potential destabilization of the Caspian region.

Russia and China may seek to exploit the expansion of the conflict in an effort to weaken the collective West, particularly the United States.